This book recollects the thrilling story of the legendary Faqir of Ippi who spent his life fighting against the British rule in India. His movement is considered to be the last of many such movements wherein all anti-British forces (national and international) sought his support for their cause. His name rose to international fame because of his connections with the Congress, Khaksars, and Communist Party of India and with Germany, Afghanistan, Italy, and Russia during the World War II. His resilience against the British forces from 1936-47 classified him as their doughtiest enemy on the soil of India, engaging around 50,000 troops on the soil of Waziristan. The study shows how history seems to have repeated itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan during the past two decades and how parallels may be drawn between the patterns of engagement in the past and current conflict. The consecutive military operations by the Pak Army and the drone attacks by the US have only served to fortify the tribal resilience and the continued strife proves that only negotiated settlements can result in enduring PEACE.

Fazlur Rahman

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Fazlur Rahman

The Warrior Saint: Faqir of Ippi

Story of the last man treading on the British Empire's toes

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Glossary

a'lim	Literally, a learned man, generally used for a doctor of Islamic Law.
algad	River bed, generally dry.
Amir	Leader.
Badraga	A formal escort or guarantee of safe conduct to a stranger, emissary, or even enemy.
Baithak	A Hindi word meaning a drawing room or a hujra.
Bala	Upper.
balakhana	Balcony
Barampta	A raid to seize persons or property as indemnity for a wrong
Chalweshti	Refers to tribal fighting unit. From the number forty, chalwesht
chiga	Pursuit.
dar-ul-ulum	Abode of science - muslim theological seminary such as Deoband.
Faqir	An ascetic
fatwa	A ruling by a jurist on the legality or otherwise of an action.
Fiqh	Understanding, knowledge, intelligence - the technical term of the science of Islamic jurisprudence.
gaddi nasheen	A saintly seat holder.
gasht	A scout's patrol, generally of about 4 platoons strength.

Ghar	Hill.
Ghazi	A participant in jihad, a fighter in the cause of Islam, a hero in the way of Allah.
Hadith	The body of traditions - the record of the saying and doings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W).
Hakeem	Doctor practicing traditional muslim medicine.
hakim	A ruler, an executive officer.
Hamsaya	Literally one who shares shade; client, dependent.
hijrat	Migration from one place to another for the cause of Islam.
Hujra	A meeting and get-together place where the Pashtuns assemble and talk to each other.
Eid	A Muslim feast, day. There are two chief feasts - the `Eid-ul-Fitr' or day following the past month of Ramadan, and the Eid-ul-Izha which is the feast of sacrifice, in memory of Hazrat Ibrahim's would be sacrifice.
Imam	A leader, a person whose eminence is recognized in any field, a person who leads congregational prayers.
ippi	The village and the tribe of daurs situated on the main Bannu Miranshah Road where Mirzali Khan settled down for sometimes after leaving his native village.
jashan	Day of celebration; festivity.
jihad	Literally the utmost effort, a war in the cause of Islam.
Khalifa	A person holding authority from spiritual preceptor to train others.
Khanqah	Sufi monastery and teaching center; hospice. The

	arrangements of expenses are borne by the murids.
Khassadar	Un-uniformed tribal levy, armed with rifle.
khel	Lineage; clan or smaller sub-division of a tribe.
Kotwal	Chief police officer in the city or town under both the Mughals and the British.
lambardar	Village revenue official.
Langar	The arrangements of food to all those who visit the Sufi monastery.
Lashkar	Tribal armed force.
Malang	Half naked saint.
Marakka	Meeting for consultation, to make strategy for a problem.
Maulana	Literally, our lord, title applied to scholars of Islamic religious services.
maulvi	Title equal to maulana - also a diploma in Arabic studies.
Mianah	Middle.
mu'tabar	Influential in the society.
Mujahidin	A participant in jihad; a fighter of Islam.
mullah	Title equal to maulana/maulvi.
murid	A disciple of a Sufi.
Murshid	A spiritual teacher.
Murtad	One who reconvert from Islam.
Nika	Grandfather, ancestor.
nikat	Ancestral hereditament
payan	Lower

Pir	Literally an old man, a spiritual preceptor.
Powindah	Collective term applied to many nomad tribes
purdah nasheen	Literally veiled woman, house wife
Raj	Rule. Empire.
riasat	State.
sanga	Branch.
Sarishta	The customary tribal pecking order of importance of Maliks and sections.
Scouts	Para military organization consisting mainly of tribesmen. The scouts, not the regular army, are posted to the tribal areas.
shari'ah	The path to be followed - divinely revealed law of Islam governing both religious and secular matters - holy laws of Islam.
Sharmana	A kind of penalty which is an exponent of redressing this loss of good name.
Shukrana	Gratitude of grateful. It may be assumed that Shukrana what all priests expect "offerings."
Sufi	Muslim mystic - follower of mystical path.
Tabib	Doctor practicing traditional medicine.
u'lema	(Singular a'lim) learned men, scholars in religious sciences, theologians, religious teachers, jurists.
Zakat	A tax prescribed by Islam on property and capital of certain categories for benevolent purposes

Abbreviations

A.D.D.I.	Assistant Deputy Director Intelligence
A.D.I.	Assistant Director Intelligence
A.P.O.	Assistant Political Officer
Airgroup	Peshawar
B.O.	British officer
B.O.R.	British other ranks
C.I.D.	Central Intelligence Department
C.P.C.	Criminal Penal Code
D.D.I.	Deputy Director Intelligence
D.I.B.	Director Intelligence Bureau
Dycombannu	Deputy Commissioner Bannu
F&P Deptt.	Foreign & Political Department
Foreign	Delhi and Shimla
G.O.	Gurkha officer
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
G.O.R.	Gurkha other ranks
Genstaff	General Staff
I.O.	Indian officer
I.O.R	Indian other ranks
I.P.Code	Indian Penal Code
IOL&R	India Office Library & Records
IOR L/P&S	India Office Record Library/Personal & Secret
KAI	Khaisora
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Kohdist	Kohat District

KT	Kohat
L.T.I.	Left thumb impression
Lordist	Lahore District
MRE	Murree
NDC	National Documentation Centre, Islamabad
Northcom	Northern Command
Northwaz	North Waziristan
Norwef	North West Frontier (Peshawar)
NTY	Nathiagali
NWFP	North West Frontier Province (Now KP)
P.A.	Political Agent
P.N.T.	Political Naib Tehsildar
PCR	Parachinar
PE	Peshawar
Peshdist	Peshawar District
Pindist	Rawalpindi
Razcol	Razmak Column
RNI	Razani
R.O.D	Road Open Days
Southwaz	South Waziristan
Tocol	Tochi column
TRC	Tribal Research Cell, Peshawar
Wazcom	Waziristan commander
Wazirdist	Waziristan District
Wazirforce	Waziristan Force

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Introduction

A large number of studies have been published on the freedom movement, particularly how the Muslims parted ways with the Indian National Congress and instead rallied under the banner of the Muslim League and how in the end these two parties became the founders of two different sovereign states, India and Pakistan. Such studies still continue to appear but now the focus of scholarly interest, particularly in the West, has changed.

The general historiographical trend has been to undertake regional or local studies rather than studying the top leadership at the national level. Scholars have taken up the freedom movement from the limited perspective of a region or locality and have been endeavoured to relate their findings to the existing view of the struggle at the all India level between the nationalists and the British.

The current research is perhaps not in line with the general trend in the historiography of nationalism in the sub-continent. This work is intended as contribution to filling the gaps: first, the local or regional studies undertaken so far ignored the role of opinion leaders living in hilly areas of tribal belt; second the role of religion, Islam was either minimized or neglected on one pretext or the other.

The basic problem for analysis in this study is: Why and how Faqir of Ippi started movement when the whole tribal belt was calm? Was this an agitation against the court decision in Islam Bibi's case or a continuation of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed's Jihad movement? Can one

consider the Faqir's Pashtunistan movement the same as was initiated by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan? And above all why movements based on Islamic ideologies fail to accommodate with the changing circumstances and end tragically? These questions were the starting point of the investigations.

Tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa present a very special problem to the historian: it is a very sensitive subject in Pakistan. The country has from its birth been under more or less constant challenge of integration from within and without and its political history has been troubled, to put it very mildly. In this situation it has been felt to be a matter of national interest that the picture of Muslim nationalism and solidarity, which was projected to the masses during the freedom struggle, must not get tarnished. The freedom movement is perhaps the only manifestation of something which could be termed a national will.

Selection of the Period

The periods 1936-47 and 1947-60 were chosen because it constitutes a demarcated period in the religio-political movement of the Faqir. Islam Bibi case in 1936 provided an opportunity to the Faqir to leave secluded life, initiate resistance against the British Indian government and become an un-disputed leader of Waziristan, and 1947 was the obvious point at which the Faqir chose new option for his movement. The period 1947-60 was of crucial importance for the new born state Pakistan when she was facing Pashtunistan movement in KP.

The Present Research Position

The purpose of this dissertation is not to pursue a tempting sentimental exercise in reviving the exploits of the most fascinating guerilla leaders in a region, nor is it the intention to dwell on the parallel. However, the case of the Faqir could be of great interest to historians since it opens the back door to an amazing story of guerrilla activities against a major power.

The books which have discussed the Faqir's movement, Waziristan and the Faqir's illusionary state of Pashtunistan have given little attention to the peculiarity of his movement; his approach towards the national and inter-national events and their impact on the Faqir; his own interpretation of Pashtunistan and dis-regard of Pakistan have been ignored. Many of the works which exist on the Faqir and Waziristan are biased. So far as the Faqir's movement is concerned, hardly anything of value has been published on this topic. Only three publications are known to me, Fazlur-Rahim Marwat et al., Faqir of Ipi; S. Mazhar Ali Shah The Saint Warrior and Milan Hauner One Man against the Empire. The last one is very important article on the Faqir's movement. The author has gone through an enormous amount of material and presents an impressive mass of data, from which one can benefit significantly.

Milan Hauner's analysis is in part very similar to this work. The most important similarity is the way both regard the Faqir as a great guerilla leader in Waziristan. There are also significant differences between Milan Hauner and this work. The most important relate to the

fundamental role of religion in the Faqir's movement. Different answers are mainly due to a fundamental difference in our approaches.

Even though, in the modern age, religion has receded to the background in the exercise of foreign and domestic policy among Muslim nations, it remains an element of reckoning, a touchstone, and always capable of rapid, often revolutionary revival. In case of Waziristan, Islam was inextricably woven into the Pashtun's culture. It provided them with moral and metaphysical precepts to guide their lives, ideals to which they aspire, and holy men to revere.

The political patterns, which were established in Waziristan in the 30s and '40s have in large part survived with minor alteration the coming of independence and the tumultuous post-independence years. Moreover, people feel that the experiences of that period are still highly relevant. With changing conditions, the Faqir's followers may have altered their character and programme, but his heirs look upon and present themselves as continuation of his thought.

Although the events of those days and the myths that have grown up around them have mostly been taboo so far as print is concerned, they are still hotly debated by young and old and serve as source of inspiration, political motivation and not lease defamation. Faqir of Ippi, his late nephew Amir Niaz Ali Khan/ now grandsons and their followers are for example accused of being controversial, a charge which is debatable. This current day relevance of the topic has influenced the direction and the structure of the dissertation.

It must right away be stressed that the objective of this research is not to take side of the Faqir or to condemn him - beyond wishing a constructive role of the Faqir's heirs. It is hoped, however, that the work may help to place that part of discussion, which concerns the period (1936-60), on a somewhat more factual basis and to clean it from the politically motivated distortions which flourished against the Faqir.

This study is not so much a contribution to the general scholarly debate concerning the nature of Pashtunistan in Tribal areas. It has been endeavoured to place the Faqir and his movement in all India context of the period but, rather than relating the findings to any general comprehensive theories of Pashtunistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It has primarily been concerned with those aspects of the Pashtunistan experience which remain in one form or another, alive in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa . even today.

Every Pakistani tends to regard all freedom fighters as heroes and those who opposed them simply as villains. This idea of their hostility has also given them rather a peculiar view of their country's difficulties. The story does have its heroes as well as questionable characters and that their personalities and individual persuasions influenced the course of events. This work has therefore tried to shed some light on what considerations lay behind the actions of leading politicians at crucial points and has sometimes allowed the researcher value judgments of a kind which is perhaps otherwise not commonly encountered in scholarly works.

This was felt to be important because the debate in Pakistan today too often concerns only who was for Pakistan and who was against it, while the question of what they stood for beyond that is ignored. These over-simplified arguments obviously have political aims. They have led to a distortion of the history not only of the pre-independence period but also of the events arising out of those years. In this way people's political views have sometimes been clouded by distorted facts. A revision of this politically inspired historiography is long overdue.

The Book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter covers the basic information about the land of Waziristan and characteristics of the people. The second chapter is the summary of the British Policy in Waziristan (1846-47). It is impossible to analyze a movement without knowing the background. The third chapter relates to the personality of the Faqir, his early life and Islam Bibi case which provided him a sound religious ground for initiating a movement against the British. The fourth chapter relates to the armed resistance of the Faqir against the British. The study is restricted only to the period (1936-38). The fifth chapter relates to the crucial period (1939-47). In this chapter the role of Faqir of Ippi in the World War II and partition of India is discussed. The sixth chapter relates to Afghan's role in the Faqir's movement. The Afghans in their individual capacity could not ignore a major unrest in their neighborhood. In turn, when Afghanistan was directly threatened by the crusade of Shami Pir, the Faqir and Mullah Fazal Din persuaded the tribes not to help the Shami Pir. Again the role of Afghans in Pashtunistan movement is considerable. The

seventh and the last chapter relates to political developments in the sub-continent and the role of the Faqir. When Pakistan became inevitable, different interest groups contacted the Faqir to gain his favour. How far he succeeded in maintaining his own identity is discussed. Later developments in Pakistan provided him a chance to throw his weight in favour of Pakistan, but he failed to do so. This and his concept of Azad Pashtunistan discredited him in the eyes of general Muslims, but he insisted on his thoughts.

Sources

Published sources require little comment. By far the most important source for the reconstruction of the general course of events has been the reports, summaries and letters written by British government officials. Although there is often an anti-Faqir slant in them, these reports etc. were written with a view to give the government a factual background on which to base its actions and therefore had to be as accurate as possible. Having had access to a large amount of other material, it is hoped that the study is not unduly influenced by their anti-Faqir bias.

Unfortunately rather little material was found emanating from the Faqir's followers. The problem seems to have several explanations. Private houses had been raided by the Police in the settled areas and razed to ground in the tribal areas, government achieves have been split up and moved, and in the process much material has been lost. The remaining material became the prey of bureaucratic complications, as it belonged to the activities of a "traitor" Faqir of Ippi.

Moreover, the Faqir did not write much but communicated orally with his followers.

On the other hand, National Documentation Centre Islamabad and Tribal Research Cell, Peshawar have invaluable record, which provided great help in this study. As regards newspaper material, a representative selection was made. Fortunately a remarkable newspaper clipping of the leading N.W.F.P. newspapers and outside is available of the year 1937 about Waziristan in Tribal Research Cell, Peshawar.

The published sources have been complemented by some rare interviews. Since the Faqir led his whole life in an-inaccessible land of Waziristan and since the human memory is unreliable and selective, such oral evidences, given more than 39 years after the events it concerns, can be used with the utmost care. Generally speaking, these interviews were not used to reconstruct the sources. Instead they have been used to illustrate more general points which were made.

SKETCH MAP OF WAZIRISTAN



SKETCH MAP OF WAZIRISTANT ROAD SYSTEM



WAZIRISTAN
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

1

Between the Kurram river to the north and the Gomal river to the south lies Waziristan, an area of about 5,000 sq. miles of a barren and formidable tangle of hills.[1] It is divided into two Agencies, i.e. North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Each Agency is administered by a Political Agent.[2]

North Waziristan

It lies between 32° 45 and 33° 15 N. and 69° 30 and 70° 40 E; with an area of about 1817 sq.miles.[3] It is bordered on the north and the east by Districts of Kohat and Bannu, and on the south by the Shaktu stream, from the point where it enters the latter District to Shuidar and its head. From Shuidar the boundary follows the eastern watershed of the Shawal valley as far as Drenashtar Sar, and then runs north east-west along the Durand Line to Kohisar in the region of the Kabul Khel Wazirs and Biland Khel. The Agency thus comprises four large and fertile valleys; in the north to lower Kurram valley between the Kurram Agency on the upper reaches of that river and Bannu District; the Kaithu valley; Daur in the valley of Tochi, the most open and fertile of the four, the khaisora valley in the south. Between the Kaithu and Tochi lies the Sheratualla and, north of Miranshah, the Dande -- two barren plains each about 30 sq. Miles in area. Another plateau called Sperarogha, similar to Sheratulla but smaller, lies between the Kurram

and Kaithu. With these exceptions, the valleys are separated by high barren hills. The loftiest peak is Shuidar (11,000 feet), at the western end of the Khaisora valley.[4]

North Waziristan Agency has nine Tehsils or basic administrative units, namely Miranshah (or Miram Shah), Datta Khel, Dosali, Garyom, Mir Ali, Ghulam Khan, Razmak, Spinwam and Shewa. The last census showed the population of the Agency as 2, 50,663, out of which 1, 60,000 were counted as Wazirs and the rest Daurs and others.[5]

South Waziristan

It lies between 31° 55 N. and 69° 20 and 70° 15 E. with an area of about 2734 sq. Miles. It is bordered on the north by the range which terminates in the Ghalimighar and separates it from North Waziristan, while on the east, its boundary runs to south along a continuation of the Babaghar range to Jandola, where it rises to the Girni Sar and then descends to the valley of the Gomal River above Murtaza. On the south as far as Khajuri Kach in the Gomal valley it is separated from Shirani region by the hills south of the Gomal River, the highest of which is the famous Takht-e-Suleiman. West of Khajuri Kach the Gomal is the boundary between the Agency and the Baluchistan District of Zhob. On the west it extends to the Durand Line, the boundary line between Afghanistan and the then British Indian Government demarcated in 1893.

The agency includes all the area occupied by the Mahsud branch of

Wazirs, and, on the west, a portion of the area of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs. This division based on the traditional nikat (ancestral hereditament) was confirmed by the British as the basis for all tribal dealings whether in terms of loss or profit, reward or punishement.[6] The whole country is extremely mountainous and its main peaks are Shuidar (11,000 ft.), Janimela (8400), Pre-Ghal (11,600), Kundighar (8100), Grini Sar (5800), Dre Nashtar Narai (8750), Momin (10,800), and Sarwar Gul (10700). The last two lie in the Marwatai range which runs along the Afghan border. To the south-west the landscape changes into wide open plains. The chief plains are Zarmelan north-east of Domandi, Wana and Spin.[7]

The only river worth the name in South Waziristan is Gomal, with a depth of 2 to 20 feet and a width of 60 to 300 feet. Entering in Domandi in south-west corner of the agency, it follows almost due east along its southern border, receiving numerous tributaries, nearly all of which are on its left bank, but only one, Zhob of an importance is on its right. It then breaks through the Suleiman range and debouches on the Derajat plains near Murtaza. Other perennial streams are Tank Zam and its tributary Shahur, which drains the whole Mahsud area, and the Wana Toi, which rises at the head of the Dhana valley and falls into the Gomal at Toi Khulla. Others are mere terrants, dangerous after heavy rainfall, but almost dry at all seasons of the year.[8]

South Waziristan has eight Tehsils namely Sararogha, Ladha, Tiarzah, Wana, Birmal, Sarwakai, Toi Khola and Chalarai.[9] Wana, the

summer headquarters of the Political Agent, is situated in the Wana plain which is some thirty miles long and ten miles broad and the home of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. The winter headquarters of the Agency are at Tank, in Dera Ismail Khan District, which is mostly owned by the Mahsuds, who filled the vacuum left by Hindu migrants in 1947.[10]

The People

Wazirs

Wazirs are the most important and the biggest tribe in the tangle of mountains which runs south, for more than a hundred miles below the Kurram. In the earlier times scarcely known to the historians, in the last hundred years or so they have become famous as the doughtiest warriors of all the people of the Frontier.

They are all Karlanis and by Caroe's classification Pashtuns rather than Afghans.[11] Their Karlanis classification, and their hill fastness, suggest that they may represent the oldest and purist strain of any of the hill tribe.[12]

With the exception of Daurs of Daur valley, the people of North Waziristan all belong to Darwesh Khel branch of Wazirs, who are divided into two main sections, the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai. They are further subdivided into numerous clans.[13]

On the Pakistani side of the border, the Utmanzai are concentrated in North Waziristan and Ahmadzai generally live in South Waziristan.

The main centers of their population are Wana and Shakai. Some of the sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai live in the neighboring areas of Afghanistan, while others are scattered throughout the entire area of Wazirsitan.[14]

Daurs

Daurs constitute an important minor tribe of the Agency and are said to be the original inhabitants. They are settled in Daur valley, lying between 30° 50 and 33° N. and 69° 55 and 70° 25 E. The valley lies on the banks of river Tochi, extending from the point where the river leaves the Wazir hills to where it re-enters near Khajuri, about 15 miles from the western border of Bannu District. Thus the valley is entirely surrounded by the Wazir hills, the highest peak being Vezhda (7,700 ft.). Its length is 35 miles and its breadth averages 1½ miles, but it widens to 5 or 6 miles at its broadest. The protected area which extends to the crest of the hills nearest the river on both banks, measures about 700 sq. Miles. Like most Frontier valleys, it is divided into Lar or lower and bar or upper Daurs, the former occupying the largest area.[15]

They are a separate tribe from the Wazir for all practical purposes.[16] The lower Daur inhibit the Mir A'li Tehsil of North Waziristan. Prominent Daur hamlets in this area are Ippi, Haider Khel, Hassu Khel, Musakki, Hurmaz, Issori, Zerakki, Khaddi, Idak, Hakeem Khel and Mubarak Shahi.

The valley was politically independent up to 1892. When the British

demarcated their boundary with the Amir of Afghanistan in 1895, the Daur area came under the tutelage of the British empire.[17]

When the British demarcation commission was in Daur area, the Daurs and Wazirs dwelling on the Tochi valley petitioned on April 6, 1895 to assume control of the whole valley and protect them from occasional forays into their territory by the Mahsuds and Wazir tribesmen.[18] The British Government accepted their petition and summoned the whole upper and lower Daur Jirga on October 31, 1895.[19] The Jirga also requested that if Government took revenue from them, it should be fixed for all time.[20] Consequently the summary settlement of the Daur valley followed by regular settlement that took place in 1902.[21]

Daurs are more religious than Wazirs. Village Hassu Khel in the lower Daur area is a land of maulvis galore. Village Ippi in the lower Daur area is prominent because the late Faqir of Ippi (Haji Mirzali Khan) spent some part of his life in this village. His spell still pervades the Ippis.

Saidgi

Saidgi live in danday plain near Miranshah and have also settled in Zoi near Maizer in Datta Khel (North Waziristan). They claim to have direct lineage from the Holy Prophet (S.A.W). However, no written record, whatever, is available that could be of any help in tracing their origin. It is un-known why the British failed to jot a single word on the Saidgis, beside the fact that the Danday Saidgi holds a key to a

strategically important entrance route from Afghanistan to Miranshah. It is possible that in the past because of poor communication or lack of interest on the part of Afghan military expiditionists who did not use the Saidgi pass, failed to mention them. It is said that their fore-fathers had left Madina and came to Pishin in Baluchistan. Some of them settled in Ghazni, Urgun and Birmal in Afghanistan while others came to Danday area (North Waziristan) in the early eighteenth century. They are therefore, recent settlers in North Waziristan.

They are broadly divided into two distinct sections; Malka Khel and Jibo Khel. Malka Khel are again divided into Shodi Khel and Boder Khel. Jibo Khel is divided into Zakar Khel and Dirmoni, Shodi Khel and Boder Khel comprise Zoi and Dewagar Saidgi. The Zoi reside in Maizer area of Datta Khel Tehsil and Dirmonis live in Danday near Miranshah. Some of the Jibo Khel also inhabit Birmal.[22]

Mahsuds

Mahsuds are Wazir in origin, but now are considered as a separate tribe. They are surrounded on three sides by Darwesh Khel Wazirs with the forth, or eastern side being occupied by the Bhittanis. They are continually engaged in aggressive warfare against their Wazir cousins on one side and the Bhittanis on the other side.[23]

They too, like the Wazirs, have their local place of pilgrimage, the shrine of Mubarak, their great uncle, on the 9000 feet. Crest of the mountain of Kundi Ghar.[24] The tribe is divided into three branches; Bahlolzai, Alizai and Shaman Khel.[25]

> *They call themselves 'Dre-Mahsud', 'Dre-Mahsit,' in their own dialect. Three Mahsuds, because they are divided into three sections, each of which having several sub-sections.*

The most important sub-groups are the Shabi Khel, Manzai Khel, Nana Khel and Aimal Khel. The main centers of life and activities are Kaniguram, Ladha, and Makin. Mahsuds are compared to a wolf, and the Wazir to, a panther. Both are splendid creature; the panther is slier, sleeker and has more grace; and the wolf pack is more purposeful, more united and more dangerous.[26]

Bhittanis

Bhittanis are spread over a large area east of Waziristan from Marwat plain south to Gomal. Some are located in tribal territory, while others dwell in Dera Ismail Khan District.[27] This tribe claims descent from Baitan, the third son of Qais, in the male line before Bibi Mato came on the scene, and therefore akin to the Ghaljis.[28] They numbered about 43,000 and are divided into three branches, Tatta, Dhana and Wuraspoon (or Uraspoon). Tatta inhabit Jandola, Tehsil Tank and elsewhere. Dhana dwell in Gabar ghar and the surroundings of Bannu. While Wuraspoon (Uraspoon) live in Tank Tehsil and the surrounding hills.[29] They are hereditary enemies of the Mahsuds, although they have more than once foregone their age-long feud, and either joined, or aided and abetted their more rapacious neighbours in their raids on the British territory in the past.

In appearance the Bhittanis are not as rough as the Mahsuds, though in physique they closely resemble them. Their accent and dialect

resemble that of the Mahsuds.[30] They are referred to as "the jackals of the Wazirs."[31]

Ormurs

The tribe is mainly settled in South Waziristan. They are believed to be the aboriginal people of this area and have a pre-Islamic past. Besides Waziristan they are scattered throughout Pakistan. Some are living in the Logar province of Afghanistan, some in Daur area and in Ormurs (10 miles away to the south of Peshawar) comprising of three different villages namely Ormur Bala, Ormur Mianah and Ormur Payan. They have adopted the customs and traditions of those areas where they live. However, the Ormurs living in Kaniguram have their own traditions. Their language, called Ormuri or Burki derives from Sanskrit. They can also speak Pashto and have close contact with the Mahsuds.[32]

Kaniguram is famous historically as the place that gave birth to the Roshnia movement, during the Mughal era in the sixteenth century. Pir Roshan (saint of light) or his opponents called him Pir Tarik, (saint of darkness) is buried near Kaniguram. The housing pattern of Kaniguram is distinct from other typical tribal villages as these are placed together, indeed almost on one another, and the large village is dense and crowded. The daggers of Kaniguram are famous for their Craftsmanship.[33] Besides these tribes there are also Ghaljis and Dottanis etc. living in South Waziristan. But their number is very small.

The people of Waziristan reside in a very rough and inhospitable

territory. It is perhaps owing to the ruggedness of the terrain that these people have developed a unique tribal culture. They are above all individualists. They have no one to speak for them, since each man speaks for himself, no leaders since no man admits the superiority of another man and they all go on their own ways, in consequence. Nonetheless, there are important traditional and social factors which guide community life and in many cases influence or even determine the actions of individuals. Some of the prominent traditions which are common in Waziristan are:

PASHTUNWALI

It is a term broadly used for all those codes which are embodied in a Pashtun, like honour (nang), hospitality (melmastia), retaliation (badal), Begging or Pardon (Nanawati), Taunt (Paighore) etc. It is impossible to trace the origin of these traditions, but one can safely claim that these go back as far as Pashtun history goes. Some of the terms are hereby explained.

MELMASTIA

Melmastia or hospitality and protection are the greatest demand of pukhtunwali in Waziristan. Melmastia must be offered and protection provided to anyone who seeks it, invited or un-invited, Pashtun or otherwise, Muslim or unbeliever. It includes food, lodging, entertainment, protection often to a degree far beyond what the host can afford. Besides he is bound to protect hamsayas (persons sharing the same shade). They include others whose role is to help maintain the social structure and do the jobs which Pashtuns are incapable of

doing, either because they consider them below their dignity or because of their pre-occupation with the tribal affairs. It was because of the pukhtunwali that Dr. Theodore Pennell[34] worked in Bannu as a missionary doctor and physician. Mullah Karbogha[35] considered him as "the embodiment of heresies of an infidel Government" but Pennell used Pashtun customs to overcome his rivals in religion. He rode to the Mullah's village to speak to him in person, with the prime intention of forcing him to give him hospitality. Pennell knew that under the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali one of the most important strictures is melmastia. "The Pashtun", writes Andre Singer, "does not believe in melmastia merely as a form of politeness; it dictates a whole code of behaviour." A host once giving hospitality also becomes responsible for the safety and comfort of his guest. To harm, insult or cause inconvenience to his guest becomes a matter of shame and would do irreparable harm to his reputation. So when Pennell arrived at Mullah's village and found the Mullah away for a few hours, he felt relieved. He was offered hospitality by the Mullah's eldest son, which Pennell accepted at once. "Our reception as guest broke down their attitude of hospitality", writes Dr. Pennell," because this news spread all over the area." From then on, Pennell was able to develop a dialogue with the Mullah and further hostilities between the two ceased.[36]

Melmastia enjoins the obligation of protection as well as entertainment, although both obligations cease the moment the guest pass beyond the door-step of the host or the limits of his territorial responsibility. But if the guest is of a particular chieftain or clan,

protection may be extended as long as he is in the Pashtun community. In some areas guests are offered some symbols of protection e.g. a dagger and a garment or even badraga.

The British Government generally respected pukhtunwali, but it also led to difficulties for the Government.[37] Under the British principle of joint responsibility, the Government insisted that the tribes should refuse protection to and deliver up individuals, who had committed serious crimes in the settled Districts and had taken refuge in the hills. It is said that "for gold, they will do almost anything except betraying a guest,"[38] but Charles Chenevix Trench observes that "this saying is generally, but not always, proved true."[39]

BADAL

Pukhtunwali confers on Pashtun certain rights and requires of him certain duties. The most important of the duties is Badal, (vengeance). He must take vengeance, at any risk and at all cost for an insult or injury done to him, his family, clan or tribe. If he dies, then his inheritors take up his cause. This has given rise to the blood-feuds which dominate many inter-tribal relationships and has resulted in the wiping out of whole families or even tribes.[40]

The main causes of disputes are "zar, zan, zamin," (gold, women and land) with murders and reprisals, long after their origin is forgotten.[41] A Pashtun may wait years for his chance, but take it he must, sooner or later, or incur a life-long stigma. As Pashtuns say, "patience is bitter, but the fruit is sweet."[42]

NANAWATI

When a person realizes his being on the wrong in killing, injuring or insulting another person, he goes to the hujra, house or mosque of the aggrieved family and throws himself at his feet, confessing his fault and begs pardon of the person or family whose sense of honour, he had injured.[43]

To show his humility the man seeking nanawati appears before his foe bare-headed, with Qur'an on his head, and a tuft of grass in his mouth indicating that he is his protector's animals; he may bring a sheep as peace offering, or produce his wife unveiled. Nanawati sought with the Qur'an is never refused, but to seek it from the enemy is indelible disgrace.

Generally nanawati is never refused. The aggressor is asked either to pay an indemnity or part with a piece of land in favour of the aggrieved party. If a person accepts any material consideration in lieu of the pardon, it is looked upon by the general public as ungracious on his part.

At times, when the act is too gracious and serious, pardon is sought from the elders of the adjacent area. Those elders if agree, go there in the form of a Jirga. The members of the Jirga first get complete knowledge of the problem, then approach to its solution with dignity, honour and respect.

The aggrieved party may demand a piece of land or cash. In some

cases the aggrieved party demands to give his daughter or sister for ending hostilities. This is the worst type of indemnity demanded by the aggrieved party or by the Jirga itself, from the aggressor. The poor girls, generally called Swara give sacrifices for their fathers and brothers and thus become scape-goats.[44]

THE JIRGA

The Jirga is an assembly in which every man of the tribe might play an equal part.[45] "It is probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy" writes J.W. Spain, "that has existed since the original."[46] It is essentially a round-table conference, having no chairman or presiding officer. Everyone whose interest may be affected has a right to speak. It may meet under the shade of a solitary tree, by the side of a dusty road in Waziristan or on the spacious green lawn of Government House in Peshawar.

Jirga still exists in the tribal areas. Its instruments are the Maliks and elders, selected almost on the basis of age, shrewdness and reliability, sitting in conclave manner. In major matters such a conclave may represent a whole tribe, when lesser issues are at stake, it will represent a clan, or sub-section small or large. Representation is usually chosen on the spur of the movement. The un-written law is that the Jirga takes decisions which in the end overbear opposition and are accented as unanimous. Minority has the right to express its own opinions, but unless the argument or personality is strong enough to sway the Jirga, they are borne down by rude eloquence, by the personality of most persuasive or forceful,

and in the last resort by force or threat of force. The essential point is that everything takes place in the open and there is nothing like secret ballot.[47] It is an un-deniable fact that Jirga very rarely breaks up in fight. In view of the volatile nature and heavy armament of Pashtuns, this is truly a triumph of tradition over instinct.

A tribesman may not invariably obey the decisions of the Jirga, when his interest or his passions are too strong, but he will think twice before flagrantly defying it. The traditional penalty for defiance of a Jirga is the burning of the culprit's house. This is particularly effective, as the Pashtun's house is very literally his castle, being fortified with watch towers, thick walls and iron-studded gates. The owner's prestige and honour are intimately associated with this ability to protect it and in British times, large punitive expeditions or bombing aircraft were sometimes sent out with the sole object of destroying a rebellious Malik's house and thus discrediting him in the eyes of his clan.

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3. Sayed Mazhar Ali Shah, The Summing up. (Peshawar: 1981) p.9.
4. Imperial Gazetteer of India, North West Frontier Province (Lahore: 1991), pp.243-44.
5. Mazhar, op.cit, p.9.
6. Akbar S. Ahmad, Social and Economic Change in Tribal Areas (Karachi: 1977), p.36.
7. More generally known as Wano in the pre-1919 days but referred to throughout as Wana for simplicity. (Col. H.R.C. Pettigrew, op.cit, p.3).
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10. Ahmad, op.cit, p.36.
11. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (Karachi: 1985), p.392.
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18. See Appendix A.
19. File No.31/33 F.R.P. Letter No.569c Dated: 2/11/1895 D.I. Khan. H.A. Anderson to Chief Secretary Punjab. T.R.C., Peshawar.
20. See Appendix B.
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BRITISH POLICY IN WAZIRISTAN (1849-1947)

2

The date, the Punjab was conquered in 1849, the area now included in the North West Frontier Province formed part of the Province of the Punjab till 1901. Political control was exercised by the Punjab Government and its offices, subject to the general control of the Government of India.[1]

After the arrival of the British in 1849 till 1887 the British adopted the policy of non-interference towards the tribal areas. Their advanced posts remained stationary. They held Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan under their regular troops while established their advanced posts along the Waziristan foot-hills, and conducted occasional military expeditions into the tribal area, followed by withdrawal. From 1879 to 1881 the British Government instituted a blockade of the Mahsuds, which was not successful.[2]

In 1887 the question of Policy in relation to the tribal area being under consideration, the Government of India informed the Punjab Government that it appeared to them that: [3]

> *the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under*

> *control, and if possible to organize, for purpose of defence against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along with our North West Frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves.*

The emphasis at this moment was one of security, which meant the peace of the border and, in a wider sense, the defence of India. The peace of border required that the hills of Waziristan should provide neither a base for raids into the settled districts of Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and the Punjab nor a safe refuge for offenders from these settled districts. Regarding the strategic defence of India with which the British were concerned, was to secure at least the neutralization, and if possible the co-operation of the tribesmen in the time of war. Their nuisance value if they were against the British in the event of war reaching the North West Frontier was obvious. It was equally clear that the fewer were locked up on purely local problems, the better.[4]

From 1887 to 1898 Policy in the forward direction replaced the Policy of non-interference during the viceroy ship of Lansdowne and Elgin. This policy was also supported by Lord Roberts and along with other certain prominent civil administrators.[5]

In 1890 Sir Robert Sandeman whose Policy of Penetration and control through the tribes themselves had been very successful in Baluchistan, made his first attempt at the solution of the Waziristan Problem on similar lines by negotiations with the Mahsud and Wazir clans for the opening of the Gomal Pass.[6] But his arrangements failed

to provide positive results.

In 1893 the negotiations between Sir Mortimer Durand and the Amir of Afghanistan resulted in the drawing of the Durand Line, and the same time gave birth to various problems and difficulties. The line for the first time established the respective spheres of responsibility in the ill-controlled territory lying between British administered frontier and the area under full control of the Amir.[7]

Between 1893 and 1897 further departure from the policy of non-interference took place in Waziristan. At the request of their Wazir and Daur inhabitants, the British Government occupied the Wana plain and the Tochi Valley.[8] Elsewhere in the frontier the British had a little earlier, occupied the Samana heights in 1890-91 in the first instance. This occupation had placed the British in a position to effectively control any tribal rising in Orakzai territory; the Kurram Valley was taken over, at the request of the Turis, in 1892; and in 1895 the British decided to retain a garrison in Chitral[9].

In the light of the general tribal rising of 1897, which followed the British establishment at Wana, and the rising in the Tochi Valley in 1894-95 which rapidly spread from Tochi to Swat, the Mohmand area, the Orakzais and the Afridis, the question of Frontier Policy was exhaustively reviewed by the Government of India.[10]

Lord Curzon's Policy (1899)

In June 1899 the whole matter was further reviewed by Lord Curzon, with particular reference to the military occupation of Tochi and Wana. He urged that the reason for holding Tochi and Wana by regular troops had no longer existed. Time had clearly proved that it was not a feasible line of advancement for the regular troops into Afghanistan. He accepted, on the other hand, that British position in the Tochi along their forces at Wana gave them some control over the Mahsuds. Apart from that there was the political argument that as the Daurs and Wazirs had been taken over by the British and as the former were actually paying revenue, the British protection of them could not abruptly be withdrawn. Lord Curzon strongly urged the withdrawal of regular troops so far as possible to cantonments in rear, and the maintenance of frontier posts such as those in the Tochi and Wana, and in the Khyber and Kurram by militia.[11] Tribal leavies of any sort, he regarded as without value. He opined: [12]

> *It is of course inevitable that in the course of time the whole Waziri country up to the Durand line will come more and more under our control. No policy in the world can resist or greatly retard that consummation. My desire is to bring it about by gradual degrees and above all without the constant aid and presence of the British troops.*

Creation of N.W.F.P. In 1901

Consequent on Lord Curzon's memorandum the North and South Waziristan militia were formed in 1899 and they gradually replaced the

troops in the Tochi and Wana. Two years later in 1901, came a change of great importance affecting the political control, when the present North West Frontier Province was separated from the Punjab, and transferred together with the problem of its tribal areas, to the charge of a Chief Commissioner serving directly under the Government of India.[13]

In 1908 the Secretary of State refused assent to a proposal by the Government of India after the Zakka Khel expedition to occupy the Bazar valley permanently, and reaffirmed the policy of non-interference.[14]

The First World War and Waziristan

The tribals did not fail to turn the British pre-occupation with the Great War to advantage on various occasions during the war. The conclusion of the war quickly followed by the outbreak of the third Afghan war, from which the British emerged on terms much less satisfactory than she could have wished. The militia arrangements initiated by Lord Curzon in 1899, which held the field with great success for years broke down.[15] In 1919, the British concluded a not wholly satisfactory peace followed by a further in 1921, with Afghanistan. Between 1919-1922 the question of the future policy to be adopted in Waziristan became of great moment.[16] The outcome was the policy of 1922, which became the basis of the British policy later on.

Terms of The Policy Of 1922

The main terms of the policy were: [17]

a. The locations of strong forces in one or more central dominating positions in Waziristan.
b. The construction of a system of metalled roads connecting these positions with British India and with one another.
c. The disposition at nodal points along these roads of posts to be held by scouts irregular, all Pashtuns, but non-local forces with British Officers.
d. The employment of a large number of local tribesmen providing their own arms, as Khassadars.
e. The grant of increased allowances to recompense the tribes for the various responsibilities imposed on them and for the increased facilities required in their country, and to consolidate the position of the tribal Maliks.[18]

Details of the Policy

It was finally decided by the British that:

i. for the control of Waziristan a force of sixteen battalions of infantry, with complementary troops of other arms, located in the Waziristan Military District, was required. This force was in time to be reduced to twelve battalions.
ii. out of these a strong force of regular troops of all areas should be located at Razmak on the edge of Utmanzai Wazir area from there it could at any rate dominate Makin, one of the three

centres of tribal life in Waziristan. The other two centres were Kaniguram and Wana. The location of one brigade out of the remainder of the Waziristan Force in the area was left for subsequent decision.

iii. The system of metalled roads should in the first instance consist of roads:

a. from Bannu Via Idak and Miranshah to Datta Khel at the head of the Tochi Valley;
b. from a point on the Bannu Datta Khel roads between Idak and Miranshah to Razmak;
c. from Bannu to Tank Via the Bain Pass, and thence along the district border to Draban;
d. from Tank Via Manzai, Jandola and the Takki Zam Valley to Razmak;
e. from Jandola Via Shahur Valley and Sarwakai to Wana;
f. a final direct connection between Razmak and Wana Via Kaniguram was also considered desirable, but was not put in the initial scheme.

The construction of these roads was intended to enable columns from Razmak, Bannu and Manzai by the use of mechanical transport to reach various points in the country where trouble might threaten, and to carry relief to any scout post which might be beleaguered by a tribal Lashkar beyond the power of the scout themselves to deal with.

iv. The main function of the scouts was to maintain political control and to prevent raiding, and the effective discharge of their duties in normal times was held to be best fulfilled by constant and vigorous patrolling sufficient enough to over-come any raiding gangs likely to be encountered.[19]

v. As regards the Khassadars, the intention was that they should be the agency through which the tribes might be enabled to discharge the obligations they had undertaken and should develop into a sort of tribal police. In addition they should also be an agency for peaceful penetration and the extension of Government's influence in the remoter parts of the tribal territory.[20]

Beside the above steps the British Government initiated a series of agreements with the major tribes of Waziristan, e.g.

1. Turi Khel, Mamit Khel, Tatti Madda Khel, Hasan Khel, Madda Khel, Maliks and Mu'tabars signed a written agreement in consideration of allowances granted, in the presence of the then political agent on March 20, 1904 and concluded that:
   a. The British Government had the right to construct roads, and to establish check posts on these roads (Idak, Spinwam, Thal, Bannu- Spinwam).
   b. The Government could use all such roads for military purposes. (Thumb impression of 72 Maliks.)[21]
2. In 1908, in consideration of allowances granted, the Madda Khel

tribe executed a written agreement. The main points of the agreement were:

a. Guarantee of safety given to all passengers passing through the Tochi Valley and to Afghanistan.
b. Free hand given to Government to construct roads, check posts and stationing the military.
c. No shelter would be given to outlaws from British territory.
d. Surety of good conduct with the neighboring tribes of Afghanistan.
e. The whole tribe would observe good conduct and loyalty and render services to their best to Government (Thumb impression of 146 Maliks and Mu'tabars of the tribe.)[22]

3. In 1922, in return for a further and large increase of Madda Khel allowances and the grant of 128 Khassadars they renewed and re-affirmed that agreement and added the following undertaking: [23]

> *We shall be responsible that nobody from our tribe will commit any offence in Government territory and that no ill-disposed person or persons of whatever tribe will be allowed to live in our territory or to pass through our limits to commit any offence in Government territory.*
>
> (Thumb impressions of 160 Maliks and Mu'tabars)

Later on this agreement was extended to other tribes and on August 26, 1922 Mamirogha and Kanirogha of Manzar Khel in consideration of allowances granted, executed a written agreement.[24] The Tori Khel tribe also entered in the agreement with the British Government. The period of the agreement was fixed for 50 years w.e.f. April 1, 1923.[25]

The tribe of Dardoni Wuzzi Khel Mohmit Khel wrote an agreement in the presence of the then Political Agent North Waziristan Major C. Erskine with the British Government on September 6, 1925 at Razmak. The Manzai hill was given to the Government on ten years, lease, commencing from June 1, 1925. The area of Manza, about 411 acres was rented for ten years at an annual rental of Rupees two thousand and six hundred.[26]

In 1928, the asylum afforded to outlaws resulted in a blockade of Madda Khel. Later on the blockade was lifted and in 1929, they re-affirmed this agreement and made special mention of their undertaking to observe good conduct and loyalty to the Government.[27]

The task set by the British Government was to make the tribes control and take responsibility for their own tribesmen. The method was, on the one hand inducement like payment of allowance to the Maliks or tribal leaders, the employment of Khassadars, payment of direct rewards for specific services, freedom of access to British India, recruitment to the regular and civil forces, etc. and on the other fear of blockade, stoppage of recruitment and suspension or forfeiture of pay and allowances etc.[28]

The Howell Committee (1931)

In 1931, the question of policy on the frontier was referred for consideration to an expert committee under the chairmanship of the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Howell.[29]

The committee recommended that there should be no radical change or reversal in the tribal policy or no large scale extension of the policy of occupation initiated by force.[30] They added that Government should aim at the "peaceful penetration and civilization" of the tribes. So far as the policy in Waziristan was concerned, they concluded that no radical reversal of policy was possible.[31]

This policy of gradual penetration continued between 1931 and 1935. It was proposed to make one Crore Rupees available for development of the tribal area, this decision appears to have represented an attempt to further peaceful penetration, more particularly by making roads.[32]

This was followed in 1936 by the definition of the British policy in a written communication from the Secretary of State for foreign affairs to the Afghan Minister in London in the followings terms: [33]

> *The policy of the Government of India in regard to their tribal territory is to preserve the peace of the border, foster good relations with the tribes, and gradually to introduce standards of civilization and order into the tribal area together with the improvement of their economic conditions. Moreover, it is their policy to pursue these ends by peaceful means and an agreement with the tribes, and not to resort to do so in order to preserve the peace, and to repel attacks on British and protected areas, or British forces, or on friendly tribes.*

British Objective in Waziristan

The British objectives in Waziristan may be summarized as:

1. The control of tribal areas adjoining the settled Districts to an extent which would admit of British protection of the settled Districts and their inhabitants from tribal raids; to direct such policy which could bring the tribes unquestionably within the Indian orbit, and enable them eventually to take their place in the Indian federation.
2. The area lying between the administrative border and the Durand Line must not be used as a raiding base against Afghanistan.
3. The enabling of military pressure to be applied with greater expedition and effect when disturbances required, or likely to require, military operations,
4. The prevention of Afghan political influence from establishing itself in the tribal area on British side of the Durand Line and confining itself in that region.[34]

Analysis of the Objectives

I. The statistics of tribal raidings during 1910-1939 disclose that so far as the British objective of stopping the raids of the Districts was concerned, it was achieved to some extent during the period from 1923 to 1936. But there were some sound reasons for it, which were the economic benefit of Razmak and Wana,

the threat of withdrawal of the Khassadari allowances, greater mobility and effectiveness of the scouts, the military roads and the knowledge that behind the scouts there was the ultimate backing of troops. Once operations commenced, the very success of the tribes promoted a recrudescence of raids on the settled Districts for the time being, because in face of the superiority established by the troops and by the air, such raids along with the mining of road and the destruction of property, represented almost the only form of offensive action open against the tribes to take: [35] (see Table No.1 on last page).

II. The experience of the Frontier problem led to the first conclusion that it was inseparably bound up with the Empire's relations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan stood as a limiting factor to all that she did in the tribal belt. In the first place she could not go much faster in extending her control over her tribesmen than the Afghans could do.

The Yahya Khel dynasty remembered that its founder ascended the Kabul throne with the aid of tribesmen of Waziristan. It was impossible for any Afghan patriot to forget that in times past, and without doubt in times to come the tribal strength had forged and might again forge, a potent weapon in case of war with the Government of India. The tribesmen were therefore in Afghan eyes something of heroes and ogres in one. King maker and king breaker, as the spirit of the occasion moved them.[36] It is known that in the preface or his political testament, Nadir Shah set down the injunctions to maintain at all costs equilibrium in the tribal belt. For the year 1936 and onwards it was

difficult to gainsay the conclusion that the Afghan Policy was to permit the Government of India to exercise just enough control to save Kabul from tribal inroads. The result can be well seen in the history of the years 1936 and onwards. Faqir of Ippi had drawn inspiration and reinforcements in men, money and material from Afghan tribes, who in many actions had formed the main array of the British opponents in the field. He himself, when hard pressed, had more than once taken refuge in Afghan territory and communed with Afghan officials.[37]

Meanwhile Afghan Allowance holders in the case of Kabul Khel of Birmal and the Zilli Khel of Nikaband had appeared as Ippi's lieutenants among the tribes. They had murdered British officers and attacked British troops.[38] In another aspect, an adventurer, the Shami Pir set on the overthrow of the Kabul throne attached himself in the Mahsud tribes, emphasizing the cleft between one set and the other. In the Shami Pir's case the British allowance holders were speedily dismissed, but the suspicion and intrigue remained embittering the relations of the Governments. The existence of the Afghan Party, by turning tribal minds to Kabul, provided exactly the fuel on which such dissension fed.[39] Without removing this source of advantage, it was impossible to control the tribes of Waziristan.[40]

> *As a condition of its removal we must give the Afghans a clear guarantee, and enforce it that we would allow no threat from our tribal areas to endanger the Kabul throne. The cessation of allowances would compel every element in the frontier tribes to turn toward India.*

III. As far as the enhancement of the welfare of the tribes and the extension of `civilization' among them was concerned, British Government failed to do so. She put money into the area, but it contributed to more armament.

IV. The British claim in this regard was that:

> *had it not been for our occupation of Waziristan we should have been most awkwardly placed in 1930, given the very serious nature of the rising in the northern part of the province.*

Despite this she bore disastrously heavy expenditure in 1936-39, but for her occupation of Waziristan in pursuance of the 1922 policy, the Financial drain upon her would have been far more serious.[41] (see Table No. 2 and 3)

The British Government tried to rid herself of the system of Afghan allowance holders, and to induce the Afghan Government to implement fully their formal agreement as regards spheres of influence, and to refrain altogether from intrigue on her side of the line.[42] The imposition of 1922 policy and the occupation of Waziristan, was a severe blow to Afghan influence and to Afghan ambitions in that area. At the same time it was arguable that while she might had decreased active Afghan influence in this area. She might equally have stimulated their interest in it, since in the process of applying her own control to the degree to which she had been able to apply it. She had inevitably provoked tribal elements with Afghan connections to appeal for sympathy and for assistance to the rulers of Afghanistan

against her growing if gradual, penetration and against the increase of her influence.[43]

The Main Alternatives

1. Retreat from central Waziristan to the administrative border.
2. Effective occupation up to the Durnad Line.
3. Total or partial disarmament of the tribes either,
    i. Up to the Durand Line or
    ii. Up to some point falling short of that line.
4. The Baluchistan solution of control from within the tribal area, through tribal leaders.

Analysis of the Alternatives

1. It would represent a complete reversal of policy. From the tribal point of view it seemed clear that the results would not be confined to Waziristan but to other parts of the frontier as well.[44] Secondly, the political void left by such a retreat must inevitably be filled by the Afghans, who would increase their influence in the frontier, with the result that in due course the effective frontier would run along the administrative border. Thirdly it would initiate again raiding of settled areas.[45]

2. Effective military occupation up to the Durand Line had the attraction of many advantages which would accrue from complete occupation.[46] But the problem was that in such a case

it was impossible for the Afghan Government to stand aloof, or if it did stand aloof, how to survive whereas the Survival of Zahir Shah Government was essential for the British Government.[47] Major campaign to subjugate and to disarm the tribes up to Durand line at that stage would most seriously lead to a war with Afghanistan. Secondly, occupation must meant effective control up to the boundary. It would definitely require a major operation against the tribes, and it would involve the possibilities at all time of hostilities with an Afghan Government. Finally, occupation and disarmament meant effective protection of the area occupied and disarmed. The burden, involved whether financial or military was un-imaginable.[48]

3. Total disarmament was impractical without a major war with the tribes, and probability of serious hostilities with Afghans. Another vital problem would be of protecting the disarmed area and finally, the fact that if disarmed area tribes sided with an armed, and weakly controlled Afghan tribal belt it would involve her not merely in frontier raidings, but also in incidents which would not fail to assume an international character. The British Government considered partial disarmament in council in considerable detail in the summer of 1937. Linlithgo, the Viceroy concluded that:

> *We might disarm a small selected area such as Ahmadzai salient. But even in an area so limited as this, I am very doubtful, whether we should be able to prevent re-arming, while disarmament would have to be accompanied by effective administration and protection on our part.*

The disarmament of a larger area such as Waziristan with a hinterland stretching back into a country over which she had no control was task far heavier than she should be justified in undertaking. The Government in this regard, in concert with the Afghan Government, tried to establish control over sources of ammunition supply and in particular, on her side of the Durand Line, over the arms factories.[49]

4. The system operating in Baluchistan was the administrative and political capacity of Sir Robert Sandeman, who laid down this policy in 1879.[50] But there was a wide difference between Baluchistan and Waziristan. In the first place tribal conditions, and the social structure, differed so widely in Baluchistan and Waziristan as to constitute a substantial obstacle in the way of adopting the policy with latter area which had been so successful in the former.[51]

In Waziristan, the problem was one of negotiations, not through acknowledged leaders as with the tribal Jirgas in which the influence of individuals is bound to be limited. The final voice rests in effect with the whole body of the tribes.[52] As a result there was a greater difficulty in negotiations, a greater risk of the emergence of the "turbulent priest", and a greater risk that the settlement arrived at would not be honoured or that the intransigence of a small section or sections would delay its conclusion. In other words, the methods applicable to those areas which had come under a greater degree of feudal influence on the borders of N.W.F.P. and to the traditionally feudal

areas of Baluchistan could not be applied with confidence to the very democratic areas of Waziristan. Finally, Waziristan and the adjoining areas were part of an international problem to an extent that was not the case with Baluchistan. The whole Afghan position, which was of fundamental importance in any decision of policy had radically changed in those years. She was subject to the reserves, and within the limits prepared to co-operate with British Government and under her present rulers (Zahir Shah), she had now for some years back pursued on the whole a generally friendly policy.[53] Conditions differed in Waziristan from those in Baluchistan to a degree that made it impossible to even consider with any confidence to apply the policy here especially, at stage at which she found herself at that time.

Table 1. Raids committed by Tribesmen in the Districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.

Year	Bannu District	Dera Ismail Khan	Total
1910-11	15	5	20
1911-12	5	9	14
1912-13	7	12	19
1913-14	9	11	20
1914-15	12	36	48
1915-16	46	126	172
1916-17	37	74	111
1917-18	26	54	80
1918-19	21	27	48
1919-20	126	198	324
1920-21	149	84	233
1921-22	78	51	129
1922-23	24	49	73
1923-24	9	35	44
1924-25	3	22	25
1925-26	1	6	7
1926-27	1	3	4
1927-28	..	7	7
1928-29	..	1	1
1929-30	1	..	1
1930-31	..	4	4
1931-32	1	2	3
1932-33	1	2	3

Year	Bannu District	Dera Ismail Khan	Total
1933-34	..	1	1
1934-35	..	6	6
1935-36	1	12	13
1936-37	11	2	13
1937-38	34	23	57
1938-39	45	20	65
1-4-39-29-5-39	2	9	11

Source: *File No. Zero*

Subject: Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939, T.R.C., Home Deptt, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P. and Fazlur-Rahim et al., "Faqir of Ippi (A study in religious militancy", Pakistan 11 and 12 (spring and summer, 1985) p.145.

Table 2: Statement showing cost of Military Operations on the NW Frontier of India for the last 20 years.

Name of Operation	Year	Expenditure Rupees
N.W.F.P. 1916 -- (Operations against Mohmands, 1916. Operation on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.) Operation in Baluchistan. (Operation in Kalat, 1915-16, and Operations against Marris, 1918.)	1918-1919	1,56,86,185
N.W.F. 1916 -- (Operations against Mohmands, 1916. Operation on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.) N.W.F.P., 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defence of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)	1919-1920	23,87,44327
N.W.F., 1916 -- (Operations against Mohmands, 1916. Operations on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.) N.W.F.P., 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defence of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan,	1920-1921	19,16,26414

Name of Operation	Year	Expenditure Rupees
1919.) Wana Column (Advance to Wana, 1920). Occupation of Waziristan, 1920-21.		
N.W.F. 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defence of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.) Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)	1921-22	6,39,57,539
Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.) Razmak operations (occupations against Mahsuds, 1923.)	1922-1923	3,33,33,67
Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)	1923-1924	1,20,12,035
Saraogha Road Restoration Operation. (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1924-1925	2,72,784
Saraogha Road Restoration Operation. (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1925-1926 1926-1927 1927-1928 1928-1929 1929-1930	1,3 Negligible
Peshawar District Disturbances --- (Operations against Afridis: In Waziristan, in Kurram and in defence of Peshawar District against Mohmands and Bajauris. Khajuri Operations	1930-1931	89,8
Khajuri Operations. Khajuri Operations Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamozai, 1932.) Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.)	1931-1932 1932-1933	 7,2
Khajuri Operations. Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamozai, 1932.) Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.) Mohmand Bajaur Operations -- (Operations in Gandab against Mohmands and covering force to construction of Balambat Bridge, including cost of Gandab road.)	1933-1934	30,6
Mohmand Bajaur Operations (Operations in Gandab against Mohmands and covering force to construction of Balambat Bridge, including cost of Gandab Road.)	1934-1935	1,7

Name of Operation	Year	Expenditure Rupees
Mohmand Operations Loe Agra Operations	 1935-36	 42,1
Mohmand Operations Waziristan Operations	 1936-1937	 30,5
Waziristan Operations	1937-1938	1,58,1
Waziristan Operations (Preliminary Actuals.)	1938-1939	29,7
Waziristan Operations	April 1939	2,8

Source: *File No. Zero*
Subject: Memorandum by His Excellence the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939, T.R.C., Home Deptt, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P.

Table 3: Statement showing the actual expenditure incurred from 1920-21 to 1937-38 and the revised and budget estimate for 1937-38, 1938-39 and 1939-40, respectively for the Administration of the Agencies and tribal areas on North West Frontier (in Lacs.)

Year	Pol: Agent	Watch & Ward Trans: Frontier	Pol: Subsidies	Entertainment Charges	Allowances to Tribesmen	Work Exp:	Misc.	Total
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
1920-21	5.81	44.27	.61	3.61	5.15	…	2.83	Rs.62.28
9121-22	6.87	51.79	.12	4.37	7.97	…	1.65	Rs.72.77
1922-23	8.16	78.45 (A)	.16	3.89	8.19	…	1.63	Rs.100.48
1923-24	7.54	89.55	.12	2.69	7.78	NA	3.31	Rs.110.99
1924-25	7.25	92.04	.12	3.22	8.32	…	3.10	Rs.114.05
1925-26	7.49	98.28	.10	4.17	8.02	…	1.68	Rs.119.74
1926-27	7.91	96.97	.12	3.25	7.01	…	3.31	Rs.119.47
1927-28	8.00	94.51	.12	3.17	8.47	31.57	2.80	Rs.148.64
1928-29	9.03	93.37	.42	3.43	8.12	40.16	2.79	Ra.157.32
1929-30	9.00	94.64	.42	3.86	8.29	50.13	2.72	Rs.169.06
1930-31	16.62 (B)	101.14 (C)	.42	5.93	7.01	49.86	3.94	Rs.180.92
1931-32	10.37	92.95	.42	3.39	7.12	32.54	3.15	Rs.149.49
1932-33	9.03	90.42	.42	3.26	8.64	19.62	3.57	Rs.134.96
1933-34	9.39	93.28	.42	3.17	8.13	18.55	3.57	Rs.136.51
1934-35	9.60	89.58	.42	3.07	8.14	18.33	2.79	Rs.131.93
1935-36	10.55	86.70	.42	3.33	6.87	28.91	4.52a	Rs.141.03
1936-37	10.55	85.46	.42	3.17	7.64	27.40	4.14b	Rs.138.78
1937-38	13.10	94.29	.42	3.42	8.85	30.61	3.20c	Rs.153.89
1938-39	12.18	91.73	.57	3.31	8.39	22.80	3.36d	Rs.142.34
Revised 1939-40 Budget	11.02	88.84	.57	3.00	8.29	18.46	2.81	Rs.132.99

a. Includes Rs: .85 on account economic development
b. Includes Rs: 1.12 on account of economic development
c. Includes Rs: .44 on account of economic development
d. Includes Rs: .07 on account of economic development

Source: File No: 0
Subject: Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939, T.R.C, Home Department, Civil Secretariat, Peshawar NWFP.

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FAQIR OF IPPI - MYTH AND REALITY

3

The life of Faqir of Ippi is shrouded in mystery. It was somewhere between 1892 and 1901 that a boy was born to one Arsala Khan in a small village Kurta[1] near Khajuri post on the main Bannu Miranshah road.[2] He was named Mirzali Khan. The family belonged to the famous Bangal Khel clan of the Maddi Khel Haibati section of Turi Khel Wazir of North Waziristan Agency.[3] Arsala Khan and his father Ayaz Khan both were deeply religious. It was, therefore, but natural that young Mirzali Khan bore a conspicuous religious stamp on his personality.

Like other tribal Pashtun children, Mirzali Khan got his early education in Arabic, Persian and Pashto from his father and village Mullah. He was sent to Bannu at the age of eight. There he became the disciple of Maulvi Gul Khoidad in Nurar and Mandan.[4] He continued his religious studies in Karbogha, Kohat District, in Swat and finally in Charbagh, in the eastern province of Afghanistan.[5] After a couple of years, he came back to Tochi area and settled down in Daur area. He became disciple of Maulvi A'lam Khan Ippi Daur and Maulvi Manay Jan Daur, Hasso Khel.[6] The mind of Mirzali Khan was steeped in books of Psychology and Tibb, which he greatly fancied. He was about twelve years old when his father died.

Meanwhile following a dispute with his cousin Malik Lalai, Mirzali Khan and his brothers sold their property in Zakkar Khel village and shifted to Arghund in Spalga. There they purchased thirty Kanals and thirteen Marlas of cultivable land and built a house and a mosque in an area of three kanals. In addition they acquired a cave and some four kanals of land in Zindarga (Sham area). The three brothers lived for about four years, during which period Mirzali Khan frequently visited Ippi village for further religious instructions from Mullah A'lam Khan.[7] After the death of his mother, he shifted to the village Ippi in 1926, situated near Bannu Razmak Road about two miles south east of Mir Ali.[8] He took his residence in the house of Mst. Kamali, widow of one Razi Gul, a Daur of Ippi village. He became an Imam in the village mosque. Later the villagers constructed a hujra and a separate home for him. Impressed by the noble character of the Faqir, Qazi Hayatuddin Sherzad Bannuchi of Fathma Khel, famous as Qazi Sherzad and practicing Hakeem in Idar Khel gave him his daughter, Mst. Marwari in wedlock; in 1928.[9] Shortly afterwards he proceeded on Hajj.[10] After his return from Hajj, his reputation as a religious scholar and pious man spread all over the area. Students from various places started visiting him for education.

Contacts With Naqib Sahib Jalalabadi

Faqir of Ippi's thirst for knowledge could not be quenched in the traditional local centres of learning; he visited different places in search of a true teacher and guide. He had lived purely a religious life, frequently visiting shrines and centres of spiritual guidance in such

localities as Swat, Tirah and Karbogha (Qarbogha).[11] He went to Peshawar in 1934 and tried to enter Afghanistan via Torkhum to meet Sayyid Hassan Algilani alias Naqib Sahib Jalalabadi of Charbagh but failed to do so because he had no passport.[12] He was against photographs and it was impossible to get a passport without a photograph. Later he and his two other companions Faqir A'lam Jan Katawaz (Afghanistan) and Maulana Muhammad Khan Daur alias musakki faqir planned to enter Afghanistan via Khost. They travelled through Khost and reached Jalalabad. There they visited the Khanqah of Naqib Sahib and became his murid. Impressed by his piety and obedience the latter bestowed upon him his robe of lieutenancy. The company of Naqib Sahib recoupled Mirzali Khan his religious and temporal thoughts and he soon decided to go back to his native village, Ippi.[13]

After coming back, he started his own Langar and busied himself in prayers according to the guidance of his murshid. Here as a man of the priestly class, he devoted himself to religious work and used to pay annual visits to the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh. He gradually acquired the reputation as a saint and gained popularity amongst the Daurs partly owing to the fact that he did not accept alms to augment his substance though he had scant resources. There was, however, little in his behaviour to attract attention of the Government at this stage, and his influence was confined to the Daurs and the Turi Khel Wazirs. This was the time that he became known as Faqir of Ippi.

Mirzali Khan had three brothers. The eldest one was Maulana Sher

Zaman, who was at one time a teacher in the primary school at Idak (North Waziristan), which Mirzali Khan had attended. Later on due to Mirzali Khan's prompting Sherzaman resigned from his post.[14] His third brother was Mullah Mirzaman and the fourth was Gulzali Khan. All of them except Gulzali Khan were issueless. Gulzali Khan had only one child, Niaz Ali Khan. He is still alive and is the Gaddi nasheen of Mirzali Khan.[15] Faqir of Ippi led a simple life. He wore simple clothes and ate simple food. He used to take single meal daily and often kept fast. He slept very little and was always busy in prayers, especially at night. He did not have much to care for his livelihood as he had inherited some landed property from his father which sufficed him and his wife. When the Britishers confiscated his irrigated land, he started practicing medicine and giving amulets to the sick and needy people which provided him some income to keep his body and soul together. He did not spend a single penny from the public for his personal needs; rather he spent his own money on public. His Langar at Ippi and Gurvekht supplied food for all.

The Faqir was against the traditional musical concerts held at the time of marriages in North Waziristan. He was always gloomy, engrossed in thoughts and never laughed. His greatest pleasure showed itself in the form of a smile which played on his lips and that too was a rare phenomenon.[16]

Prior to 1924, he was comparatively unknown but after that his influence began to increase gradually. He was the most important divine of North Waziristan to accompany the Wazir Lashkar to

Moghalgai, Khost, during the Khost disturbances of 1933.[17]

Miraculous Powers

Although his reputation of saintliness among the people of those areas gradually spread, however he became more known when he challenged the British in 1936. The great loss of the British military might in the first encounter was attributed by the Wazirs as manifestation of the Faqir's miraculous power. The fame of his miraculous power spread quickly. He attracted a large number of followers who brought food and money, which helped to some extent to keep his Lashkar in the field. The tribesmen flocked under the Faqir's banners believing genuinely in his divine power. Even the Indian Intelligence considered it important to analyse their credibility and superstition as an important factor. Some of the miraculous powers commonly attributed to the Faqir were: [18]

> *His followers had only to cut branches of trees and he would turn the sticks into rifles. Firearms would not harm his followers, provided they were true ghazis. The ghazis would be helped by divine power, and the troops would be assailed by showers of stones and sand from the skies. A few loaves in a basket, covered by a cloth, would suffice to feed a multitude. Any person who betrayed the Lashkars would be visited with everlasting disgrace and shame. Gas, if loosed by the troops, would be dissipated by divine breezes. The faces of the martyrs would shine whilst those of the infidels would be distorted and ugly. Divine power turn bombs dropped from aircraft into paper.*

Fantastic though the stories may appear, still they were widely

credited in tribal areas. These stories became an important topic and are still narrated in the tribal areas.

During the time of unrest, a number of supporters of the Faqir acted and behaved and behaved emotionally. Some of them were in search of loot and adventure. Other interested elements joined him for their ulterior motives. However, majority of those who flocked to Faqir of Ippi did so in a genuine belief in his miraculous powers and his claims to divine support.[19]

Factors Responsible For The Faqir's Movement

It is difficult to speak in general terms about all those factors and motives which mobilized and inspired tribes of Waziristan and brought them face to face with the British government. It is noteworthy that in all the revolts religion played a pivotal role. Andre Singer writes: [20]

> *In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the presence of the Sikhs and the British on the Frontier, irrespective of whether its approach had been repressive or enlightened, was by its very non-Islamic nature an affront to the religious belief.*

In March 1936, a case came up for trial in Bannu which concerned, according to official record, the alleged abduction and conversion to Islam of a minor Hindu girl. The case, which became well known as the "Islam Bibi case", aroused considerable excitement of a communal nature, in Bannu and Tochi Valley. They joined the movement at the appeal of Faqir of Ippi. It is probable that the Faqir was influenced by his connections in Bannu itself. The case of Islam

Bibi was his long awaited opportunity to demonstrate his inherent qualities of leadership.[21]

He received active support in all his affairs from certain Turi Khels particularly the younger elements who already had supposed grievances against the Government concerning the distribution of allowances and Khassadari, granted during the construction of a road in the Khaisora Valley.[22]

In the early autumn of 1936 Faqir of Ippi openly assumed the role of a champion of Islam. One can easily find this role in his own letter: [23]

In the Name of Allah
The Farman of Haji Mirzali Khan

> *My Salam may reach to all the faithful Mussalmans, and may God the merciful save the faithful Mussalmans from the devilry of Satan. The doomsday is near and the time has come when the Muslims and Kefirs (non-believers) are differentiated. Those who profess Islam should come out into the battle field to help Islam. If Mussalmans abstain from helping the British, so much the better for them, otherwise when the war starts, the repentance of the supporters of the British with religion will not be accepted. It is the decree of the religious U'lema of Waziristan. You may choose between Kufr and Islam, in the doomsday we shall not be answerable for you.*

Faqir of Ippi did not confine himself to the question of the girl and the demand that she should be handed over to the Muslim custody. He also alleged government interference in religious matters and demanded the restoration to the Muslims the Shaheedganj mosque in

Lahore, a problem some two years old.[24] The Eastern Times Lahore introduced Faqir of Ippi in its edition on December 28, 1936 as;[25]

Faqir of Ippi's Identity
British subject who is preaching holy war.

Shaheed Ganj Case Echo

> *Mirza Ali Khan is the real name of the Faqir of Ippi who has made a hijrat from his native village in British territory and settled in the territory of azad (independent) tribes in the N.W. Frontier. He is 35 years old and accept no donation form his followers. He is preaching Jihad on the ground that the judgment of Shaheedganj mosque and Islam Bibi are in his opinion mudakhelat fid-deen (interference in religion) and Islam is not safe in India. This is the real cause of the trouble in Khaisora valley (Waziristan).*

In addition he voiced other grievances, concerning postmortem examinations, imposition of certain taxes, imposition of fine on the Daurs and heavy punishment imposed on the people of Bannu, the prohibition of marriages of boys and girls below the age of fifteen, marriage fees and the British occupation of Khaisora valley etc. By championing the local grievances he was able to get the support of the sections that otherwise were not attracted by the cry of "Islam is in danger", a slogan which acted a fuel to the movement.[26]

There were many more factors and motives on national and international scene which provided a solid footing to the movement, e.g.

- The political confrontation between the British Government and the Indian political parties; their effects

on Waziristan.

- The British policies towards Waziristan and the tribe's reaction.
- The Great political game between British and Russian Government and its effects on Waziristan.
- Wazirs were considered as "The king makers and king breaker" in Afghanistan's affairs; vested interests of Afghanistan in Waziristan.
- The Second World War and the manipulations of Germany, Italy and Turkey to engage maximum numbers of British Army in Tribal areas.
- King Amanullah Khan's struggle to regain the Afghan throne; the visit of Sa'di Algilani to Waziristan in this connection.

All these and many other factors projected Faqir of Ippi as an international figure and he gained widespread fame and sympathy. Here we are highlighting the two basic issues on which the footings of the movement started.

Shaheed Ganj Mosque Case

In the Lunda bazaar of Lahore a mosque had been constructed in the days of Shah Jahan by the Mughal Kotwal Abdullah Khan. When the Sikhs came to power in the Punjab they occupied this building like many other buildings.[27] It remained in their possession for about 170 years.[28] The Muslims of India had gone to the courts once in 1922 and again in 1929-30 for the restoration of the mosque but it had not borne any fruits.[29] In June 1935, bands of Sikhs from all parts of the province began to pour into Lahore and the rumour spread that they wanted to demolish the Shaheedganj mosque.

A deputation of Muslim leaders met the Governor, Sir Herbert Emerson, and asked him to place the mosque under the custody of the Archeological Department. They requested to impose Section 144 so as to prevent demolition of the mosque. The Governor put off the matter. The Muslim leaders met the Sikh leaders who assured them that no damage would be done to the mosque until the Muslim's proposal had been fully considered by the Gurdwara Committee. While the negotiations were going on the Sikhs suddenly began to pull down the mosque on the night of July 4, 1935 under the protection of the Police and armed soldiers who had been posted to prevent the Muslims from checking the Sikh vandalism.[30]

Deeply stirred by the sacrilege, the Muslims, without any prior planning, proceeded towards the mosque and were repeatedly fired upon, many of them being killed. The Muslim leaders, headed by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, were thrown behind the bars. Quaid-e-Azam visited Lahore on Feb 20, 1936 to help the Muslims find an honourable solution of the dispute. Unfortunately the Sikhs did not show willingness to reach an amicable settlement and the stalemate continued. The mosque still exists as a protected monument.[31]

Islam Bibi's Episode

In 1936, one Ram Kaur, the only daughter of Mewa Ram Gulati, a Hindu Zamindar of Jandu Khel District Bannu was living with her mother Mansa Devi and paternal uncle, Harnam Das. She was about six months old when her father was killed by an outlaw in 1920.[32] She

fell in love with Amir Noor Ali Shah S/o Amir Zada Shah, a young Sayyid of Jandu Khel. On the night of March 5, 1936 she eloped with him. Her mother alleged that she was taken by force. She also claimed that some valuables amounting to Rs.980/- in the shape of clothes, cash and ornaments were also carried away with her.

Mansa Devi along with her relatives went to make a report to Domel Police Station regarding the abduction of Ram Kaur. Since Mansa Devi gave the age of her daughter as 18 years, the case was not regarded as cognisable by the Police and so no action was taken. Later on they obtained a birth certificate from the office of the Civil Surgeon, Dr. Sher Bahadur on March 8, 1936. According to this certificate her date of birth was October 27, 1930 which meant that she would obtain the age of 16 on October 27, 1936.[34]

Meanwhile a complaint was made by Mansa Devi on March 9, 1936 to the Deputy Commissioner, which mentioned that her daughter had been kidnapped by Amir Noor, Amir Abdullah Shah (elder brother of Amir Noor) and Amir Khan alias Makhar. A case may be registered under Section 363,368,379 and 411 I.P. code. The complaint could not be presented on that date because it was court holiday.[35] Later on Mansa Devi along with her relatives gathered in the baithak of Harnam Das in Bannu City on March 11, 1936 in the hope that a compromise would be struck with the accused. Mir Abdullah Shah came to the baithak and promised the return of the girl. Mir Hamza, Head-Master, lower middle school of Jandu Khel was asked by Mir Abdullah Shah to arbitrate the dispute. A bond was written on behalf

of Mansa Devi and this was witnessed by Amir Khan Lambardar of Fathma Khel and Sardar Shah of Kotka Masti Khan Kalla Khel. At the same time on March 11, 1936 an endorsement was made on the complaint which had been written on March 9, 1936 that Mansa Devi would not charge any one for the abduction of her daughter Ram Kaur. These two deeds were handed over to Mir Hamza in order that they should be handed over to Mir Abdullah Shah when Ram Kaur was handed back to her mother.[36] On March 11, 1936 the girl was not returned through Mir Hamza. On the morning of March 12, 1936 Amir Abdullah Shah came to Mir Hamza and informed him that the girl could not be produced till the following day; at the same time he informed Mir Hamza that they would have to make a report at the City Police Station that the girl had been found in the bazaar and that she had been taken home.[37] Accordingly on March 12, 1936 a report was made by Mansa Devi at the City Police Station. Amir Abdullah Shah said that he would go back to the school to obtain leave for absence in order that he might arrange to go with Mir Hamza and return the girl. He did not, however, return and disappeared. Mir Hamza accordingly went to Harnam Das on March 12, 1936 and returned the deeds which had been in his custody saying that he had been tricked by Mir Abdullah Shah who had absconded without restoring the girl.[38]

The complainants were unable to find the City Inspector on that day but on March 13, 1936 Mansa Devi made a third report at the City Police Station that Amir Abdullah Shah, Amir Noor Ali Shah and Makhar had abducted her daughter as already reported and that they had been tricked by Amir Abdullah Shah, who had cheated them into

believing that he had restored the girl to them.[39] The City Police registered the case under Section 363 I.P. Code and obtained the deeds with certificate and the reports already referred to and took up the investigation of the case. Amir Abdullah Shah's house was searched on March 13, 1936 but no trace of the girl was found there.[40]

During the investigation of the case, the Police came to know that the girl was being taken in a car bearing Plate No. F.R.4049 to Tank onwards to the Mahsud area. Accordingly on March 24, 1936 a car was stopped at Ghoriwala Police Station and the police found two women, four males and one child besides the driver. They were detained till the arrival of the City Police and Mansa Devi. Later on they were identified as:

1. Mst. Jamala, step mother of Amir Noor Ali Shah.
2. Ram Kaur, now Bibi Marjana as her Islamic name.
3. Qamar Ali Shah, minor brother of Amir Noor Ali Shah.
4. Halim Khan, Paternal uncle of Amir Noor.
5. Amir Noor Ali Shah, Central figure of the case.
6. Manohar Lal, Gurmukh Singh and Kartar Singh, the remaining occupants of the seats who were ordinary passengers and had no connection with this case.[41]

Gurmukh Singh, the driver of the car stated that on the morning Halim Khan came and negotiated for the conveyance of four persons, two woman and two men, from Bannu and Tank for Rs.8/-. Kartar Singh and Manohar Lal came up and arranged to take them both to Bain for Rs.2/- Later Amir Noor Ali Shah came and sat in the car; they left

about 2.00. P.M. By turning to Bazar Ahmad Khan, two miles outside Bannu City, Amir Noor Ali Shah and Halim Khan stopped the car saying that the women would board the car at this place. About 20 minutes later these two women and Mir Abdullah Shah came up. Mir Abdullah Shah went back.[42]

All the boarders were identified by Mansa Devi on the spot. Indian and Afghani coins were also recovered from them.[43] Amir Noor Ali Shah claimed that Ram Kaur alias Bibi Marjana had come to him of her own free will, she had adopted Islam and he had married her. He was taking her to the Ziarat of Bahaud Din Zakaria in Multan.[44]

All the accused were first proceeded in the Court of Assistant Commissioner, I.D. Scott, I.C.S., on March 26, 1936. Meanwhile Amir Noor Ali Shah filed a written application in the Court of Assistant Commissioner and requested that: [45]

- Ram Kaur has willingly embraced Islam and she is named Bibi Marjana. She has given a written statement to the Police Station in which she has clearly stated that she has embraced Islam of her own accord without any coercion or undue influence. As she refused to go with her mother, she was detained in Jail.
- Yesterday (i.e. March 25, 1936) an interview with the said Bibi Marjana was permitted to her uncle Harnam Das and her mother along with some orthodox Hindu influentials of Bannu City. This interview was against the wishes of Bibi Marjana and was a sort of pressure upon her so as to reconvert her to Hinduism. A similar attempt is being made today.

- All contacts with her by her close relatives or other influential Hindus may very kindly be stopped. Her detention in jail is illegal as she is not an accused person. She may therefore be made to sit in the house of some responsible Muslims in Bannu City till her statement is recorded by some Magistrate and, which should kindly be recorded without any further delay.

The Assistant Commissioner Bannu wrote comments on this application as:[46]

> *Mst. Ram Kaur is in jail at her own request ... She has stated before me that she is afraid she will be murdered. In these circumstances it is desirable to prevent any breach of peace, and the police has in my opinion acted correctly under Section 148 c.p.c. in keeping her in jail, with no other satisfactory place for her to live in. This case has communal aspect and every effort should be taken to prevent any possible breach of peace.*

Bibi Marjana's case became famous in both Muslim and Hindu Community all over the area. She became Islam Bibi (the name shows the enthusiasm of the Muslim community.[47] The influential Muslims formally requested the Deputy Commissioner Bannu to transfer the case from Assistant Commissioner to any other Magistrate, so he transferred the case to the Court of the District Magistrate Mr. Cobb on April 7, 1936.[48]

Judicial Procedure of the Case

Amir Noor Ali Shah's case started in the District Court on April 7, 1936

and continued till May 25, 1936. The District Magistrate concluded that Ram Kaur alias Islam Bibi was a minor girl of 15 years 4 months and 8 days on March 5, 1936 the date on which she was kidnapped from the custody of her mother.

> *There is evidence of the minor girl that she went of her own free will being in love with Amir Noor ... The question of minor's attitude however, is immaterial to the charge under Section 363 I.P. Code. If the minor was kidnapped without the consent of her lawful guardian ... I find him to be guilty of the charges and I convict him accordingly under the Section 363 I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years.*

He was also sentenced on account of his presence in the car when she was found at the Ghoriwala Police Station on March 24, 1936 and the evidence proved that the girl was being taken to Wana.[49] She had also been kept in concealment between March 5, 1936 the day on which she was kidnapped and March 24, 1936. No evidence of her whereabouts during interim period had been proved. He added that: [50]

> *I am therefore of the opinion that the charge under Section 268 I.P.C. has been proved and I find him to be guilty and I convict him accordingly of this charge and order that he undergo imprisonment for a period of 2 years. The two charges are to run concurrently.*

Amir Khan alias Makhar was also sentenced on the basis of his assisting Amir Noor in kidnapping Ram Kaur under Section 363 I.P.C. for a period of 2 years.[51] Mst. Jamala was accused of assisting in the whole case. She was charged under Session 363 I.P.C. The Magistrate wrote in his order: [52]

> *Such Purdah Nasheen women are under the influence of their men-folk and I am of the opinion that her responsibility in the matter is not as great as that of the other accused. I, therefore, sentence her to pay a fine of Rs.50/-.*

Mir Abdullah Shah (the elder brother of Mir Noor Ali Shah) was charged under Section 368 I.P.C. He was alleged to have concealed the girl, and to bring to the place from where they were picked up by the motor-car; he was fully conversant with the whole facts of the case. He was convicted of the charge and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years. He was also charged with inducing Mansa Devi to execute a deed dated March 11, 1936 that the girl had been found and restored to Mansa Devi and that she would not pursue the criminal proceedings. At the same time a fraudulent endorsement was made in the same hand-writing. The object of these proceedings were to induce Mansa Devi to withdraw the complaint on the understanding that the girl had been restored while actually the girl was not restored and at the due time he absconded. He was also present when the girl was seated in the car. He also hoped to take possession of the deed and the complainant to prevent proceeding being subsequently taken against his family. The District Magistrate wrote in his decision that: [53]

> *His mala fides has been conclusively established and I have no hesitation in convicting him of the charges under Section 420 I.P.C. He is accordingly sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of 2 years, the sentence to run with that Section 368 I.P.C.*

Halim Khan was charged under Section 368 I.P.C. He was accused

that he was closely associated with Amir Noor, as he was referred to as Mamu (Maternal uncle) by them; he had made arrangements with the driver of the car for taking the party from Bannu to Tank on March 24, 1936 he had paid Rs.8/- for the four seats; he was later on arrested on the same day in the same car with the accused at the Ghoriwala Police Station; he was dealing as an agent to shift the girl to the tribal area. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year.[54]

All the accused were shifted to Bannu Jail and warded "C" class on May 25, 1936. Later on they were shifted to Dera Ismail Khan Jail on May 27, 1936 and at last to Haripur jail on June 7, 1936.[55]

Appeal in Session Court

All the accused appealed in the Court of Captain H.D. Rushton, Session Judge Derajat. The defence council raised the following points in the Session Court that:

i. the age of Ram Kaur was above 16 years;
ii. having embraced Islam she was not under the guardianship of her mother at the time of the occurrence;
iii. she voluntarily came to the accused and there was no taking her but within the meaning of Section, 361 I.P.C.;
iv. an offence under Section 363 is not a continuing offence and therefore none of the accused can be convicted under Section 368 I.P.C.
v. the charge under Section 420 I.P.C. against Mir Abdullah

Shah is neither proved on merits nor can it technically hold good;

vi. the charge against him under Section 368 has not been proved, and;

vii. Mir Noor cannot be convicted both under Section 363 and 368 I.P.C.

After thoroughly examining the case the Session Judge concluded that: [57]

> *Amir Noor Ali Shah is rightly convicted under Section 363 I.P.C.... He however, could not be convicted at the same time for the offence under Section 368 I.P.C. as he cannot be said to be person who willingly conceals another whom he has reason to believe to have been abducted. The Public Prosecutor concerns that the conviction under Section 368 I.P.C. cannot be maintained. Amir Noor Ali Shah is hereby acquitted of that charge.*

The sentence awarded to Amir Abdullah Shah by the District Court was maintained by the Session Court.[58]

About Amir Khan alias Makhar the Judge wrote in his decision[59]

> *If the girl went with Amir Noor Ali Shah of her own free will, there is no question of her having been forcibly carried away, there being no other evidence against him, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and is hereby acquitted.*

The sentence of Halim was minimized from one year to six months. While the case of Mst. Jamala was referred to the Court of Judicial Commissioner with the recommendations that the opinion of the trial Magistrate be set aside and a sentence be passed on her according to law.[60] The remaining petitions were rejected on June 24, 1936.

Appeal in the Court of Judicial Commissioner

The Judicial Commissioner Mr. L. Middleton decided the case on July 22, 1936. He wrote in his decision: [61]

> *I have examined the records and am satisfied that in the circumstances of the case the punishment awarded by the District Magistrate was equitable, although illegal. I hereby sentence Mst. Jamala to imprisonment till the rising of the Court in addition to the fine imposed upon her by the District Magistrate. She will remain under Surveillance in the Court precincts.*

The remaining petitions were rejected.

Islam Bibi was handed over to her mother

When Islam Bibi was recovered from Amir Noor Ali Shah, she was sent to jail. Later on she refused to go with her mother and used derogatory words against the Hinduism in the Court of Assistant Commissioner I.D. Scott. She was sent to jail for six months and fined Rs.200/- for using derogatory language against Hinduism and contempt of Court.[62] The Superintendent jail was Lala Jodha Ram. Amir Noor and the Muslim Community were fearful about his

prejudice. He was alleged to have permitted some orthodox Hindu influential to persuade Islam Bibi to change her new religion. They continuously wrote complaints against such activities. They requested the Deputy Commissioner Bannu to release her from jail and to arrange her residence with any respectable Muslim family.[63]

She was first of all handed over to her Sikh relative Dr.Samandar Shah[64], then a Christian lady Doctor Mrs. Bejumen was specially deputed by the authorities to attend her and keep watch over her, presumably with a view to keep her away from the influences of both the Communities.[65] Later on she was handed over to Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan, Shah Buzurg Khel.[66]

When the Judicial Commissioner rejected the appeals of Amir Noor and others on July 22, 1936, Mansa Devi applied for the restoration of her daughter. Islam Bibi was handed over to her mother on September 27, 1936.[67] Commenting on the Judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Khan Habibullah Khan, Ex-Deputy President of the Frontier Legislative Council, Bannu wrote[68]:

> *At the time of her elopement Islam Bibi was a few months less than 16 years and at the time of execution of the order passed by the Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner, she was nearly sixteen. Thus it would be seen that though for the purpose of the case under the Guardian and Ward Act, which came up in appeal before the Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner, yet for the purpose of embracing Islam and contracting valid marriage with a Muslim, she was quite major, according to the Civil Law in force in the Land.*

According to Norval Mitchell, the rights and wrongs of the case were not fully established but the Hindu Community in general and her relatives in particular were incensed over the loss of Rs.20, 000/- which was the girl's personal property.[69] Islam Bibi was restored to her mother through the Deputy Commissioner. He was afraid to take them out during the day light. Hence at midnight, accompanied by an escort of Police he went to the house of Malik Taj Ali Khan, where she was shifted to be taken away at once out of the Province. A car had been arranged and so by the morning the girl was out of Frontier.[70]

As for Islam Bibi herself, nothing is known of her new life as a reclaimed Hindu in Hoshiarpur. But something can be told about her lover and Ex-husband, Noor Ali Shah. He was convicted of "abducting the minor girl" and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment. Apparently he obtained his release after 18 months and, immediately on coming out of jail, his marriage was arranged in his own family.

He is reported to have spent about a year or two with his new wife, but then the yearning for his tempestuous love affair with Islam Bibi overcame his new domestic life. One day he quietly left home, never to return. May be he is still looking for his lost love in Hoshiarpur. Who knows? But he has not been heard of again. He had a daughter Mehrjana who now lives in Bannu with her husband, Sayyid Manzoor Ali Shah, his nephew and a School Teacher.[71]

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. File No.260. S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Khaisora Situation; Letter No.752-S from the Political Agent North Waziristan to the Resident in Waziristan, Razmak, June 15, 1937, p.167 T.R.C. Peshawar.
2. File No. L/P&S/12/1393, Letter No.Pol:Ext. 6943/49 from K.R. Crook, Common Wealth Relations Office London to Brig: H.W. Burrows on May 30, 1949. IOL & R London; File No.L/I/I/1414, Faqir of Ippi, Early Life (1942) IOL & R London; File No.260, S.T.B.I. Vol V, letter No.6.T/37/6056-61 from D.D.I., Peshawar to Chief Secretary N.W.F.P. Nathiagali, dated May 25, 1937, p.83. T.R.C. Peshawar.
3. File No.L/I/I/1414 IOL & R London; see also Maulana Gul Muneer, Mathla'ul Anwaar, (Peshawar: 1950), p.221.
4. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Letter No.6/T/37/6056-61, May 25, 1937, p.83.
5. File No. L/I/I/1414, IOL & R., London.
6. Ippi is not the original name. The original word was Aupi, Aubi or Iba. Laiq Shah opines that in Waziristan the word Ayub is pronounced as Aiip, as this area once belonged to Ayub, his name became Aiip and later on Api or Ippi. [Laiq Shah, Waziristan, (Lahore: 1994), p.500].
7. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Letter No.6/T/37/6056-61, May 25, 1937, p.83.
8. ibid; see also Laiq Shah, op.cit, p.500; File No.L/I/I/1414, IOL & R. London where his date of movement to the village Ippi is mentioned as 1920.
9. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol (V) Khaisora Situation, Letter No.752-S from V.H.M. Cox Political Agent North Waziristan to the resident in Waziristan, Razmak, dated June 15-16, 1937, p.167.
10. Laiq Shah, op.cit, p.500. While Milan Hauner has mentioned the date as 1923. [Milan Hauner, "One Man against the Empire." The Faqir of Ippi and the British in Central Asia on the eve of and during the World War." in The Second World War, ed. Walter Laqueur (London: n.d.), p.381.] The same date is mentioned in File No.L/I/I/1414 IOL & R., London.

11. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Letter No.752-S. p.168.
12. A prominent Sufi and gaddi nasheen of the Qadria order in Charbagh, a place near Jalalabad. He was at the time the most famous and influential leader in Afghanistan.
13. Laiq Shah, op.cit, pp.500-501.
14. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Letter No.752-S. p.167. T.R.C., Peshawar.
15. Interview with Amir Niaz Ali Khan, Khalifa and gaddi nasheen of Faqir of Ippi. He is the nephew of the Faqir, June 13, 1993.
16. Interview with Master Mir Sahib Khan, a school teacher who resigned from Government service and joined Faqir of Ippi in early days of the movement, March 7, 1993.
17. File No.L/P&S/12/1393, letter No.Pol. Ext. 6943/49 from K.R. Crook to Brig Burrows, on May 30, 1949, IOL & R., London.
18. File No.L/I/I/1414, IOL & R., London.
19. Interview with Faqir Muhammad Alias Faqira Punjabi. He had deserted from the British Army and joined Faqir of Ippi. He became a well-known ghazi, while the Britishers named him Faqira, the outlaw. He is still alive and has settled down in Daur area. Interview on April 16, 1993.
20. Andre Singer, Lords of the Khyber: The Story of the North West Frontier (London: 1984), p.158.
21. Charles Miller, Khyber: British India's North West Frontier; The Story of Imperial Migraine (London: 1977), p.357.
22. File No.L/I/I/1414, IOL & R., London.
23. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol. VI. (n.d., n.p.), T.R.C., Peshawar.
24. File No.L/I/I/1414, IOL & R., London.
25. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Khaisora Situation, (n.d,n.p.).
26. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Proclamation of the Governor Lord Cunningham on March 10, 1937.
27. Inayatullah Naseem Sohdravi, Zafar Ali Khan Aur Un Ka A'had (Lahore: 1982), p.231.
28. Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar Vol: I (Lahore: 1975), pp.182-3
29. Maulana Mazhar A'li Azhar, Mas'ala-i-Shaheed Ganj (Lahore: n.d.), p.104.

30. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement (Lahore: 1969), pp. 151-52.
31. Muhammad Shafi'Sabir, Tareekh-e-Suba-e-Sarhad (Peshawar: 1986), pp.935-6.
32. Application of Mansa Devi to the Deputy Commissioner on 9th March, 1936. She mentioned her husband's death as 14-15 years before the incident of Ram Kaur (approximately in 1920) case of Crown versus Amir Noor, Register General No: 2002/1173, Record Office, District Courts, Bannu.
33. Interview with the mother of Dr. Fayyaz and Ihsan, Darma Khel village District Bannu on Jan 1, 1996. She used to play with Ram Kaur in her childhood and is the witness of their love affair.
34. Although Mansa Devi had produced Islam Bibi's birth Certificate which was prepared on March 8, 1936 and duly signed by the then Civil Surgeon. Amir Abdullah Shah's plea was that such a certificate was not an authentic source of age because it was prepared in her absence on March 8, 1936 while she was with Amir Noor from March 6, 1936 to March 24, 1936. It meant that her birth certificate was merely a transcript from the village chowkidar's register. He provided another decision of the Judicial Commissioner as a precedent in this regard which was announced on July 31, 1920 in favour of the accused, but the court rejected his plea. (File Crown versus Amir Noor.)
35. File Crown Versus Amir Noor, Ex.P.E. 1917 dated March 9, 1936.
36. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Translation of Ex. P.D.
37. File Crown versus Amir Noor, copy No: 2 Thana City Bannu, Ex.P.E. 20/7. Dated March 12, 1936.
38. File Crown versus Amir Noor, order of the District Magistrate, p.4-5.
39. ibid.
40. File Crown versus Amir Noor, case No: 42 Thana City, 21/8, I.P.C. 363, dated March 3, 1936.
41. File Crown versus Amir Noor, copy of Statement of Fatheh Khan constable, Thana Ghoriwala.
42. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Statement of the Sikh Driver, Gurmukh Singh.

43. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Order of the District Magistrate, p.6.
44. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Written Statement of Amir Noor Ali Shah on March 24, 1936.
45. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Another Statement of Amir Noor Ali Shah to the Assistant Commissioner I.D. Scott on March 26, 1936.
46. File Crown versus Amir Noor, No: 35/8.
47. Gul Ayub Safi, Bannu au da Waziristan Tareekh, (n.p: 1969), p.273.
48. ibid.
49. Crown versus Amir Noor, Order of the District Magistrate, pp.1-12.
50. ibid.
51. ibid.
52. ibid.
53. ibid.
54. ibid.
55. ibid.
56. File Crown versus Amir Noor, "Complainants replication of the defence arguments in Jandu Khel kidnapping case".
57. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Order of the Session Judge of Derajat. Case No.725 H.D. Rushton on 24th June, 1936, pp.1-3.
58. ibid.
59. ibid.
60. ibid.
61. File Crown versus Amir Noor, Criminal Refer. No.187 of 1936, pp.1-3.
62. Tufail Ahmad Faizi, Bannu Tareekh Ka Aiina Ma (n.p. 1979), pp. 567-68.
63. Those who wrote application to the Deputy Commissioner were:
    1. Khan Sahib Karim Dad Khan, Inspector Police (Retd.), President District Muslim Association;

2. Malik Akbar Ali Khan of Sokari;
3. Bahadur Khan of Kot Beli;
4. Maulvi Lutfullah alias Khan Mullah Kaushi Khel Mandan;
5. Sheikh Ghulam Sarwar Mazoon Mirzali Khel;
6. Malik Shirin Zaman Khan Member District Board;
7. Malik Ghulam Jelani Khan Raees-e-A'zam Mandan, Sokari, Member District Board. [File Crown versus Amir Noor, (No.38/8 dated 6.4.36.)]

64. Saifi, op.cit, (n.p. 1969), p.267.
65. Bahai Permanand, "Frontier Forward Policy", a rejoinder to Pundit Nehru; HERALD (Lahore) on July 3, 1937.
66. Saifi, op.cit, p.281.
67. Khan Habibullah Khan Ex-Deputy President, Frontier Legislative Council, "Origin of Trouble in Waziristan", Reply to Bhai Permanand's Statement, The KHYBER MAIL (Peshawar), July 7, 1937.
68. ibid.
69. Norval Mitchell, Sir George Cunningham (London: 1968), p.60.
70. Bhai Permanand, op.cit.
71. Hafizur Rahman, "Tribal revolt: a Hindu Woman love inspired". The Friday edition of the Muslim (Islamabad), November 25, 1994.

CONFRONTATION WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 4

(1936-38)

In the mid-thirties, the inhabitants of Waziristan, like all Pashtuns, had been aware that changes were taking place in India which could not be to their advantage. They saw the Government of India Act 1935 as a concession to Hindu pressure, and the Hindu majority in the Legislative Assembly as the first step towards Hindu rule over the Frontier itself. The infiltration of the British in their area had already threatened their independence, it would be far worse if the British handed them over to the Hindus[1].

For an annual sum of 75000 rupees, the Tori Khel had agreed to the construction of a road southward from Mir Ali into the Khaisora valley[2]. The young elements were dissatisfied with the internal distribution of their tribal allowance. The influence of the older Maliks, who had made their name in the 1919-20 fighting and many of whom now held lucrative supply contracts from the British garrison, was diminishing. The young men were eager for another fight in which they could prove themselves, and were willing listeners to Mullahs such as Faqir of Ippi.

The decision of the court in the Islam Bibi affair was considered by the Muslims as downright interference in their religious freedom, fanning

the ember of hatred against the British. They started doubting the Britisher's intention in regard to their religious affairs. It had evoked ire of the entire Muslims, particularly those of the southern districts of N.W.F.P., and protest rallies and meetings in Bannu and North Waziristan Agency started taking place. Mosques played focal centres in the protest meetings[3]. The angry and riotous mob attacked the court and set it on fire. "The case immediately took on a communal aspect", writes Charles Chenevix, "with angry Moslem (Sic) mob demonstrating in Bannu and even threatening the Deputy Commissioner's house."[4] The local Muslim population could not take any action beyond this against the British and the Hindus, because they were in the settled area. Consequently, they took the issue into the tribal areas. The grievances between the tribes of Waziristan and the British government were already in progress. The incident of Islam Bibi provided them an immediate cause to raise the banner of revolt.[5]

A joint meeting of the U'lema and Maliks of Bannu and North Waziristan Agency was held in the village of Idak (Tehsil Mir Ali) on April 11, 1936. Faqir Ippi was also present in this meeting. The Jirga unanimously demanded the return of Islam Bibi to the Muslims. They openly threatened to violate the decision of the court. Meanwhile some young elements set ablaze three government vehicles.[6]

Again in Malik Azhdar[7], a large gathering was held on April 15, 1936. The speakers spoke against the government's interference in their religious affairs. The Daurs decided to attack Bannu. Faqir Ippi was against this decision. The hotheads criticized Faqir Ippi's approach.

Later on, it was decided to choose a safe place for the Lashkar and to assemble there again.

Another Jirga of Wazirs, Mahsuds, Bhittanis, Khattak, Marwat, Bannuchis and Daurs was held at Natasi[8] to discuss inter - alia the selection of an Amir and declaration of war (ghaza) against the British. The Jirga unanimously elected Haji Mirzali Khan as their Amir and declared Jihad against the British. Since Mirzali Khan was a disciple of anti-British Mullahs and pirs, he cast away the robe of a Sufi and wore armour for the defence of Islam and Pashto. With the assumption of political leadership, he visited Haji Sahib of Turangzai, Pir Sahib Nasim Shah of Landai and Seen Gul Faqir of Shewa, and discussed with them the strategies of ghaza. He also gained the support of Naqib Sahib Jalalabadi, Gian Mullah, Spin Gul Faqir of Shoor, Maulvi Waris Shah Manzar Khel, Mullah Sher Ali Mahsud, Shahzada Fazal Din Mahsud, Din Faqir Bhittani, Zonday Qazi of Bannu and Ghazi Marjan Tori Khel against the British for their Mudakhilat Fid-din (interference in religion)[9].

The Lashkar after electing their Amir proceeded towards Shaktu (South Waziristan) and soon returned to Khaisora valley. Faqir of Ippi announced Jihad against the British government according to the Fatwa (verdict) of the U'lema. The British government was keeping a close eye on the movements of the Lashkar. The Resident of Waziristan ordered the dispersion of the Lashkar, but in vain. The government dropped written warnings from air and later on sent Scouts on April 23, 1936.[10] The Scouts demolished the mosque and the houses of the Faqir and of his prominent supporters.[11]

The major part of the Lashkar consisted of Khassadars, Maliks or contractors and businessmen. They were persuaded by the government not to co-operate with the Faqir and to leave him alone. Faqir Ippi permitted all such persons to return to their homes on April 25, 1936. He was now accompanied by his two brothers Maulana Sher Zaman, Gulzali Khan, his father-in-law Qazi Sherzad Bannuchi, Ghanam Rang Daur, Mehr Dil Zerinai Tori Khel, Lamdai Khel, Id Hassan and others.[12]

The British government blockaded the Tochi area and arrested all those persons who had accompanied the Faqir in the Lashkar, especially those who were in government service. They were kept in jail from April 27 to July 26, 1936. The government invited the Daur Jirga on June 16, 1936 and fined them Rs: 12,000/-[13]

Meanwhile the Faqir was invited to the Sain Waruki in the Khaisora valley by the elders of the village for dinner on May 11, 1936.[14] This opened a series of invitations from different areas. Faqir used these invitations as a forum against the British government. He mobilized the inhabitants to accompany him in waging Jihad against the British.

The British government obviously could not brush aside lightly this surge of renaissance amongst the Muslims. After taking the wind out of the sails of the Daurs, the British now turned to the Tori Khel Wazirs and tried to break their allegiance to Faqir of Ippi. He shifted his centre from Khaisora to Gariom, then to Sham and later on to Shaktu. During this time, he held meetings with Mullah Fazal Din (Son of Mullah Powindah) and Din Faqir Bhittani. He returned from cold areas in

September 1936 to Din Dragai near Razmak. When his tribe knew about his arrival, they sent ten camels and took him to Khaisora valley. He settled down in Karkanri and built his house and mosque there.[15]

Generally, the Waziristan tribes were engaged in continuous everyday fights and raids against one another due to murders and cattle lifting. When the Faqir declared the mosque built by him to be the common property of all the Muslims, the Mahsuds, the Wazirs and the Bhittanis came to the mosque and offered their prayers together. All the three tribes thus neglected their past enmities, became friendly and united due to the favourable atmosphere provided by the Faqir. Khonia Khel, a Jalal Khel Mahsud, Din Faqir Bhittani and Mullah Fazal Din also helped him in patching up differences between the three tribes. The credence of these tribes in the spiritual powers of the Faqir further strengthened by this compromise amongst inveterate enemies, an achievement which had baffled all their leaders for years.[16]

The British government warned the Tori Khel Maliks to persuade the Faqir to normalize his relations with the government; otherwise the government will wipe out the area. Faqir refused to do so and the Maliks admitted their inability to expel, or persuade and convince him. In addition they refused to take the responsibility of the safety of the government's movement in the area. The die against the Faqir was finally cast in November 1936, when the Political Agent North Waziristan, Crichton in consultation with the Resident finally decided to attack Khaisora and wipe out the strongholds of Faqir of Ippi from

the area.

Unleashing of War

A plan was drawn up: that on November 25, 1936 the Razmak Brigade (Razcol) would start from Damdil and move eastwards down the Khaisora valley; that the Bannu Brigade (Tocol) would start from Mir Ali and move south-wards over low hills; that they would meet at Biche-Kashkai in the Khaisora valley, spend the night there and would return the next day to their bases. The British hoped that it would be an exemplary demonstration of the government's might. The Tori Khel Maliks were warned that any opposition would be severely dealt with because the Faqir had previously announced his intention of resisting the army entry to the Khaisora. In addition, a hundred and fifty Tori Khel Khassadars were sent down to try and hold the people together. The general impression gathered from the Jirga was that there would be no opposition, or at the most, there would be long distance sniping[17]. (See Table 1 on the next page).

Hopes of peaceful promenade soon proved illusory. On reaching Zaperzai, about one third of the way to Biche Kashkai, Felix Williams with the platoons leading Razcol was warned by the Khassadars that there were hostile elements on the hills ahead. They soon came under fire.[18]

In their bid to counteract the British move, a group of pro-Faqir of Ippi fighters comprising Tori Khel, Bakka Khel, Madda Khel, Bora Khel,

Daurs, Bannuchis, Marwat, Khattak and about 200 Mahsuds took up their positions in the graveyard of A'lam Sheri. The Khassadars accompanying the Brigade also took part against the Column secretly.[19] Yet another group of similar strength held the fort, near Tangri.[20]

They ambushed the Columns on both places. There was a hand to hand encounter also in which the Britishers lost considerable number of weapons, besides losing many lives and, above all, their face. On November 26, 1936, the British Army demolished the houses of Faqir of Ippi in the village Kankanrwam. In sheer desperation, it had to pull back to Mir Ali, leaving behind a trial of 107 dead British soldiers, including Major W.B. Tendal, Major J.B.P. Sacombe, Captain F. L. Boyed, Captain A.R. Phillips, Lt. W.J. Flatcha and Captain J.R.H. Peacock.[21]

Table 1:Details of the Columns proceeded towards Khaisora valley on November 26-27, 1936.

Commander	Column	Platoon	Action
Major A Felix William M.C. Captain Fek Laman	Razcol	6	Left Damdil on 25th with Column and accompanied it the whole time arriving Mir Ali evening 27th.
Capt. G.E. Attwell Lt. G.H. Prendergast	Razcol	8	Left Damdil on 25th with column. Left column at approx. 1330 hrs. and withdrew to Dosalli.
Lt. V.L.M. Wainright	Tocol	4	Left with Tocol with whom they stayed until eventual arrival at Biche Kashkai; then joined up with C.O's six platoons.
Lt.T.S. Taylor	Tocol	2 M.I (mounted infantry troops)	Co-operated with Tocol from morning 25th until 1700 hours 25th when they withdrew to Khajuri.

The details of the losses of the military and the Lashkar are given below: [22]

Sources	Killed	Wounded
Government losses (Official sources)	9	17
Freedom fighter's losses -do-	57	-
Charles Chenevix (government loss)	117	-
	1835 including (25 B.Os.)	-
Laiq Shah -do-	2228	-
Fazlur-Rahim -do-	2300	-
Freedom fighter's losses	53	32

The British Army could not forget its beating at the hands of the Lashkar of Faqir of Ippi. Preparations were afoot to avenge the defeat and remove the stigma from the British Army. In this regard, the Viceroy of India in consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, London, decided that:

a. Operation by land and Air forces would be started in the Khaisora valley to punish Tori Khel for their attack on government forces. The forces would remain there as long as government considers it necessary.

b. A road or roads will be constructed in the Khaisora Valley.

SKETCH MAP OF KHAISORA OPERATIONS



c. Political control would be shifted from Political Agent, North Waziristan to G.O.C. in-chief, Northern Command. (General Coleridge was made G.O.C-in-Chief). He was given discretion to use air attacks in consultation with Political authorities to punish tribes living elsewhere in Khaisora valley, who had been assisting Tori Khel freedom fighters. He was given discretion to bomb all such villages.[23]

d. Afghan government would be requested to do everything to prevent their subject taking part in the disturbances.[24]

e. Confiscation of rifles and other penalties will be imposed (if troops are opposed in any way during their entry into, and occupation of Khaisora valley.[25]

Bannu cantonment was practically transformed into a base for the Khaisora valley operations. All the civil and the military offices of Dera Ismail Khan were shifted to Bannu, like the Indian clothing depot, R.T.O.S, etc. Three or four special military trains arrived daily, in addition to a large reinforcement arriving by Motor vehicles via Kohat road. About two dozen regiments arrived at Mir Ali including the Hampshire Regiment, the Punjab Regiment, Jhansi Brigade and a Rawalpindi Brigade in addition to a signaling corps, camel corps, armoured cars and aeroplanes.[26]

On December 1, 1936, when the necessary preparation had been made, work on the Bannu Mir Ali road began. The progress had been

steady and swift, one mile a day was the rate of construction. The government started another road along with sein Tangi and Narmi Khel Khassadar Post.[27] Small fortified posts at a distance of 4 miles were constructed as camp picquets on Tochi road, Jaler Algad, and Khaisora road. The main object was to prevent the camp from being attacked. Within the perimeter, each unit had its own appointed area and a portion of the perimeter for which it was responsible. Each day, at dawn, the troops for protection purposes would move, clear and protect the area in which the days' work had to be done. They were closely followed by the working parties. In the sky above, aircraft would fly to and from, watching carefully for any sign of hostile movement. In the evening, the troops would withdraw to the camp.[28]

Leaflets were dropped throughout the area by aeroplane, warning the villagers to evacuate the places by removing their families and children as the British government would not be responsible for the damage to their lives and property in case bombing operation was started.[29]

Faqir Ippi shifted his centre to Shaktu and divided his Lashkar in small groups to protect them from air reconnaissance. The British Army started demolishing the surrounding villages. Zaikhe, Faqir Ippi's village was demolished on December 15, 1936. Dagai, Sheikh Muhammad Ziarat, Zairpezhi, Dinor and Bobali were demolished by December 22, 1936.[30]

The Faqir's fame had now spread throughout India. From his new

head-quarters, he organized and dispatched number of small bands of Tori Khels, Mahsuds and others to harass the British personnel and installations over a wide area.[31] In one such attack, an English Officer, Major William and five other officers with thirty five soldiers were killed, and nine English and seventeen others were injured. During the month of December 1936 the British Army attacked the surroundings of the Khaisora valley 45 times, killing more than 63 freedom fighters, and losing 235 soldiers of its own with 75 wounded. The details of losses of the freedom fighters on December 22, 1936 (shown in the Table 2 on the next page) indicate wide spread involvement of the tribes in the Faqir's movement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Faqir sent his younger brother, Gulzali Khan, to Mullah Fazal Din, and some other messengers to Badshah Gul, son of Haji Sahib Turangzai, Akhunzada Mullah Mahmud and Malik Khonia Khel Jalal Khel Mahsud for help. Mullah Fazal Din, Badshah Gul and Akhunzada declined to help him at the moment. Fazal Din advised him to make peace with the government while Badshah Gul flatly refused to give any help. He told the Faqir's messengers that "Since the Wazirs had not supported the Mohmands during the operations of 1935, neither he nor the Mohmands would give them any assistance". The same was the case of Akhunzada. Khonia Khel was the only person who came to the Faqir's assistance with 80 Jalal Khel and Bhittanis.[33]

Table 2. Details of losses of tribes on December 22, 1936.

Wazirs	Killed	Wounded
Ahmadzai	-	2
Utmanzai, chiefly Zerinai and Shogi Tori Khel	7	7
Mahsuds		
Shabi Khel	3	5
Jalal Khel	2	1
Shingi	1	-
Kikarai	1	-
Nazar Khel	-	1
Langar Khel	-	2
Bhittanis of Gabar	1	1
Afghan subjects		
Tanis	2	2
Zadrans	1	-
Kabul Khel of Birmal	2	-
Total	**20**	**21**

The tribes generally were tired of the blockades, repeated bombardments and the military presence. A general consensus among them was that there should be some sort of settlement between the government and the Faqir.[34] In this regard, the Lower Khaisora Maliks met the Faqir. The Faqir informed them that "they are free to make peace with the government, but that he will not enter into any negotiations until the government signs a guarantee not to interfere in their religious matters".[35] He declared that, "it would be foolish for the Tori Khel to make peace with the government, since troops must leave the Khaisora eventually."[36] He threatened the Maliks that" should the Wazir Lashkar fail, he will raise the Mahsuds; and failing the latter (Sic) he will assemble Lashkars from Afghan tribes of the Southern Province".[37]

The task set by the British government was on the one hand to induce the tribes and on the other to spread fear. The Bakka Khel Jirga was summoned to witness the commencement of the Lower Khaisora road from Dre Ghunderi on December 21, 1936. They were asked to supply badraggas, but they refused to do so because they did not want to incur the enmity of the tribes engaged against the government.[38]

Waruki Jani Khel and Shui Khel Wazirs of Bakka Khel, who took part in the fighting on November 26-27, 1936 and remained there until December 8, 1936, were compelled to deposit 18 rifles as security for their good conduct, and to execute an undertaking not to assist the Faqir in any way for a period of six months.[39]

Until the evening of the December 22, 1936, the Faqir was with the Astoni, Shabi Khel Mahsud, at Sangar kach in Shaktu. He was visited there by many Mahsuds and Bhittanis, and was interviewed by a representative Jirga of the Shaktu on December 22, 1936. The Jirga informed him that they were prepared to ask for peace on his behalf, but that he could not be allowed to remain in Mahsud country as a leader of active hostilities against the government. The Faqir replied that he would only make peace on the terms which he had originally presented to the government and that he had been promised of active support from many Frontier and Afghan Tribes. He, therefore, moved his headquarters the same day back to Wazir territory and settled in the house of one Arsal, Madi Khel.[40]

The Britishers had not yet completely lost their heart, they continued to woo the recalcitrant Tori Khel Wazirs in their bid to create dissention amongst them, and to force them to stop patronizing Faqir of Ippi. Numerous pleas were made to them to come for a Jirga with the British political Administration promising them a safe future if they decided to end their hostilities against the British government. In order to sabotage the much sought-after Jirga, the Faqir of Ippi also continued holding marakkas at various places to refrain the Tori Khels from attending it.

On December 24, 1936 the Royal Air Force distributed notices widely over the lower Khaisora and Shaktu valley inviting the Tori Khel Maliks and elders, if they wished to make peace with the government, to present themselves in full Jirga at Mir Ali on December 28, 1936 to make known their grievances against the government and hear further orders of the government.[41] The salient features of the notice were as follows:[42]

> *A road has been made to the lower Khaisora and Government forces are in full possession of that part of your country. Punishment has been given to those who have taken a prominent part in hostilities ... If the Tori Khel desire to make their peace with Government, they should present themselves in Jirga before the authorities at Mir Ali on December, 28th at 12 noon. The government guarantees safe conduct to all Tori Khel attending the Jirga. Government desire to make it clear that she has never interfered in the religion of any of its subjects in the past, nor has any wish to do so in the future.*

The impact of all such notices in Waziristan was mixed. The elders

and the Maliks generally were in favour of any sort of compromise, while the hot-heads could not bear the presence of the British on their soil commanding their conditions to them. Tori Khel Maliks and elders held their meetings at Kankanrwam and Sham to arrange for their attendance at the Jirga.[43] There were some sections reluctant due to the presence of the Faqir in their limits. The majority of the elders decided to attend the Jirga to know the government attitude. The Jirga came to Mir Ali on December 28, 1936. It was interviewed by the Resident in Waziristan and G.O.C. Wazirforce. The Jirga was required to produce 100 hostages and 100 rifles within seven days as an earnest of good faith. The Maliks declared their willingness to do so.[44]

Faqir Ippi continued his struggle from the new headquarters, Arsal Kot. The British government decided to bomb the headquarters of the Faqir. Notices were dropped from air on Arsal Kot and the adjacent areas with following salient features.[45]

> *You are hereby warned that as your Kot has been used for some days in the past and is still being used to shelter a hostile Lashkar, the Government intends to destroy it by bombing from the air. Your Kot will be attacked from the air from noon on Thursday December 31, 1936 and it will continue within two miles of the Kot. You should therefore remove all persons to a place of safety outside this dangerous area and keep them away until further notice is given to you.*

The Faqir's Lashkar in retaliation attacked Khaisora and Jaler camp on the night of December 30-31, 1936. One side of Razmak Camp was set on fire. The Faqir was present on the morning of December 30, 1936 at Arsal Kot, but his whereabouts were not known.[46] Later on

he was reported to be living in a cave some 200 yards south-west of Arsal Kot. The British Air and land forces struck Arsal Kot four times between December 31, 1936 and January 4, 1937 but to no avail. The same area was again bombed between January 12-18, 1937 but because of his umpteen hideouts; Faqir of Ippi could not be targeted.

It was during this time that propaganda and wild stories full of rumours started to circulate everywhere in Waziristan and the southern province of Afghanistan. One such rumor was the fall of Miranshah at the hands of the Mujahideen which created enthusiasm in Ahmadzai Wazirs of Birmal and Mangal country, Afghanistan.[47]

Despite the British Bombardment and destruction of the assumed hideout of the Faqir, he was still in Arsal Kot commanding his Lashkar. His resolute and truculent attitude increased his prestige locally, and with Khonia Khel, Jalal Khel and his section openly on his side, the Mahsud situation became uneasy. The Maliks failed to restrain the tribes from visits to the Faqir and to the Khaisora. The Nano Khel and Shabi Khel Jirgas were summoned for a final warning of immediate action against Khonia Khel.[48]

In addition, the British government became anxious about the widespread propaganda of the Faqir that "the British troops are unlikely to remain out in camp indefinitely". This created enthusiasm in the tribes, and attacks on troops increased.[49]

The punitive action against Arsal Madi Khel and Tori Khel was

suspended on January 4, 1937. However, the activities of the freedom fighters continued. River Camp was sniped on the nights of January 1-3, 1937 and telephone lines between Jaler and river camps were cut on the night of January 1-2, 1937. Nano Khel Mahsud Jirga was interviewed at Sararogha on January 9, 1937 and the following terms were enacted for the future good behaviour of Khonia Khel and the Mirat Khel.

a. Four British Magazine rifles and four hostages from the tribes;
b. A bond for Rs.10, 000;
c. Khonia Khel and four houses of the Mirat Khel were to live as hostages with the Jalal Khel till further notice.[50]

The Tori Khel handed in 13 hostages and some rifles by January 3, 1937. Faqir of Ippi left the vicinity of Arsal Kot with his family and took shelter in Kikarai limits with Hasan Kikarai Mahsud.[51] The British government had secretly decided that she would increase pressure on Tori Khel if they did not fully comply by January 6, 1937 with terms mentioned to them in the Jirga of December 28, 1936, especially the condition of expulsion of all hostiles belonging to either tribes.[52]

In addition, the Commander-in-Chief gave permission to the authorities of Waziristan to attack bodies of men numbering ten and over, travelling in the proscribed area.[53] On January 4, 1937 the Faqir was reported to be still in Kikarai Mahsud limits, living in a cave during the day and in a Kot during the night. The Kikarai Jirga was summoned by the government and ordered to expel him and his

family from their limits. The Jirga promised to comply with the orders within four days.[54]

The Tori Khel Jirga was seen by the Political Agent, North Waziristan at Mir Ali on January 5, 1937. All sections handed in hostages and rifles. The tribe, while depositing hostages and rifles, denounced 11 hostile individuals for whom they declared their inability to accept responsibility. They were ordered not to harbour Faqir of Ippi in their limits. The same day 13 hostages were taken from the Astoni Shabi Khel Mahsuds and 2 from the Abdullai Mahsuds of Mandewam.[55] The government failed to control sub-sections of Tori Khel Zarinai Haibati (Faqir Ippi's tribe). Faqir Ippi returned to the caves in the vicinity of Arsal Kot, and left his family with a Kikarai Mahsud Malik at Gul Zamir Kot.[56] He remained busy consolidating his position and frequently indulging in vitriolic harangues against the Britishers which made the later more suspicious of his designs against them. This was the period when the North Waziristan Agency was on fire, insofar as law and order was concerned. There was not a day when there was no kidnapping, cutting of telephone wires or explosion of bridges. Besides, the air reconnaissance reported the strength of Faqir Ippi's Lashkar in the Lower Khaisora valley on January 3, 1937 as 820 comprising of different tribes.[57] (see Table 3 on the following page). Although the government tried her best to restrict the unrest to Tori Khel, they failed to do so. The Lashkar continued its opposition through sniping, looting and attacking the picquets etc.[58]

Arsal Kot again became the headquarters of the Faqir after the

suspension of British bombardment. The Lashkar of the Faqir was scattered in parties inside nullahs to avoid being seen from the air.[59] Bombardment again started on Arsal Kot from January 12, 1937. The political authorities were not fully satisfied with the military solution of Waziristan, nor were they in favour of the permanent presence of the military in the area. The Resident of Waziristan handed over a detailed note to General Coleridge on January 11, 1937, wishing to communicate it to the higher authorities. In this note he made some recommendations against retaining troops in Dakai Bobali area beyond January 12, 1937.[60]

1. The object of the troops had been achieved by turning enemy Lashkar out of Khaisora and dispersing it after inflicting heavy casualties on it.
2. Their prolonged stay in the area was creating difficulty for Shaktu Maliks.
3. There was a danger of large scale Mahsud involvement in the Faqir's cause.

He suggested that:

a. Troops be withdrawn as soon as possible to their stations as before January 9, 1937.
b. Efforts be made to get Tori Khel to reoccupy Bobali-Dakai Khula area.
c. Their Jirga be then summoned and final orders (including the expulsion of the Faqir) be announced to them on penalty of relation of their hostages until they comply.

The General Staff approved his plan of action. The Resident took the following steps in this regard:

i. Tochi column to stand fast at Jaler camp.
ii. Razmak column to remain in Khaisora valley camp on January 12-13, 1937.
iii. Suspending operations projected for January 13, 1937.
iv. Razmak column to withdraw from Damdil, January 14, 1937.

Table 3. Details of the tribes involved in the Faqir's movement.

Afghan Subjects:

- Zadrans, Tanis and Gurbaz 250
- Jajis of Jaji Maidan, Mangals of Gabar and Khostwals of Sabarai Lakanr & Arun Khel 250
- Kharotis of Shakin 25
- Pirkoti 15

Detail of those who were either Afghan subjects, or *dwa kora* (having residence both in the tribal territory of Waziristan and in Afghanistan).

- Saifali and paipali Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal 75
- Ahmadzai Wazirs of Birmal 75

- ...Inhabitants of Waziristan and the tribal territory of Bannu and D.I.Khan Districts.
- Mahsuds, chiefly of Shaktu valley 20
- Bhittannis 15
- Saidgis of Zawe 20
- Madda Khel Wazirs, Chiefly macha of Sartoi and Latakka, Kazha valley 25
- Tori Khel and Manzar Khel 30
- Miscellaneous Wazirs 20

Total 820

The Tori Khel Jirga was invited in Mir Ali by the Resident of Waziristan on January 15, 1937.[61] It was fined Rs.50,000/- and 120 Tori Khel Khassadars were dismissed for siding with Faqir of Ippi. The tribe was permitted to bring their families, back to their villages. The British government felt that there will probably be no more trouble. Political control of Waziristan was handed back to the Resident. Things were getting back to normal.[62]

The Maddi Khel (sub-section of Tori Khel) Maliks held meeting with the Faqir in Shaktu on the night of February 1-2, 1937. He apparently agreed to their request to cease hostile activities, and expressed willingness to abide by the terms of any undertaking the government might require of the Maddi Khel in regard to his future good behaviour. He asked for a little time to decide about his future place of residence, but gave the Maliks an assurance that his promise of good behaviour would hold good wherever he went in the Agency. He apparently added that if the government would not accept the assurance of the Maddi Khel, he would leave their country rather than involve them in further trouble. The only request he made was that those Tori Khel who had stood by him to the end should not be singled out for further punishment by the government.[63]

Six days later, on February 6, 1937, Captain Ceogh of the south Waziristan Scouts and his orderly were shot dead on the road near Ladha.[64] The following day, Captain Roy Beatty, an officer of the Tochi Scouts acting as Assistant Political Agent in North Waziristan was murdered along with his two escorts. He was killed by a Madda

Khel Wazir named Zawe. Zawel and his gang had got away with 32,000 rupees, three rifles and a revolver. The territory where Capt. Ceogh was murdered belonged to Umar Khel Bahlolzai Mahsuds. The government arrested 120 Khassadars of that tribe due to their negligence.[65]

Hamzoni Daurs were fined Rs.5000/- because they had not fulfilled territorial responsibility as Capt. Roy Beatty was murdered in their area. But they swore on the Quran not to pay the fine.[66]

Attack on Wana Brigade

A Powindah Lashkar, half Suleiman Khel and half Kharotis, led by Gul Jan Kharoti attacked Wana Brigade on February 17, 1937. He was the son of a Kharoti Malik, who was killed by Zhob Militia. Gul Jan gave Wana Brigade a run for about twenty miles of Wana at Obo Sar, near the Afghan border. The British loss was 14 killed and 5 wounded. They also lost four rifles, much ammunition with several mules and camels.[67]

On February 20, 1937 about 150 Tori Khel Maliks representing all sections attended Jirga at Mir Ali. All speakers stressed the religious basis of the Faqir's movement, and confessed their inability to take direct action against him. They prepared a petition, signed by all present and sent it to the Faqir that it was their unanimous desire that he should either come in or abide by the terms of security they are prepared to give or leave their country and save them from further

suffering.[68]

Faqir Ippi received this letter in Arsal Kot, where he was in seclusion. He emerged from seclusion on February 22, 1937 and led the Id prayers. He announced that he would issue orders in a month's time.[69] He addressed another meeting of a mixed gathering of Wazirs and Mahsuds on February 26, 1937 after Friday prayers, saying that he had received the assurance of help from many religious leaders in his fight for Islam. Under the circumstances he ignored the letter he had received from the Tori Khel, and hoped that people would now come openly to his help. He exhorted his audience to commit offenses throughout Waziristan and adjoining districts to awaken people to the cause of Islam.[70] Meanwhile, he was receiving numbers of tribesmen at Arsal Kot. About 100 kabul Khel from Birmal joined him during the first week of March. There were 400 men constantly present as his audience.

Faqir Ippi proposed to place the letter from Tori Khel before a council of Mullahs. If the council decided in his favour (i.e., that he was justified in conducting Jihad), he had planned to issue a proclamation to all tribes calling upon them to choose between Islam and Kufr.

He issued invitation to a feast at Arsal Kot on March 5, 1937. Faqir's feast was largely attended by the Mullahs and other sympathizers of his cause. Later, he issued a proclamation with the support of these U'lema to all the tribes. In addition he dispatched another letter on the same day, refuting the propaganda of the government that he had

made peace with her. The salient features of the letter are as follows:[71]

> *If a Lashkar of Mujahideen from me or from other momineen (Pious Muslims) enters your country for Jihad, you should give them all assistance, because they are ready to fight in the name of Allah and because they would be stranger in your country. And therefore, all men be they great or small, should help them and join in the Jihad. Furthermore, if anyone in your country begins to fight against Kafirs (infidels) other Muslims should help them. You should give all possible help to Mujahideen, so that you should also reap the fruits of Jihad. If the British government announces to the people that I, Mirza Ali Khan, have become on peaceful terms with the British government, know that this is entirely false, because I do not desire to make peace with them. If God wishes that peace should be made, you people will be informed accordingly.*

In addition to these letters, he sent his brother Sher Zaman to the Mangals of Afghan Southern Province to obtain their support. The Mangals and Zadrans agreed to a truce to their feuds while acting in support of the Faqir. On the other hand, Jalal Khel Nazar Khel and Abdur Rahman Khel sections of Chagmalai and Mastung, Shabi Khel villages and the Bhittanis had been holding hostile meetings and discussing methods of attack on roads. Din Faqir openly promised aid to Faqir of Ippi from Bhittani side.

Muslim feelings in the Bannu were high and many of the widespread rumors which had been circulated regarding further trouble in Waziristan were believed to be emanating from the area. Local

Muslim feeling were largely connected with the Islam Bibi case for which further civil proceedings were pending in Bannu courts.[72] A number of posters appeared in Bannu city demanding that Muslims should abandon their support of government and pray for the success of the Faqir.[73] The letters and emissaries to different areas of Waziristan, Afghanistan and Bannu had a positive response, and the tribes which were still aloof during the Khaisora operations, also declared support to the Faqir. One such example was that of Dreplari section of the Tori Khel who had joined the Lashkar. A large number of temporary Wazir M.E.S. Labourers employed on Khaisora road stopped work and joined the lashkar.[74]

The Faqir was receiving a succession of visitors with regular supplies of food from Bannu District. He issued a fatwa saying that no Mullah would perform the funeral ceremony of any Malik or Khassadar remaining in government service. In response, 22 Khassadars left the government service on March 9-10, 1937. During the 3rd week of March 1937, 83 Khassadars deserted of whom 50 were Tori Khel.[75]

Conditions in Bannu were far from peaceful. A bomb scare prevailed in the district especially at Bannu proper, and explosions took place quite frequently with disastrous results. Railway trains were particularly subject to such sabotage and as precautionary measures the train was always preceded by one or two empty bogies, so that in the event of explosion the empty bogies bore the brunt and the engine and the trains were safe. Raids were a normal feature and the entry of the public (even of Magistrates) into the Cantonment limits was by

permits. It was during these days that Mr. A.C. Fryer, Superintendent Police; Bannu while chasing a raiding gang in the vicinity of Pezu, received a bullet in the head and died.[76]

The number of visitors to the Faqir at Arsal Kot increased during these days. They included Hati Khel Ahmadzai Wazirs and other Wazirs of Bannu District, Gabar Bhittanis and men from the southern province of Afghanistan. They all brought sums of money for the Faqir. He continued his propaganda although he was sick. The Maliks and Khassadars were unable to control the situation. The government feared the possibility of an outbreak among the masses of the tribesmen. She feared that such an outbreak in those conditions of unrest with its religious undercurrent might be precipitated by a violent incident or an incursion from outside. The Faqir was trying to start such an outbreak by propaganda. His immediate efforts were directed towards cutting communication lines between Dre-Ghunderi and Razmak and towards persuading Maliks and Khassadars to leave government service. He informed the Khassadars through letters that unless they left government service before Friday March 19, 1937, they would be considered infidels. This fatwa along with the previous one created a commotion in the British Camp. To save her face the government herself suspended the Haibati Tori Khel Khassadars from March 18, 1937. The remaining three section were given twenty days ultimatum either to expel the Faqir from their area or bring him under control.[77]

Damdil Setback

The British government had restricted the traffic on the roads of Waziristan due to worst situation of law and order in the area.

One Shodi Khel, a Daur had joined the Lashkar of Faqir of Ippi and had remained continuously on the prowl in the lower Tochi area, making things extremely uneasy for the government. He had later been killed by a bomb dropped by the RAF Planes. Wali Khel, a brother of Shodi Khel who was a Khassadar Subedar had been removed from service for his complicity with Shodi Khel, and the Daurs had expressed their inability to produce his substitute. Malkhe a Manzar Khel lieutenant of the Faqir, and his gang had made the Boya Datta Khel strip of road extremely unsafe. A Kharsin Bora Khel gang under Khon, Ghazle and Dur etc., had rendered travel between Miranshah and Bannu extremely hazardous. One Bare, a former Khassadar Jamadar and Zindai, Musakki Wuzi Khel and their gang were infesting the Isha-Razmak road. The Mir Ali - Spinwam road had also been rendered unsafe by the hostile activities of Latif, a Mir Ali Tori Khel lieutenant of Faqir of Ippi.

Journey between Miranshah - Bannu - Razmak was performed only on fixed three specific days in a week which were called road-open-days, popularly known as `ROD', on those days a whole Brigade with all its accoutrements, guns, armoured cars and tanks was employed to keep the road open. The `ROD' could not deter the Mujahideen from their activities, as the only effect of `ROD' was the diversion of

the activities of the Mujahideen from civilians to the Army, for hardly did a `ROD' pass without reports that a soldier or two had been ambushed and killed and their rifles or machine guns taken away. These incidents had become so frequent that they were treated as a routine matter.

On March 29, 1937, 1 infantry Brigade came out of the Damdil Camp for the road protection duty at 8 A.M. It was immediately attacked by the Mujahideen Lashkar that had established its position in the broken ground, nullahs and culverts. The encounter took place of about 2 miles west of Asad Khel. All the four Battalions of the Brigade remained heavily engaged the whole day. The machine-gunners were shot down at once. On hearing the fire, armoured cars started arriving from Dosalli. Throughout the day tanks, aircraft assisted in reconnaissance and dispersing offensive tribesmen endeavoring to join the battle.

The British officers themselves admitted the severity of the encounter. The strength of the Lashkar was about 300, increasing to 700 in the evening. It was mainly composed of Wazirs of all sections, Mahsuds and Afghan subjects. In a 12 hours shoot down, which ended at 7.47 P.M, the losses on both sides (shown in Table 4 on the next page) were high beside 163 rifles which were snatched from Britishers.[78]

British Government's reaction

The Resident of Waziristan discussed exhaustively the Waziristan

situation with the local political authorities. The threat of Faqir Ippi to start another campaign around March 5, 1937, the flow of tribesmen towards Arsal Kot, the open rebellion of Din Faqir, wire cuttings on a large scale, the existence of more than 50 gangs committing outrages on roads and the hostile attitude of Mahsuds were forcing the authorities to take steps in this regard. Those Wazir and Mahsud Maliks who were in the government Camp were warning the Political Agent, pleading for action before it assumed a tribal scale. The advent of spring would enable both Ahmadzai Wazirs and Afghans of southern province to join the Lashkar.

The traffic completely ceased on all South Waziristan roads except in shape of convoys. The government took precautionary measures and increased Military strength in Waziristan. The Resident informed Tori Khel tribe that unless they expelled Faqir of Ippi within a week, their Khassadari and Razmak contracts would be stopped and they would be prohibited from entering British India or Razmak area.[79]

Table: 4 Details of losses of the government and tribes in Damdil setback.

From government side

Killed	British Officers : 2 (Captain R.O. Bathune, Lieut. R.A. Marks)
	Gurkha Officers : 2
	British other ranks: 1
	Gurkha other ranks: 30
	Indian other ranks : 3
	Total : 38

Wounded	British Officers :2 (Major J.F. Marindin, Lieut. P.F.C. Nichelson)
	Gurkha Officers : 1
	Gurkha other ranks : 38
	Total :41

From Mujahideen side:

Killed	Utmanzai Wazirs: 47 (Tori Khel 27)
	Mahsuds :15
	Others:30
Wounded	Utmanzai Wazirs:36 (Tori Khel 22)
	Mahsuds:10
	Others:18
Total killed : 92	
Total wounded : 64	

Tribal Jirgas

The Political Agent South Waziristan held a Jirga of Bhittanis at Jandola on March 3, 1937 and informed them about the hostile activities of Din Faqir. The Maliks, 95 in number, signed a statement, admitting full responsibility of Din Faqir's behaviour.

Madda Khel and Dre-Mahsud Jirgas

The murderers of Lieut. Beatty belonged to Madda Khel tribe. They had taken shelter in their own villages. The Maliks of the tribe were invited for meeting on February 22, 1937. The Maliks sent a message that they were bringing the murderers of Beatty. They sent a representative to discuss the matter with the authorities on February 25, 1937. He demanded a conditional surrender of the wanted men, which the authorities refused. The British government declared that she is not prepared to parley with the murderers. The government gave a week for definite reply, with the threat that suitable action would be taken after that period.

Malik Khandan Khan, Madda Khel wrote letters to other tribes for their assistance in Beatty murders 'affair. He sent a letter to Musa Khan Abdullai asking for assistance. The government intended to invade Madda Khel territory to seize Shawal. Musa Khan summoned a meeting of Mahsud Afghan allowance holders at Maidan on March 5, 1937 to discuss the situation. Mullah Fazal Din was also invited, but he did not attend the meeting.

Another Jirga of Madda Khel was held at Zuram. Malik Abdullah Khan sent a letter to the Political Agent North Waziristan stating that they would only surrender the Beatty murderers on the condition that trial would be held according to tribal customs. He threatened that if the government took action by ground or air, the tribe would counter it by force with assistance from the Tori Khel, Kabul Khel, Zadrans and Tanis of the Southern province of Afghanistan.

In view of the refusal of the Madda Khel to hand over Beatty's murderers unconditionally, there appeared little hope of settlement with them. Sales of food to tribesmen at Miranshah had greatly increased during these days. The Kabul Khel, Ahmadzai Kharotis, Zadrans and Gian Khel had decided to support the Madda Khel, if the government took action against them. Another Jirga took place on March 8, 1937 and one of the leaders of Madda Khel with nine hostages surrendered to the government demand. At the same time, warnings were dropped on the Madda Khel that the government had decided to destroy through bombardment the villages of Zuram Astad and Ismail Khel. The inhabitants were ordered to evacuate the

villages. The two villages along with Raghzai Kalai were twice bombarded on March 10-12, and 20, 1937, but the government failed to capture the real murderers because they had crossed the border to Afghanistan. One hundred rifles belonging to them were forfeited and 86 men of their tribe detained after the barampta.[80]

The Resident held a Jirga of Dre-Mahsud at Sararogha on March 8, 1937 and imposed a fine of Rs.75, 000/- for the Keogh murder. The Shaman Khel pleaded innocence, and the Alizai stated that should Faqir of Ippi moved into their country, it would be difficult to deal with him, as he would be entitled by custom to their protection.[81]

Re-Enforcement of Military

The strength of the land forces was considerably increased. Camps were established on the Bannu. Razmak line in order to safeguard the line of control to Razmak; to provide a striking force as and where required and to overawe the tribes by a show of force. In this regard section 22 Fd. Company, 1/6 Gurkha, 2/6 Gurkha, 9 light Tank Company had arrived at Mir Ali on February 24, 1937; Tochi Column moved to Miranshah; the 6th light Company (Armored Cars) were placed at 24 hour notice to proceed from Delhi to Kohat and then to Waziristan; 2/Ist Punjab Regiment arrived Bannu from Multan on March 7, 1937. The Air forces was employed in punitive action against the Madda Khel tribe so as isolating Faqir of Ippi, by blockading his headquarters.[82]

Warning notices were dropped on areas where lashkarwals had concealed themselves. These were the days when Faqir of Ippi had arranged a feast on March 5, 1937, to discuss the letter from certain Tori Khel Maliks and the ongoing situation. The Britishers along with dropping the warning notices started air demonstrations but they had no effect on the Lashkar. As such they decided to block certain areas of Pasal Kot, Arsal Kot, Gulzamir Kot, Tital Kalai and other Kots within three miles distance of Arsal Kot.[83] The Governor N.W.F.P, George Cunningham delivered a written proclamation to the tribes of Waziristan, on March 9, 1937, which was also dropped from air. (See appendix `D').

The Resident in Waziristan held a Jirga of the Tori Khel on March 9, 1937 at which the whole tribe was represented with the exception of the Maddi Khel section which was harbouring the Faqir. The Jirga was told that unless they expelled the Faqir within a week, they would be denied access to Bannu and the Razmak area, and the use of the Bannu - Razmak road, that their contracts would be cancelled. The Jirga expressed their inability to compel the Maddi Khel section to expel the Faqir on account of tribal custom.[84]

Utmanzai Mediation

The re-enforcement of the military, the air blockades of Arsal, Pasal Kot and the neighboring area, the bombardment on Madda Khel and barampta of Ghiljis and Haibati Tori Khel continued without positive results. Realizing that the rod was no longer effective, the British

extended olive branch to Faqir of Ippi. A Jirga of the whole Utmanzai Wazirs was invited to Miranshah on March 24, 1937. The Resident of Waziristan assured the Jirga that the government had no intention to interfere in the religious affairs of the Muslims. The Jirga agreed to act on behalf of the Tori Khel to settle the present dispute. The government suspended blockade of the area to allow the Utmanzai Jirga to enter the area.[85] The government offered that:

a. all mosques of Faqir of Ippi which have been damaged by British shelling will be reconstructed;
b. Britishers will not interfere in the religious affairs of the Muslims;
c. no compensation will be demanded by the Britishers of the loss sustained by them at the hands of Faqir of Ippi's lashkars.[86]

Representatives of all section proceeded to the Lower Khaisora to deal directly with the Tori Khel hostiles who were harboring the Faqir. The Jirga met the Faqir of Ippi at Dakai Khula on the March 27, 1937. Before meeting the main Jirga, the Faqir interviewed four Maliks from each section for about two hours. He then announced that he had no intention of making any settlement with the government; that he had been approached by the whole Utmanzai Jirga, and he would consider a course of action that would be accept-able to all of them and that after consulting his followers, he would draft a letter setting forth his demands to the government. He summoned his principal supporters to meet in the Shaktu within the next few days.[87] It is interesting to note that the Jirga was playing double game. On one side the Maliks were giving surety to the government that "they would

fight the hostile elements if necessary and ask for assistance from the government if they required it."[88] On the other side, they were unable to confront with the Faqir. They presented Rs.2000/ (Rupees two thousand) to him in Shukrana on March 27, 1937.[89]

Meanwhile the Faqir's Lashkar attacked 1 infantry Brigade on March 29, 1937 near Asad Khel, killing 38 soldiers. This incident changed the situation. The Jirga returned to Miranshah to meet the Resident in Waziristan. He complained about the Asad Khel incident. He delivered a written document to the Maliks that the government would not interfere in their religious matters and never had done so. The Maliks wrote to the Faqir asking him to meet 85 representatives of the Utmanzai, who would go on March 31, 1937 to Spalga to await his reply.

The deputation, consisting of 85 Maliks, went to Spalga on March 31, 1937. From there, they sent a smaller deputation of three Maliks accompanied by five women carrying the Qur'an on their heads. This deputation spent the night at Arsal Kot without seeing the Faqir, because he had gone to see Mullah Fazal Din. They were received by his brother, Sherzaman and his father in Law, Qazi Sherzad. They returned the next day with the gratuitous advice from Sherzaman and Qazi Sherzad that they should give preference to their religion over the welfare of their tribe.

The Faqir subsequently sent a letter to the Jirga saying that he had not been able to consult all the representatives of the other tribes. He

suggested that the government should help him in collecting the tribes, and in order to facilitate this task, she should postpone action until after April 5, 1937.

The British government felt that the reply was evidently intended to gain time, during which he would increase his influence over the tribes and receive re-enforcement, possibly from the Tori Khel Khassadars if government terms were enforced on April 5, 1937. Obviously negotiations served the double purpose: of increasing his importance, and of gaining time during which the number of his adherents' increased.[90]

Mediation Failed

The suspicion and hatred against one another was the main reason of the failure of the mediation between the government and the Faqir. The government on one side was offering peace, and on the other introducing new orders in the North Waziristan Agency and Bannu Tribal Territory as: [91]

1. The inhabitants of the above areas were ordered not to move outside their village between sunset and sunrise (w.e.f. 22nd March, 1937.)

2. They were restricted not to carry rifles on the road within an area of one mile on either side of it.

    a. Khassadars were ordered to carry their rifles when on road. Their picquets would be stationed on the road itself.
    b. Government mails and their escorts could carry the rifles only when on the road.

c. Movement of the Maliks and Khassadars would be confined to not more than 10 armed men.
d. Movement would be restricted to tracks in everyday use.
e. All movement would be conducted by parties moving in single file;
f. Within the prescribed distance from the main road (i.e. one mile) sitting about or taking up positions was prohibited.

3. Party of ten or more armed men within an area of three miles in any direction form Damdil Camp would be treated as hostile.

4. A raiding gang or a party which had attacked troops or committed an heinous offence would be punished.

The inhabitants of Bannu District were prohibited from all intercourse or communication whatsoever with the hostile utmanzai Wazir tribes.[92] Civil Authorities took steps to close all passes from Bannu District into North Waziristan. The number of Lorries leaving Bannu for Waziristan was limited to six a day.[93]

Change of Strategies

Steps taken by the government till now failed to produce lasting effects. The tribes were unable to produce more than temporary quiescence on the part of Faqir of Ippi. The movement of the Faqir got momentum day by day. Stringent precautions unknown for several years had to be taken by the government to ensure safety of the government officials and others using the Waziristan roads.

The centre of the trouble was Faqir of Ippi who was now living at Arsal Kot, a Tori Khel village, in the Shaktu valley. He had provided a

rallying point for the hostile elements. He had throughout been the inspiration of the feelings roused by the Islam Bibi case. The Britishers failed to gauge this inspiration because they thought it to be an ordinary judicial case. They saw no apparent reason why either the Wazirs or the Mahsuds should be anything but peaceful. The Faqir had been visited constantly by disaffected tribesmen from all parts of Waziristan and even from the Southern province of Afghanistan.

The British government had till now dealt only with the symptoms of the Faqir's influence whenever they appeared. She had taken stringent action against the Madda Khel and the Mahsuds for the two murders of the British Officers by means of air action and heavy fines. She had dealt with individual cases of wire cutting, etc. through ordinary political methods but the Faqir was still untouched. The efforts to induce the Tori Khel, his own tribe, to influence him had failed.

The problem was to deal with the Faqir. There was difference of opinion whether or not his removal or control would mitigate the trouble. The government feared that she might still face the opposition, active or passive, of certain Tori Khel who objected to her penetration of the Khaisora area. The British was confused whether to wait or not, in the hope that the pro-British elements might ultimately brought him under control. The Faqir's propaganda did not show the slightest sign of abating. His religious call provided a convenient rallying point for certain Tori Khel who were disgruntled, joined by elements from other tribes who disliked and feared the possibility of

an extended government control in Waziristan. In other words the Waziristan trouble was a revolt in the name of religion against the government control. The government thought out a two pronged strategy:

One, to prevent hostile tribesmen from gathering round the Faqir in numbers sufficient to form rising gangs or Lashkars, the government of India approved the implication of an air blockade of an area of three miles round Arsal Kot. The government assumed that even if it did not force the Faqir to quit the Shaktu, he might take shelter in a cave which would make access to him very difficult; it would help to stop his supplies of money and food and greatly hamper his efforts to organize raids and other offences. The air blockade had begun on March 17, 1937. The government laid down no precise terms to be fulfilled. Later on April 5, 1937, the blockade was extended to the whole Tori Khel tribe.

The Tori Khel opposition did not emanate from the Maliks or Khassadars of the tribe, but from that large bulk of the tribe who had no interest in Maliki or Khassadari, had very little landed property, and who had to depend for their livelihood on their flocks. The measures the government should take therefore, to deal with the Tori Khel directed towards causing the greatest inconvenience possible to the grazing community of the tribe. Their exclusion from the Razmak area, their summer grazing grounds, would not be felt until the middle of May 1937.

Two; the government decided to

a. Declare the Faqir an Outlaw;

b. Tighten aerial blockade on:
   i. Faqir's residence (3 miles radius),
   ii. Khaisora valley (2 miles on each side from Musakki exclusive to Pasta Algad junction inclusive),
   iii. Shaktu route (from Tabai Algad junction inclusive to one mile short of Arap Kot.);
c. Take punitive action as feasible against villages and the leaders of attack of March 29, 1937 (see Table 5 on the following page);
d. Limit number of civilian lorries leaving Bannu for North Waziristan daily and so restrict supplies reaching North Waziristan tribes;
e. Complete evacuation of all Tori Khel villages within 3 miles of Bannu-Razmak road within 48 hours;
f. Impose restrictions on all Tori Khel as now in force on Haibati section viz:
   i. Debarring from Razmak and Bannu areas and all government roads.
   ii. Suspending all Khassadari and Maliki.
   iii. Cancelling of all contracts;
g. In addition to (f) withdraw Khaisora allowances;
h. Review the steps taken when the Tori Khel made complete submission and had cleared out the area of hostiles; but if not, to take further steps; arrest all Tori Khel if seen by the government forces in the area under blockade except Jirga coming to see the political authorities.[94]

Table: 5 List of the prominent figures against whom punitive action had been initiated.

No	Name	Tribe	Place
1	Janat Mir	Maddi Khel	Sham Algad
2	Asal Mir	Maddi Khel	Sham Algad
3	Id Hassan	Mir Ali Dreplari	Mir Ali
4	Behram	Shogi Kuts Khel	Khaisora
5	Akip (Yaqub) u/o M.Baloch	Shogi	Ghwaibi Mela
6	Gulagai C/o M.Baloch	Dreplari	Datta Khel
7	Gagu	Dreplari	Datta Khel
8	Gulmasha	Dreplari	Datta Khel
9	Gul Jan	Dreplari	Datta Khel
10	Pir	Dreplari	Datta Khel
11	Said Din	Dreplari	Datta Khel
12	Marwat	Dreplari	Datta Khel

Faqir Ippi's Counter Attacks

The Faqir's propaganda was increasing everywhere in Waziristan. Till April 4, 1937 the Lashkar in the Lower Khaisora was reported to be 1200. These men were being rationed by Faqir of Ippi who was drawing his supplies mainly from the Bannu District.[95] A lorry was looted and three Hindus were kidnapped; a large gang consisting of Dre-Plari Tori Khel held up the mail runners between Spinwam, and Mir Ali and looted the mail bag; three lorries were held up and, two men were killed; the water supply to the scout post in the Khaisora was cut on April 6, 1937.[96]

Faqir Ippi was still in Arsal Kot, detailing large gangs to carry out raids in Bannu District. A Muslim District Board overseer and a Hindu munshi were kidnapped on April 8, 1937; an aeroplane, carrying P.A. North Waziristan was fired at when it left Spinwam, the occupants

were not hurt.

The Tori Khel Khassadars were dismissed on April 5, 1937 and the government faced certain amount of difficulty in procuring others to take their place. Eventually recruitment was made from the Bora Khel. The new Bora Khel Khassadars were heavily fired on during the nights of April 7-8, 1937 by the dismissed Tori Khel Khassadars and one Bora Khel was killed.

Shahur Tangi Setback

The Shahur Tangi, on the Manzai road, is a defile three miles long formed by the Shahur nullah, generally dry or a mere trickle, running between steep rocky hills. The road runs, with three sharp bends, along the north side of the defile, above the nullah bed, and for about two miles the defile is very narrow with steep slopes. Vehicles except with much forwarding and reversing cannot pass it. On either side of the nullah are innumerable boulders, caves and catchment-drains from which it is easy to enfilade, at point blank range, stretches of road up which lorries must crawl in low gear.

At day break on April 9, 1937, a routine convoy of forty nine lorries and two private cars left Manzai for Wana. It carried military and civilian loads details rejoining their units, and some officers going up for a language examination to take in Wana the next day. At the same time there were activities on the slopes overlooking the Shahur Tangi, six miles from Jandola on the Sarwakai Wana road, just beyond

Chagmalai. They were Mahsuds, quietly listening to the instructions of their leader; a Jalal Khel called Khonia Khel, and then moving effortlessly, inconspicuously from one rocky eminence to another, carefully choosing their positions. There must have been seventy of them there, at least. An early morning flight by the RAF disclosed nothing suspicious; but the convoy commander, as he entered the defile from the Chagmalai end, noticed with surprise that there were no Khassadars present on either side.

SKETCH MAP OF SHAHUR TANGI SETBACK



The convoy reached Chagmalai without incident. At a quarter to eight, the leading car with Lieut. Hopkinson was two-thirds of the defile, the rear well inside the Tangi and the convoy crawling up the steepest part, intense fire was opened along with its entire length and continued for about fifteen minutes. Nearly all officers, sitting beside

the drivers or in the two private cars, were killed or wounded in the first minutes. Forty people were killed in the first fatal minutes of surprise and chaos. The infantry escort, who had been well forward, and other survivors were pinned to the ground in the ditches and small nullahs by the road side, or under the culverts that carried the road over them. Accurate sniping kept them there. Lorries were slewed all over the road, their drivers dead at the wheel. Captain N.M. Durrani, himself a Pashtun, walked towards the tribesmen calling on them in Pashto to cease fire while he brought the wounded under cover. He was shot dead.

Lt. Hopkinson in the leading armoured car managed to get out of the Tangi with the three leading lorries, one driver being wounded. The other three armoured cars, spaced at intervals down the column, were all immobilized by stranded lorries, but able to use their machine-guns to cover the road, except at one point where it was defiladed and the tribesmen came in with the knives, mutilating and finishing off the wounded officers and several others. One lorry was blazing fiercely and made the confusion worse. It was a quarter past eight before news of the disaster reached Manzai and Jandola, from Sarwakai. Two more sections of armoured cars, one from Sarwakai and one from Manzai, moved out at once and on arrival at Shahur began to extricate the lorries from each end. The nearest scouts were on a road protection gasht from Sarwakai, one troop mounted infantry and four platoons under Captain Cheeseman. But Lowis, the Assistant Political Agent, was at Splitoi before them, with a lorry load of Maliks and Khassadars from Wana, where he had heard the news by Wireless.

He put the Khassadars into two permanent picquet posts (F_1 and F_2, see Map) without opposition. There was very little direction since the scouts from west and east were separated by the full length of the Tangi. Cheeseman and his Sarwakai gasht arrived about mid-day taking over Splitoi post and the picquets from the Khassadars. Help from Jandola under Major Skrine and Lt. Wilcok also reached. They occupied high ground north of the Tangi, to prevent tribesmen streaming down from the north to join in the battle. A plane arrived to support them but, with one bullet in the petrol tank and another in the Pilot's ankle, it had to force-land on the road, crumpling a wing against the only tree for miles. Other planes could not locate the correct position of the gang.

The bus load of Maliks arrived and tried to remove their fellow tribesmen by sweet reason. One Qur'an in hand was shot dead, and the rest prudently withdrew. The encounter continued till the night. There was a hand-to-hand fight in the darkness, bayonets, knives and grenades. Later on the Maliks and Khassadars were again sent straight down the road into Tangi. No one fired at them and they occupied the culverts and Sangers from which their fellow Mahsuds withdrew. The last vehicles were removed during the afternoon thirty hours after the ambush. The convoy losses were ninety nine including seven officers. The Mujahideen initially were about seventy to eighty but swelled to three hundred as their success became known. Their losses were sixteen killed and twenty six wounded. The majority of these had been among the people coming to the sound of the firing.[97]

Renewed Struggle

The Shahur incident had tense excitement in Waziristan. Attacks on government convoys and posts were renewed. The summary of events in the remaining days of April 1937 is as below:

The Spinwam post was sniped again and again. Dre-Plari Tori Khel to the number of 300 surrounded the post and kept it under fire for the best part of three days, making movement from the post impossible. Two freedom fighters had been killed.

Faqir of Ippi had intensified his propaganda as a result of Shahur incident, and had sent letters and presents of money to many Mahsud Mullahs announcing that now was the time for Jihad; a taxi lorry going to Razmak on April 11, 1937 was fired on at Shini Algad; road blocks were placed on the Mir Ali Thal road; the telephone and telegraph lines were cut between Mir Ali and Bannu on the nights of April 12-13, 1937.[98]

Tiarza post was surrounded by Lashkar on April 16, 1937 and sniped. Tiarza Wana road had been blocked by boulders near Lwargai Narai and telephone line were cut down.[99] Tajori post was fired at on the nights of April 17-18, 1937; a bridge on the Mir Ali Razmak road was damaged.[100] A picquet of 4/8 Punjab Regiment covering the water supply at Alexandra Ridge was attacked on April 19, 1937 and eight I.O.Rs. were killed; the bridge at Razmak was damaged again on the nights of April 19-20, 1937 and made unfit for traffic; Jandola and

Manzai camps were sniped on the nights of April 20-21, 1937; three culverts and one retaining wall were damaged on the Razmak Narai on April 22, 1937.[101] Mullah Fazal Din and Musa Khan Abdullai had sent presents of food to the Faqir; Faqir of Ippi had written a letter to the Faqir of Alingar (Mohmand Agency) asking him to begin Jihad in sympathy with him [102]; Tochi and Jaler camps were sniped on the nights of April 23-24 and 24-25, 1937, British casualties were one killed and seven wounded; the telegraph line between Karab Kot and Wana was cut on the nights of April 22-23, 1937; the pipe line at 45-46 mile on the Bannu Razmak road was cut on the nights of April 23-24, 1937; two civilian lorries carrying supplies were attacked on Bannu Razmak road on April 26, 1937, four drivers were kidnapped.[103] In all these encounters the Mujahideen casualties were 68 killed 54 wounded.[104] One aircraft had been forced down east of Khaisora post and the pilot was slightly injured; cable between Mir Ali and Tochi camp had been cut down. Mujahideen casualties as a result of land and air action at Dakai Khula on April 25, 1937 were reported to a minimum of one hundred killed and wounded.[105]

British Reaction

The measures then taken by the government were two fold. i.e.

a. Air power
b. Use of or threat of both
c. Land force

The authorities planned to continue political and military steps. The main objectives of all these steps were:

Political objects

a. Cutting off of grazing and watering for flocks.
b. Denial of hill country in summer.
c. Causing discomfort by evacuating villages.

Military objects

a. Prevention of traffic on certain routes.
b. to provide a wide area for freedom of offending air action against enemy.
c. to disperse enemy in areas favourable to land forces and cause them to concentrate in such areas.
d. to place a barrier between enemy bodies/tribes and prevent their co-operation with one another.[106]

In addition a list was prepared of all the prominent freedom fighters of North Waziristan and punitive action had been initiated, targeting their residence or their whole villages.[107]

Air Blockades and Bombing

The British government again started her old play card of blockading, bombing and fining the area. Now she gave free hand to civil authorities to use every means of pressure in this regards. e.g., Bakka Khel and Jani Khel were fined Rs.300/-. In addition their allowances

were stopped, they were forbidden to enter North Waziristan. The main objective of this prohibition was to keep them out from their summer grazing grounds in Shawal from which they also exported timber into Bannu District. It is interesting to note that the said tribes were first fined and later on the Resident wrote to D.C. Bannu to search out any blame in support of this fine. They were blamed on April 9, 1937 (while fined on April 7-8, 1937) that "the party who raided Bachakan Ahmadzai passed near the village Nana Nur ... the inhabitants of the said village failed to check the party on its way through their territory. They not only rendered no assistance to the police but actually hindered them." The Waruki and Shui Khel Wazirs were also forbidden by the Resident to go to Shawal[108]; notices were dropped on Datta Khel village, five miles south-east of Spinwam on April 9, 1937 that they should vacate their village at once because it would be bombarded tomorrow[109]; the inhabitants of the area residing between Khajuri and Saidgi post and within three miles of the government road on either side were warned that their area will be bombed from April 12, 1937 till the further orders. All the inhabitants of Waziristan were warned that in future, if troops, convoys, picquets, posts or government parties were attacked in any place, all tribesmen within 2 miles of attack will forthwith be treated as hostile and will be attacked whether by troops or from air without further notice.[110] Tori Khel from villages close to Spinwam post had been taking part in persistently sniping the post. Notices were dropped to evacuate the selected villages, within three miles of Spinwam to start bombing from April 17, 1937; bombing on Umer Khel (Mullah Sher Ali's village) started on the same date.[111]

The Maliks succeeded in bringing Tori Khel of Spinwam to make peace with the government. The authorities not only suspended the bombardment but also permitted them to re-occupy their villages before first light on April 21, 1937. After this date the following areas of Tori Khel would be bombed.

i. East of the Kharaghora Range, on the south by the Khaisora river, on the west by the main road from Asad Khel to Thal and on the north by the Tochi river (but an area one mile to the south of the Tochi river would be exempted). Other areas under blockade would still remain under blockade.

ii. From April 19, 1937 till April 21, 1937 no Tori Khel moving to Spinwam area from the south will be molested whether moving on government road or otherwise. Such movement however, must be confined to night time, i.e., between sunset and sunrise and military post must be avoided. They were also warned not to allow their ilaqa (territory) to be used by hostiles, either of their own or their tribes.[112]

Military again assumed political control of Waziristan

In order to avoid more sections particularly the Mahsuds in supporting the Faqir and to give political authorities every chance of setting matters through tribal Maliks no offensive land operation had been undertaken. But there were still large Lashkars and offences were being committed daily in Bannu District by tribal gangs acting under

the orders of the Faqir.

The government had therefore, decided to place again General Coleridge in political control of both Waziristan Agencies and of the tribal areas under Deputy Commissioners Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. He had been directed to restore peaceful conditions in the area and all land, air and irregular forces operating in that area had been placed under his command. In the hope of bringing the hostile elements to battle and of inflicting a decisive defeat on them Ist Indian Division less Ist Infantry Brigade remaining at Damdil moved on April 23, 1937 from Mir Ali under de Burgh with intention of advancing into the Khaisora and operating as opportunity offered therein. Future policy and plans must depend largely on the effect of this operation which was being supported by all available air forces. Three additional infantry brigades with the necessary ancillary troops could be added to Coleridge's command if needed.

The government tried her best to avoid giving parliament or press any such frank indications of her plans and dispositions. All official pronouncements made in England on this subject were immediately telegraphed to India.[113] One such telegraph was delivered from Sir E. Drumond (Rome) to Delhi, which mentioned that: [114]

> *The tension increases. The Holy War proclaimed by Fakir Ipi finds ever wider echoes. But England, imperturbably icy, pitiless, continues her old methods, methods which no colonizing people has ever followed, while she is always the first to be scandalized by some drops of blood which are shed for the colonial expansion of other peoples,*

> *even if these other peoples have millenary colonizing traditions that fear no comparisons. England allows chatter, provokes revolts, then tightens the vice and crushes small. English history is rotten with the slaughter of entire unarmed populations.*

Another organization, the National Peace Congress held its 27th session at Friends House, London and adopted a resolution against the repressive policy of the British government. The Congress was attended by some eight hundred delegates representing eight nationals and three hundred local organizations, and drawn from all sections of the peace movement in England.[115]

The Congress instructed the general purpose committee to make a request that the Secretary of State for India might receive a small deputation representative of the Congress, to discuss the subject of the resolution.[116] The Secretary of State justified the actions taken by the British government and refused to receive the deputation.[117] Faqir of Ippi was aware of all these developments which appeared in the Indian press.

After the assumption of power, the military authorities established its camps in different areas. Traffic rules for government and Civil vehicles were managed on Dera Ismail Khan - Bannu and Kohat roads. All traffic was closed on these roads after 5 P.M. till 8 A.M.[118]

The government was trying to confine the trouble to her own chosen areas while Faqir of Ippi was successful to spread it to far flung areas. Major developments had taken place in North Waziristan, the focus of

the trouble had moved towards South Waziristan. Majority of the gangs now operating were Mahsuds, with a smaller proportion of Wazirs and Bhittanis. Khonia Khel, the Jalal Khel Mahsud was a chief leader, and was now as important a factor as the Faqir of Ippi. Mullah Sher Ali, Nanu Khel Mahsud was also trying to raise trouble.

The government was trying to confine the action to sections. The main objective was to localize the problem. The action taken so far against the Mahsuds apart from air blockade at Arsal Kot and the punitive bombing of Mullah Sher Ali's village had been directed against the Jalal Khel and Abdur Rahman Khel, because these were the two sections responsible of the attack in the Shahur Tangi on April 9, 1937. Their Jirgas were summoned and professed inability to control Khonia Khel and his associates. They had been told that, failing to surrender the Khonia Khel himself and his fellow leader Dilbogh, within seven days, they must hand over hostages and not migrate to their summer grazing grounds; in default the whole section will be treated as hostile, and allowances and Khassadari will cease.

Action of this kind by itself was not likely, in those circumstances to have any speedy effect, even if it was extended to other sections. The only kind of action which the authorities felt at that time, which could bring things to an issue quickly - was the action on ground. A fight with as many of the gangs as would join in it and some bloodletting would clear the air as nothing else could. Preparations were now on foot to bring this about. The success of these preparations depended largely on whether the hostiles would be induced to come and offer fight. If they did not, and continued their present hostilities, the only choice left

for the British was to bring on a fight on a battle ground of their own choice.[119]

Bombardment extended to other areas

The British government extended punitive air action to those areas where there was complaint of anti-government activities. The inhabitants of the area between the Shaktu Algad and Khaisora Algad were ordered on May 4, 1937 to vacate their villages on 24 hours' notice. In the same way the inhabitants of the country drained by the Sham Algad, the Babrakka Algad, the Sre Mele Algad and the Bhittanis were bombed on May 13, 1937.[120]

The authorities gave free hand of air attacks against those gangs irrespective of their location.[121]

Faqir Ippi's Agitation

Faqir Ippi wrote letters to prominent Maliks of Waziristan, agitating against the heinous bombardment on civilian area. He claimed that British government had deceived him in offering peace. When he responded positively and placed his peace conditions, they did not reply and continued bombardment on his residence and other areas. He again offered to receive a representative Jirga and initiating his peace offer but the government flatly refused to deal with him.[122]

Mullah Fazal Din's Mediation Offer

Mullah Fazal Din had been secretly helping Faqir of Ippi with money,

men and supplies. He sent a message to the Political Agent South Waziristan with the proposal that he would call Faqir of Ippi to his village Latakka and arrange his meeting with the government representatives to discuss peace terms. Mullah Fazal Din offered that in the meantime the Lashkar would be ordered by him and the Faqir to stand fast. He was prepared to take this initiative if he be given written assurances that he will not be held responsible for the past.

The government felt that Mullah was disappointed at the lack of Mahsud support. He was apprehensive of government punishment. Now he was saving Faqir's and his own face. The government was confused to decide about the offer because if his offer was rejected, there was a possibility of his open rebellion. On the other side his withdrawal at this stage would be heavy loss to the Faqir.

The government responded tactfully and put the following conditions demanding that: [123]

1. He must withdraw all support open and secret from the Faqir;
2. should use his influence to call off all Mahsud support and satisfy government in this respect;
3. Government would respect safety of Fazal Din, his wife and his village;
4. Government will not alter her plans in any way;
5. Government is not prepared to negotiate with Ippi except through properly constituted and fully representative tribal Jirgas after ceasing hostilities from his side.

Mullah Fazal Din responded that all should now work together for peace and asked for Mahsud Jirga to discuss with them ways and means, but the government bluntly refused to do so.

Mediation By Faqir of Shewa

Faqir Ippi's movement was a threat to all those Faqirs and Pirs who had their adherents in Waziristan. Faqir of Shewa was in touch with the Islam Bibi's affairs from the beginning. When the British government decided to hand over Islam Bibi to her parents, there was a cry everywhere in Bannu against this decision. Faqir of Shewa was visiting Bannu in those days. He wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner Bannu, stating that: [124]

> *Islam Bibi has embraced Islam without compulsion from any side. She has legally recorded her statement in the court of Asst. Commissioner. She has been even sentenced because of contempt of court, abusing her former religion. I would request to hand over back Islam Bibi to the Muslims in respect of general Muslim sentiments, because the consequences of the Government's decision would be very dangerous.*

When Faqir of Ippi was elected as the leader of Jihad movement, he had consulted among others Faqir of Shewa also but later on when open confrontation started between Faqir of Ippi and the British government, it was difficult for the Faqir of Shewa to support the Ippi's cause. On one hand he wished to maintain his prestige in his tribe, on the other to maintain good relations with the British and Afghan

governments. In the beginning he tried to persuade his own tribe and especially his adherents not to take part in anti-government activities. He even warned Ghilzais of Afghanistan "that it was unlawful to proceed on Jihad except under order of the king."[125]

Faqir of Shewa induced the Kabul Khel to abstain from committing a hostile act against the government. His own adherents in the Kabul Khel decided to punish all those members of the tribe by having their houses burnt and being fined Rs.100/- Afghani. In this connection the Hakim of Urgun (Afghanistan) had been in communication with the Faqir.[126]

The British government in recognition of the valuable service he rendered to her by keeping the Kabul Khel and other tribes out of the disturbances, gave him financial assistance to protect his lands at Shewa from damage beside other forms of rewards.[127]
Later on the British government intercepted two letters of the Faqir written to the Afghan authorities, advocating the cause of the Faqir of Ippi, which made him suspicious in the eyes of the government. She felt that: [128]

> *... the Faqir of Shewa is finding it increasingly difficult in face of continued pressure from Birmal Kabul Khel and hostile propaganda to maintain pro-Government attitude hitherto observed. Suggestions is made that if no objection Afghan Government might summon him to Kabul and detain him on some pretext for the present thus giving him excuse for absenting himself and removing half his difficulties.*

The Afghan government tried to clarify the impression created by these letters as: [129]

> *... from our most recent reports on the activity of the Faqir it would appear that he has no warlike intentions nor is he spreading any propaganda or taking any action contrary to the interests of the Government of India, but on the contrary, is preaching in favour of the cessation of hostilities. The Faqir's action appears neither dangerous nor provocative.*

He was invited by the Afghan government to Urgun with a sum of money but he declined to accept the offer, on the ground of his ill health. He then sent message to the British government that:*" pressure on him to join hostiles is becoming intolerable ... he wishes to act as mediator between government and Ippi".* He suggested that he may be permitted to meet Assistant Political Officer at Datta Khel to discuss matters with following possible concessions on the part of the government: [130]

1. The government will not occupy Madda Khel, Shawal or the Dhana country.
2. Remission of one year land revenue would be left for Daurs and Ippi would be allowed to settle down in peace on furnishing adequate security.

The British government replied that he should use his influence with the Tori Khel to make Faqir of Ippi give up hostilities, and then when he (Faqir of Ippi) had done so the government would be ready to discuss the question of his future residence. In the same way the

government clarified that as long as the tribe on those areas (Madda Khel, Dhana, Shawal) remained well behaved, there was no intention of occupying their area. As far as remission was concerned, the government refused to do so.[131]

Later in June 1937 when a large Lashkar of Ghilzais was on its way to Waziristan, they approached the Faqir of Shewa to ask the Ahmadzai Wazirs to allow them to cross their territory. He had told them that they could do so at their own risk.[132]

When the Faqir of Shewa died during the turbulent time of Faqir of Ippi, the Britishers mourned his death a great deal and quite naturally.[133]

Occupation of Arsal Kot

The military authorities were convinced that on the Frontier a purely defensive attitude was regarded as a sign of weakness and an incentive to the tribesmen to raise the standard of revolt.[134]The problem remained of bringing the Faqir's Lashkar to battle. The Faqir's headquarters was always selected with great skill, as was usually a cave area to render him immune from air action, and so located as to be more than one full night march from anybody of troops or Scout post.[135] His headquarters was at Arsal Kot, comprising of a complex of caves and fortified towers in the Shaktu valley. The Britishers could hardly hope to catch him there, but his prestige would take a knock if he were chased out of it. A plan was made to attack on Arsal Kot and

occupy it. For the operation a division was formed of the Bannu and Abbottabad Brigades under Major General A.F. Hartley, and concentrated at Dosalli.

The first objective was the Sham plain, a high plateau five to six miles south of Dosalli and an important grazing ground of the Tori Khel. From Dosalli there were two possible approaches; the obvious one up the Sre Mela nullah and gorge and another approach, far more difficult, along the top of the three mile long Iblanke ridge, rising from north to south one to one and a half miles east of Sre Mela. Hartley decided to outflank the freedom fighter's preparations by a night advance by the Bannu Brigade (commanded by Brigadier F.H. Maynard) up the Iblanke ridge to the Sham plain.

The essence of the plan was surprise. A deception plan was necessary. Fortunately there was one at hand. From Dosalli a road ran south-west to Razmak, eighteen miles away. But the freedom fighters had broken it in many places and sabotaged the pumping station at Razani, six miles from Dosalli. The military authorities ordered re-establishment of road-communications with Razmak. They established a camp, known as village camp. The real purpose of this camp was to be the base for a supply-route passable by animal transport and, later, MT, up the Sre Mela to the Sham plain after the plain had been occupied. So successful were these cover-plans that the Faqir kept a Lashkar of four hundred on the Razmak road, and went on building Sangers on both sides of the Sre Mela, but did not suspect that the advance would be by the Iblanke ridge.

It was to be on the nights of May 11-12, 1937. Commanding officers were given verbal orders only on the morning of the 11th and written orders not before 5 O'clock. It was not until after 6 O'clock, when the camp gates were closed, that the deception orders, for the move to Razani, were cancelled.

SKETCH MAP OF ACTION AT IBLANKE



By 9 O'clock they started the journey. John Masters wrote: [136]

> *We tried to quiet, but our passage boomed indescribably loudly in the silence of the kills. Boots clashed on the stones; mule harness creaked, hooves struck sparks from the rocks. There was no path on the spine of the ridge, men and animals foundered on up, panting, among the bushes and concealed rock-outcrops. Sudden storms of louder noise burst over us as mules loaded with shovels or radio-sets lost their balance and crashed down two hundred feet of mountain among us. There were soldiers everywhere on the ridge spine, lost along the sides, down in the dark gullies looking for fallen mules.*

On May 18, 1937 the Bannu Brigade moved on to a new Camp site at Gariom, four miles south-east of Coronation Camp, better placed for an attack on Arsal Kot.

The Column pushed on to Arsal Kot, razed it to the ground and blew up the Faqir's cave headquarters, which was twelve paces deep with two side rooms six yards deep and a big room at the end, seven to eight feet high. Nineteen hundred pound cotton was used for the destruction of these rooms. Faqir of Ippi had left Arsal Kot some days earlier.[137]

Request of Tori Khels for Peace

The occupation of Arsal Kot compelled all sections of Tori Khel to request for peace.[138] The government of India released a notification and ordered the Tori Khel that:

1. The representatives of all sections of the Tori Khel should assemble at Spalga on June 3, 1937 and hold their tribal marakka.
2. The Jirga should then assemble at Miranshah on the morning of June 5, 1937.
3. To enable the Tori Khel representatives to collect at Spalga in safety the air blockade now in force on Tori Khel country will be raised with effect from midnights of May 30-31, 1937. As the Sham Area is occupied by troops this area and the country between Sham and Razmak should be avoided.
4. The existing restrictions regarding the carrying of rifles on the main Bannu-Razmak road will continue.[139]

The government authorities were careful in formulating definite proposals to be announced to the tribe. They concluded that:

> *if the Jirga developed favourably, the tribe may be placed on one month probation. During this period their hostages would be retained and Razmak area would remain closed to their families and flocks. Their Khassadars might be re-employed on half pay.*

Prior to their dismissal, the Tori Khel Khassadars were paid Rs.14, 605/- per month. Haibati Tori Khel (a branch of Tori Khel) were dismissed w.e.f. March 17, 1937 and the remaining Tori Khel from April 5, 1937. Their loss was therefore, Rs.2,307/8/- during March and Rs.14, 605/- monthly w.e.f. April 1937. In addition they held M.E.S. contracts to the value Rs.1, 39,000/- annually, which were cancelled

due to their involvement with the Faqir. It had shattered their economic position.[140] The government also was unable to fill the vacuum by other tribes. The government considered that the benefit of re-employment of Khassadars was to re-open Spinwam Mir Ali road, Patrol Razmak and Sham areas and provide protection for coolies engaged on road construction. They might also be useful for enforcing the will of Maliks against hostile individuals of their tribe.[141]

The central government considered that this opportunity should be taken to effect some measure of disarmament. The Tori Khel representative Jirga was seen by the Resident in Waziristan on June 5-6, 1937. They were asked about the activities of the individual hostiles (about 25) who were still outstanding. Their spokesman made a statement as:

> *People of all tribes have taken part in fighting. We are not the only tribe but we have been singled out by you for punishment. We have been destroyed. We have been scattered to the four corners of Waziristan. Our crops have been lost, our villages destroyed, our cattle and sheep killed. About 20 of our women and children have been killed by bombing. We did our best to make the Faqir come to terms with government. We even sent our womenfolk to him to beg him to do so.*

At last the government delivered the following orders till coming of the final orders:

a. The air blockade of your country is removed.
b. You are allowed to re-occupy your village and resume your normal life.

c. You are allowed in the Razmak area but for the present British territory remains closed to you except to Tori Khel holding a pass from the Political Agent.
d. You are now free from fear of arrest.

The release of the Tori Khel hostages was made conditional on the deposit of 100 rifles.[142] Later on an agreement reached by the Maliks and Mu'tabars of the Tori Khel which is as follows: [143]

> 1. *We the Maliks and Kashars of Tori Khel hereby undertake today, June 5, 1937, in presence of the Assistant Political Officer that neither we will permit Faqir Mirzali Khan and his assistants and followers to enter or to do any mischief against the Government in our territories called Razmak, Khaisora, Tochi Spinwam, Sheratala and Ketu Algad (except Shaktu where control is out of our power) nor we will assist them in any way. In case they attempt to enter our territories with such force that we could not resist we will inform the Government, will drive them from our territory with the help of the Government, will take Government's enemies as our own enemies and will neither feed nor harbour them.*
>
> 2. *If any member of our tribe remains hostile to the Government, the members of his section will, restrain them, will try to bring them to terms, and if the section fails the whole Tori Khel will expel them from their territory but if the Tori Khel fail in this way they will request Government's assistance.*
>
> 3. *We will not permit the antagonists of the Government to cultivate or reap any benefit from their lands until they make peace with*

govern-ment.

4. *Our whole tribe is being scattered in different and remote corners of the country. We cannot single out real opponents of the Government but we will find them out and submit a list of them within a month.*

The Tori Khel Jirga was interviewed again on June 6, 1937. They were told to carry out their responsibilities especially kidnapped Hindus to be released, bad characters to be suppressed and hostiles of other tribes to be kept away. They demanded the restoration of the services of Khassadars to which the government refused.

Later on the Jirga reported that they had decided to call up all their Khassadars themselves and employ them without pay for use as Chalweshti or tribal police. The Jirga was also advised by the government to send letters to the tribes of the Afghan Southern Province telling them they had made peace with the government.[144]

The government was convinced that the Tori Khel have done much to rehabilitate themselves. All kidnapped Hindus whom they were responsible for, were released and their tribal police, some 300 ex-Khassadars were working well. She sanctioned as a solution of temporary measure half pay from July 1, 1937 for those Tori Khel ex-Khassadars reporting for duty. Dreplari of Spinwam areas were deprived of this benefit because of their uncompromising attitude. Later on Tori Khel agreed to take up contracts on new roads in their limits. The government restored full pay for Tori Khel Khassadars from August 1, 1937. The main purpose of this concession was to counter

the propaganda of the Faqir against the road programme of the British and to provide safety to the labourers working on roads.[145]

Faqir Ippi In Search of New Headquarters

The destruction of Arsal Kot and the Tori Khel's acceptance of peace terms compelled the Faqir to leave the Wazir area and seek shelter in Mahsud and Bhittani areas. He was constantly changing his headquarters from one place to another.

His main hiding places were respectively as follows: [146]

- From Jan. 1937 to May 20, 1937	Arsal Kot
- From May 20, 1937 to Aug 5, 1937	Gulzamir Kot, Prekari Sar and neighbourhood
- From Aug 10, 1937 to Oct 8, 1937	Gambaki (Shawal)
- From Oct 16, 1937 till his death	Madda Khel country in various places on either side of Durand Line.

He was reported to have settled in Zowa on the Shaktu below Arsal Kot and in Marsanzai Mahsud limits, immediately after the destruction of Arsal Kot. There he approached to the Pir of Landar with an appeal with a Lashkar. The Pir expressed his inability to help him.[147] Later on he was approached by Din Faqir Bhittani and Khonia Khel Mahsud. They used to visit different places and preached against the British invasion in Waziristan.

It was reported that they arrived Waliadin on June 12, 1937 from Shawana Manda, escorted by Wazirs of Daur, Mahsuds and about 150 Bhittanis.[148] Faqir Ippi and Din Faqir were at Baramand below Arsal Kot on June 14, 1937. They moved to Shawal or Ghoreshta.[149] He and Khonia Khel were visiting Gulzamir Kot, Wurgurao, Marsanzai, Shawana Manda near Prekari Sar repeatedly. The government imposed air blockade of these areas within two miles radius of each of these places.[150]

British Sought Help from Mullah Karbogha

British policy till then with regard to Faqir of Ippi was that no negotiation should be entered into with him direct. Negotiations were held either through his own tribe or through representative Jirga. This policy was not fruitful. The military authorities proposed to lend the services of Mullah Karbogha who might induce him to leave Waziristan. Mullah Karbogha had great influence with the Mahsuds and Wazirs. They proposed that "he would no doubt work through messengers and not by visiting Faqir himself." Mullah Karbogha was contacted secretly through Assistant Commissioner Hangu, but he failed to produce favourable results.[151]

Attack on Gulzamir Kot

In mid June 1937, Indian Intelligence reported that the Faqir was residing in a tower known as Gulzamir Kot, about a mile from Arsal Kot, on the Wazir-Mahsud boundary. A purely Scout operation, with

eight platoons of Tochi Scouts under Felix Williams and eight platoons of South Waziristan Scouts (SWS) under Skrine, was laid on to catch him. They left Dosalli in the evening and were lorried to Gariom, five miles from Gulzamir Kot. They marched at 11 P.M. to a point on the Shaktu River two miles from Gulzamir Kot and then separated, the Tochi Scout moving forward over the high ground north of the river and the SWS south of it.

By 3:45 A.M. a cordon had been formed round three towers, and at first light the search began. Faqir of Ippi had shortly departed the cave elsewhere. Ten Mahsuds and one Tori Khel were captured, the last being Arsal Khan, the owner of Arsal Kot and for many months host to the Faqir. Two Hindus were found, in a pitch-dark room. They were kidnapped four months before. Later on Razcol established its camp at Torwam and SWS a temporary camp on Sharawangi Narai, about six miles east of Torwam.[153]

Questions in The House of Commons

Meanwhile Mr. George Lansbury, a socialist leader of the British Parliament criticised the Waziristan Policy of the government in the House of Commons on June 14, 1937 and asked to issue a white paper on the facts and figures on Waziristan.[154]

Government of India gave a detailed account of events occurred w.e.f. November 1936 till June 1937 as following: [155]

Total of Raids Since November 1936	
People Kidnapped	31
Hindus	23
Muslims	7
Shikhs	1
Civilians killed Shops, houses burnt looted	60
Troops Involved	
Regular Troops	39,000 80% fighting troops & 20% administrative
Indian followers	10,000
Tochi & South Waziristan Scouts	5,000
Royal Air Force Personnel	600
Total Troops	54,600
Casualties of the tribes (killed) approximately	719
Wounded Severely	663
Casualties of the troops (killed)	163
Wounded	440

Within those eight months RAF aeroplanes supporting the British troops flew a total of nearly a million miles. The government of India had omitted all mention of Afghan tribesman's participation in the Waziristan operations. It was a fact that prolongation of resistance to the British forces in Waziristan had been due to support from Afghan tribesmen in men, supplies and ammunition. Not less than 25% of total casualties among the Faqir's Lashkar were known to be Afghan subjects.[156]

In addition the government released a white paper which broadly explained the types of air action, dividing it into three categories:

1. Action against villages (forts and headquarters of tribal forces) either to prevent their use by tribal forces or a short, defined period to cause damage to buildings as penalty for specific outrages.
2. Proscription of small defined areas; in such cases all inhabitants and their families and livestock were ordered to evacuate the area, the object being either to reinforce political pressure against offending sections or to make it possible to attack hostile forces in the area without risk to non-combatants; in each case convenient adjacent asylum outside the proscribed area were available for non-combatants.
3. Air blockade of the territory of a hostile section (small in extent); the object being to exclude offending tribesmen from their villages and from the use of their usual amenities and interruption of their normal habits of life until they complied with the specified terms.

The villages affected in the course of the troubles, apart from the use of action of the second type, air action of the first type had been taken against the following villages: [157]

a. Arsal Kot (December 31, 1936 and January 1, 1937) which was harbouring the Faqir.

b. Three villages of the Madda Khel (March 10, 11, 23 and 24, 1937), which were guilty of harbouring the murderers of Lieut. Beatty.
c. A village in the neighborhood of Spinwam post (April 10-12, 1937), which was guilty of hostile action against the latter.
d. A village in the Mahsud country (April 17-19, 1937) which was guilty of an attack on the Tiarza Scout Post.
e. Four villages in the Bhittani country (June 1, 2 and 12-14, 1937), which were guilty of harbouring the raiders and kidnapping (see detailed account of air action/blockades in Table 6 on the next page).

Public Resentment

The operations in Waziristan had a mixed reaction in the political circles of India. Jamia't-ul-U'lama-i-Sarhad blamed Hindus for the Forward Policy of the government, and had started a vigorous campaign against the Hindus and the Sikhs. A meeting was held at Lund Khwar (District Mardan) of the Jamia't and a resolution was passed, warning the Hindus and the Sikhs to desist from false propaganda that the oppressed people of Waziristan are responsible for kidnapping and abduction outrages.[158]

Later in Nowshera Kalan, `Waziristan Day' was observed on August 6, 1937, according to the declaration of the Reception Committee of the "Waziristan Conference". A meeting of the Muslims was held after the Jum'a prayers. After a short speech by Maulana Abdur Rauf, following

resolution was adopted: [159]

> *This meeting of the Muslims of Nowshera Kalan strongly resents the Forward Policy of the British government on the Frontier. It condemns the Hindu Press for its Mahasabhai mentality, which it has shown, in urging action against unarmed Muslims of Waziristan.*

The Conference passed another resolution and announced to send a medical delegation to Waziristan to give medical aid to all the sufferers of bombing.

The matter was becoming communal. The District Magistrate Peshawar sent notices to Maulana Abdul Waheed and Sultan Muhammad, members of the Reception Committee, forbidding them from speaking about the Waziristan disturbance and holding their activities in this connection. The Aljami'at condemned this order and wrote: [160]

> *We know for certain that the Waziristan affair is a `Gol Mol' (confusion) which the government is not prepared to disclose at any cost. It is the only question among all the political issues of the day, which the government intends to conceal from all eyes we want to know as what motives compel the government not to tolerate interference in the Waziristan question? If the* position of the government in the matter is safe and clear, it should not then unjustly throw obstacles in the way of the conference.

Table 6: Areas proscribed/air action in Waziristan Nov 25, 1936 to Oct 15, 1937.

S.No	Date	Locality & nature of action	Reasons	Remarks
1.	5/12/36 to 15/1/37	on flanks & front of land forces in Khaisora Valley (area proscribed)	-	Suspended between 27/12/36 & 7/1/37 to allow assembly of Jirga.
2.	31/12/36 & 4/1/37, 11-19/1/37	Arsal Kot	-	-
3.	17/3/37 to 26/3/37 & 6/4/37 to 30/4/37	an area of three miles radius around Arsal Kot	-	-
4.	From 6/4/37	an area four miles broad in Khaisora Valley between Musakki & Sein	-	-
5.	From 6/4/37	an area two miles broad in Shaktu Valley from Tabai Algad to one mile short of Arap Kot	-	-
6.	From 12/4/37	area of the Shinki defile between Saidgi and Khajuri	-	-
7.	From 23/4/37 21/5/37 30/5/37 1/6/37	area mentioned in (4) was extended, new boundaries being the Bannu Razmak road to Kharaghora Range & Khaisora Valley air action over Shobi Tori Khel was suspended Tori Khel area was further reduced, leaving on Sham plain & area in vicinity of land forces proscribed. air action over remaining small area ceased to allow for assembly of Tori Khel Jirga	-	-
8.	28/4/37 to 30/5/37	Saruna in Jalal Khel (Mahsud) territory was proscribed	punished for participation in attack on Shahur Tangi Convoy on 9/4/37	-
9.	17/6/37 & previously to 10/9/37	proscription of area each side of Shinki defile, between Bannu & Mir Ali	to exclude inhabitants and hostile bodies from an area selected for a line of advance	This had been in force since the spring, 12/4/37.
10.	8/7/37 to 10/7/37	punitive action against the Mahsud village of Razin	for participation in hostilities by its inhabitants	-
11.	1/8/37 to 8/8/37	proscription of Prekari Sar area on Mahsud - Bhittani border	Faqir of Ippi's headquarters	this was a regularly prepared cave area, with no defined hamlets
12.	30/8/37 to 2/9/37 9/9/37 to 13/9/37 23/9/37 to 12/10/37	proscription of area of Bhittani territory, combined with punitive action against houses and villages of persons and sub-sections proved to have been engaged in hostile acts	for raiding and kidnapping of Hindus	The proscription was twice suspended for Maliks to negotiate for the handing back of kidnapped Hindus.

S.No	Date	Locality & nature of action	Reasons	Remarks
13.	9/9/37 to 10/9/37	punitive action against Laswandai village, in Upper Baddar Valley	for participation of inhabitants in hostilities and raiding, and use as Sher Ali's headquarters	action against Laswandai & other selected villages in Upper Baddar was from the 11/9/37 combined with the proscriptive action mentioned immediately below
14.	11/9/37 to 15/9/37	proscription of two adjacent areas in Upper Baddar and main Toi Valleys	for attacks by the inhabitants of these valleys on Khassadar posts and participation in raiding	see remarks above, Maliks were informed that action would be reconsidered when Jirgas presented themselves
15.	19/9/37 to 26/9/37	punitive action against Khonia Khel's hamlet in the Saruna area	used as refuge by Khonia Khel, who had been guilty of numerous attacks on troops etc.	-
16.	25/9/37 to 8/10/37	proscription of area in Shawal Valley	Faqir of Ippi's headquarters and rendezvous for his followers	this area is almost devoid of hamlets
17.	5/10/37 to 13/10/37	proscription of area in Splitoi Algad	punishment for attack by Abdur Rahman Khel Mahsuds on troops on the range at Sarwakai on 27/9/37, and of raiding by Shaman Khel	–

The most sensational news was the rumour of the presence of Badshah Gul (Son of Haji Sahib Turangzai) in Waziristan. The government was anxious about the facts of this news.[161] Later it proved fake. He had gone to Charmung, ilaqa Bajaur, where he visited different places. At Charmung he addressed an audience of 20,000 men and said that they had the deepest sympathy with their brethren Wazirs in their present dire trouble, the Mohmand considered them to be an essential part of the Pashtun. He further invited a joint committee of the Indian statesmen to come over to the Frontier and go into the matter of kidnapping themselves.[162]

Nehru's Proposals and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Offer

The growing Hindu-Muslim communalism had embarrassed the All India National Congress and Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgars) both.[163] An important meeting of the provincial Red Shirt Parliamentary Board held in Bannu in the Mid of June, 1937. The board appealed to the Muslim villagers to help their Hindu and Sikh neighbours when the raiders fall upon them, it was also decided to send deputations to tour the villages to ask the Muslims to refrain from assisting the raiders.[164]

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote extensive articles in the Indian newspapers condemning both the bombing and kidnapping in the Frontier. In one such article he wrote that "air bombing and military expeditions do not materialize unless there are important reasons of policy behind them". He prophesied that: [165]

> *This Forward Policy becomes an intense preparation for war, for the Great War that is prophesied for the not distant future. Apart from our opposition and strong objection to the Forward Policy in itself, we have to oppose it as such preparation for war. The Congress has declared itself against India's participation in imperialist war and by that declaration and policy we must stand, not for quixotic reasons, but in the solid and interest of the people of Indian and their freedom.*

He proposed that:

> *The trouble at the frontier can be ended by a friendly approach on our part, if we were free to make that approach. One man alone, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, loved on either side of the frontier, could settle it.*

Meanwhile Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan gave an interview to the press, saying that the unrest can be brought to an end if Red Shirts were given one month time, after meeting the tribal leaders.[166] Later, when the British government removed ban on Abdul Ghaffar Khan on his entry in the North West Frontier Province, he granted another interview on August 23, 1937 on Sarda Mandir. He told that: [167]

> *Faqir of Ippi is a landlord and an educated man. The kidnapping cases are political. I placed one scheme before the government, asking them to allow me to work amongst the tribes for about five years. I suggested educating the tribes and opening industries. The scheme was taken from me, but nothing was done.*

The official response in this regard was that `the tribes cannot understand his ideas or his aims and his influence among the tribes is practically non-existent.'[168]

Final Peace Terms Announced to the Tribes

The terms announced to the Tori Khel tribes were of temporary nature. With the invasion of Shaktu Valley and the construction of roads in the heart of Waziristan, the campaign entered on a new phase. A conference was held in Simla under the chairmanship of the Viceroy of India on July 13, 1937. The Waziristan situation was discussed exhaustively. The authorities considered the idea of partial disarmament of the tribes, but for financial and political reasons the idea was dropped.

It is interesting to note that the Indian government was spending one Lakh rupees a day on the Waziristan operation. In the last six months, this was the 55th expedition going on .[169] Faqir of Ippi was still at large and the hostile activities on his side had not completely ceased. The operations were a tremendous strain on the purse of a country which required every pie for its nation building purposes. The question was that how long could the country go on sinking money at this rate in the tribal land which bred but did not feed? And whether India could afford to pay for this so-called civilization? The general public was of the view that if the Frontier must be `civilized ', it was fair that England should foot the finances from her own exchequer. The Congress raised the issue in the Central Legislative Assembly. In replying to Mr. Satya Murti, Col. Parson, Secretary for External Affairs stated that: [170]

> *The Government did not contemplate any radical change in their policy towards tribes beyond the North West Frontier Province.*

In the course of further supplementaries Mr. Satya Murti asked: In view of the ineffectiveness of the policy hitherto pursued, will the government ascertain the opinion of this regarding a settlement with the tribe? Col. Parson suggested that:

> *There were many members in the House who comes so far away from the Frontier that they could not form any real opinion on the questions involved.*

Several members, interrupting, asked if the Secretary for External Affairs thought England was nearer the Frontier than any place in India. Later the Secretary refused to promise consultation of the members elected from the N.W.F.P. in the matter. The government

decided that: [171]

1. Disarmament should be limited to the fines of rifles stipulated in the peace terms;
2. new protected areas should be introduced; in addition to the new areas the existing protected areas in Waziristan like Daur area in the Tochi Valley and the Ahmadzai Wazir territories of the Wana and Spin plains were remained as such;[172]
3. a new road from Barari Narai through Bhittani country to Tajori in the Bannu District should be constructed through Mahsud country as far as the Bhittani border; a force of 10 Platoons of Scouts should be raised to protect this and the three other new roads from Madamir Kalai to Dosalli, Razmak and Ahmadwam;
4. the disposal of Faqir of Ippi should be attempted by getting him to settle down in an area under the British control even if this involved the grant of a free pardon, etc.

The government initiated a series of tribal Jirgas of Mahsuds, Tori Khels, Daurs, Bhittanis, Jani Khels and Bakka Khels on specific dates from August 24, 1937 till November 12, 1937. The Jirgas were informed of their crimes and punishment was inflicted on every tribe in shape of rifles and cash.[173] (see Table 7). Fine as over two thousand rifles had never been imposed before. After the campaign of 1922 only about two hundred rifles were taken. Moreover, these rifles would be confiscated and destroyed, not held as hostages to be restored on good conduct.[174]

The peace terms offered to the tribesmen in Waziristan left no room for doubt that the government was bent on depriving them and their

independence and reducing them to the same position as in the settled districts in the Frontier Province like Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar etc. "What the government deeply desires", according to the proclamation, "is the peace and prosperity of the Waziristan tribes".

One can imagine the sincerity of the government in this regard as she dropped 7087 bombs on Waziristan in the period lasting from February 1937 to August 1937. Majority of them were of 20 Pound type.[175] It meant not only the interference of the Political Agent with tribal matters and his decision of tribal disputes but also the enforcement of the F.C.R. 1932, a law which was the bane on the Frontier Province, Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali districts in the Punjab. Whether the tribesmen would assent to the proposals was, however, another matter.

It was obvious that unless that acquiesced in the arrangement, another expedition might be necessary to enforce it, involving a heavier outlay than the one Lakh rupees a day the present had entailed.[176] Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, member of the Central Assembly from N.W.F.P. strongly criticized these terms as: [177]

> *The terms offered to the tribes by General Coleridge appear very harmless on the surface, but they contain the germs of future trouble.*

Table 7. Fine imposed on tribes in shape of rifles and cash with effect from August 24, 1937 to December 16, 1937.

S.No.	Name of the Tribe	European made	Other magazine rifles	non-magazine rifles	Misc.	Total rifles	Total cash
1.	Mahsud	30	270	700	47	1047	40,000
2.	Tori Khel	20	200	200	37	457	20,000
3.	Daur	-	50	100	-	150	3,000
4.	Bhittanis	-	50	300	222	572	5,000
5.	Jani Khel	-	20	60	-	80	1,000
6.	Bakka Khel	-	10	50	-	60	1,000
7.	Ormurs	-	-	-	20	20	500
	Total	**50**	**600**	**1410**	**306**	**2386**	**70,500**

Source: *File No.361 S.T.B. Vol I, Operations in Waziristan, (third and concluding phase); see also File No.324-F of 1937; Serial No. 1-120, Policy in Waziristan.*

Taking strong exception to the comments of the Eastern Times on this question, The C&M Gazetteer of Aug 29, 1937 responded: [178]

> *So far as the independence of the tribesmen is concerned, the peace terms of the government contain a generous and even a magnanimous gesture for the preservation of the independence of the Mahsuds and Wazirs which is worth preserving.*

The Eastern Times of August 31, 1937 replied that:

> *If the terms are so generous and even magnanimous, would the C&M Gazetteer like the Briton to be administered on the system of protected areas and the Frontier Crimes Regulation enforced in London?*

Offer of Afghan Government to the Faqir

The operations in Waziristan had indulged the British government in so many complications. To save her face she designed a conspiracy with the Afghan government to convince the Faqir that the British

government is willing to leave Waziristan if the Faqir promise not to attack the retiring army. The Afghan government advised the Faqir to stop all his anti-British activities until conditions for peace are settled.

In this regard Malik Musa Khan Mahsud, an Afghan allowance holder received a Farman from Pir Muhammad Khan Firqa Musher of Urgun. Farman called for leading Afghan allowance holders to hold Jirga with the Faqir and persuade him to make peace. Faqir of Ippi queried authenticity of the Farman and Musa Khan volunteered to wire Kabul for confirmation. Meanwhile he invited the Faqir to come to Shawal and also informed the British government of the progress.

Faqir Ippi was suspicious about the authenticity of the offer, even then he accepted the invitation and proceeded towards Shawal on August 10, 1937.[179] A mammoth meeting of Wazirs, Bhittanis, Mahsuds and other prominent tribes attended by ten thousand tribesmen was held on Shawal mountain on August 16, 1937. Faqir of Ippi, Shahzada Fazal Din, Musa Khan, Shewa Faqir, Malik Hayat Khan, the son of Zangi Khan and the nephew of Din Faqir and other leading men and U'lema participated in it.

The Shewa Faqir bore the expenses incurred on the first day of the meeting. On the second day Mullah Sher Ali also reached there. It was explained that the object of convening the meeting was to consider the letter received from the Prime Minister of Afghanistan through Hakim-e-Urgun. At the same time Faqir of Ippi asked the tribes not to attack government forces up to September 12, 1937,

during this interval they expected to receive the Afghan Premier's reply to their letter.

After that they would chalk out a line of action for which a separate Jirga would be called. The leaders held a separate meeting away from the gathering to consider the Afghan Premier's letter. They wrote the following conditions to the Afghan Premier.

1. Islam Bibi should be handed over back to the Muslims.
2. Islamic Laws should be promulgated in Waziristan.
3. British government should evacuate Waziristan permanently.
4. All the prisoners caught during the operations should be sent free.

The reply was sent in a sealed envelope to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile rumours spread everywhere that the British government is leaving Waziristan. Another Jirga was held at Ladha at which the Political Agent spent three days holding separate conversations with the Malazai, Manzai and Shaman Khel tribes to convince them that the letter alleged to be written by the Afghan Premier was a concocted letter and that they had been deceived. He also told that, if they did not believe his version to be true, he could send a few of them to Kabul on government expenses to verify this fact. The P.A. said that the government was not prepared to leave Waziristan in any case.[180]

Faqir's Emissaries in Kurrum Agency

Four emissaries of the Faqir Ippi entered the Massozai country on June 12, 1937. Their main object was to unite all the Muslim tribes, with a request for the help of the Faqir of Ippi in men, money, or at least prayers. Two of the emissaries remained in Massozai, busy in Ashi Khel (fourth sub-section of the Massozai) with the Lashkar of Mastu Khel Dalmazai, Mardu Khel (sub-section of Massozai); in order to bring all the Massozai into one union to facilitate decisions in cases and truces etc.

The two other emissaries proceeded then on July 6, 1937, with a following of Massozai and Chamkanni to a number of about 400, to Afridi Tirah. They toured Dre China, Qambar Khel village and Bagh where they addressed the gathering with the following requests:

i. that the Massozai and Chamkannis should be included in the Sarishta.
ii. that a combined Jirga of Afridis, Massozais and Chamkannis should visit Mohmand area to persuade the Mohmand to join the Sarishta.
iii. the Afridis should settle their inter sectional disputes.

The emissaries with 20 Wazirs, 20 Massozais, 20 Chamkannis and 10 Afridis deputation arrived in Ali Khel Orakzai on July 11, 1937 and held Jirgas in different villages up to July 19, 1937. They left for Tirah on July 20, 1937 in order to advocate an Afridi-Orakzai Sarishta.

Another Jirga of Para Chamkannis and Massozai was convened on July 23, 1937 at Doga and addressed by two emissaries of the Faqir. They persuaded the audience to attack on Badama Militia post. Later they moved to Mian Wali Baba shrine, situated between Khani Khel and Massozai limits, adjudicating local quarrels. The leader of the party was Lataf Shah, accompanied by his brother Gharib Shah with his followers, the young Faqir. They continued their efforts for an Islamic Unity.[181]

Another prominent figure was Ghazi Maulvi Abdur-Rahman of Murghan (Alisherzai) Kurram Agency, who played the role of the brother of the Faqir, preaching against the British and mobilizing the inhabitants to raise the banner of revolt against the government. In this connection he contacted Mir Muhammad Khan of Sadda and sought his help in mobilizing Turis and Sunnis and to join him in the cause of Islam.

Interestingly Mir Muhammad Khan had also hobnobbed with the British. The government had asked the Khan to get in touch with the Maulvi pretending himself sympathizer of the Faqir. Maulvi Abdur Rahman sent a letter to the Faqir through Abdul Rahim to send a certificate that the Maulvi was his brother, and has sent him to Tirah under his orders and all Muslims should accept what he say. The certificate was sent by the Faqir which was widely circulated among the people.[182]

Faqir of Ippi wrote a letter to Maulvi Abdur-Rahman on September 25, 1937, praising the assistance of Malik Mir Muhammad Khan of Sadda. The salient features of his letter are as follows: [183]

> *We are trying our best to collect a heavy Lashkar by the third day Eid-ul-Fitr so that we may start ghaza in Thal and Spinwam areas. Now I have no trouble. I got help from all sides. You should collect the Lashkar of Orakzai by that date. The Malik should also keep united the Sunni and Shia in his country for the service of Islam, because service of this sort is binding on every Muslim whether he is a Sunni or Shia. All the Muslims are one of the same religion, and are the followers of Hazrat Muhammad (S.A.W).*

Although no hostile Lashkar remained in the field, a number of small groups under Mullah Sher Ali, Sherzaman, Khonia Khel and Din Faqir etc were active, and offenses on the roads, picquets and Khassadar post showed a marked increase. Faqir of Ippi had now moved his headquarters to the caves in the Shawal area, between Razmak and the Durand line where he established his new headquarters.

Increasing numbers of tribesmen, Mahsuds, Wazirs and Afghan subjects as well, visited him, and owing to his ceaseless and virulent anti-government propaganda, a certain number of Khassadars were persuaded to desert their posts.[184] Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan become the target of kidnappers, mostly Bhittanis, Mahsuds and Wazirs.

The Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan advised the Hindus residing in the Tank sub-division to shift from unsafe villages to safe

localities like Tank and Gul Imam. The Hindus of Pai were instructed not to remain in Pai. In addition rifles were given to the residents of the affected areas for the purpose of defence.[185]

The government dropped handbills from air in the Bhittani territory warning the inhabitants to safely restore before sunset of August 27, 1937 ten Hindus kidnapped, during past twenty days from Tank Tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan failing which their country excluding south of Shuza and within five miles of the British border will be blocked by air action.[186]

Air blockade was imposed which was twice suspended during September, to enable the Maliks to negotiate for the return of the kidnapped Hindus. The air action ceased in the month of October, 1937 after the captives were released. On the other hand the Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan Major A.A. Russel fined Rs.1000/- the residents of Pai under section 22 F.C.R. for not helping the lady who was kidnapped from the centre of the village.[187] Even at some places orders were issued that any of the resident passing night in certain villages will be fined rupees five per night.[188]

Many Hindus were leaving the villages and pouring into the Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Tank cities. The Hindu shopkeepers of Datta Khel had closed their shops and came to Bannu proper.[189] Dr. Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister of the Frontier Province promised in the Assembly debate to tour every village in the suffered area and to restore confidence of the people.[190]

The tribes in the Shawal area had already been warned not to harbour the Faqir, but this was unabated. Later, notices were dropped on September 24, 1937 proscribing the locality in which the Faqir was residing. Air action compelled the Faqir to shift his headquarters to the Madda Khel area.

Operations in the Upper Badar and Khaisora Valleys

Mullah Sher Ali had raised a gang of some 300 Mahsuds in the early September 1937 and attacked Khassadar posts in Sharwangi Narai and Torwam. He had also attacked Chaudwan village in Dera Ismail Khan. The government took punitive air action against the inhabitants of upper Badar, Main Toi valleys etc. The area was proscribed which minimized the numbers of the Lashkar.

In addition operations were undertaken by the land forces. The Razmak Brigade moved to Ladha, and the Bannu Brigade from Asman Manza operated in the upper Badar Valley, west of Kaniguram, and later moved to Torwam in order to carry out punitive operations in the Khaisora valley. These resulted in the dispersal of the Lashkar, the submission of the offending sections, on which fines were imposed.

With the dispersal of Sher Ali's Lashkar small group of hostile Mahsuds and Wazir began to assemble in the Razmak area. Sniping occurred, telegraph lines were cut and Khassadars protecting the damage water pipe line were forced to withdraw, seven Khassadars

being captured. The government took punitive action by land and air forces, as a result of which a large number of the group disappeared. The same was the case of Razmak area. Accordingly punitive action was taken by air and land forces.

Three I.O.R wounded from the government side. In the area of Sham and Shaktu Algad progress in the road construction was maintained with the normal incidents of the Faqir's Lashkar. In the Wana area, a hostile group of Ahmadzai Wazir continued sniping and telegraph wire cutting, damaging bridges between Wana and Tanai and destroyed Khassadar posts at Garm and Karabkot. Another group of about fifty attacked the range picquets at Sarwakai killing one Indian Officer and three I.O.Rs.

The Faqir had now moved to Madda Khel territory near the Durand line. His propaganda had effects on the Afghan tribes of Khost, which led to an increase in hostilities particularly in the area about Spinwam. A group of some 150 tribesmen, including Tori Khel, Madda Khel and Afghans attacked Khassadar posts, damaged and blocked the road and offered opposition to the repair parties. The government sent the column on October 20, 1937 in the area. The column was opposed; the Lashkar suffered twelve casualties with eight rifles. The column lost three I.O.R killed, sixteen I.O.R wounded.

Mullah Sher Ali again collected a group of 150 hostile tribesmen. It attacked on South Waziristan Scouts in the area west of Tiarza post on October 19, 1937. The Scouts were reinforced by military from

Wana and R.A.F also provided close support. The government casualties were two Scouts killed and one wounded. On the following day the group again attacked the Scouts at Inzar Narai, two I.O.R were wounded.

The government started punitive air action against Abdur-Rahman Khel and Shaman Khel Mahsuds for attacking on troops at Sarwakai in September, 1937, and October 5-13, 1937. The troops also visited the Splitoi area on October 12, 21, 1937 and returned to Razmak without opposition.

Faqir Ippi in Khost (Afghanistan)

During November 1937, the tribal situation continued to improve, and there was a steady progress towards a return to normal conditions. The Faqir was still at large. Driven out of Tori Khel and Mahsud countries, he was hiding particularly with the Madda Khel and early in the month the Madda Khel complied with the orders that were issued for his expulsion; the Faqir migrated in the adjoining Afghan district of Khost on November 10, 1937. Since then he was constantly changing his location moving to one side or other of the Durand line.

Visit of Commander-in-Chief to Waziristan

To enable important areas to be visited by troops, operations were carried out by the Ist Infantry Brigade on the north of the Tochi River from Mir Ali and the 9th Infantry Brigade from Miranshah. These

troops concentrated at Biche Kashkai in the Khaisora valley. The 9th Brigade moved from Boya to Damdil and then to Jaler Algad and Biche Kashkai. The Ist Infantry Brigade moved into the lower Shaktu Valley between November 16 and 18, 1937.

The Brigade was attacked by a group of 150 tribesmen. The casualties of the government were four killed and nineteen wounded while the tribesmen suffered about 30 killed and wounded (see Table 8 on next page). In order to facilitate future control in this area a motor able road was constructed from Rocha, near the eastern end of the Khaisora Valley to the village of Karkanwam in the lower Shaktu and thence to join the frontier road at Jani Khel.

At the end of November 1937, the commander-in-Chief visited Waziristan. He motored along all the newly constructed roads, and inspected contingents from all formations and units which had taken part in the operations.

Suspension of the Operations

The road construction programme having been completed, the withdrawal of troops additional to the normal garrison of Waziristan commenced at the beginning of December, 1937. Two new Scouts posts, one in the Khaisora Valley at Biche Kashkai and the other at Gariom had been constructed.

The Wazirforce, specially established for the operations on April 20, 1937 ceased to exist on December 15, 1937 and military and political

control in Waziristan was delegated by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command to the General Officer Commanding Waziristan District, with his headquarters at Dera Ismail Khan.[191] The District was organized into the following areas, under the Commanders shown:[192]

Area	Commander	Area H.Q.
Bannu	Comdr. Bannu Brigade	Bannu
Mir Ali	Comdr. 3 Inf. Bde	Mir Ali
Razmak	Comdr. Razmak Brigade	Razmak
Wana	Comdr. Wana Brigade	Wana

Major General A.F. Fartley was appointed as the Commander of Waziristan District and was authorized to: [193]

a. deal with local political questions in the North and South Waziristan Agencies and in the tribal areas of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts in consultation with the Resident in Waziristan;
b. control the F.C., District Armed Reserve and Levies in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu civil Districts for defence of civil population against raiders
c. One flight, 5(A.C.) Squadron, R.A.F. Miranshah was placed under his command.

Table 8. Details of casualties from government and Faqir Ippi's side w.e.f. March, 1937 to December, 1937.

	Killed					Wounded					Died of Wounds				
Army	B.O	I.O	B.O.R	I.O.R	Folls.	B.O	I.O.	B.O.R.	I.O.R.	Folls.	B.O	I.O.	B.O.R.	I.O.R.	Folls
	11	6	14	117	-	18	8	58	393	7	1	-	7	22	-
R.A.F	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil:															
Scouts	-	-	-	14	-	-	5	-	35	-	1	-	-	2	-
F.C.	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	-
Bagai Motor Service	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-
Total	12	6	15	137	4	18	13	58	431	10	2	2	7	24	739

Casualties of Faqir Ippi's Lashkar: Killed Wounded
Total 774 663 1437

Source: *File No.361 S.T.B. (Vol.I) T.R.C. Peshawar.*

SKETCH MAP OF WAZIRISTAN BOUNDARIES



Although conditions generally had greatly improved and large scale hostility to government had ceased, the excitement engendered had not entirely subsided. Hostile activities such as sniping of posts and government forces, damage to roads and culverts, cutting of telegraph and telephone lines, robberies and kidnapping were committed in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.[194]

Faqir of Ippi had settled down in Madda Khel area, sometimes living in the house of Gulmat Shah, Madda Khel, west of Datta Khel, near the Afghan border, and sometimes visiting the village in Maizar area. During these visits to Maizar Ippi's father-in-law and family remained in Gulmat Shah's Kot. He was making stronger propaganda on both sides of the Durand line for the raising of a Lashkar. He had sent messages to the various tribes telling them that their help would shortly be required. He had been visited by Sher Ali, Doz Gul Abdullai, representatives of Malik Farmanullah Khan, Zilli Khel, Gagu, Gulla Jan Tori Khel and Khonia Khel Jalal Khel. The Faqir had started issuing to his followers two types of arm badges. Some three hundred badges were issued in January 1938.[195]

The tribes of Waziristan still looked on the Faqir as a very holy man whose miraculous powers placed him beyond earthly control of any kind. The feeling of the tribes at present was one of sympathetic interest but one of apathy to any suggestion of action, i.e. the general feeling was that it will take more than propaganda to start hostilities. To do this it was necessary to instigate the feelings of injustice among

tribes and to rouse the tribes in defence of what they considered their right. The ordinary hostile tribesmen had nothing to lose. He was well prepared to die in the cause of the Faqir.

There were no definite signs that the Faqir desired reconciliation with government. In this connection the following reasons were noteworthy: [196]

i. Faqir of Ippi had, as his patrons, some influential Maliks and Mullahs on his side such as Khandan, Abdullah, Khonia Khel, Hayat Khan and Mullah Fazal Din, Mullah Sher Ali etc;
ii. he had never been in want of a residence nor had been in exile. He had been treated as an honoured guest whenever he went;
iii. collection of grain, cash, in shape of Zakat, ushr and charity in many villages still continued and even if tribes were not able to supply men, sympathy in Ippi's cause was displayed by supplying rations;
iv. Ippi still had a number of energetic hands ready to work for him as the nucleus of his force.

So long as those conditions remained, a desire for reconciliation with government was unlikely. He was popular and respected.

Raid on Kaitu and Spinwam

Since the end of October 1937, when the Ahmadzai Suleiman Khel

Ghilzais (who in winter occupied the grazing grounds on northern bank of the Kaitu on both sides of the Durand Line) moved to their winter quarters, this tribe showed an interest in Ippi's cause. It was reported that on November 7, 1937 Malik Muhammad Jan Suleiman Khel, their Chief Malik, had sent his son to Sherzaman (the elder brother of Ippi) with Rs.1000/- as Shukrana and offered his tribe's help by supplying ammunition, sheep and goats to his Lashkar.

On January 2, 1938 it was reported that Sherzaman had effected a settlement between the Ahmadzai Wazirs of the Ghoreshta and the Ghilzais of Muhammad Jan's kirri; that in gratitude both parties had promised on oath to help Ippi's cause. The Ghilzais sent one hundred sheep, flour and rice to Landar in Kozha area for the Ippi's Lashkar living there on January 7, 1938.

These hostiles had been joined by a party of Jajis and Mangals who intended to assist them in raiding when the weather improved. On the same day Gagu, Gulla Jan and some other hostiles from Kozha proceeded to Maizar to interview Faqir of Ippi. When this party returned to Kozha, they brought with them cannon of tribal manufacture and ammunition.

They caused some renewed excitement among the tribes who had not been expecting further hostilities until after Eid-ul-Azha. On January 17, 1938, Gagu assisted by some 80 companions, including Ghilzais, attacked a Tochi Scout piquet near Spinwam. About sixteen shots were fired from the cannon but no serious damage was done.

Troops assisted by aircraft and armoured cars were sent to Spinwam from Mir Ali and dispersed the group, who lost two men, and six wounded.

In another encounter on Tabai Narai two I.O.R. were wounded and few mules were hit while from the Faqir's followers at least one was killed and five wounded.[197] The main purpose of this attack was to involve the Ghilzais in hostilities while they were still in Spinwam area. In February they usually begin to move back across the Durand Line, and therefore to wait for Eid (which was to be celebrated on February 12, 1938) was too late.

In addition there was a very strong rumour in North Waziristan at the time that troops were shortly going to Maizar (Madda Khel area). This rumour was prevalent not only in Madda Khel but also in the Kaitu, and started on Malik Khandan's return from a recent visit to Peshawar. The raid on Spinwam was a diversion of interest of the government from Maizar.[198]

Madda Khel Jirga

Faqir Ippi's popularity and respect among the tribes and the danger of future trouble persuaded the government to summon the Madda Khel Jirga. The Jirga was seen on January 22, 1938 by the Resident. Malik Khandan and his uncle Abdullah Khan were absent. They were informed that the fine imposed upon the tribe because of the Beatty

murder was still due. They requested to accept part of payment, the 100 rifles, now in deposit as security valued at Rs.15,000/; also that Rs.1600/- had been paid by their timber contractor and that the remaining Rs.2500/- would be paid till the middle of February 1938. This request was accepted.

The Jirga was informed about the recent tour of Malik Khandan Khan and Abdullah Khan to Peshawar to interview the Governor. The Governor had warned them of the consequences of harbouring the Faqir. The Jirga was threatened that government would be compelled to place the responsibility for any future hostilities in Waziristan, instigated by the Faqir upon the Madda Khel, as they had allowed him to establish himself in their country.

The Jirga denied the presence of the Faqir in their limits and the spokesman Malik Arsala Khan promised to hold a tribal Jirga on the matter. The government gave the Jirga two options; to expel the Faqir or to keep him and give security for his future good behaviour. They were given fifteen days to decide.[199]

Cunningham's Offer to The Faqir

The government had been considering position in Waziristan with particular reference to presence of the Faqir in the Madda Khel area. He continued to maintain connection with hostile elements in Waziristan and was endeavouring to arouse fresh enthusiasm for his

prestige which was becoming more formidable as time passed and he remained undisturbed.

Cunningham was hoping to arrange for him to go into retirement in Swat where Wali, who was very friendly with the British government, would keep him out of mischief. But so long as he received harbourage from Madda Khel and was able from there to communicate with supporters in Afghanistan and to stimulate enthusiasm by attack on government forces, there was little chance of his agreeing to give up struggle. The government was extremely anxious to end this tension which kept an extra Brigade in Waziristan at considerable cost.[200]

Conference on Waziristan

A conference was held at Rawalpindi on February 1, 1938 at which Governor General, Coleridge, C.G.C$ and Resident Waziristan were present. The conference concluded that: [201]

a. The Faqir should not be allowed to remain in Madda Khel area, unless adequate restrictions are imposed on his activities;
b. ultimatum should be given to Madda Khel, ordering them within specified period either to give satisfactory guarantees for the Faqir's good behaviour, or evict him, otherwise they will be severely punished. In this regard following action was recommended:

1. Madda Khel Jirga would be summoned on February 8, 1938 and given the orders to comply within ten days;
2. If these orders were not complied with action would be taken simultaneously;
   i. economic blockade including closing of trade, restriction outside tribal limit and stoppage of allowance;
   ii. punitive air action against selected targets of influential and tribal leaders.
3. If these actions failed, an air blockade of Madda Khel territory;
4. If (2) and (3) failed, combined operations by land and air would be considered.

The government considered possible reaction among Afghan tribes and opined that it was in the interest of Afghan government that the Faqir should be dealt with. General Coleridge was instructed that the nature of punishment should only be conveyed to the leading Maliks privately.

The Madda Khel Jirga was seen on February 8, 1938. The Maliks expressed their willingness to comply with the terms but requested for short extension of time to enable them to obtain co-operation of the whole tribe. Twenty days grace was granted.[202]

Madda Khel Gathering on Eid

Eid meetings among the tribes are annual affairs at which tribal

matters are discussed. These were held in three places in Madda Khel on February 11-12, 1938; at Narakai under Malik Badar Din, Khonat and Khongai; at Bibi under Malik Arsala Khan, Dalai, Said Musa, Khonas Gul, and at Shawangi under Malik Khandan Khan and Abdullah Khan.

The ongoing situation was discussed in these meetings. All were agreed that Ippi's presence in Madda Khel should be denied and that he should not be evicted unless he himself decided to move to another place. At the Bibi meeting under Arsala Khan, Malik Said Musa took a strong stand against either eviction or security. Following him, Mullah Zar Sherin produced a letter from Faqir of Ippi which he read out. It asked for the skins of the animals slaughtered at Eid to be sent to Ippi. At the other two meetings the attitude was not so much "we cannot evict Ippi" as "we are afraid to evict Ippi" on superstitious grounds.

Apart from Madda Khel meetings two very large meetings were held at Tal in Tochi and at Idak in North Waziristan. In South Waziristan one of the meetings showed a more hostile tendency. At Kharlai Khula a meeting of Shabi Khel, Kikarai and Marsanzai at which Khonia Khel was present was addressed by Mullahs from each tribe asking them to make sacrifices in the cause of their religion. Arrangements were made for the collection of skins to be sent to Ippi, and Khonia Khel appealed for financial help. Mullahs were also appointed to collect skins in Kotkai, Sararogha and Piazha areas.[203]

Arrest of Malik Akbar Ali Khan

Malik Khandan Khan sent for Akbar Ali Khan, a Congress Leader and M.L.A. from Bannu to Miranshah through a special messenger. Akbar Ali Khan left Bannu for Miranshah and arrived there on the morning of February 9, 1938, spent a few hours with Malik Khandan Khan. They talked secretly and all orders of the Governor, N.W.F.P. and the reply of Madda Khel were explained to Akbar Ali Khan.

On this Akbar Ali Khan advised Khandan Khan to make a representation from all big Wazirs and Mahsud Maliks duly supported by their thumb impressions, stating therein as to how the government could forcibly interfere in their independence, and send it to Malik Akbar Ali Khan for onward dispatch to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who will pass on to the prominent Congress Leaders for obtaining their opinion in the matter.[204]

Akbar Ali Khan paid a second visit to Miranshah on February 16, 1938 and was arrested along with his son by the political authorities under U/S 21 F.C.R.[205] His son was expelled from Agency under Section 121-A of Indian Penal Code.[206]

Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, M.L.A., attempted to raise the question of Akbar Ali Khan's arrest in Assembly on February 21, 1938. The government alleged Akbar Ali Khan of fostering and instigating trouble in Waziristan.[207]

Nehru's Visit of Bannu

Pundit Jawaharlal Lal Nehru along with Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Bannu on January 26, 1938. He delivered a speech to a large audience of 20,000 including a number of tribesmen. Replying to certain fears mentioned in the various addresses on behalf of Hindu and Sikh associations, Nehru said their plea of being a small minority was not proper and tenable. They had to share the joys and sorrows with the people inhabiting the province and create mutual confidence. And indeed their strongest armour would be their friendship with them.

No better safety could they get than through their ties of intimacy with the rest of the people. Recalling the gallant part played by Indian women in the cause of independence, he appealed to the women assembled there not to depend on any one for protection. They must have self-confidence to be courageous.[208] Referring feelingly to his daughter, Indira, he said that: [209]

> *I have a daughter, an only child, young in years, whom I sent abroad for her education if she happened to come to the Frontier Territory, as I hoped she would, I would unhesitatingly and willingly agree to her going to Waziristan unaccompanied, for I was confident that she could look after herself and I was equally confident that the Wazir would welcome her and treat her as a friend and guest.*

Referring to Faqir of Ippi's letter to him, Nehru said that the Faqir emphatically resented the gross accusations leveled against him by interested person who had their own axe to grind. The letter written in

Persian was addressed to him as Congress President, and the invitation was extended to him and other Congress leaders to visit the territory and verify the truth of their statements. He severely criticized the Forward Policy and asked: [210]

> *Do you think the British Government invaded Waziristan because, say, one or two or some Hindu women had been kidnapped? That is not the way of the British Government. There are other ways to get back the women. The trans-border territory is invaded in furtherance of imperialist designs and to push back their frontiers and to strengthen themselves. They make such accusations as tribal raids as only a pretext. There can be no justification whatever for the waste of millions of our money.*

He stressed that the trouble of Waziristan was economic and not religious or communal. Responding to Nehru's tour, Mullah Sher Zaman (elder brother of the Faqir) sent a letter to Akbar Ali Khan, M.L.A., of the Bannu Congress Party on February 12, 1938, as: [211]

> *We have learnt with much sorrow that Jawaharlal Lal Nehru has delivered several speeches, in which he has mentioned several things against the thought of Ippi, for which Ippi is very angry. All efforts of Ippi in connection with Waziristan disturbances are only for the sake of welfare of Islam and to save Islamic matters from the interference and attack of infidels. We think that somebody has misrepresented Jawaharlal Lal Nehru and the fault lies on your shoulder.*

On the other hand Hindu Community in Bannu was not satisfied by Nehru's justification and support to the Faqir. It was reported that one

Kartar Singh, caste Byi Khel, newspaper seller in Bannu City, and Kanshi Ram Chawla, tailor, Chowk Bazar, Bannu City had condemned the statement of Nehru publically.[212]

Congress Members subscriptions to the Faqir

The relations of Congress and the Faqir are believed to be cordial from the first day of the movement. In this regard Nehru mentioned a letter from the Faqir to his daughter Indira Gandhi on January 30, 1938.[213] Later, when he visited Bannu, he instructed the Hindus and Muslims Congress members to collect subscriptions for Ippi's help.

When Akbar Ali Khan visited Malik Khandan on Feb. 9, 1938, he delivered a letter brought by him from Bannu to Ippi and told him that "soon after Eid Hindus and Muslims will gather subscriptions for Ippi's help as these instructions have been received by the Congress from their head office." On Eid day the following subscriptions were collected in Bazar Ahmad Khan, Bannu city.[214]

S.No.	Name	Amount	Remarks
1.	Seth Loku Ram, Hooja	Rs.50/-	(He had trade with Khost (Afghanistan) people, where he usually went)
2.	Khan Chand, Narula	Rs.50/-	-
3.	Tora Chand, Gulati	Rs.30/-	(He was a partner with Dunger, Khushali Tori Khel, and contractor in Bannu Cantt.)
4.	Seth Neku Ram, Kanal	Rs.20/-	-
5.	Sher Chand, cloth merchant	Rs.20/-	(Belonged to Khiddi, Daur village. Since 4 years he settled in Bannu and opened a shop.)
6.	Haji Aslam Khan, Bazar Ahmad Khan	Rs.60/-	-
7.	Salim Khan, Bazar Ahmad Khan	Rs.30	-
8.	Perma Nand, cloth merchant	Rs.30/-	-
9.	Mullah Abdur Rahman	Rs.90/-	-
10.	Shajan Bannuchi, Physician	Rs.80/-	-
11.	Shah Jehan, Congress Leader of Sokari, Bannu	Rs.30/-	-
12.	Damsaz Khan, Contractor of Bazar Ahmad Khan	Rs.300/-	-

These subscriptions were collected through efforts of Salim Khan, Bazar Ahmad Khan and Master Kewal Ram, Congress Leader. It is noteworthy that all the persons mentioned above did not belong to Congress; some of them belonged to All India Muslim League, like Damsaz Khan who was the president of Bannu Muslim League. Later the money was sent by Aslam Khan through a Bannuchi on February 14, 1938. The said person was arrested by the authorities on return from Datta Khel in Miranshah Sarai on February 16, 1938.[215]

Strategic Settlements of Hostiles

The year of 1938 saw some hostile leaders coming in and making

peace with the government. The objective of the government was to low the moral of the Faqir's movement while the hostile leaders made peace with the government only to minimize pressure on their tribe. In January 1938, Badegai, Gujar Shabi Khel, Mahsud, Malik Bostan Langar Khel, Tarmachai and Rabatai Jalal Khel and Alam Gul Shingi made their peace agreements with the government.

Din Faqir saw the Political Agent South Waziristan in December, 1937 and promised to return in a month's time to make peace agreement with the government but never did so. Astan Muhammad Bhittani surrendered himself to the Bannu authorities. Malik Sarwar Shahur Shaman Khel hostile came in and gave security of Rs.4000/- for future good behaviour. Najim Shingi hostile of Jangal settled his case on January 15, 1938.[216] Janat Titi Madda Khel, Watai Zawe Saidgi, Ahmad Shah, Asad Khel Mohmit Khel, Mullah Juma Gul Aba Khel Mohsud, Faqir, Darang, Gulzang, and Khailajan etc. made peace agreements with the government.[217]

Khonia Khel, Jalal Khel Mahsud who was responsible for the Shahur Tangi set back made peace in February 1938. Interestingly these hostiles did not bother to take part in future hostilities. Malik Sarwar was killed in such an encounter with the government and Khonia Khel refused to fulfill the conditions of guarantees.

Madda Khel Affairs - third Jirga

The time limit given to Madda Khel lapsed comparatively quite. It was supposed that Khandan Khan and his friends had done their utmost to make Ippi refrain from hostile action during this period. The Faqir was still in Madda Khel area. He was hopeful that the government would take such action against Madda Khel that the tribe would be driven into open and thus provide him a Lashkar. Khandan Khan and his friends were probably anxious for Ippi to shift at some place reasonably distant from Madda Khel country on the expiry of the 20 days. Government would then be assured that Ippi was not with them. Faqir of Ippi had not yet done so. There were three alternatives open to the government:

1. To carry out the programme laid down i.e. economic blockade and bombing to force the Madda Khel to comply with the terms. But the government was not sure that this action would force the Madda Khel to give security for Ippi's future good behaviour. The probable result of this action was
    i. Ippi will come into open somewhere and attempt to raise a Lashkar;
    ii. Madda Khel will start hostile activities either independently or with Ippi;
2. economic blockade action only keeping the bombing threat over the heads of the Madda Khel. It was probable that the Faqir would leave Madda Khel area without resentment in the tribe as

to cause them to become openly hostile;

3. to deal with the Madda Khel in this way:
    i. Madda Khel would be told that Ippi is still with them or under their influence;
    ii. they have failed to give security;
    iii. the government would insist on their responsibility for Ippi and all his activities. The government shall treat them as if they had given security. In order to save themselves, therefore, they should keep him in the same way as if they had given us written security.

The government was convinced that it might enable her to restrict the activities of the Faqir far more effectively than by forcing his expulsion and in view of the general situation in Waziristan, Khost and Katawaz.[218]

The Madda Khel Jirga was interviewed at Miranshah by the government representatives on March 1, 1938. It was fully representative. It was informed that the government was convinced that the Faqir had remained with Madda Khel or in country immediately under their influence and that they had made no effort to evict him or give security in spite of 20 days grace given to them. Khandan Khan and his followers denied all knowledge of the Faqir and his whereabouts but another Malik Arsala Khan accused Khandan of hiding him and thus bringing all trouble on Madda Khel. The atmosphere was very tense.

The Jirga was told that in order to safeguard themselves against further punishment they would be wise to continue to keep the Faqir and secure his good behaviour as they would be held responsible for outbreak instigated by the Faqir. Notices will be dropped at first light on March 3, 1938 and bombing will commence at first light on March 5, 1938.[219]

Bombing on Madda Khel

The villages chosen for punitive action included followers of both Khandan and Arsala, but the majority were of Khandan's party.

The details are given as:

Village Name	Tribe	Party
Stara Kazha	Nazar Khel Khazar Khel Macha	Khandan's party
Wucha Kazha	Boder Khel	
Sarrum	Macha	
Sar Kalai	Khoji Khel	1/3 Arsala's party 2/3 Khandan's party

The bombing continued for three days and the result was bitter. Approximately 450 bombs (ranging from 20 lbs. to 500 lbs.) and 1100 incendiary bombs were dropped. The majority of the houses and towers in the villages were badly damaged, and a number of towers knocked down. The reaction of the bombing was impending attacks on Datta Khel fort and on Scout gasht in that area. During the bombing two Khoji Khel of Sar Kalai were killed and three wounded.

Faqir Ippi's Movement to Gurvekht

Gurvekht Algad (pronounced by the locals as Gurvek) is grazing area used by Kabul Khel paipalis, Kharsin Saidgis and Macha Madda Khel. There is running water in the nullah and some big natural caves on the west bank. The actual cave occupied by the Faqir was said to be about seven miles upstream from the junction of the Gurvekht and Margha Algads, the place being called Shara Chandah. The ownership was so disputed between Kharsin and Machas that cultivable land was left uncultivated and the area was used for grazing only.

To this area the Faqir moved on March 1, 1938, himself from Sarkalai in Maizar, his father-in-law from Gulmat Shah's kot and his baggage from Malik Said Musa's village, Jambe Khel in the Kozha. The cave chosen was only a few miles away from the previous headquarters at Gulmat Shah's Kot. He was in touch with the same people and tribes, and remained under the patronage of the Madda Khel.

The three days following the Jirga were taken up by a visit of Khandan and other Maliks of his party to the Faqir at Gurvekht. The purpose of the visit was to persuade him to settle down on security. During his visit they wrote several letters to the Political Agent telling him of the progress they were making. The final result was that Faqir of Ippi refused to allow security to be given saying that such a procedure would turn him Kafir; he declared he would only make terms with the

government when she began to rule the tribes by the sharia't.[220]

Another Jirga of Madda Khel was interviewed by the government representatives at Miranshah on March 18, 1938. Before government orders were announced, the Jirga was asked whether they had anything to say. In reply various speakers made remarks to this effect:

a. The tribe had endeavoured to carry out government orders but had failed to influence the Faqir to make peace;
b. they were still unable to comply owing to the attitude of the Faqir;
c. they suggested that leaders of the adjacent tribes should be asked to join them in asking the Faqir again to make peace.

The government refused to call an Utmanzai Jirga but agreed to assist them by summoning certain leading Maliks nominated by the government whom she desired to co-operate with them.[221] The Jirga was informed that while the Faqir remains peacefully within their territory, no further action will be taken against them. But should any further outbreak occurred in Waziristan, traceable to the instigation of the Faqir or his followers while he is in Madda Khel area, government will take such action against the tribe as she considered desirable.[222]

Certain delays occurred in the dispatch of the deputation. The Kabul Khel were not at first willing to join through fear of taking on themselves the burden of responsibility for future developments. But by March 31, 1938 all the nominated Maliks assembled at Datta Khel.

In the meantime Khandan Khan had written to the Political Agent suggesting that Mullah Fazal Din and certain other Maliks should be added to the Jirga.

The government was not prepared to include Fazal Din due to his support to the Faqir. In the light of subsequent events, it appeared that the request was made by Khandan with a view further to delay the dispatch of the peace mission, for when it became apparent that the Jirga was about to precede a report immediately circulated that the Faqir had moved from Gurvekht to an unknown destination.

The reason of delay on the side of Khandan was that the Madda Khel Jirga of March 18, 1938 were expecting an announcement of further punishment either in the form of hostages or aerial action for non-compliance with the government's orders. Finding that no further action was intended against them, they, therefore tried successfully to evade the issue of the peace mission as being no longer necessary.[223]

Arrest of Malik Shahzar Khan

British government was trying to harass every person, either influential or ordinary who had some relations with the Faqir. Shahzar Khan was given the title of Khan Sahib due to his pro-British services, but now he was suspected to have a close contact with the Faqir. He along with his brother Daulat Khan, his son and a cousin were arrested on

March 19, 1938. Before his arrest he was informed by the Political Agent the reasons of his arrest as follows: [224]

1. He was a Maddi Khel and belonged to the same section as Faqir of Ippi;
2. he had been in correspondence with Ippi and was strongly suspected of having been in league with him from the start along with Khandan and Fazal Din. The general story in North Waziristan was that Shahzar Khan, Khandan Khan and Shahzada Fazal Din had taken oaths to support Ippi's cause. The story had been repeated by a large number of influential men in the Agency and had also been told to the Resident by the Mullah of Karbogha;
3. the disunity in the Tori Khel was chiefly due to his notoriety;
4. at the Dosalli Jirga in 1937 it was Shahzar Khan who tried to prevent Tori Khel contractors working on the newly constructed roads;
5. he was sent by the authorities to Kozha to bring in his relatives in the hostile party. A very short time after his return, Azal Mir, who was his close relative, kidnapped two Hindu children from Bannu;
6. Azal Mir's son had been living in a village on the Sheratala plain for over a month. He took no action nor did he report this matter to the authorities;
7. after the death of Shahzar's wife, Azal Mir visited Spalga to offer his condolences. Shahzar made no report to this visit;

8. he had rendered no assistance whatsoever in liquidating the Tori Khel hostiles nor had he exerted any pressure on them although he was the leading Tori Khel Malik.

He and his brother Daulat Khan were sent to Peshawar and his son and a cousin were brought to Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu respectively. Later on his son and cousin were shifted to Haripur jail.

Concealment of Bombs

A new departure in the hostile acts had been the mining of roads, tracks, and even railway lines, with country made bombs or unexploded shells. Over 50 of these were laid in the roads of North Waziristan, mostly between Saidgi and Idak, while others were placed on parade grounds at Miranshah and as far afield as Kohat and Bannu. It was reported that a bomb was exploded by a party of Zadrans and Kharotis walking down the road near Idak. Four Zadrans and one Kharoti were seriously wounded.[225]

Sources of Supply

The bombs of various patterns were being collected from several sources. A few of them were unexploded artillery shells and aeroplane bombs which were collected and stored during the recent campaign, but the majorities were country made. It was reported that on February 25, 1938, Berai Zadran, purchased 300 bombs from Abdul

Aziz Khan Kharoti to supply to the Faqir. On the other hand Mianda S/o Waris, a well-known blacksmith of Mamirogha, had opened a shop between Karwanda and Mamirogha in Manzar Khel limits and was making bombs for the Faqir.

He was evicted from the area by the Manzar Khel because of government's pressure on March 19, 1938. Now he was in Gurvekht with the Faqir. Two important blacksmiths, either of Bengali or Afridi origin, were living with Dunger, Khazar Khel, Madda Khel, in the Kazha, or were making bombs.

Organization

During the week ending 12/3/38, there was a preliminary effort at road mining over an extensive area covering the Bannu-Razmak, Mir Ali-Spinwam, Mir Ali-Biche Kashkai and Dosalli-Gariom roads. When casualties of the tribesmen, walking on the road were reported, the bombing was suspended during March 12-20, 1938. Between these dates a number of notices were found warning the tribes not to use the roads. The first such notice was discovered in a Khassadar Piquet on March 11, 1938 at Idak. It was written in Pashto with following material:

> *This proclamation is from 3000 ghazis. It must be known to all Muslims that after next Friday (i.e. March 18, 1938) the concealment of bombs in the roads will be increased. Therefore if any Muslim*

has work to do which entails travelling by lorry, he should do this before next Friday. After this everyone should avoid the road.

This pamphlet was read by the Mullahs in Idak and was then sent to the Daur villages of Mubarak Shah and Hakim Khel. Later Faqir Ippi issued instructions to all local people not to use the main roads as bombs would be put everywhere when opportunity occurred. The main reason of concealment of bombs, mentioned by the followers of the Faqir was that "all our women and children and the rest of people are being bombed. For this reason we are mining the roads."[226]

Situation in South Waziristan

After the Shabi Khel baramta on December 2, 1937 there was an intervening period during which the tribe refused to come in to see Political Agent, and threatened hostilities. Finally, orders for the Jirga to proceed to Tank were dropped from aeroplanes, and after a certain amount of discussion the orders were obeyed. The Jirga was seen by the Political Agent on December 20, 1937.

The Mahsud hostiles, who were most active, were Sher Ali, Mir A'zam and Sakhi Marjan. Their united group did extensive damage to telephone wires on the Wana-Sarwakai and Wana-Ladha roads. On December 31, 1937 the Frontier Constabulary, on patrol in the lower Gomal, engaged a party of hostiles killing one of them. On the night of January 1-2, 1938, Mir A'zam destroyed some telephone wires near Jandola, and then moved to Mastang, near Chagmalai.[227]

Malik Sarwar, Shaman Khel hostile and some other prominent figures came on January 1938 and settled their cases with the government. Azal Mir, who was living in Mandech with the Mahsuds, was evicted from the area and settled down with the Zawe Saidgis west of Datta Khel near the Durand Line.[228] Immediately before the Eid, there was a noticeable increase of petty hostile acts occurred over a wide area on the same night i.e. Feb 9-10, 1938. Telephone wires were cut on the Wana-Tiarza, Sararogha-Razmak, Razmak-Ladha roads etc. A new hostile, Sialgai Langar Khel of Walma village, arose in South Waziristan, engaged sniping the Sararogha fort. Mullah Fazal Din was also making anti-government propaganda among the tribes.[229]

The Shabi Khel completed most of the terms on which the release of their prisoners were dependent. The eviction of Azal Mir, the settlement of Badegai, Dunger and Khonia Khel and the movement of Gujar to the Shaktu made 93 Shabi Khel released. Khonia Khel settlement was:

a. surrender of 10 magazine rifles;
b. furnishing a security bond of Rs.20,000 by Shabi Khel Maliks;
c. holding as hostage a cousin of Khonia Khel and a son of Malik Gulgai, Kikarai.

The Bahlolzai Jirga was dispatched by the political authorities to attempt a settlement with Sher Ali. The Jirga failed to meet him as he had gone to visit Faqir Ippi. Meanwhile Khassadars near Tiarza fired

on a group tempering with telephone wires; killing two men of Miche Khel Mahsuds. On another occasion the Khassadars extinguished a fire which had been lighted under an unexploded shell with the object of damaging a culvert.[230] Later arrests were made and at a subsequent Jirga the Miche Khel and Shabi Khel were fined for their part in the affairs.

Mullah Sher Ali left his headquarters at Samal on March 28, 1938 and visited Mulla Fazal Din. He stayed there for two nights and returned to his own headquarters. Sher Ali had requested Qazi Najibullah, Malikshahi of Kotkai to preach and urge upon the people to support his cause. Mulla Maizar Din Shabi Khel was endeavouring to collect followers under his patronage. He was digging caves in the vicinity of Machi Khel in the Khaisara Algad. Malik Hayat Khan Nazar Khel was also digging caves in the vicinity of Sine Tizha.

Action at Dargai Sar

The centre of interest had changed from North to South Waziristan due to the adventure of Sayyid Hasan Al-Gilani alias Shami Pir and Sher Ali's renewed activities after his return from Faqir of Ippi in the first week of April 1938. Sher Ali began to enlist Bahlolzai recruits for his Lashkar. By April 10, 1938 he had managed a group of 30 to 40 men, consisting of Bahlolzai, Shahur Shaman Khel, Malikshahi Wazirs and Zawe Saidgis. By April 13, the strength increased to some 150 men. He moved to the area between Kotkai and Splitoi to attack

government posts, parties and convoys.

He threatened both the Jandola Razmak and Wana roads. On April 14, 1938 two converging gasht of S.W.S. Kotkai (eight platoons) and Splitoi (six platoons) were on to the Dargai Sar (4 miles north to Splitoi) to frustrate any such intent. The advance of Kotkai gasht met with strong opposition, suffering seven casualties, they were compelled to withdraw to Kotkai. Later they moved via Jandola to assist the Splitoi gasht. The gasht from Splitoi reached Dargai Sar hills at 1020 hours without incident.

After consolidating their position, a detachment was moved to face Sher Ali's fighters. The detachment was immediately held up and Captain I.B.D. Dewar, Commanding Officer was killed. The gasht retreated to Dargai Sar, where they were engaged the whole night by Sher Ali's group. Continuous close support of R.A.F. was available to the gasht.

By the evening re-enforcement of ten platoons of S.W.S. from Kotkai, detachment of 1.F.F.R. from Manzai, Section 17 Mutineer Battery. R.A.F, 3/6 Rajput Riffles, detachment 2/8 Gurkha and 1 Light Tank Company (less one section) had also arrived at Splitoi. It was possible to withdraw the Scout gasht on Dargai SAR to Splitoi on April 15, 1938. As a result of the combined action of the Scouts and R.A.F. Eighteen tribesmen got killed and 15 wounded while on the other side two B.Os. and two IORs were killed and 10 IORs wounded.

It was noteworthy that when the Scouts saw Sher Ali's group, they were mistaken for the Splitoi gasht and the Scouts tried to get into helio communication with them because they were dressed entirely in Mazri grey similar to the Scouts uniform. The Lashkar consisted of several tribesmen who had formerly been hostiles and had made their peace. Among these were four men who had taken part in the attack on Sarwakai piquet on September 27, 1937. These were Malik Sarwar Khan Shaman Khel, Rabatai Jalal Khel and Daulatai Shaman Khel. Malik Sarwar was killed and Rabatai wounded in Darzai Sar attack.

The areas of Baddar, Maintoi and Splitoi were heavily bombed by delayed action bombs, after a warning was given to all persons to evacuate those areas with their livestock.[231]

Mullah Fazal Din, who was the main figure behind the disturbances in South Waziristan, remained in Lataka receiving several deputations of hostiles, seeking his advice and encouragement. He was anxious to keep his own tribe in a state of ferment against the government, unwilling to allow large scale hostiles in his area; for fear that the government may take action against him. He was reported to have received invitation to Kabul by the Afghan authorities along with Malik Musa Khan, probably due to increased anti-Yahya Khel propaganda of Shami Pir and ex-king Amanullah Khan.

Madda Khel Affairs

Political and military authorities, concerned with the Waziristan affairs,

held a conference at Mir Ali on April 7, 1938. Following orders were issued by G.C.O.-in-Chief, Northern Command in connection with the anti-government activities of Faqir Ippi in North Waziristan.[232]

1. Baramta (Barampta) of Madda Khel would be held;
2. Madda Khel to be summoned to a Jirga, April 12, 1938, and informed that:
    a. they will be placed under blockade (ground) for as long as the government deems fit;
    b. hostages are to be given and will be retained for as long as the government deems fit;
    c. any offence proved to have been perpetrated by members of tribe will render Madda Khel liable to punitive air action;
    d. allowances of Khandan Khan only are placed under suspension until further notice, provided he does not surrender himself;
    e. in the event of failure to produce requisite hostages by April 17, 1938, the government will take what action they consider necessary; and
    f. if outrages continue, whilst the Faqir is in their country or under their influence, the government intend to punish them by punitive air action.

3. In addition (a) measures at present pursued as summarized in paragraph 2(b) (c) (d) (e) announced to all tribal sections of North Waziristan that the government intend to strictly enforce territorial responsibility for any outrages committed. Baramta of

Madda Khel was held in the first week of April, 1938 which resulted in the arrest of 43 men, including Malik Dande, Khonat Gul and Payo Khan. Of these Khonat Gul was of Khandan's party and was a supporter of Ippi.

Madda Khel Jirga was invited at Datta Khel on April 12, 1938. About 200, including 22 Maliks, assembled in Datta Khel on that date including Abdullah Khan but not Khandan Khan or Arsala Khan. The Jirga refused to be seen inside the fort or outside surrounded by Scouts guard. Political Agent gave several opportunities to the Jirga to collect and finally gave a half an hour ultimatum during which period Jirga dispersed. The reason of refusal was the fear of their arrest.[233]

The government later dropped notices by air, inviting Jirga to Miranshah on April 25, 1938. Madda Khel were assured that no arrest would be made in connection with the Jirga. The Jirga assembled in Miranshah on April 25, 1938. Government's orders were announced to them. Political Agent asked them to produce nominated hostages including Khandan and Arsala, and then their prisoners would be released, captured during baramta. The Jirga requested to be allowed to return to their country to consult their tribes. The Faqir had settled down at Darrekhela. They were given May 7, 1938 as deadline for the compliance of the government orders.[234]

Malik Arsala's Letters to the Political Agent

The relations between Khandan and Arsala became tense when Arsala openly denounced Khandan during the process of Jirga held in Miranshah on March 1, 1938. Arsala accused Khandan of harbouring the Faqir in Sheranni area. After the Jirga it was reported that the old enmity between Khandan and Arsala had greatly intensified. Fire was set to the doors of Arsala Khan's Kot on the night of March 7-8, 1938 and the fruit trees in his orchard were destroyed. A few days later an attempt was made to set fire to a kot belonging to a relative of Khandan Khan in Rashida village of Kazha area.[235]

Arsala Khan offered his services to the government to provide information against the Faqir and Malik Khandan. He wrote a letter to the Assistant Political Agent, Miranshah on April 21, 1938. The glimpses of the letter are as follows: [236]

- The Faqir is advising the people at Darrekhela not to commit mischief among themselves because religious war is prevalent.
- Malik Khandan says that it is honour to Islam if the Madda Khel help the Faqir of Ippi.
- Malik Khandan has planned to arrest alive or kill the Political Agent when he will attend the Jirga at Madda Khel.
- Mullah Alam Khan was collecting and storing ration in the house of Malik Khonas Gul for Faqir Ippi.
- In giving evidence in the case of Faqir Ippi; I have spent two to three thousand rupees because every night I had to entertain two or three hundred men who ask me whether I have given

evidence regarding Faqir Ippi's location. It is better that I am compensated.

- I am very careful to convey information because the government put us to shame by asking the informer for witness as in the case of Lt. Beatty. I also fear from this. I do not care about the tribal fine; but shame is intolerable to a tribe.

The government's response to Khandan and Arsala can be assessed from the intelligence diaries as "one of the difference between Khandan and Arsala is that Khandan sticks to the story he has told at Jirga, whereas Arsala says one thing at a Jirga and entirely the opposite at a private interview. The latter story is very often the truth."[237]

The Madda Khel held their marakka at Maizar on May 7, 1938 which was not attended by Malik Arsala. Malik Khandan's party decided that they were unable to produce hostages as ordered by the government and government should deal with each section individually.[238] Situation in Waziristan was creating anxiety. Despite counter measures adopted by the authorities, difficulty was being experienced in liquidating Lashkars and groups in Agency whose offences were widespread. Scouts were stretched to utmost.

Faqir Ippi was located in Kharre, six miles from Durand Line, which was more convenient headquarters to initiate hostile action against the government Madda Khel had tried to attack Lwargai reservoir on the night of April 18, 1938. In addition poisoning water supply of Asad Khel and Razani; attack on Tochi Scouts; kidnapping Hindu boy; Mir

Ali bomb outrage on May 5, 1938 and kidnapping three Hindus, one Muslim from Bannu on May 7, 1938 were the offences perpetrated by Faqir Ippi. Madda Khel were told that if outrages continued whilst Faqir Ippi was in their limits, they would be punished by air action.

On May 13, 1938, the government informed the Madda Khel that: [239]

a. As they have failed to produce hostages and to take effective steps either to control the Faqir or to expel him from their country, the government has decided to take action against them and to continue this action until satisfied that:
   i. the Faqir is no longer under their protection;
   ii. he will not be readmitted; and
   iii. suitable guarantee have been given to ensure future good behaviour of the tribe.
b. that the area of their country will be proscribed forthwith after due warning to evacuate;
c. that punitive bombing of their villages will commence at once starting with Sheranni and Kashkai Janbe Khel and proceeding if necessary with other villages to be selected thereafter;
d. if in future the Faqir should return to their protection after proscription has been discontinued it will immediately be re imposed.

The Secretary of States for India advised Government of India to take all possible steps to avoid publicity of the bombing of Madda Khel. He wrote: [240]

> *... if however, any information should leak out it is suggested, with a view to obviating misleading reports and comments in press here and in America and ensuring that reasons for operations are appreciated by public, you should arrange with Reuters to send a message which would include, as our justification for action taken, a full description of recent offences traceable to Faqir of Ippi or committed by tribes and repeated opportunities given to latter for a settlement together with a reference to proceed regarding warning before air action.*

Madda Khel villages in Maizar area and in Kazha were bombed on May 29, 1938 and continued till June 1, 1938. The same area was again bombed on June 4, 1938.[241] Madda Khel Jirga was seen by the authorities on June 27, 1938. Khandan and Arsala both were absent. The Jirga was informed that the tribe should guarantee either good behaviour of the Faqir, while he continue to remain under their influence, pending his ultimate removal from Waziristan, and furnish requisite security of 300 rifles, as an earnest of their good faith.

After compliance of these terms, the Jirga will be summoned to negotiate details for his final departure, or they should prove to the government's satisfaction that the Faqir is no longer in their territory or under their influence, and that the tribes are to give guarantee never to allow the Faqir to re-enter their territory or territory under their influence. On compliance, their prisoners would be released and the blockade and proscription would be raised.

The Jirga gave written assurances that the Faqir is at Kharre which is

outside their limit; they would not permit the Faqir to return to their country failing which they would ask for the assistance of the government. The authorities suspended allowances of both Khandan and Arsala Khan and warned the tribe that blockade would be raised till the production of security of rifles.[242] Blockade was lifted and prisoners released on June 29, 1938 after the tribes deposited the rifles.

The Historic Bannu Raid

Conditions in Bannu were serious. Bomb explosions took place in the district especially at Bannu proper. The Deputy Commissioner, Bannu was F.E. Laughton, who took some measures to stop bomb explosions, but they were quite inadequate and irrelevant. Ultimately the continuous lawlessness and trouble in Bannu came to a head when in the summer on July 23, 1938, the city of Bannu itself was raided by Faqir of Ippi's Lashkar and his Lieutenants; especially Mehr Dil, early at night.

He collected a Lashkar in Changhoz Algad tribal territory, which consisted of Wazirs, Khattak, Bannuchis and Marwat in June 1938. He established himself in Juni Ghar hills, in tribal territory, some 12 miles north of Bannu. Early in July this group assumed the proportions of a Lashkar and moved southward, threatening the Bannu-Kohat Road. Government columns were sent out from Bannu and Kohat to deal with the Lashkar if it crossed the administrative border, while

reconnaissance aircraft, which had been fired on, retaliated. As a result of this action the Lashkar virtually dispersed, though remnants still remained in the Juni Ghar.

On July 8, 1938 ninety nine members of the Utmanzai tribe were arrested and detained for having assisted Mehr Dil. This tribe deposited 145 rifles as a security for future good behaviour on July 11, 1938.[243] This act on the part of the government infuriated Mehr Dil. He openly sent a threat to the government that he will attack Bannu on July 23, 1938. He along with his Lashkar of about 200 men, which had collected and been lurking near Gumatti, four miles north of Bannu came down the hills through the Ahmadzai salient in broad day light and had reached the main road near Nizam Bazar early in the afternoon, blocked the road to stop any interference by government forces and then marched forward.

The Deputy Commissioner was informed by Khan Bahadur Ghazi Marjan of the advancement of the Lashkar and its intention to attack Bannu city. Frontier Constabulary were moving out to intercept them, and firing started on the outskirts of Bannu city. Local Muslims had joined the Lashkar increasing the numbers to between 300 and 400. Simultaneously with the raid, the Kohat-Bannu road was blocked in many places. The remaining part of the Lashkar proceeded towards Bannu city.

They first shot down the perimeter lights and then forced their entry

through the gates. The arsons were perpetrated and "it appeared that no action had been taken either to prevent the occurrence or to deal effectively with it", writes Abdur-Rashid, the then Assistant Commissioner Bannu," I was in my house in the city at about 9 P.M. when I heard Volleys of shots."[244] Mehr Dil along with his Lashkar marched through Chai Bazar and offered prayers in the shop of a Muslim tailor-Master. Two of his companions Zar Gul Khattak and Abdullah Jan entered forcibly in the Police Picket of Lakki Gate. Abdullah Jan was shot dead by Nizam Khan Head Constable and Zar Gul was captured alive.

Air action was taken to effect the dispersal of the group. Additional troops and Frontier Constabulary from Kohat were moved into the Bannu District. Mehr Dil retreated safely to the neighborhood of Juni Ghar. Killing seven Hindus, destroying four miles of telephone line and looting/burning £ 30,000 of property.[245]

Peace Offers to The Faqir

The unsettled situation was a great concern to the British government. Faqir's continuous movement made him difficult to deal with, especially his camping on Afghan border. The government took the initiative to contact the Faqir through leading Maliks from all tribes in Waziristan especially through Shahzar Khan and Khandan. Shahzar Khan was released from prison for this purpose on August 8, 1938. Both these Maliks interviewed the Resident of Waziristan along with

Mullah A'lam Khan on September 26, 1938. Mullah A'lam Khan was Faqir Ippi's teacher, who proposed deputation to visit the Faqir with the British Agent in nanawati and renew peace talks. Government offered following terms for peace to the Faqir through tribal emissaries: [246]

a. no further punishment will be exacted to the Faqir and his followers provided that he settled down among the tribes to which he belonged, viz., Tori Khel or Lower Daur on assurance from tribes that he will live at peace with the government in future. Other trans-border hostiles will also be pardoned if they come in and gave assurance for future good behaviour;

b. though the government of India intended to maintain rights which they enjoyed by existing treaty with Afghanistan and by agreements with the tribes as regards control over all areas on the Indian side of the international frontier, they had no intention of acting aggressively against any tribe which fulfilled its treaty obligations and whose members remained at peace with the government;

c. Faqir of Ippi and his followers must undertake to refrain from any interference with the internal affairs of British India.

Since he left Nikaband on Sep 2, 1938, the Faqir had sheltered almost entirely in the Shawal Tangi, Madda Khel limits, dividing his time between Gugushti, Chaprai, Sankari and Rana w.e.f. 16/9/38 to 24/11/38. Government decided not to touch him up to November 1, 1938 until peace efforts are fulfilled.[247]

After most careful consideration, the British government decided not

to delay action against the Faqir who was now in the neighborhood of Durand Line (Mastoi-Margha area) in Madda Khel country. The Faqir did not react favourably to any proposals for peace and his lieutenants and supporters remained active in committing offences against the government forces in Waziristan.

Government considered it necessary to take action against him during the present winter season when pressure exerted was rendered more effective by climatic conditions. The bombing of Shawal Tangi began on December 4, 1938; ten days after Ippi had left. It was decided that the areas of Mastoi, Margha and Gurvekht Algad would be proscribed from December 21, 1938.[248]

Convoy Halt- RAZCOL-1939

Convoy Razmak-Bannu (1939)

Officers Tents, Razani- 1939

Razmak Bannu Road-1939

Rifle Inspection (Razani Camp-1939) before heading out on road protection

Waziristan-1939

South Waziristan-1939

Waziristan Today



Athanr (Tribal Dance)

(Tribal Gathering-1939)

War Planes on Waziristan-1939

Waziristan-scenic view

Unrest in South Waziristan

Mullah Fazal Din was the chief hostile in South Waziristan and the front rank supporter of the Faqir against whom punitive action had so far been withheld. Shabi Khel, Manzar Khel and some other tribes were directly under his influence. There were some hostile groups in central Manzai Mahsud country engaged in sabotage activities.

To counter their activities, Razcol was ordered to proceed their country. Razcol left Razmak on Dec 9, 1938 and moved in three days to Katkai, camping the first and second night at Bibizai and Sararogha. Sniping occurred when the column was passing through Shabi Khel country, south of Tauda China. During these two days and nights one I.O.R. and four animals were killed and one I.O.R. was wounded.

On the third day during the march from Sararogha to Kotkai opposition began against the rear guard when it had passed Ahni Tangi. During the day one I.O.R. and two animals were killed and I.O.R. was wounded. From the tribes four were killed and 10 wounded.

Mullah Sher Ali was reported to be in the Dargai Sar area with a group of 60 men. On December 15, 1938 owing to the continued presence of Sher Ali and his gang, notices were dropped proscribing the area for air action from December 16, 1938. On the first day of the bombing

it was reported that villages had not been evacuated and about 60 animals were killed from the bombing.

Abdur-Rahman Khel gave assurances of future good behaviour and offered six hostages and six.303 magazine rifles as security on December 29, 1938. Political Agent recommended the raising of proscription. Notices permitting them to return to their home were dropped on December 30, 1938.[249] The Shabi Khel Jirga was interviewed by the Political Agent and was ordered to assemble at Kotkai on the next day. They were ordered to hand in Rs.10, 000 and 20 British 303 rifles as a fine and 20 hostages within 10 days. They complied with the orders on December 30, 1938. They also proposed that fine of Rs.10, 000 might be deducted from the gross income of the three lorries which were running in the Mahsud Convoy.[250]

The Manzai Mahsuds handed over 14 out of 19 of their named hostiles and gave security for the remainder. Razcol entered Manzai country on December 17, 1938. The column camped at Karama and Ladha. The Maliks of this village burnt the houses of two hostiles on the Political Agent's orders. Column moved from Ladha to Razmak on December 20, 1938. The main objective of the column was to show the flag in Mangai country and enforce the Malik's authority in the discharge of territorial responsibility. The opposition of the column, which caused a total of 23 casualties to the troops, was encountered in Bahlolzai and Shabi Khel country.[251]

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4. Chenevix Trench, op.cit, pp.148-49.
5. Fazlur-Rahim Marwat, et al, "Faqir of Ipi (A study of Religious Militancy)", Pakistan, No.11 & 12 (Spring and Autumn 1985) Pakistan Study Centre, Peshawar University, pp.138-39
6. Laiq Shah, Waziristan (Lahore: 1994), p. 508.
7. A place near Tapi village on the bank of the Tochi River. (Abdul Hameed Tareen, Faqir Ipi (Karachi: 1984), p.68).
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69. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.4, dated 24/2/37, p.122.

70. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.6, dated 1/3/37, p.122.

71. File No.260 S.T.B. (I) Vol IV, Express letter No.257-62, from Intelligence, Miranshah to the Resident, D.I. Khan, dated

12/3/37.

72. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.2, dated 22/2/37, p.116.

73. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.7, dated 3/3/37, p.124.

74. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.8, dated 4/3/37, p.125.

75. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Situation Report No.10, dated 01/3/37, p.127; see also Waziristan Situation Report No.13, dated 11/3/37, p.131; Northern Command Summary of Events No.10 of 1937, Copy No.180, dated 16/3/37, p.136; Waziristan Daily Situation Report No.18, dated 19/3/37, p.146; File NO.29/2 F.R.P, Vol II, dated 8/8/1940, p.38.

76. Abdur Rashid, Civil Service on the Frontier (Peshawar: 1977), p.16.

77. File No.KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Daily Situation Reports Nos. 16 & 17, March 17-18, 1937, pp.144-45.

78. File No.KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Dairy NO.124/P.S, dated 5/4/37, p.189; see also Abdur Rashid, op.cit, pp.32-33; Account of Action of Ist BDE West and South West of Damdil-29/3/37, pp.172-74; Northern Command Summary of Events NO.13 of 1937, Part II, N.W.F.P. Tribes, p.179; Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary dated 30/3/37, p.169; Chenevix Trench, op.cit, p.157, Mazhar, op.cit, p.18. He has mentioned that 41 Indian Officers were killed, while Laiq Shah mentions 115 killed, 70 wounded from Government side and 80 killed from Mujahideen side. (Laiq Shah Op.cit, pp.542-43.)

79. File No.260 S.T.B.(I) Vol IV, Telegram `R' No.15 from Norwef, Camp Bannu to Foreign, New Delhi, 3/3/37, p.19; see also Telegram No.590 from Foreign, New Delhi to Resident in Waziristan, 4/3/37, p.20.

80. File No.KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Pol. Branch, Diary No.198-Ps, dated 8/4/37, p.196.

81. File No. KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Situation Reports Nos. 4,6,7,8,9,10,11,13 and 19 of 24th February, Ist,3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 22nd March 1937, pp.119, 122, 125,

126, 128, 131, 155; see also Northern Command Summary of Events No.10, Copy NO.180, 16/3/37, p.136.

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83. File No.260 S.T.B.(I), Vol IV, Express letter No.121-P.S. from Norwef, Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 9/3/1937, p.37.

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85. Mazhar, op.cit, p.18; see also Laiq Shah, op.cit, p.537; File No.KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Situation Report, 25/3/37, p.150; File No.260 S.T.B.(I), Vol IV, Express Letter Confidential No.1311-14-P.C./260.S.T.B.I. IV from G. Cunningham, Governor N.W.F.P. to Foreign, NEW Delhi, 29/3/37, p.81.

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89. File No.260 S.T.B.I, Vol IV, Letter No.2111-12, from Major J.A. Robinson, I.A., Asst. Director Intelligence to the Resident in Waziristan, Bannu, 31/3/37, p.84.

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91. File No.260 S.T.B.(I), Vol IV, Letter No.10619-27-P.C. from Norwef, Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 24/3/37, p.74.

92. File No.260 S.T.B.(I), Vol IV, Order No.224-P, 24/3/37; Memo NO.2992-93 from F.E. Laughton Deputy Commissioner Bannu to the Resident in Waziristan, 25/3/37, p.75; see also Memo NO.3183 from D.C. Bannu to the Resident in Waziristan, 31/3/37, p.89.

93. File No.KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Pol. Branch, Diary NO.198-Ps, 8/4/37, p.196.
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95. File No.KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Pol. Branch, Diary No.124-Ps, 5/4/37, p.189.
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98. File No. KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.265-Ps, 12/4/37, p.207; Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.278-Ps 13/4/37, p.212; Northern Command Summary of Events/Diary No.366-Ps, Copy No.210, p.225; Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary/Diary No.315-Ps, 15/4/37, p.221.
99. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V Telegram No.36/T.B. from Norwef Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 16/4/37, p.8.
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101. File No. KN(2) to 260 S.T.B.(I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.400-S.T.B, 20/4/37, p.231; see also Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.401-S.T.B, 21/4/37, p.232; Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.439-S.T.B, 22/4/37, p.233, Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.463-S.T.B, 23/4/37, p.234.
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of Events No.16 of 1937, Part II, p.235.

103. File No. KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.528-S.T.B, 24/4/37, p.237.

104. File No. KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.528-S.T.B, 28/4/37, p.238.

105. File No. KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary, Diary No.632-S.T.B, 30/4/37, p.249; Diary No.632 S.T.B, 1/5/37, p.251.

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109. File No.260 S.T.B.(I), Vol IV, Telegram `Q' No.3, T.B, from Norwef Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi,8/4/37, p.123; Express Letter No.52-58 S.T.B.I from Norwef Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 9/4/37, p.125.

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111. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol IV, Telegram 'Q' No.11-T.B, from Norwef Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 15/4/37, p.1; File No.

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113. File No.18-S/38, Telegram No.1072 from Governor General, Simla to the Secretary of State for India, London, 24/4/37, p.2. T.R.C., Peshawar.

114. File No.287 S.T.B. (I), from Italy, Telegram (en clair) from Sir E. Drumond (Rome) NO.72 saving, 8/4/37, p.17. T.R.C., Peshawar.

115. File No.260. S.T.B.I. Vol.VI, Bombing on the North West Frontier of India. Resolution adopted by the 27th National Peace Congress held at Friends House, London, N.W.I., May 28-31, 1937, p.9. T.R.C., Peshawar.

116. File No.260. S.T.B.I. Vol.VI, letter to the Marquess of Zetland, Secretary of State for India, 3/6/37, p.8.

117. File No.260. S.T.B.I. Vol.VI, from Zetland to Gerald Bailey, 17/6/37, p.10.

118. File No.KN (2) To 260 S.T.B (I), Waziristan Daily Intelligence Summary/Diary No.463-S.T.B, 23/4/37, P.234.

119. File No.260 S.T.B.I, Vol V, Express Letter No.35 S.T.B, from Norwef Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, 20/4/37, p.25.

120. File No.260 S.T.B.I Vol V, pp.53-54; see also Receipt Telegram No.1204 from Foreign Simla to Norwef Nathiagali, 10/5/37, pp.60,65-66, Receipt Telegram No.C-35 from Wazirforce Bannu to Norwef Nathiagali, 25/5/37, p.73; see also Telegram `S' No.32-T.B. from Norwef, Nathiagali to Foreign,

Simla, 26/5/37, p.75; Receipt Telegram No.1279, from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 26/5/37, p.78.

121. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V, Telegram `Q' No.29, from Wazirforce Bannu to Norwef Nathiagali, 21/5/37, p.69; Receipt Telegram No.1269 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 24/5/37; p.71, Receipt Telegram No.C.36 from Wazirforce to Norwef, Nathiagali, 26/5/37, p.76; Receipt Telegram No.1282 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 26/5/37, p.79.
122. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V, Letter No.467-8, 24/4/37, p.52; see also Express Letter No.476-S, from Resident Camp Bannu to Northcom Bannu, 23/4/37, p.40.
123. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V, Receipt Telegram No.C.19 from Wazirforce Bannu to Norwef Nathiagali, 8/5/37, p.56; see also Receipt Telegram No.1201 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 10/5/37, p.58; Express Letter No.558-S, from Resident Bannu to Wazirforce Bannu, 16/5/37, p.68.
124. Case of Crown verses Amir Nur Ali Shah, Register General No.2002, District Courts Bannu, p.32.
125. File No.260 S.T.B.I., Receipt Telegram No.55 from Minister Kabul to Norwef Nathiagali, 24/6/37, p.51.
126. File KN (2) to 260 S.T.B. (I), Pol. Branch, Diary No.201-Ps, 9/3/37, p.197.
127. File No.22-S/37, D.O.No.45-S from Political Agent North Waziristan to the Resident in Waziristan, 4/2/37, p.4.
128. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V, Receipt Telegram No.C.38 from Wazirforce Bannu to Norwef Nathiagali, 26/5/37, p.81.
129. File No.283 S.T.B.I, Translation of a letter from His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, to His Majesty's Minister, Kabul, No.1328, dated 28/6/1937,p.3. T.R.C., Peshawar.
130. File No.260 S.T.B.I, Vol V, Receipt Telegram No.C.60 from Wazirforce, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 13/6/37, p.145.
131. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol V, Telegram `S' No.50 T.B, from Norwef Nathiagali to Foreign, 16/6/37, p.146; see also Receipt Telegram No.1433 from Foreign Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali;

Letter No.91-S.R from Major H.H. Johnson, Resident in Waziristan, 18/6/37, p.156.

132. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, North Waziristan Summary No.2 for the week ending June 9, 1937, p.139.
133. Mazhar, op.cit, p.29.
134. File No.28-S/27, Role of Waziristan Military District in War, p.3. T.R.C., Peshawar.
135. Muhammad Nawaz Khan, `Frontier's Saint Warrior', The Frontier Post, April 8, 1992, p.12.
136. Chenevix Trench, op.cit, pp.168-74.
137. Ahmad Saleem, `Faqir of Ippi, Fact and Fiction', The Frontier Post, March 9, 1990.
138. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Receipt Telegram No. GS-544 from Wazirforce, Bannu to Norwef, Nathiagali, 29/5/37, p.72.
139. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, No.27/GS. From General Commander Wazirforce to the Deputy Secretary to Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla, 29/5/37, p.94.
140. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Express Letter No.106-S.R from the Resident, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 24/6/37, p.164.
141. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Receipt Telegram No. C.44 from Wazirforce to Norwef, Nathiagali, 30/5/37, p.96; see also Receipt Telegram No.1333 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 2/6/37, p.104
142. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Express Letter No.68-CM from Resident Camp, Miranshah to Wazirforce, Bannu, 5/6/37, p.130.
143. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Translation of Tori Khel Agreement, June 5, 1937.

    (L.T.I. of Tori Khel Maliks & Mu'tabars.

    K.B. Shahzar Khan, Haibati. M.Barrai, Shogi.

    M. Sanobar, Dreplari. M.Baloch, Shogi.

    M. Gulsher, Shogi. M.Amir Khan, Khushali.

M. Habibullah Khan B/o Gulab Din, Haibati.

M. Mirdad, Khusali. M. Nur Muhammad, Haibati.

M. Atta Muhammad Khan, Haibati. M. Mian Khan

Haibati. M. Adam Khan Haibati. Muhammad Jan, Haibati, etc.).

144. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Express Letter No.72-CM from Resident Camp, Miranshah to Wazirforce, Bannu, 6/6/37, p.137.

145. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.V, Receipt Telegram No.1528 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 2/7/37, p.182; see also Receipt Telegram No.C/95 from Wazirforce, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 29/7/37, p.205.

146. Muhammad Nawaz Khan, op.cit, p.12.

147. File No.260 S.T.B.I. Vol.VI, North Waziristan Summary No.2 for the week ending June 9, 1937, p.141.

148. File No.289 S.T.B.I., Express Telegram No.Nil, from Southwaz, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 13/6/37. T.R.C., Peshawar.

149. File No.289 S.T.B.I., copy of an express telegram No.Nil from Southwaz, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 14/6/37, p.144.

150. File No.289 S.T.B.I., Receipt Telegram No.C.64 from Wazirforce, Bannu to Norwef, Nathiagali, 18/6/37, p.153; see also Receipt Telegram No.1438, from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 18/6/37, p.154.

151. File No.289 S.T.B.I., Receipt Telegram No.C.71 from Wazirforce, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 24/6/37, p.157; see also Receipt Telegram No.1471 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali, 25/6/37, p.159; Telegram "S" No.56 T.B. from Norwef, Nathiagali to Foreign, Simla, 25/6/37, p.160.

152. File No.289 S.T.B.I., Receipt Telegram No.C.73 from Wazirforce, Razmak to Norwef, Nathiagali, 25/6/37, p.161; see also Receipt Telegram No.1470 from Foreign, Simla to Norwef, Nathiagali 25/6/37, p.162.

153. Chenevix Trench, op.cit, pp.175-78.

154. File No.287 S.T.B.(I), Telegram No.1642 from Secretary of State for India, London, to Governor General (Ext. Affairs

Deptt), Simla, 14/6/37, p.74.

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172. File No.324.F, Memorandum from Sir George Cunningham, Governor N.W.F.P., 7/8/37, p.8.
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CONFRONTATION WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT (1939-47)

5

In the summer of 1938 British government decided to bring pressure on the Tori Khel to settle their hostilities and to bring in all kidnapped persons in their custody. They were informed in Jirga on August 23, 1938 that sections complying with the above terms within one month would be accounted as friendly, and any sections failing to do so would be liable to punishment.

Meanwhile a deputation headed by K.B. Shahzar Khan, Tori Khel, together with Mullah Alam Khan, a former teacher of Ippi, was sent to interview Ippi if possible to bring him to terms. The deputation proceeded to Sheranna and thence onwards under the guidance of Abdullah Khan Madda Khel. Two days later they returned, announcing that they had failed to get in touch with Ippi, but that there appeared to be hopes of his settlement. The general tribal opinion exposed was that the deputation actually saw Ippi, and that their non-admittance of this was due to their wish to conceal his location.

Owing to the peace deputation to Ippi, action was deferred until October 8, 1938, when sections of the Tori Khel, who had not complied with the above orders, were informed that:

a. they were debarred from Bannu and Thal;
b. their winter grazing grounds and habitation were denied to them;

c. Maliki allowances were withheld.

As regards Para (b) these consisted of

i. area around Spalga,
ii. the Sheratala plain and Spinwam,
iii. the area around Biche Kashkai,
iv. the hill area between Tochi and Shaktu rivers, including the Lower Khaisora but excluding the two Sham plains.

The area pointed out was to be denied by Scouts, Troops and by air proscription. The punishment proposed was severe, as it meant that either their flocks would have remained in the uplands, where they would suffer heavy losses from the cold, or they would have to find agistment in the grazing grounds of other tribes, for which they would have to pay heavily.[1]

Tori Khel failed to effect settlement in respect of their radical members; the government increased pressure on her, involving forfeiture of allowances and suspension of Khassadars in the case of the hostile sub-sections.[2] Their grazing grounds in the Khaisora and the Karista area were put under air action on Jan 21, 1939 and extended to include the watershed of Zeri Algad and Band Algad up to a line between Ziarat Ghar and Tangi Sar, on February 3, 1939.[3]

The tribes (Wazir & Daur) in a mixed Jirga requested the Governor Sir George Cunningham that the blockaded sections of the Tori Khel

should be interviewed by the Political Agent. The Jirga was seen by the Political Agent on April 30, 1939 in which the Maliks stated their readiness to estrange all hostile elements. By May 15, 1939 the government raised the blockade and air proscription. Tori Khel produced all the kidnapped Hindus and their Khassadars returned to their posts. The inhabitants of the area were allowed to come back on June 22, 1939.[4]

The various forms of pressure exerted upon the Tori Khel in order to force them to sue for peace were:

The practical impossibility of sowing or reaping crops, the loss in both numbers and in the condition of the flocks and herds owing to their having to be driven into less hospitable areas, the difficulties in obtaining supplies from settled districts, the feeling that the troops on their country might destroy their towers, mills, wells and houses, the loss in money owing to the withholding of Maliki allowances, the dismissal of Khassadars and loss of contracts and the unusual severe weather during the first three months of 1939.[5]

To counter pressure on Tori Khel and Madda Khel, Faqir Ippi along with his lieutenants were trying to maintain the momentum of the unrest in Waziristan. There had been increase in guerilla activities in Waziristan, and renewed raiding especially in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts. On Jan 3, 1939, Katgarh village was raided by a group of some sixty strong, killing two villagers, kidnapping three, including one woman[6]; Khemi Bai, a Hindu girl kidnapped from Bannu

District on the night of Feb 14, 1939, converted to Islam and married Sadda Khan Marwat. She refused to leave Sadda Khan when offered release by the Tori Khel Maliks.[7]

A road protection picquet moving into position was fired by a small group at fairly close range. A Convoy bringing relief to this regiment also came under fire from the group. One British officer and five B.O.Rs. were wounded on May 20, 1939.[8] These raidings were undertaken on the definite orders of the Faqir as part of a campaign to lower government prestige. Reactions to government recent movements in both Agencies were inevitable; for Waziristan was as yet far from subdued; and the strength of present reaction was a measure of feeling in the minds of leading hostiles that it was now necessary for them to maintain honour.[9]

Mehr Dil Khattak had stationed his headquarter in Ahmad Zai salient. The inhabitants were warned to evict Mehr Dil and his gang. They failed to do so. In consequence a blockade of this salient by troops and police was instituted on the border of Bannu and Kohat Districts. This blockade was lifted on April 17, 1939, after an undertaking by the inhabitants, in the presence of the Governor Sir George Cunningham, to remove Mehr Dil and other "outlaws" from their limits.[10]

Madda Khel Affairs

Madda Khel was still under air blockade but the bulk of the tribe was endeavouring to comply with government's terms. Malik Khandan was

in jail. On April 9, 1939 the Resident saw a representative Jirga. They submitted 100 magazine rifles, 9000 round of ammunition and 54 hostages. The government raised air blockade from the area after fulfillment of conditions on April 13, 1939. They requested to be interviewed by the Governor, which was granted on April 17, 1939.

The next day the Governor interviewed Malik Khandan Khan with some leading Maliks. Khandan identified himself with the settlement of Madda Khel. The Governor sanctioned release of Khandan on his furnishing a security bond for Rs.40, 000/-, of which Rs.8, 000/- were to be paid in cash.[11]

Faqir Ippi in South Waziristan

Faqir Ippi was residing in Inzarwari. He was active in his correspondence with the various hostiles and was visited by parties of Mahsud hostiles seeking his advice. Mullah Fazal Din remained in Lataka, receiving several deputations of hostiles seeking his advice and encouragement.[12]

The government had taken action against Shabi Khel by re-imposing air proscription on Karesta and holding twenty hostages of the tribe which provided a good lever for dealing with the Jirga.[13] The tribes were busy committing hostile acts on Ladha and Sararogha roads. The government sanctioned imposition of a punitive proscription of Ladha and Sararogha areas. The main object of this operation was to

force these tribes to move to areas more accessible to land forces.[14] Later on proscription was lifted on the assurances given by Shabi Khel on July 11, 1939 not to allow any offences to be committed in their area.

On July 2, 1939, South Waziristan gasht was heavily attacked near Janata. The tribe responsible for this act was Galleshai, Mahsuds. They were fined in a Jirga seen at Sararogha on Jul 23, 1939 as: [15]

Galleshai	Fine: Rs. 500 Hostages to be produced: 10 (having close relations with the responsible Maliks.) 10 genuine British magazine rifles as Security.
Band Khel	Fine:Rs.250 Hostages:4 Rifles:4
Badiwai	Fine:Rs.250 Rifles:4
Gori Khel	Fine:Rs.500 Hostages:4 Rifles:6

Faqir Ippi moved from Gurvekht to Kharre in the beginning of July 1939, where he spent a couple of months in comparative quiet. Visits to Ippi by large number of Bannuchis, Daurs, Afghan Tannis and Zadrans, as well as by Mehr Dil, Gul Nawaz, Gagu and other prominent leaders of hostile groups continued. Bannuchis came with offerings and to get blessings. As a result of these consultations there was a considerable increase of hostilities around Razmak. On July 12, 1939 the most daring attack was made on a lorry near Razmak Narai

in spite of the fact that the road was picquetted by regular troops. Four Hindus were kidnapped and four wounded.[16] The Maliks of the area were summoned to Razmak on July 26, 1939 and informed of measures that were to be taken to ensure the safety of road and to give to troops a free hand in dealing with hostiles who were boldly moving about in close proximity to the road and villages. These measures included the confinement of all villagers to their houses on `road open days' and treating any person as an enemy found at large on Razmak Plateau during "road open" hours, as well as an announcement that any firing from a village would render that village liable to punishment or, if necessary, destruction.[17]

Bhittanis Punished

There had been serious raids originated in Bhittani tribal territory. Two Jirgas were held under the government auspices on Feb 5, 1939 in Tank. The first Jirga consisted of Tatta and Wuraspun branch of Tank Bhittanis and the other was of Bannu Bhittanis. Both the Jirgas were asked to produce the persons kidnapped by their outlaws, otherwise serious action would be taken against them.[18] The major events which persuaded the government to call these Jirgas, were: seven Hindus were kidnapped from Nurgram Nullah near Tajori on April 1, 1939 and a group of some thirty men raided the village of Kahiri, some 20 miles South of Dera Ismail Khan.

During the fraces which ensued four Hindus were killed and ten

villagers were wounded. The group looted six shops and took away goods worth Rs.3600/.[19] Again three consecutive raids took place in Titer Khel, Jatta near Kaur and the looting of a mail lorry near Khirgi. At least ten Hindus were kidnapped. Bhittanis were given seven days' time to produce all the captives in their possession, otherwise whole of the Bhittani area to the north of the Shuza would be bombed.[20]

The Government started bombing of the area on Oct 27, 1939 after the ultimate time. Later, on November 11, 1939, air proscription was extended to the whole of the area drained by the Karesta Algad from the Sammal Narai down to Karkanwam. In addition the area allowed to the Bhittanis as a sanctuary between the Tank Zam and the Shuza was also included in air proscription because of the offences occurred in British India and the tracks of the offenders had been taken to the area allowed to Bhittanis as a sanctuary.

It was felt that the object of proscription had not been fulfilled as the majority of the tribes of concerned area was staying at home. Crops reaping and irrigation was carried out by moonlight. Herds which kept out of the proscribed area by day were driven back by night to water. Villagers were now quite inured to the air raids and each village had its caves or hiding places close at hand. They used to purchase foodstuff from Tank, carried it back at night on camels.

The effect of bombing was negative and those sections that had not actually harboured hostiles were very indignant at being punished for

their neighbour's sin. The R.A.F. had taken a heavy toll of cattle and sheep with casualties of herdsmen and shepherds.

The available record shows: [21]

- Men (including women & children)
  - Killed : 16
  - Wounded : 14

- Cattle (including sheep, goats, camels etc.)
  - Killed : 267
  - Wounded : 51

- Grain burnt intentionally by bombardment : 82 mounds
- Losses to property
  - houses : 40
  - Towers : 13

The situation became worse when on December 6, 1939, the Resident in Waziristan ordered under Section 21(a) of F.C.R. the seizure, wherever they might be found, of any member of such tribes and of all property belonging to them or any of them. The result of such extreme step was that many of the Bhittanis were starving and had no hope of anything else, unless they increased raiding. Men who had lost not only their last season's grain, their plough bullocks, sheep and goats as well, were in desperate straits.[22] On questioning an old women from Gabbar area she said that `the aeroplane did not spare the chicken in the area.' She used to cook on stones and all the cattle were dying of hunger and thirst

Kidnapping of Major Duggal

Major Amar Nath Duggal, a British Army Officer was kidnapped in administered territory on Tank Dera Ismail Khan Road. His staff driver was killed on the spot.[23] In another encounter nine sepoys of Frontier Constabulary were captured on December 12, 1939.

British government intensified the proscription of the area, and two more flights R.A.F. were utilized to proscribe all the known caves in the territory with the object of bringing the inhabitants speedily to a breaking point. Later Major Duggal was released after paying Rs.30, 000/- to the kidnappers. The Mahsud tribe was compelled to pay the ransom.[24]

Situation in Bannu District

The situation in and around Bannu was far from peaceful. A large portion of the Tehsil appeared to be out of control. The free movement within the District of the groups led by Gul Nawaz, Mushk-e-A'lam, Mehr Dil and others pointed to a serious atmosphere existing within the District.

Faqir Ippi who was in Kharre, summoned Mehr Dil, Gul Nawaz and others to see him and receive instructions regarding further hostile acts. He was also visited by large number of Bannuchis who took subscriptions in cash and kind to him. The visitors included

Muhammad Rafique S/o Haji Muhammad Aslam Khan, President of the Bannu District Congress Committee and Sher Afghan son of Rakhti, the secretary of the same committee. These Congressites, on return reported that the Faqir had ordered his `Generals' and Khalifas not to kidnap any more Hindus, but to intensify their activities against government forces.

Maulvi Abdul Haq of Surani made a pro-Ippi speech after Jum'a prayers in Bannu on July 28, 1939 and a resolution was passed demanding the release of all persons detained at Miranshah on their way to Ippi. Malik Akbar Ali Khan, Congress M.L.A. of Bannu was working in the district on Ippi's behalf. Offences on and near the road radiating from Bannu began to increase and large quantities of Copper telephone wires were stolen.[25]

Five Hindus were kidnapped from the village Mauza Dost Muhammad in close proximity to the Paizu railway station on May 5, 1939; a group under Gul Nawaz came into Bannu District and shot up Bannu Cantonment killing one I.O.R. and killing and wounding some animals on the night of May 28, 1939; one Mills type bomb was thrown into Frontier Constabulary Lines at Bannu on the night of June 12, 1939, wounding two I.O.Rs; Telephone line was cut down four miles from Bannu on D.I. Khan road on June 15, 1939; Muhammad Khel village was proscribed by air on June 16, 1939.

The groups however, continued to commit offences, some of them in

daylight, in the District. Mir Mukhtiar, a Special Police Constable deserted with his rifle and went to the Ahmadzai salient to join Gul Nawaz. The Superintendent Police, Bannu, dismissed all Bannuchis of the Special Police, numbering 22, from service; on three nights during June, 1939, three different police posts were fired upon and a Sikh Zamindar was kidnapped near Mirian (Bannu) in broad day light on June 29, 1939.

In Bannu city rumours were rife that Mehr Dil intended to repeat his raid on July 23, 1938, and at times a state of panic prevailed amongst Hindus in the city. On the night of July 28, 1939, the Constabulary Camp at Barlastai was sniped; a group raided village Teri, looting 20 shops, burnt two others and made off with a large quantity of loot; Mushk-e-A'lam attacked two Bizen Khel Khassadar posts at Zeri Garhi and Kalboi, taking six rifles from the former and burning the latter.

Some 25 raiders looted 20 shops, burnt two others and made off with a large quantity of loot in Teri village of Khattak area. The total number of kidnapping throughout the N.W.F.P. up to the end of July was 6840, compared with 5969 and 5726 for the corresponding period of 1938 and 1937. Wire cutting up to August 12, 1939 were 67.[26]

Mushk-e-A'lam's Treacherous Murder

A Sperkai Wazir named Mushk-e-A'lam son of Late Mani Khan and

uncle of Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan, leading Sperkai Ahmadzai Malik had entered the lists of the hostiles against the government. He spent some months in Peshawar jail for anti-government activities. After his release, he again decided to turn hostile against the British. He went off to Faqir of Ippi who gave him his blessing and declared him General and his chief warrior in the Ahmadzai salient.

The activities of Mushk-e-A'lam and Gul Nawaz, Bannuchi in and around Bannu District were somewhat disquieting, that they were entirely un-opposed by the local population among whom Gul Nawaz was rapidly acquiring the reputation of Rabin hood.

On the night of August 1, 1939 Mushk-e-A'lam along with a group of 50 raiders looted Nizam Bazar. Rumours were set about that the chowkidar of the area had invited Mushk-e-A'lam and his companion Saiful-Maluk to tea and murdered them treacherously. Their murder created a reign of terror in Bannu Tehsil.

There was no public rejoicing over Mushk-e-A'lam death; on the contrary prayers were offered for his soul on the ground that he had done no wrong. Reprisals followed with dramatic speed. One chowkidar was murdered; the wife and niece of another were kidnapped and given in marriage to hostiles, while the husband himself and the other two surviving chowkidars, after being completely boycotted in Bannu, had to be sent out the district for safety after being generally condemned as Kafir. Gul Nawaz, Surani was

responsible for the kidnapping of the wife and niece. With a party of 150 he raided village Boza Khel and on the night of August 3, 1939, he killed one Muslim villager, wounded another, and set fire to the chowkidar's house.

Gagu, a Lieutenant of the Faqir visited the village of Mushk-e-A'lam to deliver his condolence. Before returning to his headquarters he murdered Colonal May on August 10, 1939 near the property of Mushk-e-A'lam, along with his driver and a servant.[27] The murder was considered to be a reprisal to the murder of Mushk-e-A'lam. The quick reaction of the Faqir's Lieutenants conveyed the message to all concerned the consequences of the actions against the Faqir's followers. It increased the prestige of the Faqir in the Muslim inhabitants of Bannu.

A Congress deputation toured the affected areas of D.I.Khan, Bannu and Kohat. They directed their propaganda against the raiders and dacoits on one hand and against the government's policy in Waziristan on the other. They alleged that a number of raids had been connived at by local officers, and that all congress supporters were fully in sympathy with Faqir of Ippi and his cause, but were unable to assist him as they were un-armed.

The government was anxious about the behaviour of the Muslim inhabitants of the area as they extended no co-operation in dealing with the prolong series of outrages, and, indeed, speeches in

mosques and meetings had been little short of open incitement to the raiders to intensify their efforts. To meet this aspect of the situation, the Chief Minister Dr. Khan Sahib paid a personal visit to Bannu and made speeches in strong terms against the raiders throughout the disturbed area.[28]

Outrages continued and Bannu aerodrome was raided, situated five miles towards Tribal territory. The aircraft hanger was damaged, and all wood work in the main roof, outhouses, and offices was destroyed by fire. A gang kidnapped F.C. sepoy in broad day light on January 10, 1940 from Daud Shah Village, Bannu.[29]

World War II and The Faqir

Throughout 1930s public opinion in British and in the world became increasingly aware of the military escalation on the North West Frontier of India. Although public outrage was confined to intellectual circles and cannot be compared, for example, with the anti-Vietnam Campaign in the United States. The British government was criticized at home and abroad for the uncivilized pattern of warfare applied against civilian populations in the form of air bombing.

The outspoken C.F. Andrews, a Quaker and a friend of Gandhi pleaded for a drastic revision of British policy as, "We cannot stand out boldly for disarmament in Europe while carrying War in Asia." He proposed that troops should be withdrawn from tribal territory and civil

methods of administration applied to help to come to terms with the tribes.[30]

In 1939 the Marquess of Linlithgo, the Viceroy, himself participated in the preparation of a comprehensive document on Frontier Policy. Although strongly favouring, at least, a partial disarmament of the tribes, he admitted that as yet no way had been found to eliminate the gun factories in Waziristan, and that this would also be impossible to implement in view of the international situation.

Lord Linlithgo's recommendations amounted in fact to no more than a very slight modification of the existing `Forward Policy.' Thus, the military dispositions, involving the presence of large number of regular troops in advanced positions in the un-administered tribal territory, remained un-altered when the World War II broken out.[31]

At the beginning of 1939 political control of Waziristan, and of Scouts, was again handed back from the Army to the Political Agents, a sign that the War was again considered to be at an end. So it was, in the sense that there were no more big Lashkars in the field, except in the Datta Khel area, close to the Afghan frontier; the Faqir's followers had followed the classical tactics of guerrillas, breaking up into smaller and much more elusive groups. They became skillful with bombs and booby traps, mining roads, blowing up bridges and culverts. The sniping and hold-up of civilian lorries became a popular sport, and profitable too when affluent Hindus could be kidnapped and held for

ransom.[32]

Apart from almost invariable objection to military Columns in both Agencies, there was a difference between North and South Waziristan. In North Waziristan the internal raiding and hostile incidents by the Faqir's followers within the Agency still continued. The reasons ascribed by local opinion to explain this difference were that: [33]

a. there were no regular troops stationed among the Mahsuds. Among the Utmanzai Wazirs there were two Brigades. Their presence was an incentive to petty hostile acts;
b. the Mahsud lorry contracts gave the Mahsuds an object in keeping their roads free from incidents. The Wazirs had no such contract and therefore no such incentive;
c. there was a definite resentment among the Wazirs to Bagai Motor transport;
d. the majority of the hostile leaders in North Waziristan were Tori Khel. The only solution to their settlement was to be the settlement of their original leader, Faqir of Ippi.

Before the outbreak of World War II, the foremost concern of the British in India was the implementation and smooth running of the 1935 Act. When the war broke out on September 6, 1939, their over-riding concern instead became to ensure the Indian contribution to the war efforts as effective as possible. Interestingly the British statistics of

fighting strength and armament amongst the trans-border tribes in the NWFP (meaning Cis-Durand Line & excluding Chitral), corrected up to April 1, 1940, produced 414,000 fighting men armed with 2,33,562 breach loading rifles or Carbines; the corresponding figures for Baluchistan up to April 1, 1941, accounted for over 100,000 men and almost 18000 rifles.

Thus, on paper there were more modern rifles among the tribes and certainly more fighting men than in the entire Indian Army. As a result of this challenge, a vast proportion of the Indian Army had to be permanently posted on the Frontier, which made them unavailable for other tasks. At the outbreak of the Second World War the Indian Army formed the largest segment of British Imperial troops: 187,000, of which 140,000 were Indian.[34] To the Indian Army the War was still in Waziristan, and for the first eight months there was much more action there than in France, and a steady trickle in attendance had over one hundred casualties and lost fifty six rifles and three VBs.[35]

Although there were no large scale outbreaks after the Waziristan disturbances of 1937-38, however, traffic on the Peshawar - Dera Ismail Khan road was permitted for only a few hours in the morning when the road was heavily picketed.[36] People were kidnapped regularly from the road in the Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. The public works department road crew had to work on the road under escort and for only limited hours.[37] All movements of officials in the Agencies had to be under heavy escort, and care had

to be taken that their routes were not known in advance.

In Bannu Cantonment it became necessary for the army officers and the Deputy Commissioner in order both to protect these key officials and to provide a redoubt in the event of attack.[38] The then Governor NWFP George Cunningham expressed about the activities of the Faqir during the War as:[39]

> *It is true that, too, that when the world War began, the Faqir and his gangs showed no great desire to take advantage of our difficulties. I like to think that this was due to some instinct of sportsmanship as well as to the restraining influence of our good friends, the Afghan government.*

If we analyze the impact of World War II on the Faqir's Islamic fundamentalist view of the world, terms like Fascism, Communism and Capitalism, must have been utterly irrelevant. The Pashtun tribesmen were simply carrying on their centuries old struggles for tribal independence, to keep their valleys free from foreign occupation, and accepted the Faqir as their supreme religious authority as one endowed with divine rights. Whether Hitler or Stalin were about to conquer the rest of the world, or the British about to quit India, did not concern them in the least, unless Nazi or soviet troops entered their living space. This approach can be gauged from the Faqir's own statement delivered to his followers: [40]

> *British government is going to have a war with Germany and Russia will take the side of Germany. Russia intends to attack India via Afghanistan. If Afghan government did not like to give passage to Russia for attacking India via Afghanistan then there will be a war between Afghanistan and Russia. It would be the first duty of every Muslims to fight against Russia and he*

> *himself will also collect all his followers in Waziristan for the Russian opposition.*

During the War, however, the Faqir, though quick to explore unscrupulously any opportunity which could guarantee him Axis supplies of money and arms, proved extremely furtive whenever Axis Agents tried to establish a direct communication with him via their diplomatic mission in Kabul. He did not want to be harnessed into any anti-British scheme which would not be of his own doing.

Axis Connections

Some voices alleged that the Faqir's incredible capacity to throw in his Lashkar whenever he liked was largely due to his receiving Italian money and arms. The daily Herald on April 16, 1937 claimed on its front page that `Mussolini was behind the revolt on the NWFP.' The British Minister in Kabul could find nothing to substantiate this wild claim, but the rumours continued. The Sunday Chronicle of Feb 26, 1939 implied that a radio link between the Faqir and the Italian had been established and added, for good measure: `Meanwhile Hitler is active in Kabul ... where more and more German airmen are being sent as instructors.'[41]

Already during the First World War Imperial Germany dispatched Werner Otto Henting and Oakar Von Niedermayer to Kabul with the purpose of winning over the Afghan government for a subversive scheme against British India, which was to be largely carried out by the Frontier tribes. The mission failed but the idea persisted. The Axis

power, for instance, made several attempts.[42] It cannot be entirely ruled out that the Soviets might have harboured similar intentions, though the outside world has found only a few indications of their immediate schemes.[43]

It was in fact Pietro Quaroni, the Italian Minister at Kabul, who became the driving spirit in establishing direct contact with the Faqir. According to him, "we could not defeat Great Britain in war in those areas, but seriously injure her, and we possess adequate instrument for the purpose." One month later, Quaroni told the Germans in Kabul that the Axis power should co-ordinate their political activities in Afghanistan with a view of using Amanullah and the Faqir at the same time.

On the other hand, Quaroni played a crucial role in helping Subhas Chundra Bose, a former president of AINC and the most serious rival to Gandhi and Nehru, to acquire an Italian passport when he was hiding in Kabul in February 1941. Bose was then able to reach Berlin via the Soviet Union and became the most prominent Asian revolutionary to collaborate with Axis both in Europe and Asia.[44]

Bose indeed assigned the tribal territory an important role to play in his comprehensive `plan for co-operation between the Axis powers and India,' which he submitted after his arrival in Berlin. Isolated attacks, such as those carried out by the Faqir, were to become part of an ambitious scheme to combine propaganda and subversion

against the British Empire at its most vulnerable spot.

In his single minded obsession with ousting the British from India, Bose was convinced that the mere appearance of a small force of 50,000 soldiers with modern equipments on the Frontier would have been sufficient to turn the British out of India. However, the Axis proved incapable even in the following up of Bose's more modest suggestion to stir up a strong propaganda centre on the Frontier with a radio transmitter and printing equipment.[45]

According to Quaroni's own statement in 1943, it had taken the Axis agents a whole year after the outback of the war to establish direct contact with the Faqir. It was not until March 1941 that Quaroni's proposal to send the first payment to the Faqir was accepted by the Italian and German authorities. The Faqir's demand was £ 25000 monthly. In addition he demanded weapons and ammunition urgently for general question of money. But even if the Faqir's annual requirements amounted to around half a million Reichmark, it would have been quite a cheap price considering the cost which the government of India had to spend on each punitive expedition into the tribal territory.

The axis had the opportunity in forwarding bank notes to Kabul, as long as the Soviet territory remained open for traffic to and from Afghanistan. The problem was that of converting Pounds sterling and US Dollars into a convenient currency like Afghanis or Indian Rupees

which the Faqir's men could use.[46]

The first concrete evidence about the links between the Axis and the Faqir was received by the Indian Intelligence in June 1941, after the arrest of the interpreter to the Italian Legation in Kabul while he was visiting his relatives in Baluchistan. According to his own statement, several Italians had visited the Faqir between 1939 and 1941 with supplies of money and weapons, including machine guns and a wireless transmitter and receiving set. There were reports that some cartridges and money and weapons, sent by Germans and Turks via Afghanistan to the Faqir were held up by the orders of king Zahir Shah. He threatened Afghan authorities for its consequences but in vain.[47]

During the war, the Faqir had regained a great deal of his lost position. This return to power coincided with persistent reports of financial and propaganda support by the Germans and perhaps also the Italians at Kabul. It now seemed that reports of visits to the Faqir by Germans and German financial assistance were true, especially as the Faqir now seemed more affluent than at any time since gifts of money from the settled districts were seriously checked.

From 1936 until the World War II, the Faqir was content to remain a spiritual leader, though his Lieutenants committed many deeds suggesting an attempt to gain temporal power. In 1940, however, the Faqir himself had shown many signs of desiring to become a temporal

as well as a spiritual ruler. For instance he began to settle disputes, to realize fines and to assume the manners and functions of a local king. This change in his tactics and behaviour seemed to have rested from foreign inspiration. He modified his methods of dealing with defaulters because his original spiritual leader, the Naqib sahib of Charbagh had advised him to remain quiet and to await events. The Faqir was much influenced by the Naqib sahib. He had confined himself to attacks on road protection troops and government officials travelling between Razmak and the Tochi area.[48]

The Faqir was reported to have shown a gathering of 2000 tribesmen at Darre Khela on June 28, 1940 a letter purported to had been received from Germany which promised the Faqir a kingdom consisting of all territory between the Durand Line and the River Indus, but the particular report credited the Faqir with having refused temporal powers, whereupon the gathering was said to had selected instead ex-king Amanullah who, according to the Faqir would appear after two months.[49]

In the same year a cyclostyle poster dated November 1940, under the signature of the Faqir had been recovered in Bannu. It stated that Mujahideen of Waziristan have declared war against British government and anybody helping the government would be considered as an infidel, and urged everybody to help the Mujahideen, since Germany would win and British would soon leave India.[50]

The Faqir was conscious about the consequences of receiving aid from foreign powers. He summoned the leading tribal U'lama to Darre Khela to discuss whether the acceptance of help from one foreign power against another conflicted with the principle of Shariat.[51] It was because of the approval of these U'lama that now he openly announced the arrival of German workers in Waziristan.[52] Later he started employing paid servants to fight against the British.[53]

The only European to have visited the Faqir during the war was Enrich enzilotti, the secretary of the Italian Legation, who did so alone and in disguise as a Pathan tribesmen in June 1941. Anzilotti reported that the Faqir was in principle ready to start action against the British on the Frontier, but required money, weapons and ammunition. The Germans too wanted to establish their own link with the Faqir.

The establishment of contact with the Faqir, furnished with a transparent code name Operation Feuerfresser (Fire-eater), was to be followed by Operation Tiger, a full-scale uprising among the Frontier tribes scheduled for September 1941. The plan had been hatched by Abwehr II, responsible for sabotage and subversion, whose commander stipulated Tiger's task as follows:

a. to incite the Frontier tribes, mainly the Mohmands, Afridis and Wazirs;
b. to damage military installations in North West India;
b. to supply weapons to the tribes so as to enable them to attack

field fortifications prepared by the British in the Frontier passes.

Abwehr officers were dispatched to Rome to contact Amanullah and to Sweden in order to consult the last survey maps of India with Seven Hedin, the famous explorer and authority on Central Asia. Meanwhile, in Kabul, preparations for the full scale uprising on the Frontier were in full swing. The Chief Abwehr Agent there, Lt. Wetzel who under the cover name `Pathan' was to be in charge of contact arrangements with Faqir of Ippi, was full of optimism.

He had already started giving sabotage instructions to members of the `Bose Organization' in Kabul; it did not occur to him at the time that the main recipient of his sabotage instructions, and indeed of most of the Axis money, was at the same time spying for the Soviets.[54]

Thus, in mid-July 1941 off to Gurvekht Germany sent her two specially trained agents, accompanied by a dozen tribesmen carrying ammunition and money. They never reached their target, falling into a trap set up by the Afghan authorities in Logar Valley just south of Kabul. In the ensuing exchange of fire with an Afghan patrol waiting in ambush for them, Prof. Manffred Oberdroffer was killed and Dr. Fred Brandt wounded, the tribesmen arrested and everything confiscated. Oberdroffer was a specialist in tropical medicine and had participated in several expeditions to Africa and Asia, Brandt was a lepidopterist. The Abwehr experts in Berlin thought that if two men posed a `leprosy experts' and collected insects and butterflies en passant, they would

appear entirely harmless and inconspicuous on the Frontier.[55]

Since 1941 Indian Intelligence had been haunted by repeated rumours about two German mechanics working with the Faqir.[56] "By February 1943 Indian Intelligence estimated," writes Milan Hauner, "that the Faqir must so far have accrued about half a million Afghanis paid to him through the Axis Legations."[57]
As for the Faqir, during the dramatic months of 1941 he remained in seclusion at Gurvekht, despite German intentions to induce him into action. He continued to display an intriguing unawareness of the world situation. In one of his letters to Mullahs in South Waziristan, the Faqir stated, while continuing to vilify the British, that no help should be given to the Germans as they are opposed to Islam.[58]

But in the following spring, symptoms of growing tribal unrest became clearly discernible in Waziristan as the Faqir persisted in his attempts to fine Wazirs engaged by the British like in defence works, road constructions, lorry contracts etc and threatened local contractors with religious sanctions. It is important to realize that these seasonal job opportunities were the only ones available to the tribesmen, already suffering from the economic constraints imposed by the war on both sides of the Frontier.[59]

In May, the Faqir's Lashkar besieged the fortified outpost at Datta Khel with approximately 500 men, supplemented by machine-guns and Gurvekht made artillery. The British sent in relief column

supported by tanks and aircraft, but the convoy failed to reach its objectives because of road blocks. Two additional infantry brigades had to be sent in and it was not until August that the road to Datta Khel could finally be opened and repaired.[60]

What worried the British was not just that the Faqir had recruited a substantial number of Afghan subjects to his ranks but, even more, that the Axis Legation had re-established direct contact with him - despite the fact that in the previous autumn over 200 nationals had already been expelled from Afghanistan, leaving behind only a skeleton staff at both legations.[61]

Meanwhile, in August 1942, a major internal upheaval flared up in India, the `Quit India Movement', during which the only increase in Axis activities was through their radio propaganda. It was the time when Hurs were busy interrupting traffic between Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore, and in June 1942 Martial Law had to be proclaimed over the area.

The activities of the Hurs continued well into the spring 1943, when their leader Pir Pagaro was then finally caught and sentenced to death. Although the train-wrecking by the Hurs had no political motivation, the German Legation in Kabul was led to believe that actions had been directly instigated by Bose's underground organization in India, and that the Faqir had been Co-coordinating with Pir Pagaro.[62]

Mainly because of their pre-occupation in quelling the rebellion in India, British pressure on the Afghan government during that period almost ceased. It cannot altogether be ruled out that an internal crisis in Afghanistan, aided by Axis intrigues might have given ex-king Amanullah one more chance. The India office feared that continuous Axis intrigues among the tribes and with the pro-Amanullah elements in the country might undermine and bring about the downfall of the present Yahya Khel regime whose continued stability was so obviously in her interest to promote. There were indications that the Amanist in Axis Europe wanted to set up an Afghan government in exile.

In this context they were directly in touch with the Grand Mufti in Jerusalem, with the ousted Iraqi premier, Rashid Ali al Gilani, and especially with Subhas Chandra Bose, the most important Asian exile in Berlin. Fortunately for the British, the Axis had no clear concept of how to accommodate under one roof its support for Amanullah's restoration with that for the Frontier tribes and the Faqir.

It was not earlier than December 1942, when Abwehr agent in Kabul, Lieutenant Witzel, produced his most comprehensive scheme using the armed tribesmen to the up as many British troops as possible in the North West India - thereby facilitating the expected Japanese advance on India from Burma. Witzel calculated that about 40,000 armed men would potentially be available against the British. Witzel's key man whom, needless to say, he never met, was the

unapproachable Faqir of Ippi, being already in contact, so he claimed, with other guerilla leaders such as Hassan Khan in Baluchistan and Pir Pagaro in Sind. His calculations were wrong because: [63]

a. the Faqir's authority was too circumscribed;
b. even with unlimited supplies of arms, the Faqir could not gather more than 10,000 adherents;
c. he and his men would be useless outside their mountain fastness;
d. the Faqir relied on arms which could no longer be supplied by land after Hitler had attacked Russia whence previous arms could have been smuggled through as `factory machinery.'

During 1944 the Frontier remained unusually quit, the peace being occasionally disrupted by the customary raiding and by the British retaliation in shape of air bombing. Although German intrigues with the Faqir continued, they were certainly harmless. The main reason for this continuity was a strong tendency to survival.

In order to justify their presence in neutral Afghanistan, Axis diplomats and agents displayed feverish bogus activity which, of course, nobody in Berlin could verify. It was clear that there was not the slightest chance of inciting the Frontier tribes through direct assistance, they carried on their activities, be it in Kabul or at the receiving end in Kabul, as if such an opportunity was ever very close.[64]

Other Connections

Communist party India was also active in the international politics. She sent a deputation to the Faqir to seek his help in guerilla training of her workers in Punjab. The C.P.I., according to S.V. Gate, leading Madrass Communist, although not approving the Faqir's method, hoped that the Faqir might be able to help the party with funds and by other means in case of a revolution in India.
In addition the party wanted to investigate the Axis connections with the Faqir and to divert it to their own benefit. Gur Charan Singh along with Comrade Khushal Khan Khattak and Badre visited Gurvekht in September 1942. It was the month of Ramadan. They were received by Qazi Sherzad, Father-in-law of the Faqir. After studying the method and strategies of the Faqir, they returned dishearten because they could not adjust Communism with the traditional Islam of the Faqir.[65]

When Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed was martyred by the Sikhs in Balakot on May 6, 1831, his followers sought shelter in smast (Kala Dhaka) and Chamarkand (Bajaur Agency). The movement maintained her organizational set up to some extent. It was October 1938 when Maulvi Fazal Elahi with his Shinwari disciple, Lalai joined the Faqir. Maulvi Fazal Elahi had become member of Sayyid's movement in 1905. He used to bring students from Lahore to the Mujahideen Colony.

Most of these students eventually joined the Allahwali Fauj of Maulana

Ubaidullah Sindhi, who under Turkish influence, tried to create unrest in the Tribal Areas during the Great War. During the Mohmand disturbances of 1915 Fazal Elahi came to India to collect subscriptions for the Mujahideen who were taking part in hostilities against the British government. He was arrested and interned in jail. On his release he was restricted to Wazirabad but slipped away in 1920 and returned to smast. He used to pay frequent visits to Kabul, where it was reported, he was in touch with the Russian Embassy and the Ghadar party.

In 1938, he was reported to be in touch with Dr. Satyapal who had approached Asif Ali, M.L.A. (central) to obtain permission for his return to India. It was also reported that in 1938 his brother K.S. Muhammad Elahi, approached the late Sir Sikandar Hayat and other Muslim M.L.As and requested them to obtain permission for his return.

In October 1938 he joined the Faqir. Fazal Elahi also took with him arms and ammunition. He used to correspond with India and other foreign countries on behalf of the Faqir and was in possession of a type-writer. He also made propaganda amongst Afghans of the Southern Province to support the Faqir and collected funds from them to this end.[66]

Before Maulvi Fazal Elahi, Maulvi Barkatullah, Amir-e-Mujahideen was reported to be in contact with the Faqir. He sent two men, probably Maulvi Abdullah and Maulvi Abdur Rahman with the request that in case the Faqir was able to accommodate all the Mujahideen of

Smast in Waziristan; they would take up their residence there.

The Faqir had in turn promised to accommodate them and provide suitable means of subsistence.[67] Interestingly both these maulanas were sent by Maulvi Barkatullah to G.Cunningham, Governor NWFP with a letter from him, requesting permission to go to Waziristan with a view to persuade the tribes to give up raiding and kidnapping.[68] It was reported that:

> *About seventy Mujahideen from Asmas (Smast) and Chamarkand have recently been with Faqir of Ippi for the purpose of Waging Jihad, and that more intend to go to Waziristan for the same purpose. They do not go collectively, but in twos and threes for fear of being molested on the way by Nawab Mian Gul of Swat who is believed to be a friend of British government.*

The Mujahideen were also busy in doing propaganda in Muhammad and Bajaur illaqas against Nawab Mian Gul for his alliance with the government and for putting obstacles in the way of the Mujahideen for going to Waziristan.[69] Mujahideen residing in Jalalabad had already established their contacts with the Faqir. The Hakim of Jalalabad was against their participation in Waziristan Jihad, so they opted for alternate means to proceed to Waziristan.[70]

Faqir of Ippi was also in touch with madrassa-e-Rahimia Delhi and Dar-ul-ulum Deoband.[71] He had sent Maulvi Fazal Elahi to Madrassa-e-Rahimia to seek help from the U'lema and Master Mir Sahib Khan to

Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani.[72] When the British government extended peace offers to the Faqir; he had consulted Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani in this regard. Maulana strongly advised him not to accept such an offer.[73] Later it was reported that Maulana Hussain Ahmad and Nafe Gul (brother of Maulana Uzer Gul) were contemplating with the Faqir in sending students of Deoband to Waziristan.[74]

Anti-Axis Propaganda

In order to associate the public in some way with the war efforts after the imposition of governor's rule in N.W.F.P. in November 1939, the Frontier government formed so called District War Committees. "The members of these committees were mostly loyalist Khans", writes "Ernold Jansson, "but there was as good sprinkling of pleaders, members of the professional classes and others who have a distinctly political tinge". The idea was that these committees should spread propaganda, counteract false rumours and to assist in the collection of War Funds.[75]

Throughout the war the government conducted anti-Axis Muslim propaganda through a secret network of Mullahs in government pay. K.B. Quli Khan was entrusted the task of organizing this propaganda. The line taken by Quali Khan was that Bolshevism was the arch enemy of Islam and that the Germans were co-operating with Bolsheviks against Islam and religion in general.[76]

In 1941, Cunningham started another similar scheme. Mullahs in the settled districts as well as tribal territory were paid by a number of officials and other men trusted by the government for doing Islamic propaganda against the Germans. Mullah Fazal Din, the biggest potential source of trouble among the Mahsuds was prominent.[77]

Through Quli Khan and his contacts in Jamia't-ul-ulama, the government even approached Faqir of Ippi, but there is no evidence that he allowed himself to be influenced by the Jamiat's emissaries while there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.

Although very incomplete accounts remains of these activities but it is obvious that large sums were spent on them. The Political Agent South Waziristan received Rs.12000/- annually to be used for this work and K.S. Muhammad Sarwar, who was responsible for the work among the North Waziristan tribes, the Bhittanis in the Bannu Frontier region and among the nomad Ghilzais as well as for the work in the Kurram Agency, got Rs.19600/.[78]

The government also used the press for its sub-rosa propaganda. Politically the whole vernacular press received subsidies in return for publishing Anti-Axis articles, which were published in the name of the people who were not known to be connected with the government.[79]

Ironically in all such bulletins and press release British government

tried her best to denounce Russia and Germany as godless states and adhered herself with all those religions which had belief in God such as, "It is significant that both these countries decry religion and God and believe in nothing but worldly power and self-aggrandizement. It is the bounden duty of the God fearing countries of the world to put up a united front to stop them from this mad pursuit."[80]

Economically, the War brought prosperity to the Frontier after the hard time of 1930s. Agricultural prices rose, and employment opportunities expanded as the province's contingent in army grew almost five fold from 8828 to 41201. Politically the two years of self-rule under the 1935 Act had blunted anti-British feelings so that the government no longer appeared as an obstacle in the way of local aspirations.

With the heavy recruitment into the army and an intensive propaganda campaign which equated the War with the defense of Islam, the people of Frontier adopted the British cause as their own.

In return of liberal subsidies, religious figures preached that Great Britain's enemies were also the enemies of Islam. A rare unanimity was created in religious circles which gave the War a powerful sanction. Religious figures initially concentrated their attacks on the "Bolsheviks" who had long been held in disfavour in the Frontier for their atheism and their treatment for Central Asian Muslims.

The Germans were denounced first for their association with Russians

and then for being anti-religious themselves. When the alignment in the war changed, the propaganda was suitably redirected. Italians were condemned as no longer Ahl-i-Kitab and the Japanese as but-Parast (idol-worshippers). The Russians' religious attitude were played down, and the English alliance with them was justified as expedient politics.[81]

Waziristan was not different from other tribal areas. A big gathering was held on December 12, 1940 in Makin, South Waziristan under the president ship of Gul Lala, the spiritual leader of the area. They unanimously decided that they will fight against Russia on the side of the British as "Russian are against Islam and its principles." They assured Political Agent South Waziristan of their loyalty to the British government against Russia.

Afghan General Musa Khan Abdullai of Mandech had offered a Mahsud Army of 20,000 to help the British government against Russia. Gul Lala of Makin had written letters to other Mahsud Mullahs of Kaniguram etc. to hold such like meetings.[82] In addition Gul Lala and Musa Khan had personally asked the Faqir to confine his activities to North Waziristan and Qazi Abdur-Rahman had sent letters to the leading Mullahs advising them to keep their people from starting hostile activities and thereby save them from further punishment.[83]

Cunningham held Jirgas of Mahsuds, Wazirs and Bhittanis in tribal areas. One such Jirga of Ahmadzai Wazirs and Dottanis presented a

purse of Rs.9192/- as a subscription to the War purpose Fund. The amount represented one month Maliki allowances.[84] Another Jirga of Mahsuds offered a purse of Rs.21, 000/- towards an aeroplane to be called "Mahsud" was presented to the Governor.[85] Bhittanis, inspired by the contributions, presented eleven. 303 magazine rifles of decent quality (worth Rs.2000/-) as their offering.[86] The Viceroy of India visited Waziristan on April 6, 1942. The leading Daur and Wazir Maliks spontaneously organized a donation of Rs.25, 000/- to the Viceroy's Red Cross and prisoners of War Fund. This donation, following closely upon the tribe's refusal to pay Konra (fines) to him, so piqued the Faqir that he demanded payment of double that amount.

The lower Daur Mullahs already issued a joint pronouncement that these exactions were un-Islamic. Maulana Zahir Shah, the right hand of the Faqir was prominent against the Konra campaign. To retrieve his position Faqir of Ippi then set about enlisting paid servants. Germans rates of pay were widely published and lists of recruits were prepared by leading hostiles in various parts of the Faqir's money since they had been misled by similar unfulfilled promises in the past. Still hopeful of creating an armed disturbance during the summer months, the Faqir embarked on two courses of action:

a. He planned a public appearance at Darre-Khela, anticipating that thousands of tribesmen would flock to him and provide the Lashkar he needed;
b. he sought to unite the Mahsuds and Wazirs against government

by settling the long standing boundary dispute which was the chief cause of enmity between these tribes.

Both projects became the subject of elaborate hostile propaganda, and on June 28, 1942, the Faqir appeared publicly at Darre-Khela and summoned all and sundry to join him. In retaliation the government dropped leaflets by air on all the chief villages of the Madda Khel, Manzar Khel, Khaddar Khel etc, warning the tribes of the consequences of any move in support of the Faqir. He failed to collect more than three to four hundred tribals.

The Faqir lost no time in converting his attention to the settlement of the boundary dispute. He made extensive tour of Shawal, interviewing Wazir and Mahsud leaders and sending emissaries from place to place to secure tribal agreement to his arbitration. The Faqir failed to persuade the Mahsuds because being as aggressor; they would inevitably suffered by any finding based on traditional ownership.

The government exploited the situation in her favour, inviting the representative Jirga of Tori Khel tribe. The Jirga openly denounced the Faqir and his claim to recover Konra from them. Hardly a fortnight had passed when raiding and counter raiding broke out between the Wazirs and Mahsuds along the whole length of the Shaktu. This raiding did not amount to inter-tribal fighting but had continued in a desolatory manner, in spite of repeated efforts by the Faqir to conclude a compromise.

Early in November 1942, the Faqir received a warning from Axis Legation at Kabul that their donations would cease if he did not produce better results. This threat spurred him to action and was probably the indirect cause of an outbreak of armed attacks throughout the Agency towards the end of that month. He opened negotiations with Shahzada Fazal Din, Musa Khan Abdullai and other prominent Mahsud leaders.

The Faqir and Fazal Din issued a joint manifesto calling upon the Mahsuds and Wazirs of the Shaktu to cease inter-tribal raiding. The Faqir's guns were removed to Shaktu and Larima. It was reported that some 30,000/- Afghanis were paid to Mullah Fazal Din by the Afghan government as a reward for introducing Faqir of Ippi into the Shaktu. It seemed that this payment came from Axis sources. Fazal Din had passed this payment to the Faqir.[87]

Air action begun in Shaktu in where the Faqir was working, however, expelling the Faqir had not been achieved. Two Mahsud villages most frequented by the Faqir and his following were destroyed on March 3 and 4, 1943. This bombing caused the Mahsuds to press the Faqir to appear in Wazir limits, but stiffened the determination of the Tori Khel not to receive him. The government bombed the village of Mir Ghulam, notable Kikarai hostile on March 22 and 23, 1943. The effect was that the Faqir left Shaktu and appeared on walo Tangi.[88]

Malicious propaganda, based on fantastic accounts of casualties suffered by Mahsud personnel in Libya and Malaya was being directed at Mahsuds coming to their homes on leave from the military training and other units. Every effort was being made to prevent them from rejoining on the conclusion of their leave. The number of men affected was not yet large even though they had in some cases been bound to charpais and deprived of their kit.[89]

Repercussions of The War

The most difficult problem the administration had to deal with during the War was the shortage of food, cloth and other essential commodities. This problem arose over the whole of India and in many parts it was far worse than in the N.W.F.P. Prices began rising in the N.W.F.P. long before the Muslim League took office after the resignation of Dr. Khan Sahib's government due to `Quit India' Movement. The prices of cereals increased during the year 1943-44 until the closing months the tribesman had to spend Rs.3/- in order to buy as much food as he could have purchased with Re.1/- in 1939. A 300% increase in the cost of staple food must bear heavily upon tribe which had so exiguous resources.[90]

The Governor and his officials made arrangements to meet the crisis. However, the price rise continued and new measures became necessary. On the whole the Frontier government's arrangements were the same as those in other provinces. In April 1944 a limit was

imposed on the prices chargeable on the chief food supplies. This led to an artificial shortage as many hurried to sell their stocks at threats obtaining before the controls were introduced, and then withheld what they had left in the hope that the government would find itself forced to lift the control. The crisis continued and in July 1944 the government found itself forced to issue an order under the Defence of India Rules empowering the government to requisition grain compulsory from the bigger grain producers.

The War time shortages in essential commodities came up sometimes for discussion in the Frontier Assembly. The government introduced the `control system' by dividing the province into three zones:

a. Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu
b. Peshawar, Kohat and Mardan
c. Hazara.

For the distribution and movement of grains and other essential commodities the government issued permits to contractors.[91] These arrangements did not provide any relief to tribal areas. Agitation started both in North and South Waziristan. Unsuccessful efforts were made to organise demonstrations on the road. Leaders like Mullah Fazal Din and Malik Hayat Khan tried to exploit the situation.

Fazal Din convened a Dre-Mahsud Jirga at Kaniguram on August 27, 1943. The Jirga was attended by 4000 to 5000 Mahsuds. The Jirga passed the resolution against the higher prices and demanded that all prices should be restored for Mahsuds to their pre-war level.[92] The

`control system' in itself created serious problems. Cloth was also provided through this system. Influential Maliks were given contracts who gave cloth to shopkeepers from their depots. The problem was that of import, which remained small and a distribution of one or two yards per family with a promise of equal amount to come monthly did not satisfy the tribes who required 18 yards of cloth to make one suit for a man and 25 to 40 yards for a woman.

In addition the Agency quota had been made up largely with Khaddar of various kinds which was most un-poplar because of its poor quality and high price. There was a widespread feeling about the scarcity of cloth and the usual reaction was to blame the government.[93] Since the beginning of 1945 until August 1945, N.W.F.P. government had dispatched 297 bales of cloth to the tribes of Waziristan. The actual quota promised was 108 bales per month. It is to be noted that the census figures available for the North Waziristan gave a population of just over 100,000 persons, though the actual figure was in the neighborhood of 130,000. The total yardage received was some 5500 yards over a period of eight months. From this figure the Indian population of posts and camps was also supposed to be paid. It would be seen that something less than 4 yards cloth had been received per head of population.[94]

The matter was exploited by the religious leaders and Maliks. Prominent among them were Mullah Najibullah Malikshahi alias Mullah Laswandai and Malik Hayat Nazar Khel. They made speeches

protesting against the continuance of control. They started tour of the Manzai village and propagated against the control system. The government considered it a triumph that the only grievance which the Mullahs could find to exploit with regard to control was the scarcity of the red chintz which was the customary dress of the Mahsud women.[95]

The Eid festivals were markedly filled with a favourable topic of shortage of suitable clothing of women. A Jirga held by the Manzai Mullahs at Sabi Khula near Dwe Shinkai. Proposal was made more in jest than in anger that a Lashkar of women would hold up traffic on the roads.[96] Meanwhile feminism had reared its head in Waziristan for the first time. A Lashkar of 200 women from Makin blocked the Razmak-Ladha road near Darra Bridge on the afternoon of November 27, 1945. The Razmak-Ladha mail lorry was detained but was eventually passed through by Khassadars.

On the next day Razmak-Jandola mail lorry was held up by women who were armed with Axes. Malik Mirboz Abdullai, the mail contractor succeeded in dispersing the women by assuring them that chintz was on the way and that the dress shops would soon be able to meet their needs.[97] Following the example of their Mahsud cousins some Aziz Khel, Bora Khel women blocked the road between Duncan and crocus picquets and demanded that the A.P.A should get them Tika cloth (a sort of red chintz). An old lady armed with Axe was peculiarly pugnacious, though the whole of affair was otherwise marked by great humour.[98]

Malik Hayat, the staunch supporter of the Faqir along with other Mullahs maintained the agitation, visiting different villages and preaching against all type of control. In this regard he established Lashkar accompanying drum-beaters, stopping lorries to pay small fines. He persuaded the Maliks to withdraw from all such contracts. He called upon all the shopkeepers to take an oath that they would not profiteer when selling cloth. This campaign was a blow to all those Maliks who had monopolized the legitimate traders' cloth business and to start profiteering on their own account.[99]

Konra Campaign

The World War II exposed the Faqir to other elements outside India. This exposure directly influenced his tactics and strategies. Now he dreamed of worldly powers and his saintliness amalgamated with other affairs. He started a Konra campaign against the tribes who used to take benefits from government in any form. The tribes were tried and persuaded through this campaign to avoid such move and show resistance against the alien power.

His leading lieutenants like Shodi Khel, Wali Khel, Mehr Dil, Maulvi Abdul Hanan, Tor Mulla, Mulla Sher Ali, Hayat Nazar Khel, Gul Nawaz, Fatheh Jang, Sardodi, Sardar, Sardali, Tilladar, Azal Mir, Janat Mir, Din Bobrai, Tawildar, Gulla Jan, Mulla Ghazi, Gagu, Faizal Ustad and Sher Ali Marwat, etc. took active part in implementing the

will of the Faqir and fining elements acting against the spirit of Jihad. His lieutenants along with Lashkars visited the tribes and extorted fines from tribesmen who had assisted or received employment from the British.[100]

Shodi Khel, a Hamzoni Daur and a prominent Lieutenant of the Faqir was famous for his harshness in collecting konra. He came to Spalga Village with a following of 200-300 men on December 28, 1940 and implemented his will on the convicted villagers. He extorted ten rifles as konra from a local Malik Mian Khan Rasul Khan who had refused to feed them.

On December 30, 1940, his Lashkar burnt the house of Haji Sarwar Khan on his refusal to pay fine. He was charged for killing a Khassadar during Tappi operations in August, 1940. His Lashkar moved towards Tappi, where they demolished the tower of a local Hindu.[101] He, along with his Lashkar, visited Hurmaz, Hassu Khel and Natasi villages and arrested one Haji Hussain and another local Malik of Khadi for their pro-government feelings, demanding 3000/- Afghanis for their release.

The Lashkar took 200/- Afghanis from Malik Khan Darpa Khel on January 5, 1941 for his pro-government activities. Shodi Khel continued his job, assigned to him by the Faqir. He extorted konra from all those who collected land-revenue for government, fined persons for giving assistance to government and punished alleged

offenses. On January 11, 1941 he killed a Muslim woman in Idak village for alleged illicit relations with the son of a local Hindu and looted the Hindu's house. The family members of the Hindu were taken into custody but were subsequently released on payment of Rs.2500/- as fine.

Local mullahs declared the murder of Muslim woman without fulfilling the requisite requirements as against Shariat. The Faqir was reported to be displeased with this act of Shodi Khel and sent Tor Mullah to stop the activities of Shodi Khel in lower Daur area. Shodi Khel also detained Jamedar Amir Khan Michi Khel, Havildar Ghazigai, Khassadar Miangul and the son of Subedar Pyao Jan Momit Khel for extorting konra from them. Jamedar Amir Khan and the son of Pyao Jan were released on payment of one pass-made rifle. Zarjan, a Bora Khel Khassadar, who was also arrested, was released after giving Shodi Khel two 303 rifles.[102] Shodi Khel, while returning from Tappi village, held four private lorries between Isha and Miranshah on January 21, 1941.

One lorry, which belonged to Gela Ram contractor of Idak, was burnt. Some Scouts Sepoys who were travelling in it were allowed to proceed to Miranshah. He moved to Hassu Khel village and his followers scattered about in the villages of Idar Khel, Zeraki, Hurmaz and Hassu Khel. They arrested some villagers and extorted konra from them. The towers of two local Hindus, Bani Ram and Topen Ram of Hurmaz were demolished. Several Hindu families moved down to Bannu for fear of Shodi Khel.

The Lashkar moved to Idak from where a message was sent to Gela Ram contractor of Idak at Bannu to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, otherwise his house would be destroyed.[103] In retaliation Scouts gasht proceeded to Khatti Kili, Shodi Khel's village. His group turned out to oppose the Scouts and followed withdrawal. During this encounter Shodi Khel was killed by an aeroplane bomb. His mantle fell upon his brother Wali Khel who continued the resistance.[104]

Faqir Ippi was in Gurvekht. He sent letters to Mullahs in upper Mahsud country, instructing them to tell Khassadars and Maliks to give up government service, failing which a Lashkar with guns would be sent to demolish Khassadar posts and the houses of Maliks who continued to show loyalty to government.[105]

Besides letters, he was also busy in releasing cyclostyled posters to settled areas. One such poster was found placarded in Bannu City, in which the Faqir declared that his present war had been waged to liberate Waziristan from the British and asked the people not to co-operate with government forces.[106] Another cyclostyled letter signed by the Faqir was distributed amongst the tribes during the week of December 1941, directing them to dig caves in the villages for self defence as Waziristan was likely to become a scene of battle very soon.[107]

Decapitation of Morgan

On the morning of January 24, 1942, a group led by Sardar Muhammad Khel, Sardali Bizen Khel, Tilladar Bannuchi and Faizal Ustad, hiding in a sugarcane field on the junction of Bannu Tochi Bannu Kurram Garhi roads ambushed a party of Frontier Constabulary. On the first volley of shots Mr. Morgan and a Havildar were killed and an F.C. Sepoy wounded.

A few sepoys took up positions and returned the fire, killing one person of the group on the spot. Mr. Morgan was decapitated, his revolver, the rifles of the Havildar and their dead companions were snatched and the group returned hurriedly through the sugarcane fields in Mamash Khel area. An F.C. party between Kurram Garhi and Ali Shah Baba Ziarat shot dead two of them. The group split and one party took refuge in village Torwari Kozi Khel near Kurram Garhi, where they were surrounded by F.C. and Police . The group refused to surrender and a gun was sent out by Bannu Brigade on the evening of 24th. On the morning the towers were destroyed by gun fire and the position rushed.

The details of casualties were:

- Government forces: F.C.
    - Killed : 05
    - Wounded : 03
- Faqir Ippi's followers
    - Killed : 11
    - Captured : 05

This incident stunned the Faqir. Later on the head of Morgan was returned to the government after fulfilling certain conditions.[108] The most prominent hostile killed in the encounter was Din Bobrai, Gangi Khel of Birmal.

The Faqir had assigned different areas to different groups. Maulvi Abdul Hanan and Maulvi Abdur Rahman alias Tor Mullah collected fines from Manzar Khel of Mamirogha.[109] The Khadder Khel and Manzar Khel tribes of Datta Khel and Wazzi Khel had sent messages to the Faqir not to send his emissaries collecting fines in their limits. The Faqir directed them to collect heavy fines from government supporters themselves and sent it to him.[110]

On the evening of Feb 15, 1942, the groups threatening the Shinki Defence works sent a Lashkar of about 200 persons under Gula Jan, Mullah Ghazi and Gagu Tori Khel, Tahwildar Kabul Khel, Mullah Zwahir Shah Momit Khel, Gul Nawaz, Sardar Bannuchi and Sardali into the protected area round Mir Ali to impose konra on all persons helping in the construction of government works. Its object was to intimidate, to fine and to take security in the Faqir's name.

On the first night the Lashkar kidnapped the nephew of Sahib Jan, a Jamedar of Khassadars and Shahmatti, a hostile who had recently surrendered to government. On Feb 26, 1942 the Lashkar entered in the village Bakka Khel. The villagers held a marakka with the Lashkar as a result of which they withdrew. Their presence in the village

caused considerable financial loss to the tribe as the Lashkar had helped themselves freely to the supplies of all kind before the man folk of villagers arrived.

The Lashkar paraded showing their superior armament, accompanying mules laden with ammunition boxes which they showed to Bakka Khel. Impressed by this show, the Bakka Khel Jirga met with the Political Agent and declared inability to maintain the defence of Shini Camp unless provided sufficient security.[111]

On the other hand Ippi's Lashkar again came to Khadder Khel village for the recovery of konra but the villagers refused to pay it. The Faqir had circulated another notice asking Maliks and Khassadars to give up all their connections with government otherwise they could not be considered for the employment under the government that would succeed the British.[112]

He issued orders for the enlistment of a large number of Khassadars from all the Waziristan tribes on pay of 20/- Afghani per month. In South Waziristan he had written to Gul Lala of Makin, Fazal Din and Hayat Nazar Khel. Tribesmen generally appeared to be of the opinion that the Faqir had no funds with which to pay these Khassadars. His counsel of Mullahs advised him not to take such step till the Faqir was able to mint and issue his own coinage. He persisted on his own orders which frustrated the tribes and created controversies about his movement. He issued the following orders: [113]

a. No lorry should be looted or passenger shot unless the lorry was carrying government property or officials.
b. The Khassadars should not be disgraced by the Lashkar as this might lead to tribal feuds.
c. The Lashkar might recover fines from the Madda Khel, Zadrans, Gian Khel, and Mangals for blood feuds.

The Faqir was unable to check the implementation of his own orders. There were obviously so many reasons. The main reason was the independent role of the groups. Majority of the tribes had their own reasons to revolt. On fulfilling their grievances, they made peace with the government. That is why there was no uniformity in the resistance Khandan Khan, the leading Madda Khel Malik used to play the cards according to circumstances. In March 1942, he was deliberately encouraging the use of Madda Khel country as a base and thoroughfare for anti-government activities. On the evening of March 23, 1942 four hand-grenades were thrown from the cover of Khandan's Sarai at Datta Khel into the neighboring; over twenty horses were killed or had to be destroyed.

On March 27, 1942 news was received that a fresh Lashkar of the Faqir had been entertained at Khandan's house and set out from thence to take fines from government's supporters in the neighboring Khaddar Khel tribe just as they had previously done from Arsala Khan and others of Khandan's own tribe. The Madda Khel took no steps to expel the Lashkar and Sheranna, Khandan's village was accordingly bombed on March 29, 1942.

The number of aeroplanes used was a surprise to the tribe, who had made up their mind that government had only one or two left. Destructive action continued and Khandan's house and his uncle Dande had been destroyed. Later on Rs.5000/- fine was announced for the damage of 20 horses.[114]

These were the days when All India National Congress was indulged in "Quit India" movement. The Congress tried to own the Faqir's movement but the Faqir, although receiving material help therefrom was careful in giving co-operation.

The Faqir was still at Gurvekht. He was considering methods of enforcing konra on all who had recently served or received fresh benefits from government. He summoned all leading mullahs of the Agency to advise them in this connection. Meanwhile Mullah Khan Badan was kidnapped by Zmare, a Scout deserter, from Idar Khel village on December 12, 1942, and brought to Gurvekht. He was questioned by Qazi Sherzad, father-in-law of the Faqir, concerning his alleged performance of funeral ceremonies of Khassadars. In retaliation political authorities rounded up Idar Khel and Ali Khel villages. Some 54 hostages were taken from both the villages and sent to Bannu jail. The Mullah was later on released at Gurvekht on February 11, 1943.[115]

The tribes generally were resistant against konra. The general line of response was that the Faqir must first collect fines from his own tribe,

the Tori Khel and then collect from others. On the other hand fines imposed by the government on the tribes in Waziristan during 1942, on account of territorial responsibility for incidents as sniping troops and camps, damage to government property, etc. totaled Rs.37,000/- in cash, 54 rifles and 500 rounds of ammunition.[116]

The Lashkar entered Jaler, Katira, Bobali, Shinpon and Mutkhel on February 3, 1943 to recover konra from certain elements. They took two sons of Malik Passal, Maddi Khel as hostages. They were later released on security of 2000/- Afghanis for each captive. A general Tori Khel marakka was held at Natasi on February 4, 1943 and the whole tribe confirmed their determination to refuse payment of konra and ransom.[117]

The konra campaign created ill feeling against the Faqir among the tribes and some religious elements like Mullah Zwahir Shah, Maulvi Abdul Hannan, Mullah Ghainuddin, Mullah Fazal Din, Gulajan, and Wali Khel Wazir of Bannu came openly against the konra. Some Mullahs in Madda Khel country started preaching against Ippi.

Maulvi Abdul Hanan and Mullah Ghainuddin, two anti-government Mullahs, with about 100 Madda Khel tribesmen including some supporters of government, visited Gurvekht on February 25, 1943 to discuss with the Faqir the legality of his konra. Abdul Hanan later on broke with the Faqir over his konra campaign. Mullah Fazal Din, when received a letter of the Faqir, suggesting his visit to Latakka, regretted

to attend him on the plea that no such visit seemed necessary, especially as the Faqir was now more interested in obtaining temporal power than in spiritual power.[118]

On the other hand the Jirgas of Kikarais and Shingis were invited at Razmak by the Political Agent on Feb 12, 1943. They were ordered to deposit 14 country made magazine rifles and Rs.500/- as fine and to produce as security for certain named persons 5 country made and 3 British rifles, on account of visit of Ippi's Khalifas to their villages for extortion of Kunra.[119]

Meanwhile one of the most serious outrages in District Bannu for some years took place, when a group raided Ghoriwala. The group entered the village at dusk and went straight to Gurdwara where the ceremony of "Akhand Path" was in progress. They opened fire, killing five on the spot, and wounding four. They took six Hindus with them during retreat. The group included Sardodi, Gul Nawaz and Fatheh Jang.[120] This incident harassed the Hindu community and gave a bad name to the Faqir.

Apart from konra campaign the Faqir's efforts to enlist paid servants made no significant progress. He enrolled a certain number of already active hostiles, but the tribes to whom he had appealed for recruits had all excused themselves on the ground that other tribesmen should be enlisted before their own. The Faqir retired into seclusion for a week. He considered this setback due to the opposition of certain

Mullahs. He sent the Kharsin hostiles to effect a reconciliation between him and Mullah Zwahir Shah, who had recently moved from Larima to Ghoreshti.[121] Later on the Faqir offered the Mullah to agree to the konra campaign on the condition that half of the proceed would be given to the Lashkar. Mullah Zwahir Shah responded that if it was allowed by Shariat, then he had no objection.[122] This controversy continued up to 1947, when Pakistan appeared on the map of the world. Faqir applied every method to induce the Mullah in favour of his campaign but never succeeded in convincing him in this regard.

The Faqir's Tour in Waziristan

Faqir of Ippi initiated an extensive tour of Waziristan. The main objective was to uplift the morale of his followers, to discourage the intrigues of the British government and her supporters and make a compromise between Mahsuds and Tori Khel on their dispute about shoran Algad. He started his journey to South Waziristan. He spent the night of Jan 20, 1944 with Musa Khan at Warjoba near Mandech; the night of Jan 21, 1944 with Azam Khan, a supporter of Fazal Din at the village in the junction between Dashka and Darra Algad; and the night of Jan 22, 1944 was passed in the vicinity of Marobi. There he reportedly took his lunch with Mullah Fazal Din, at Latakka.

Mullah Fazal Din was playing a double game. He sent various persons to tell the Political Agent how cross he was that Ippi had trespassed in Mahsud Limits. The Faqir moved to Pamona on the

night of Jan 23. He spent the night of Jan 24 with Ajam Khan ex-Khassadar Subedar and Bahadur Bromi Khel Astonai. His next move was to village Shah'Alam on the Shiga where he stayed the night of Jan 25, with Malik Adram Gul, Bromi Khel Astonai; on Jan 26, he visited Mir Ghulam and Miran Khel villages. He spent the night either at Arsal Kot or Pasal Kot. On the night of Jan 27, he was at Matwam, a Wazir village; on the night of Jan 28, he was with Gud, Marsanzai at Marsanzai caves. Later on the Faqir shifted to Shaktu area.[123]

Government bombed the area on Feb 7, 1944, confining it to the caves in which the Faqir was reportedly living. Afterwards the bombing was extended to neighbouring villages. One woman and some sheep were reportedly killed and several huts damaged. The Faqir's self-allotted task of bringing the Mahsuds and Tori Khels to terms on Shoran Algad had been complicated by the daily incidents occurred between these two tribes.[124]

The bombing continued. Mir Ghulam's Kikarai village was bombed. Two-third of the village was destroyed. The Faqir shifted to Walo Tangi and appeared openly in the Friday prayers. He declared that he might have to return to Gurvekht on account of the development in Khost.[125]

He left Walo Tangi on April 4, 1944 and spent the night in Gud Marsanzai caves. On April 7, 1944 he was reported at Khorai. Adherents now began to flock towards him and by April 10, 1944 a

Lashkar in the range of 500-600 had assembled. The Lashkar consequently concentrated in the Warusta Wazina -Shahwali area. On the night of April 10, 1944 one of Ippi's guns opened fire at one of the Gariom Scout picquets. This was a symbol that serious hostilities against government had begun.

In retaliation government bombed Warusta Wazina and shelled Shahwali on April 11-12, 1944. On April 13, 1944 the tribesmen occupying the hills round Gariom were machine-gunned from air. On the same day Warusta Bazina and Shahwali were again bombed and on April 14, 1944 Shahwali was destroyed by shelling and bombing. This action was repeated on every adjacent village from where Ippi's guns shelled like Psapalpezhi Khula, Mullah Zwahir Shah's village, Spinwam, Khajuri etc.[126]

The Faqir was against the raiding and kidnapping Hindus. Some groups were directly involved in raiding and kidnapping Hindus. The Faqir warned his followers in Walo Tangi, Chichendai and Sein that if they continued to restrict their activities to raiding and kidnapping Hindus, a policy of which he disapproved, and took no action against government forces, he would stop giving them pay and rations.[127]

Darim's Challenge and the Faqir

Faqir of Ippi's Lashkar included some Manzar Khel tribesmen also. The government invited Manzar Khel Jirga on May 30, 1945. The

Jirga produced eleven hostiles and furnished security for them and for seven others whom they promised to produce at a later date. This action convinced the government to release their hostages from jail, who were arrested to pressurize the tribe. Faqir of Ippi became irritated on this compromise.

At the instigation of the Faqir and abetted by Malik Khandan, a large party of Madda Khel headed by Mian Salih and Khwaja wali entered Mamirogha Manzar Khel territory forcefully to enquire as why the tribes had given security for their hostiles. They met Manzar Khel Maliks headed by Subedar Darim, who refused to be intimidated. As a result the Faqir's party retired without any fruitful results.

The Lashkar made persistent attempts to intimidate the Manzar Khel. Both sides were determined and equal in force. On July 23, 1945 some sporadic sniping attacks were made on Mamirogha village, which continued for several days. Later, on July 27, 1945 the hostiles used L.M.G. and M.M.G against Subedar Darim's Kot without doing any damage. On July 28, 1945, the Lashkar occupied the outlying hamlets of Om and Wala.

The government supported the Mamirogha and other Manzar Khel villagers and Khassadars on occasion by firing from Gardai and Tut Narai. Attempts were made by Malik Sherjan to effect a compromise and the Lashkar made suggestions that Manzar Khel should pay a nominal konra but the tribe refused to subdue. The Lashkar looted Bariam Khel Manzar Khel Mela near Sar Punga, which had remained

isolated against government's advice. All livestock including five men were kidnapped of whom three were returned later on. A boy was killed and women's jewellery stolen. The Lashkar distributed the booty amongst themselves.

The following was supported list of property looted and its distribution to the Faqir's Lashkar.

-	Mahsuds	10 goats, 2 camels and 4 cows.
-	Ahmadzais	15 goats and 2 camels.
-	Tori Khels	60 goats, 2 cows and 2 donkeys.
-	Daurs	36 goats, 2 cows and 2 donkeys.
-	Madda Khel	36 goats, 2 cows and 2 donkeys.
-	Khaddar Khels	25 goats.
-	Kabul Khels	40 goats, 3 cows and 1 camel.
-	Momit Khels	46 goats, 4 cows.
-	Professional Hostiles, military and Scouts deserters known as Ippi's militia	14 goats.

The Tori Khel members of the Lashkar secured the lion's share as Azalmir and Janatmir Tori Khel were the leading spirit concerned in directing operations. This act of the Lashkar was strongly condemned by many Wazirs who declared it to be far from the spirit of Ghaza. Maulvi Abdul Hanan and Wali Khel Wazir of Bannu had declared that Ippi's Lashkar against the Mamirogha Manzar Khel for recovery of konra was against Shariat and those who participated in this act were Kafir. Mullah Zwahir Shah also supported this view. Mullah Fazal Din asked the Faqir to adhere to Shariat especially with regard to the recovery of konra. He suggested that Ippi should accept whatever the

Mahsuds and Wazirs willingly offered him as konra.[128]

Faqir of Ippi sent Shuidar, a Baryam Khel blacksmith living with Shah Azim, Manzar Khel at Maizar, to the Manzar Khel with a message that they should send two representatives from each sub-section to Gurvekht in order to discuss the recovery of konra under Shariat. The tribe refused to do so. This refusal was a challenge to the whole campaign of the Faqir's konra, and it could encourage other tribes to renounce the campaign. Posters purporting to bear the signatures of the Faqir were found posted on the walls of the mosques in Daur villages of Mir Ali Tehsil instigating people to commit mischief. Other notices found in Tappi and Palali villages of Miranshah Tehsil warned the inhabitants not to allow government servants to visit their villages.[129]

Subedar Darim, aspirant of the campaign against the Faqir, was the son of a blacksmith. He was a man of outstanding physical and moral courage and became a tribal leader. He enlisted in the North Waziristan Militia in 1908 and received the I.O.M in 1915 for gallantry at Spina Khaisora. Later he proved one of the few Wazirs to remain loyal during the repercussions of the Afghan War. Since then as a Khassadar he, at all times, proved himself loyal to the British government. As to his courage it is difficult for an outsider to realize the continuous pressure of hostile opinion interwoven with the arguments of religious sanctions which a man in Darim's position has had to contend with, in opposing Faqir of Ippi. His courage resulted in his murder.

The murder took place in Mamirogha village on November 30, 1945. One of the murderers Sarwar, a trusted Khassadar of Darim shot him from behind through the neck while Darim was resting waiting for his son Gingat who was making purchases from a Hindu. Roman who also fired was a professional murderer and was a Kanirogha Manzar Khel living in Mamirogha. After killing Darim, his son Gingat was also shot; though Gingat made an effort to shoot first but failed owing to a miss-fire.

Subsequently the murderers took refuge, Roman in Malik Rahmat's tower and Sarwar in his own home, where they were surrounded by village chigha and so remained for the night. On hearing the news Assistant Political Agent went to the village with an armoured car escort. The political tehsildar also arrived. Roman was first forced out of his tower and shot by Rahmat and subsequently Sarwar was smoked out of his tower. Before execution by Khazani, son of Khan Sahib Darim, Sarwar confessed that they had been hired to murder Darim; for Rs.12000/- and two rifles.

Whoever was immediately implicated was beside the main point which was that the murder was obviously inspired and carried out under the orders from Faqir of Ippi. Rumours that the Faqir intended to arrange the murder of Darim had been circulating for some time, for Darim was the corner stone, on which the opposition to the Faqir's konra campaign was built. Due to failure of this campaign the Faqir lost considerable face.

By Darim's death government lost their most loyal and staunch supporter in the North Waziristan Agency. Gingat, his son was an ex-hostile who went to the Faqir on account of a dispute with the then Political Agent over the succession to Darim's Subedari. But subsequently he became reconciled and Gingat made his peace with the government in summer 1945.[130]

After the murder of Darim Mamirogha Manzar Khel deputed a deputation of 13 members and went to Gurvekht on May 13, 1946 as nanawati. They slaughtered three sheep and gave one English and two local made rifles to the Faqir, who pardoned them.[131]

Mehr Dil, who was assigned Ahmadzai salient, along with his group intimidated Sadda Mir Hathi Khel into paying konra as also were the Umarzai and Hathi Khel tribes. It was possible that Subedar Darim's murder might had been timed to bear influence on this case, for the defeat of Ippi at Mamirogha had created an awkward precedent which might had endangered other tribes to follow their example. Darim's death on the other hand was a warning to other brave enough to oppose the Faqir's authority. The recovery of konra by Mehr Dil from Hathi Khel had naturally caused satisfaction in Gurvekht and all concerned had received congratulations.[132]

The Faqir remained in Gurvekht. This was the time when it was rumoured that government intends to construct a landing ground at

Datta Khel. He wrote letters to Khaddar Khel not to accept construction work; otherwise konra will be recovered from them.[133]

Mullah Sher Ali came to Khaisora along with other Mullahs accompanying Lashkar for the recovery of konra. He was confronted with Maulvi Ahmad Gul of Khaisora Nekzam Khel, a qualified Maulana from Deoband. He argued that the Lashkar was wrong in their pretention that they were doing Jihad. He further said that Maulvis were not entitled to receive Zakat and that considerable hardship was experienced by the Khaisorawals in entertaining them. After a long argument he won the day and Mullah Sher Ali and his followers apologized to him.[134]

Martyrdom of Faizal Ustad and Sher Ali Marwat

Faizullah Khan alias Faizal Ustad Bannuchi and Sher Ali Marwat ware two prominent lieutenants of the Faqir. Faizal patronized all guerrilla activities around Bannu district in Gumbati, Daryoba, Tangi, Bargantu and Ali Shah Baba Ziarat. He was a member of the group who had decapitated Morgan A.D.O.F.C on January 24, 1942 and had snatched his revolver. The government had declared him an outlaw and announced prize on his capture. Later on January 5, 1940 his personal and his elder brother's property in Bannu were confiscated and mortgaged. When he found no shelter in settled areas, he shifted his family to Wuzi Mumdi, North Waziristan.

On April 26, 1946 Tochi Scouts surrounded the area. Faizal and his companions took refuge in Zer Ghar and refused to surrender. At last Sher Ali Marwat, Faizullah Khan and Shaista Khan were killed and the following eight persons were captured, of whom two were wounded.

1. Said Afzal, Akora Khattak - Tochi Scouts deserter.
2. Wresham, Akora Khattak - Tochi Scouts deserter.
3. Shadi Khan Marwat of Mamma Khel (Bannu).
4. Sher Jan Ghilzai, Ali Khel of Zavo (Gardez).
5. Gul Ahmad Khan, Bangash of Darsamand (Hangu).
6. Obaidullah S/o Faizullah Khan alias Faizal Ustad.
7. Muhammad Nawaz S/o Faizullah Khan alias Faizal Ustad
8. Janan, Pashtun of Kotka Akhundan, Bannu.

Village chighas began to turn out but were largely kept in check by the presence of Tanks from Mir Ali. Apart from local chighas and party of some 40 Faqir's followers with Zindai Musakki, Nazar Bhittani tried to inflict losses on the Scouts. During the withdrawal, one Daur was killed, and a boy with some cattle wounded. From the Scout's side one Subedar died of wounds and 6 others wounded slightly. After 4 months the grave of Faizullah Khan was excavated to shift his corpse to his native village, the audience was surprised to see his corpse fresh having no change in it.[135]

The Faqir summoned U'lema of Waziristan to decide about the legality of konra in Shariat. They gave their approval in favour of konra.[136] Again he dispatched different groups to various areas. Now they entered in the Faqir's native village Spalga where Malik Ata Muhammad gave a rifle to them. Rifles were also recovered from Haji Madamir Jan, Maddi Khel, Malik Sirki Khan Zarinai, Naik Pir Khan

Zarinai and Malik Niaz Gul Rasul Khel. Accordingly the Faqir's followers had gone to Sir Kot on the night of December 4, 1946 but were refused to pay konra. The same treatment was faced by them in Tappi. The group stayed in the lower Daur area and on December 8, 1946, entered Idak village and recovered Rs.160/- from Mir Abbas Khan and Rs.100/- from Than Chand. The group administered oath to Alamdin and Mir Badshah that they were not government spies. The smallness of the fines indicated that the hostiles did not wish to risk refusal of their demand.

In retaliation the Political Agent North Waziristan invited Lower Daur Jirga on Dec 10, 1946 and announced a fine of 9 rifles on the whole tribe for feeding hostiles and a fine of Rs.700/- on Idak village for having been disunited and too timid to resist the extraction of konra from individuals in the village.[137]

The Faqir failed to realize the changed circumstances of India. When Pakistan became a reality and was in need of full co-operation of the Faqir, he did not bother to continue his konra campaign against all those elements who gave support to the then newly born state. Sir George Cunningham, the first Governor of N.W.F.P in Pakistan has recorded his memories of the days as: [138]

> *The Faqir of Ippi will probably continue to be the focus of opposition, if there is any. He has been trying to enforce konra for some of the tribes for helping government. He is also trying to declare himself Amirul-Muminin of Waziristan, but I am pretty certain that he will be opposed by important sections of tribes, if so, he cannot do much.*

And the case became true as was narrated by the Governor.

Kidnapping of Major Donald

Donald, the Political Agent of South Waziristan was on way from Razmak to Tank on June 21, 1946. The Bromi Khel of Pamana and Zhawar Khwar Kalai had been making a road block on the road below Zhawar Kali when the Political Agent arrived. The driver of Political Agent's armoured lorry attempted to crash through the road block but the lorry's tyres burst and the engine was damaged by a heavy fusillade fired by the Bromi Khel group.

This group was engaged by the Political Agent's bodyguard but they were tricked by the Zhawar Kali villagers and the Star Shawangi Khassadars who called on the bodyguard to stop fire while they removed the hostile group, but pounced on the Political Agent and his escort as soon as they got nearer, and overpowered them. The Political Agent Major J.O.S. Donald, Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Agency Surgeon designate, and the Political Agent's stenographer, M. Abdul Aziz Khan, were carried off to Pamana where they were held captive up to June 23, 1946. Later on they were shifted to Spina Mela.

There was no precedent of the capture of Political Agent in the Frontier history ever before. The Faqir had recently been advertising large financial rewards for the kidnapping of a British Officer. The possibility of the captives being passed on, the Faqir had caused particular anxiety. The Asst. Political Officer, however, secured a promise from Mullah Fazal Din to do his best to dissuade the Shabi Khel, should they contemplated doing so. Sir Olaf Caroe, Governor,

N.W.F.P. paid a visit to Razmak by air on June 25, 1946 in connection with this incident.[139]

After extensive Jirgas with the Dre-Mahsuds, Bromi Khel refused to release the Major and other captives unless they were assured of an absolute pardon. This was refused. The Resident paid Rs.1, 10,000/- to Bromi Khel as security. An enormous Jirga of more than one thousand Mahsuds brought Major Donald and others into Razmak on the morning of July 2, 1946.[140]

After safe return of the Political Agent Maj. Donald, the Resident in Waziristan directed the Shabi Khel Mahsud Jirga to deposit Rs.1,10,000/- paid to them by the Dre-Mahsud; pay Rs.20,000/- compensation; fifty arsenal made rifles and two hundred 303 magazine rifles as fine and surrender twenty Shabi Khel hostages. Warning notices were dropped from air on Shabi Khel villages to comply with the orders by the due date.[141]

Shabi Khel villages were rapidly evacuated by the villagers. Mullah Fazal Din and his brothers had moved into Abdullai villages at Makin. On the other hand Red Notices were dropped on the morning of July 30, 1946.[142] Punitive action began in shape of Air and Artillery shelling. This action was restricted only to Bromi Khel, the main culprit in Donald's kidnapping. Later, on August 26, the Resident saw a Jirga of Dre-Mahsud at Razmak and threatened to proceed to the destruction of Shabi Khel property other than Bromi Khel because they had failed to comply with Government's terms. They were given

time to enable negotiations to proceed between Dre-Mahsud representatives and the Shabi Khel.

After consultation they agreed to pay all rifle fines and to subscribe Rs.20, 000/-. Shabi Khel agreed to surrender 20 hostages to government and to repay the balance of Rs.1, 10,000/- demanded if government would consent to cut this sum from their Khassadar's pay, Maliki allowances and other tribal emoluments. They requested to accept 33 English made rifles in place of 200 .303 magazine country made rifles and 20 English made rifles in lieu of Rs.20, 000/- compensation.

The government accepted this compromise and on September 13, 1946 Musa Khan deposited Rs.10, 000/- and the Shabi Khel produced 20 hostages. Later, on September 16, 1946 the government agreed to forge 25 out of a total of 103 arsenal made rifles demanded. The Jirga promised to hand in balance of these rifles by September 30, 1946.[143]

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83. File No.361 S.T.B.I. Vol III, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan, for the period up to 28/11/41.

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94. File No.361 S.T.B. Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.45 for the period ending 16/11/45.
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132. File No.361 S.T.B. Vol V, Weekly Summary No.5 for the week ending 8/12/46.
133. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary No.10 for the week ending 22/3/46.
134. Interview with Maulana Abdul Samad of Torka, Surani, Bannu Ex-M.P.A., N.W.F.P. Provincial Assembly held on April 19, 1995; see also File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Summary No.16 for the week ending 3/5/46.
135. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Summary No.39 the week ending 11/10/46.
136. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Summary No.48 the week ending 31/12/46.

137. Fortnightly Governor's Reports, Cunningham papers, IOL & R, 21/12/47.
138. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.24 for week ending 28/6/46; see also H.E.'s Fortnightly Reports from O.Caroe to Lord Wavell, Government House, Nathiagali, D.O. No.GH-151, 23/8/46, N.D.C., Islamabad.
139. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.25 for the week ending 5/7/46.
140. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.28 for the week ending 26/7/46.
141. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.29 for the week ending 2/8/46.
142. File No.361 S.T.B Vol V, Weekly Summary of Events in Waziristan No.33, 35 & 36 for the weeks ending 30/8/46, 13/9/46 & 20/9/46.

THE ROLE OF AFGHANS IN THE FAQIR's MOVEMENT

6

For hundreds of years the great clans of warriors, merchants, Ghilzais, Powindah and Kharotis from Central Afghanistan had moved their caravans down the passes into India to trade and to graze their camels and cattle. Their chief idea was to make money. They held themselves aloof from border politics as far as possible. They paid taxes tolls, grazing tax and land tax to the Kabul government, but otherwise avoid officialdom; settling their own disputes and quarrels.

For nearly six months each year they lived under British protection without owing allegiance to the British government. Till the British occupied the Gomal, Tochi, Kurram Valleys and the Khyber Pass they had to fight their ways through the hills or pay heavy blackmail to the tribes in the neighborhood. They now paid only grazing dues and tolls to the British government. On entering British territory they were deprived of their arms which were deposited in the nearest police station till their return to Afghanistan.

In the plain area of Dera Ismail Khan, in the Kurram Valley and elsewhere, they constructed large Zaribas of thorns wherein they pitched their black camel hair tents. Huge savage dogs guarded the

enclosures. Here they left their womenfolk, children and old men, whilst the younger men took their camels and merchandise to trade in the Punjab. Their wares consisted mostly of carpets, felt rugs, dried fruits, fresh grapes in boxes and lambskin. On their return journey to Afghanistan they took up textiles, salt, tea and hardware.

Apart from these nomad traders there were many other tribesmen, not of the nomad class, who left their homes in Afghanistan in the winter for the Indian plains. Many of them would come from Khost (the Afghan province of Kurram and Waziristan border), Jajis, Jadrans (Zadrans), Mangals, Tanis etc.[1]

For nearly a century and a half the British government had relations with Kabul and for over a century with the Afghan borderland. British government was convinced that the problem of Waziristan could not be solved unless it made good relations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan stood as a limiting factor to all that she did in the tribal belt. The neighboring Afghan tribes were in a position to provide refuge to the tribes on British side and a reservoir for the supply of arms and ammunition. When the Faqir started his movement, the tribes of Southern Province of Afghanistan provided him inspiration, and reinforcement in men, money and material.

During December 1936, Afghan subjects from the Southern Province (Simat-e-Janubi) had been coming in small parties to join the Lashkars which were under the influence and direction of Faqir of Ippi

in the Khaisora Valley. The number of these Afghans showed a steady increase, until, on December 28, 1936, there were certainly no fewer than 300 of them in the Lower Khaisora. They comprised, for the most part, Tanis, Gurbaz and Zadrans, with a small number of Mangals of Gabar and a few Kharotis of Mastoi.

In addition there were some 50 Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal as well. Most of them arrived from the Afghan border by the various affluent of the Tochi River between Ghazalma and Miranshah; while the Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal, the Gian Khel Zadrans and the Kharotis came down the Tochi Valley through Madda Khel country. Before arrival or shortly after arrival in the lower Khaisora, all paid a visit to Faqir of Ippi, wherever he was at the time, in Mandawam, Sangir Kach or Arsal Kot; and most of them brought him alms (Shukrana) of Re.1/- (Afghani) each. Approximately one third of these Afghans carried rifles, and a small portion of the remainder arms of other descriptions.

Their dominating motive in joining the Lashkars was the hope of booty, of which wild stories rapidly spread all over the Southern Province after the events of November 25, 1936, but there was no doubt that they were also actuated by religious zeal for the defence of Islam.

Faqir of Ippi had also sent messages and agents for the purposes of propaganda into the Southern Province. He also entered into correspondence with Swalikh Dad, known as Gian Mullah, Gian Khel Zadrans of Birmal, and also with another individual known as Gian

Faqir. Gian Mullah was in apparent sympathy with Faqir of Ippi. He had written letters to the most distant tribes, particularly to the Muqbils, Chakmannis (Chamkannis) and the Mangals of Gabar, while nearer tribes, such as the Zadrans and Tanis, had been in touch with him either personally or through messengers dispatched by him to their religious leaders.

On December 22, 1936, Faqir of Ippi wrote letters to Malik Amzarak, Biba Khel Zadran of Almarah, the head of the leading Zadran family, and the Maliks of the Biba Khel Zadrans of Rangi, Akhtar, Miro and Sarwar, requesting their support.

Religious propaganda in favour of Faqir of Ippi led to village meetings and gatherings at various places in the Southern Province. These caused some alarm to the Afghan authorities. About the middle of December, 1936, Dost Muhammad, Hakim of Khost, summoned the Maliks of the Khost-wals, Tanis and Zadrans of Almarah to Matun, and informed them that no Lashkars were permitted to proceed to Waziristan.

Later, on December 26, 1936, the illaqadar told a gathering of some 700 Tanis, Zadrans and Gurbaz at Dargai that it was forbidden for them to go to Waziristan in large Lashkars proceeded by banners and drums, but that, if they insisted, it must be in small parties, and unostentatiously. It was, however, not absolutely forbidden for Afghan tribesmen to enter North Waziristan and join the Lashkars there and

that the prohibition applied only to large parties. In a movement which had religious motive, this attitude on the part of Afghan officials was understandable.

On December 27, 1936, F.M. Pir Muhammad Khan, Hakim of Urgun, summoned the Maliks of the Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal and the Kabul Khel Officers of the Urgun militia to Urgun. They had already been informed that no Maliks, members of the Urgun Militia or Khassadars might go to the Lashkars in the lower Khaisora. This statement contained the apparent implication that those who were not Maliks and Khassadars were free to join Lashkars. A nephew of Naib Salar Zar Khan, Paipali Kabul Khel had been in the lower Khaisora, whence he returned to Afghanistan together with some other Kabul Khels on the night of December 30-31, 1936. F.M. Pir Muhammad Khan, while apparently conniving at small parties of tribesmen proceeding to join their co-religionists in Waziristan, had apparently been apprehensive that Kharotis and other Ghilzais might become implicated in the disturbance.

It was the end of December. He dispatched Malik Jalat, son of Saudagar, Taus Khel Ade Khel Kharoti, to the Kharotis of the Mastoi Valley with instructions to restrain them from joining the Lashkars in the lower Khaisora, whither a few had already proceeded. After taking the thumb impressions of their leading men to a document by which they promised not to participate in hostilities, Jalat returned to report to F.M. Pir Muhammad Khan at Urgun.[2]

It would seem, therefore, that while local Afghan officials of the Simat-e-Janubi had done much to prevent large bodies of lashkarwals of the tribes of their Province from irrupting into North Waziristan, they had at the same time probably for reasons of religion and local politics, permitted small parties to proceed to the lower Khaisora and join Faqir of Ippi in his endeavours to raise Ghaza against government. The record supports this statement.

On January 6, 1937, the position in the lower Khaisora was that some 900 lashkarwals had occupied the deserted Tori Khel villages and Kots in the Valley from Bobali to Dakai Kala inclusive. Messengers from Faqir of Ippi at Arsal Kot brought them frequent instructions and advice. Parties of lashkarwals also paid daily visits to the Faqir either to give him alms (Shukrana) or to request food as the supply, which each man had brought with him on joining the Lashkars, ran low.

The Lashkars were thus clearly under the influence and direction of the Faqir, directions being extended most specially through certain Tori Khel leader, Azal Mir, Janat Mir, Id Hassan, Behram and a few others. These acted as the leaders of hostile bands, most of which composed of mixed tribesmen including Afghans. There is little doubt, for instance that Azal Mir, Maddi Khel Haibati Tori Khel of Sham, was the leader of the Lashkar of some 300 men which actually arrived in close proximity to Jaler Camp on the night of January 5-6, 1937 with the purpose of making sudden surprise assault, supporting fire being arranged from another direction. This project was abandoned at the

last moment, owing to disagreement among the various parties of tribesmen composing the Lashkar regarding the prospect of success.

Although the influence of the Faqir over the Lashkars was strong at that time, and did much to maintain their solidarity and unity of purpose, it would have been impossible for them to remain were it not for the shelter, provided by the Tori Khel villages during the cold night. They lived in the villages and Kots by night, and scattered to the hills in the day time, either to observe the movements of the troops in the hope that some opportunity for attack might present itself, or to take cover from observation by air craft in broken ground and scrub. The number of lashkarwals in the lower Khaisora on January 7, 1937 was estimated at approximately 550.

On the night of January 7-8, 1937 certain parts of the valley, when lashkarwals were known to be in shelter in large number at night, were shelled by six inch howitzers from Damdil. The immediate effect was to create panic among the lashkarwals, for whom shell fire of this nature was a novel and terrifying experience.

They expected a surprise night attack to be made on them by the troops from Damdil. One Tani, who was said to have been present with the besiegers of Matum in April 1933, declared with the usual expressions of amazement, that the Amir of Afghanistan had no artillery to compare with this. They fled to the hills in all directions, 11 were killed and 6 wounded. Of these, all were Afghan subjects except

2, who were Saidgis of the Zowe Valley. On the following day, British advanced down the lower Khaisora, thus preventing the lashkarwals from re-occupying it. They were consequently forced to disperse, there being sufficient accommodation in one place for the whole Lashkar.

On January 10, 1937, parties were found distributed in Kam Sham, where they found shelter in broken ground and under rocks, at Shahid Mela in group of huts, known as Sadat Khel, and in the Pasta Algad. There were no hostile gatherings on this date north of the Khaisora; the last to remain being a large party, chiefly composed of Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal, which attacked the 12-13th F.F. Rifles during the construction of a picquet on the evening of January 9, 1937.[3]

At this period, Faqir of Ippi apparently became apprehensive that the Lashkar was about to disperse on account of lack of food and the cold, and the very lack of cohesion which had previously been tendered possible by the tract that lashkarwals could live close together in the lower Khaisora. He visited Shahid Mela on January 10, 1937 sending his two brothers, Sher Zaman and Gulzali Khan to other parts of the Lashkar and gave out that he would review the whole Lashkar together in one place on January 11th.

His apparent objective in this announcement was to prevent its dissipation, but despite his endeavours, the lashkarwals now began to slip away in large parties. Many of them, estimated at some 250, left

for their homes by way of the Sham plain and the Shini Narai during the night of January 10-11, 1937. These were Zadrans, Kabul Khel Wazirs of Birmal, Pir-Kotia, Saidgis of the Zowe Valley and Madda Khel. Twenty Mangals, Jajis and Khostwals also returned to Afghanistan the same night by way of the Danday Plain; and two parties crossed Spinkamar on January 11, 1937 on their way to Birmal.

It may be noticed here that parties of lashkarwals, who had formally used the well beaten tracks, and even the roads, in their coming and going to and from the Lashkars had now begun to travel by night on more remote and difficult paths. This change in their habits was directly attributable to two successful ambushes which were laid for the lashkarwals in the Upper Khaisora by the Tochi Scouts on the nights of January 7-10, 1937. On the first occasion, three lashkarwals were captured, and on the second four were killed and three wounded.[4]

Faqir Ippi sent letters to certain Afghan officials of the Southern Province of Afghanistan, particularly to those in Chakmanni (Chamkanni), Matun and Urgun, through Mullah Ihsan of Khost in March 1937. He complained that: [5]

> *It has come to his knowledge that they are actively preventing the people from doing the holy service of Islam. If they are unable to help him in his cause, they should not hinder others from doing so; otherwise on the Day of Judgment, they would be held responsible before God for their sin in this*

> *respect. The cause of his activities against the British government is that he is bound in the service of Islam.*

He added that:

> *He would always steadfastly refuse to accept any kind of reward from the British government; he is entirely devoted to the cause of Islam.*

He further advised them to request the Afghan government to use her influence with the British government to bring about a just settlement of the Islam Bibi case.

The involvement of the Afghans in the Faqir's movement can be gauged from the casualty list prepared by the Government of India. Between December 22, 1936 and May 30, 1937, 193 Afghan tribesmen were killed and 149 severely wounded; that there had been at least 5000 Afghans engaged at one time or another with the British government. This addition to the Faqir's fighting strength had undoubtedly prolonged the struggle.[6]

British Government's Approach To Afghan Government

Government of India formally conveyed her complaint in connection with the involvement of Afghan tribes in Waziristan in the first week of December 1936. King Zahir Shah had good relations with the British government but the control of his government in the Southern Province was very limited. Moreover, widespread propaganda by the Faqir with a religious base had its effects and minor local officials in all

probability were compelled by feelings of religious sympathy to turn a blind eye to the departure of small groups of their tribesmen to Waziristan.[7]

It was also noteworthy that practically at that time the whole of the Zadran migration took place into, or through, the Bannu District. They became hamsayas of Bannuchis and Marwat. In addition, Zadrans and Tanis both were dependent upon Bannu for the sale of timber, which they exported on their camels through Tochi Valley. This interaction of both the communities had also affected Zadrans and Tanis in favour of the Faqir.[8]

The Afghan Prime Minister offered the British government to render direct assistance by trying to get hold of the Faqir, but the British government declined to accept such an offer, because it was tantamount to surrendering sovereignty over her own subject. It would cause tribes to look even more to the Kabul for help against the British and increase difficulties to her political officers.[9]

Later Afghan government summoned the old and new representatives of Shura-i-Milli and head Maliks of Southern Province in Kabul on April 1, 1937. They were interviewed by the Premier in the presence of the Defence Minister who warned the attendants that the involvement of Afghan tribes in Waziristan was adversely affecting Afghan prestige in the outer world. He told the Defence Minister to purchase rifles from the Southern Province so that these might not be misused. The Maliks

refused to hand over their rifles as they had risked their lives to obtain them.[10]

The British government considered that proportion of the Faqir's religious influence appeared to arise from the fact that he was murid of Naqib of Charbagh. They requested the Afghan government to use their good offices with Naqib to bring his influence to bear on the Faqir.[11] It was reported that Naqib had written to the Faqir urging him to continue resistance against the British forces.[12] The plan to contact Naqib was later on cancelled because it seemed to increase the Faqir's prestige.

The British government threatened that if Afghan tribes did not desist from hostilities in Waziristan, the question of their being debarred from British India will have to be considered.[13] It must be remembered that the fighting strength of the Pashtun tribes, other than Ghilzais of the Southern Province, was not less than 60,000 of whom upwards of 25,000 were armed with modern high velocity rifles. The total Ghilzai fighting strength was a quarter of a million, of whom a third were well armed. Although it was not probable that the whole of this tribal strength would cross the border en masse to assist the Faqir, the number that did go might easily been doubled, had the Afghan government relaxed their efforts to any extent.

The Afghan government was getting tired of continued efforts. It was impossible for her to keep silent when year after year the energies of

her officers were diverted from their rightful task of developing and administering the country to harassing and restraining Afghan subjects or preaching peace to British tribesmen. Every Frontier operation was fraught with danger not only to the good relations between the two countries but to the future existence of the Afghan government as well.[14]

The war in Waziristan had given rise to suspicions among the Wazirs, Mahsuds, Afridis, Mohmands, Safis, Shamozai, and also among Afghan tribes that in accordance with the Forward Policy of the Government of India the British government, every year when opportunity offered, created trouble now in one tribe and then in another in order to further their projects of road construction and advance generally. They were determined to subjugate the independent tribes of the Frontier; and that by gradually closing in on Afghanistan; their designs on that country might take on a more practical shape. These suspicions had murmurings in Afghanistan and foreshadowed a grave danger in future.

Afghan government's blame on the Faqir

The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan wrote a letter to the British Minister in Kabul, claiming that Faqir of Ippi, either through ignorance of the realization of the situation or in co-operation with Government of India, had either offered the frontier officers of the Government of India an excuse to prosecute the war and incidentally to undertake the

construction of new roads, or had himself instigated hostilities. He further claimed that such a policy would convert the area into a second Spain.[15]

The British government denied these allegations as baseless. Foreign Minister's plea was that British Forward Policy should be less forward and less abrupt for fear that the trouble which it was creating for the Afghan government would assume sufficiently serious proportions to compromise their authority.[16] Faqir of Ippi was living within three miles of Afghan border near Mazdak with another base at Mustalbar in charge of his brother, Mulla Sherzaman in October 1937.

It was difficult for the British government to start air action or send column against him because he would immediately abscond to Afghanistan. The government left him alone and suggested the Afghan government once again to influence the situation through Naqib of Charbagh, who was the Pir of the Faqir.[17]

The Afghan government was unable to control the flow of Afghans into Waziristan. Supplies continued to reach the Faqir both from across and inside the border. Some 80 Tanis were seen on June 3, 1937 at Warzhala taking 23 camel loads of rations to the Faqir. The hostile Lashkar in the Sham Area, Babrakka and Shawal Algad was composed chiefly of Afghan tribes.

Connections of Afghan Cadets and Soviet Union

Dutch charge d'affaires informed the British embassy in Islamabad that a certain number of Afghan military cadets being about to turn to Kabul after completing their course of instruction in Turkey, approached Turkish authorities for advice and assistance for the purpose of aiding Faqir of Ippi in his trouble against the British government. Turkey refused to extend any help in this regard. Later on these cadets contacted Soviet Embassy where they received both advice and material assistance from Soviet Navel attache.[18]

Ghilzai Rebellion

Afghan government was in hot waters from all sides. On one side she was facing difficultly in controlling her own tribes not to participate in Waziristan Jihad. On the other side there were rumours that ex-king Amanullah Khan was trying to dethrone Zahir Shah's government. There were some Afghan tribes, like Suleiman Khel Ghilzai who had sympathies with Amanullah Khan. Suleiman Khel used to migrate across the border to India for business. The British government could help the Afghan government not to repeat the experience of 1933 when Wazir and Mahsuds accompanied Nadir Khan and helped him to overthrow Habibullah Khan (Bachha Saqa). So Afghan government had to use argument of International Law when seeking to restrain some ring leaders from Frontier and restrict them in Afghanistan.

On the night of July 22-23, 1937, Afghan government sent some three thousand troops and some 4 batteries to Katawaz from Kabul. There were so many causes of this attack. Among these one was to discourage the Suleiman Khel Ghilzai from taking part in disturbances in Waziristan.[19]

In response the Afghan government requested the British government to remove certain leading Suleiman Khel Ghilzai, not exceeding one hundred in number, from Indian soil. Afghan government hoped that this action, if taken, would show tribes that both the governments are co-operating and also preventing leaders from causing trouble in Afghanistan during winter from India soil.

Faqir of Ippi was approaching Khost border and his emissaries were propagating among Afghan tribes to join Waziristan Jihad against the British. Afghan government was in dilemma for the second time in a few months. If they took no action they would receive protest from British government that they failed to control their tribes. If they prevented their tribesmen from crossing the border, the tribes would revolt as Suleiman Khel had done.

The Faqir's provocation made him difficult to deal with. It was probable that should column approach to him then he would immediately abscond to Afghanistan and in a better position to stir up trouble than at present. In these circumstances the British government considered better to leave him alone.[20]

Shami Pir Uprising

When by December 1937 nearly 40,000 British and Indian troops were pulled back to their cantonments, the situation was no better than it had been at the beginning of the campaign twelve months earlier.[21] In the year 1938, when Hitler was preparing for World War II, his agents in the Middle East sought means to disturb Afghanistan, and with it the North West Frontier, with the notion of tying the hands of the British government in India, so compelling to retain strong forces in that region.[22]

While Faqir of Ippi was still at large, a major threat of extraordinary dimension was developing in South Waziristan which might had brought down the ruling Afghan royal house of Yahya Khel. The story was connected with the appearance of Muhammad Sa'di al Keilani (Gilani, or Jelani), otherwise known as the Shami Pir - the holy man from Syria. His arrival was seen by many as playing the counterpoint to the actions of Faqir of Ippi.[23]

Sa'di al Keilani, the son of Ataullah al Keilani, was born in Damascus in 1901 and opted for Turkish nationality in 1925. He was educated in Damascus from 1920 to 1925, at a German school of agriculture at Potasdam. In 1929, he married Mari Richter, the daughter of a senior German Police Officer. His family was one of the main branches of Abdul Qadir Jelani (later corrupted in Persia, where the family settled, to Keilani).

Abdul Qadir Jelani founded the Qadria, one of the most important of the Islamic mystic confraternities. In India, as in North Africa, notably Morocco and Algeria, the influence both spiritual and political of the confraternities has always been great. This had led to the visits of members of different branches of Keilani family to India in order to collect contributions for themselves from the Qadria who revered them as descendants of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.).

Sa'di al Keilani or Shami Pir was thus related to the Naqib of Charbagh and a first cousin of Suryia, wife of ex-king Amanullah Khan.[24] During the reign of king Amanullah Khan, Sa'di's mother lived in the Palace at Kabul as a lady-in-waiting to Queen Suryia. In 1925 Sa'di had paid a visit to Kabul via Mahsud country, Razmak, Miranshah, Matun, and Gardez and stayed with king Amanullah for several months.

King Amanullah had showed him great respect, and had given him some valuable presents, among which was a walking stick, which had belonged to the Amir Abdur-Rahman.[25] He landed at Bombay on Jan 1, 1938 with his servant Muhammad Ali Ishaq. They stayed in Bombay for two months, during which time they grew their beards before proceeding to Waziristan.[26] Sa'di was fluent in Arabic, Persian, French and some English and Pashto.

In the first half of March 1938 Sa'di arrived in South Waziristan. He was popular both in Wazirs and Mahsuds as a Baghdadi Sayyid and

because of his connections with the ex-king. Until June he preached on religious matters, spent his time settling dispute amongst the tribes and did his best to unite the Wazirs and Mahsuds.

During the course of conversation at Delhi on June 30, 1938 with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bashir Ahmad Khan, who had accompanied him on his return from Waziristan, Sa'di had claimed that he had been responsible for settling about 160 cases of feuds, in which about 500 persons had been killed. He also succeeded in obtaining undertaking on the Qur'an from the parties that they would refrain from committing murders for at least one year.[27] He joined a very large following and was deeply revered as a saintly person, the Shami Pir, like his counterpart the Faqir of Ippi in the northern half of Waziristan.

Almost immediately upon his arrival on the Frontier, the Afghan government became deeply suspicious of his activities and alleged that he had come to stir up pro-Amanullah and anti-Yahya Khel propaganda, but Major Barnes, the Political Agent for South Waziristan, who had met Keilani several times, was not able to corroborate these suspicions.[28] Shami lived in a considerable state in Waziristan. His followers consisted mostly of better class of Maliks rather than mullahs. When he established his contacts, he began to take interests in settlements of individual and tribal disputes. He visited Tank, Karama, Nanak Raghzai, Siga, Shakai, Torwam, Kaniguram etc himself sitting in car and accompanying four lorries.

Due to persistent agitation from Afghanistan, the Political Agent South Waziristan interviewed Shami Pir at Kaniguram on June 12, 1938 and conveyed to him accusations and suspicions regarding his future intentions. He repudiated any idea of causing trouble for Afghan government and pointed out that he had openly addressed all gatherings to keep aloof from hostilities with either government.

According to Shami Pir, his family suffered heavy financial loss in Syrian revolution of 1926 and his Damascus properties were under mortgage which he was trying to redeem. He was collecting considerable sums of money from Mahsuds and Wazirs for the above purpose and was settling feuds and truces in return. He gave assurance before a gathering of leading Mahsud Maliks that he had no political intentions. British government was unable to take any drastic action against him because of fear of Wazirs and Mahsud's revolt.[29]

Mullah Fazal Din, whose thunder had been stolen by Shami Pir, was undoubtedly annoyed by his presence among Mahsuds, and was endeavouring to minimize his influence by propagating that he was really an agent of the British government, as proof of which he pointed to visits to the Pir by the Political Agent South Waziristan.

However, on June 13, 1938, Shami Pir summoned a Jirga at Kaniguram of some 3000 tribesmen. He first held meeting with

mullahs with whom he discussed tyranny of Afghan government towards Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. He nominated twelve mullahs to go to Kabul and discuss situation with Afghan government. Then he addressed the audience and openly denounced the ruling Afghan king Zahir Shah as a usurper and acclaimed Amanullah as the lawful king of Afghanistan. This Jirga was the first confirmation of suspicions of Pir's intentions.[30]

This announcement, as Fraser Tyler admitted in his annual report, unleashed a wave of fanatical enthusiasm which ran through South Waziristan with such electrifying effect that the tribesmen, predominantly Mahsuds, flocked in to join the Pir, who on the 23rd set out on his March to Kabul. It did not bother the Mahsuds in the slightest that less than ten years earlier they had played a leading role in installing Nadir Khan upon Amanullah's throne. They wanted to be king makers again.[31]

The deteriorating situation compelled British government to convince a conference on June 15, 1938 at Razmak under the chair of the Governor, Sir George Cunningham. It was felt that mass fanatical enthusiasm aroused at Kaniguram Jirga.[32] The tribes felt that:

a. government would not interfere in this religious movement;
b. Pir was working for government and it was retaliation for Ippi's Afghan following; and
c. British government aroused genuine tribal anger by the coercive action against Suleiman Khel and had broken truce in doing so.

Shami Pir started holding sectional meetings of Mahsuds to obtain unanimity into Pro-Amanullah revolt against Afghan government. Mahsuds generally were sympathetic with him except Shabi Khel, Abdullai and some Manzai who demanded production of ex-king himself or his near relative before they join. They were directly under the influence of Mullah Fazal Din. The same was the answer of Faqir of Ippi.

Afghan government tried to gain the support of Faqir of Ippi to counter Shami Pir. She sent Amzarak Zadran of Amarah to Kharre area on June 13, 1938 with presents of arms and ammunition including one machine gun for the Faqir.[33]

Shami Pir had planned to convene another Jirga of Waziristan and Afghan tribes in Mongrotai on June 23, 1938. He had sent his representatives to Katawaz and Shewa Faqir. Shewa Faqir declined to extend any help in this regard without first discussing Shami Pir's cause from Islamic point of view. This Jirga did not take place because of the opposition of the Faqir of Shewa. He was also pressed by the authorities not to co-operate.[34]

British government decided to pressurize tribes by proclamation and leaflets, warning them that:

a. the government would not tolerate participation of the tribes in any activities hostile to the Afghan government with whom Government of India were at peace;

b. the tribes must refrain from supporting Shami Pir who had declared himself enemy of Afghan government.

Political Agent South Waziristan was authorized to offer £ 10,000 sterling to Shami Pir, if he returned back to Syria. He was guaranteed safe conduct and honourable treatment.[35] This offer did not impress Shami Pir. He was continuously raising his Lashkar against Zahir Shah's government. According to Afghan intelligence, the Lashkar raised to six thousand, appeared close to the border, opposite Afghan village of Menznarai.

On the other side of the border three hundred Mahmud Khel and Sultan Khel with one hundred Wazirs under the command of Malik Shashai and Ghulam Haider left Mumain to attack Wazikwa.[36] The British government again authorized Political Agent South Waziristan Barnes to go to Wana as quickly as possible and offer Shami Pir sum up to Rs.3 lakhs. If he accepted the offer, Barnes was to take Shami Pir to some suitable place of safety until it was evident that tribesmen had returned to their homes and had given up the idea of crossing the border to oppose Afghan government.[37]

Large contingents of Mahsuds and Wazirs started moving into Afghanistan about June 24, 1938. Shami Pir himself was moving with other contingents. This was the time that Eastern province in Afghanistan was in trouble. Musa Khel Mohmands were creating trouble in Kunar and Shinwaris had murdered a Hakim near Dakka.

Kabul was full of rumours and reports. Situation in Katawaz and Waziristan was attributed to British intrigues. Strong anti-British propaganda had been spread in Kabul City, probably fostered by Germans and Japanese.[38]

Fighting continued in Katawaz. Afghan government was using aeroplanes to bomb rebels in Katawaz.[39] The followers of Shami Pir attacked Afghan Militia defending the border, on June 23, 1938 and were driven off in the direction of Wana. British aeroplanes mistakenly dropped bombs on Afghan military defending the border on June 24, 1938, killing 29, wounding 36 and packing 25 animals.[40]

In response to British overtures, an emissary came into Wana with offer from Pir to surrender on certain terms. The emissary was Amir Khan who had been with Pir throughout his stay in Waziristan and was probably in his confidence before June 13, 1938. The terms offered to Shami Pir were: [41]

a. payment of £ 25,000 in addition to expenses of transport by air as far as Baghdad and safe conduct out of India;
b. that before the money was paid to him,
    1. he would recall the Lashkar now ready to cross into Afghanistan;
    2. he would made it clear to all his followers that he had abandoned his anti-Afghan propaganda;
    3. Political Agent was satisfied that the Lashkar had returned to their homes and that movement from Waziristan into Afghanistan had definitely ceased.

c. Government of India would not impose further penalties on tribesmen who had disobeyed their orders under the influence of Shami Pir.

During his residence in Kaniguram he wore a Sayyid's robes, a beard and a sanctimonious air. After his surrender he and his servant Muhammad Ali Ishaq shaved their beards in Delhi on June 30, 1938.[42]

Hence, although the British authorities were rather slow in recognizing the threat, they were nevertheless extremely quick to meet it. Already on June 25, 1938 the Pir had agreed to the deal and was flown out of the country shortly thereafter.[43]

Controversies about Shami Pir

The Shami Pir uprising left many people completely baffled as to the British scheme behind his activities. Khan Abdul Wali Khan considers the affair planned by the British government, as:

> *The British tried to persuade the Afghans to throw out Germans. To pressurize the Afghans, they invited Shami Pir to the tribal territory, instructing him to incite the people against the Royal family of Afghanistan.*

When the task was completed successfully, the Secretary of State for India was thrilled. He asked the Viceroy to make a similar deal with Faqir of Ippi. The Viceroy's reply is mentioned by Wali Khan as: [44]

> *There is, I fear, no possible chance in dealing with*

> *him on the same basis as Shami Pir. He is not only implacable, but also completely incorruptible. Who would rid me of this turbulent priest?*

The German Minister in Kabul, Dr. Hans Pilger, admitted for instance to his British colleague, that he was totally at a loss to account for British Policy on Waziristan to raise the tribes against the Afghan government which, nevertheless, everyone assumed was Pro-British in the face of a potential Soviet aggression? Or was he somebody else's agent? Whose then.[45]

As for Caroe, who was in charge of India's external relations during the war, he remained deeply convinced that the Shami Pir's activities had been part of more sinister Axis intrigue designed for the whole of the Middle East, of which the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem appeared to have been the chief exponent and which Indian intelligence failed to discover.

It was not only the Shami Pir's family connections with Amanullah which worried Caroe so much, another deeply intriguing pointer for him was the Keilani brotherhood in the Muslim world and he wondered whether there were definite contacts between the Shami Pir and Rashid Ali al Gilani of Iraq, who, as Prime Minister, was to attempt in the spring of 1941 to ally his country with the Axis.[46]

Such conjectures were to be put forward frequently during the war, particularly after the British learnt that the German Foreign Office and the Abwehr had contacted the Shami Pir. However, there is evidence

to show that he had been recruited by the German at any stage prior to or during the war to work for them for the restoration of Amanullah to power in a Pro-Axis Afghanistan.

Although the Shami Pir had visited Germany before the outbreak of the war in 1939, and took refuge there for the rest of the war after Syria had been captured by the Free French with British assistance, he denied to his British interrogators after the war that he had resumed contacts with Amanullah or had ever met Ghulam Siddiq Khan, the ex-king's most active supporter, in Berlin.

Sometimes in June 1939 for instance, British intelligence learnt that Shami Pir had admitted in the course of a private conversation that the German authorities had expressed their displeasure at his failure to carry out the restoration of Amanullah to the Afghan throne.[47] Indeed, it is conceivable that the Pir might have been contacted during this time by Von Henting, who was the Head of the Oriental Section in the Political Department of the Wilhemstrasse till the outbreak of the war, and was regarded by the British as the most competent and therefore dangerous expert on the Islamic countries.[48]

But in 1939 Henting certainly did not include Keilani in his secret plan for the restoration of Amanullah to power, which the Wilhelmstrasse and the Abwehr had hoped to put into effect with Moscow's help, following the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact.[49] By the end of 1940 the Pir was again contacted by the Germans at his home in Syria.

There were rumours that he had been promised the Afghan throne if he was prepared to go to India at once and to conduct his mission successfully.

In January 1941 he was again visited by the Abwehr agent in Syria, Rudolf Roser, in the company of Von Henting, who was said to have been putting pressure on the Pir to go to Afghanistan to help to stir up a Pro-Amanullah rebellion. Again the Pir refused.[50]

With the failure of the Shami Pir incident of 1938, the Axis missed its last chance on the eve of the Second World War to exploit the tribes against either government. Further, during the war, even in the early stages when the Axis held the military initiative and had sympathizers among the Muslims, such unique opportunities as the rising in Waziristan under the Faqir of Ippi in 1936-7, and the Shami Pir incident in the following year, never presented themselves again.

Significance of the Faqir to the Afghan Government

Shami Pir affair had made suspicions in the minds of Afghan rulers. They intensified their aid to Faqir of Ippi since Shami Pir incident. She had now fully realized the importance of the Faqir in Waziristan and was trying to strengthen her relations with him. Many Afghan officials were visiting him. Brigadier Sherbaz saw him in Melan (Afghanistan) and gave him Rs.1000/- Afghani and Chugha. Mullah Zahir Shah leading Mohmit Khel Lieutenant of the Faqir visited Hakim of Matun

and received reward of rifles for the Faqir. Ex-Subedar Pat and other deserters from British service were being enlisted in the army by the Afghan government.[51] Faqir of Ippi left Kharre area. He was now living with Khonamad Afghan Tannis at Warzhal. He had met with Hakim of Khost about July 8, 1938.

During operations in Kharre area opposing Lashkar was largely composed of Afghan subjects, two of whom were captured and majority of dead were Afghans. British government lodged strong protest against involvement of such a large number of Afghans in Waziristan.[52]

Afghan government's reply was obvious. Eighteen months ago Afghan premier had requested Government of India that:

a. The Faqir should not be driven towards the Durand Line;
b. Afghan government's intervention should be permitted to secure the Faqir's removal.

Both the requests were denied. Now when Afghan government was facing extreme difficulty and delicacy on her own border, the Government of India drove the Faqir into Afghanistan, and demanded co-operation. Afghan government asked for following assurances before extending co-operation:

a. Government of India would not demand punishment of the Faqir;
b. she would not be suspicious if Afghan government employed

Wazir agents from British side to bring in the Faqir;

c. she would not take this opportunity of making further move forward in Waziristan and bring down on Afghan government odium of having removed the Faqir at critical moment for his co-religionist.

Government of India gave assurances of the above conditions. Meanwhile Faqir of Ippi returned to Kharre on July 21, 1938.[53] He announced that he was going to Musa Nika for settlement of dispute between Ghilzai and Afghan government. It was also a rumour that Afghan premier had promised the Faqir to pay him, the pay of 1000 Wazirs whom the Faqir liked to keep for his service. The pay of one servant would be 27 Afghanis. In addition the premier would not stop the Afghan subject from supporting him. Sherzaman, elder brother of the Faqir was interviewed by the Hakim of Khost in Matun and paid him 10,000 Afghanis. The main cause of relations between the Faqir and Afghan government was that she considered Shami Pir as British Agent.[54]

The Faqir moved to Gulmat Shah's Kot in Mastoi River, upper Tochi, Madda Khel limits. Government decided to proscribe Mastoi Basin and bomb selected villages, harbouring the Faqir. Notices of bombing were dropped on August 20, 1938.[55] Bombing started on August 21, 1938 on Mastoi Basin and continued till August 24, 1938.[56] Faqir Ippi moved to Margha area on the evening of August 20, 1938. He was invited by the Kabul government to surrender and come to Kabul or

alternatively leave Afghanistan. Faqir Ippi choose latter course and proceeded to Musa Nika. British government bombed the area of Musa Nika and the Faqir moved in the direction of Shawal.[57]

During the critical period of World War II, the Afghan and British governments had for once come closer to each other. The main reason was the common threat, which was confronting both. If British government was perturbed about the activities of the Faqir and his alleged connections abroad, the Afghan government was also facing challenges of intrigues of Amanullah Khan, the ex-king of Afghanistan. There were reports that the Faqir was exploiting the cause of Amanullah Khan. According to Milan Hauner: [58]

> *These (reports) must be taken with a pinch of salt. Although one can never be certain whether his loyalty to the Yahya Khel in Kabul would have resisted the temptation to join the Pro-Amanullah forces and they been present in sufficient strength and had they been supported by the majority of the Wazir tribes, as long as Amanullah was physically absent and the German intrigues insignificant, there was no reason to expect the Faqir to change sides too hastily. Moreover had the `godless' Soviets been a party, alongside the Germans, in a Pro-Amanullah Coup, one cannot imagine the Faqir working hand in glove with them and the ex-king, whose radical reforms of 1920s he must have loathed.*

The British Policy had been to chase the Faqir from one tribe to another by means of air action. This policy had the effect of driving him just across the Durand Line where he was completely immune

and from where he could still continue his campaign against the British. The authorities were of the view that the Faqir cannot be `bought off' by them and in any case such a step was dangerous and might not be final.

His price would only be higher on the next occasion. The only course left open seemed to be either to induce the Afghan government to harass him so that he remove himself well into the interior of Afghanistan from where he could not influence the tribes of Waziristan or that the Afghan government with the British help buy him off. Were he thus to disappear it was probable that the tribes without his material support would gradually settled own except for the handful of irreconcilables.[59]

On the other hand the majority of tribes on British side were Pro-Amanullah with the exception of Bajaur and Mohmands. In Waziristan, the Faqir was disappointed that Afghan government had not supported him whole- heartedly. The Mahsuds on the other hand remained very much under the influence of Mullah Fazal Din who was an Afghan allowance holder and also jealous of the Faqir.

Much depended on the future action of the Afghan government itself. If it appeared to be too Pro-British then the sympathies of the tribes on British side were likely to be alienated. The Faqir was much influenced by the Naqib of Charbagh and was likely to accept his advice to refrain from hostilities on a big scale during the next some months. If

however, there was any upheaval in Afghanistan, the position in Waziristan would be entirely different. It would have a disturbing effect in Waziristan.[60]

Afghan interference became on a most limited scale and had been confined to assistance by small groups of Southern Province and very modest Shukrana and supplies given to the Faqir. To maintain his own position, the P.M. of Afghanistan might sometimes be driven to appear on the surface anti-British and a protector of Muslim tribes against aggression by non-Muslims.[61] One such example in this regard was the case of Mullah Fazal Din. British government asked the Afghan government to stop official allowances to him. It was argued that the British government had never paid allowances to the recalcitrant Maliks of the Suleiman Khel who were creating trouble to the Afghan government for the last few years in Katawaz. Afghan government insisted that this act would instigate Fazal Din to increase his hostility against both Afghan and British governments.[62]

The Faqir's movement was still difficult to follow. He was residing in Tere Chaude in Afghan territory about 2 miles across the frontier.[63] When pressed by the Afghan government, he moved to Shawal[64] but again returned to Afghanistan where he was reported to be living in an old Afghan Militia post in Shakin. He was said to be settling cases among the Ghilzais, with a view to establish his influence over them so as to use them against either Afghan or the British government.[65]

This was the time when Kabul was full of rumours and the tribes in Waziristan were keenly watching the developments in Afghanistan. The Faqir was moving on both sides of the border and his teachings became more openly against the Yahya Khel dynasty. It was reported that Malik Hayat Nazar Khel received a farman from ex-king Amanullah, through the Faqir appointing Hayat Khan as his representative for Mahsud affairs. Other Maliks had also received similar documents including messages to the Mahsuds not to fight against one another and to await the Faqir's coming.[66]

In reaction to these activities the Hakim of Urgun, Afghanistan summoned representatives of the Tanni tribe, warning them not to join the Faqir in his subversive activities on the Indo-Afghan borders.[67] The situation became so tense that a store of bombs and ammunition at Pasta Mela, north-east of Darra Khela on the Afghan side of Durand Line, belonging to the Faqir was destroyed by fire mysteriously on September 4 or 5, 1940. The loss was said to have included Rs.8000/- Afghan coin.[68] Another report was received from Khost that the property of Sher Zaman, elder brother of the Faqir, situated just inside Afghanistan had been confiscated.[69]

Disturbances in Khost and the role of Faqir:

As is mentioned before, the Ghilzai rebellion was suppressed by the Afghan government by vigorous military operations. The traditional and bitter hatred of Ghilzai for Yahya Khel dynasty revealing itself for

the present in support of the cause of the greatest enemy of the ruling family, the ex-king Amanullah Khan, and their general inborn impatience of any kind of rule continued to persist.

Appeals by the hostile elements to other tribes failed to obtain the support of the latter, with the result that the Powindah Suleiman Khel hostiles became unexpectedly isolated and were left with no other alternative than to submit for the time being. They were waiting for a more favourable opportunity to revolt again.

Afghan government started fresh negotiations with the Madda Khel tribe for the disposing of Muhammad Amin Jan alias Pak Malang, who had taken shelter in their area. Madda Khel were offered of re-enlistment in the Khost Militia as a reward, but they failed to do so. Faqir of Ippi was till in Darre Khela, in Afghan territory inducing the tribes to join his Lashkar.[70] It was also reported that one of the brothers of ex-king Amanullah Khan was now living with the Faqir.[71]

Disturbances again started in Afghanistan. Now the leading Zadran Malik Mzarak son of Babrak took the initiative. It was reported that Zadrans and Mangals from Afghanistan were purchasing rifles in Kaniguram, Shaki, Sararogha and Makin areas of South Waziristan. Mzarak contacted the Faqir in his cause.[72] This unrest was causing excitement especially among the Madda Khel, of whom certain Maliks received invitations from Mzarak to attend a conference at Spera in Afghanistan.

British government sent urgent warnings to Madda Khel through their Maliks not to take part in Khost disturbances. Political Agent saw a representative Jirga of Madda Khel on April 23, 1944 in this regard.[73] Afghan government tried to dissuade the Madda Khel leaders from joining Mzarak. She sent the brother of Nasrullah Khan, Paipalli at Sheranna, who approached leading Madda Khel Maliks and took promise from them not to join Mzarak. Madda Khel took this opportunity by exerting pressure through him on the Afghan government to restore the allowances and employment which the tribe enjoyed before 1933.

Despite these promises, a good many Machas and Ismail Khel of Kaza, a number of Kazar Khel of Sartoi and small parties form Ger area went to join Mzarak.[74] In retaliation, Afghan government warned all its allowance holders in Wazirs and Mahsuds both to stand by. Afghan authorities were trying to persuade the leaders of Wazir Militia to escort troops into Zadran country if this should be necessary.[75]

Mzarak sent his brother Sher Muhammad to do nanawati to the leading Madda Khel Maliks. He was preparing himself for the day when he might want a place of refuge from Madda Khel against the Afghan government. At the same time the Khost authorities sent Akbar Jan, Paipalli Kabul Khel with instructions to the Madda Khel that Mzarak must not be allowed to stay in their territory on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.[76] Mzarak moved from Khost to Konra near Garipai (Afghanistan). Large number of Zadrans, Tannis and Madda

Khel met him at Id gathering. He was persuading Bakhshi Khel and Madda Khel to agree to his taking up winter quarters at Dadam.[77] When he took refuge at Dadam, British government dropped white notices and sent warning messages to all the leading Madda Khel Maliks to evict him.[78]

Afghan government continued her struggle to convince Madda Khel not to give shelter to Mzarak. The War Minister visited Gardez, appointing some Afghan allowances holders among Ahmadzai Sulmanzai Wazirs including Shergai, Dilboz and Bajan to go and advise Madda Khel to persuade Mzarak to settle with the Afghan government in return for which their allowances would be sanctioned.[79]

There was a general impression that both the Afghan and Wazir tribes were ready enough to fight for Mzarak, but since both wished to escape reprisals from their respective governments, each wished that the other should make the initial assault.[80] Afghan government again tried to maintain good relations with Faqir of Ippi.

At that time Mahsud and Wazirs, especially Tori Khel were engaged in the dispute of Shoran Algad. Kidnappings, sniping, holding up of traffic of each other's, and looting one another spread on such a wide scale that majority of the tribes could not pay attention to other issues. There were two points of views among the tribes in this regard, that: [81]

a. Political authorities of the British government were behind all the disturbances. Their main objective was to divert the attention of the tribes from the Faqir and other prominent freedoms fighters of their area to other issues. Thus they created inter-tribal rivalry which inflamed the hidden enmity between Mahsuds and Wazirs.
b. It was a common talk that the Faqir, Mullah Fazal Din and Musa Khan Abdullai had instructions from their Afghan pay masters to keep Mahsuds and Wazirs too busy at home to have leisure in Afghanistan. If this was so they had been remarkably successful.

In addition to Mzarak some other personalities also came on the scene against the Afghan government. All these personalities tried their best to rouse sentiments in favour of ex-king Amanullah Khan. Photographs of Amanullah Khan, letters of Shami Pir and the promised help of Axis powers was propagated but in vain.[82] Mzarak tried to convince the Faqir and the prominent Maliks of Madda Khel to favour him in men but the Faqir was determined that favouring anti-Yahya Khel dynasty meant death of his own movement against the British, because the soil of Afghanistan provided him shelter.

In the initial stages he invited Mzarak to stay with him which the latter declined but when some malangs like Ghilzai Malang, Powindah Malang, Pak Malang, Dewagar Malang etc. came on the scene in favour of Mzarak, he rose openly in favour of Yahya Khel dynasty, claiming that it was forbidden in Islam to revolt against an Islamic government. In this regard Afghan authorities sent money and

presents to him and later on thanked him for discouraging Mzarak's movement.[83]

Afghan government confiscated the land of Mzarak. In retaliations Mzarak renewed his hostilities. His companion Dewagar Malang succeeded in collecting a Lashkar of 300 including Khostwals, Gurbaz, Mangals, Jajis and Sabris at Lawo Zhawar. Afghan government repulsed the Lashkar, killing three of its members. Mzarak, Sultan Ahmad and Pak Malang again decided to appear at Moghalgai and raise a Lashkar. They again failed to attract the Madda Khel in their cause, although Madda Khel tribe tried her best to make profit from her position astride the international fence by the suggested threat of force.

There were many reasons of the failure of Mzarak. The most important one was the fact that Ippi and British government for once had similar policies. The Faqir's plea was that he would lose his own men if any Lashkar was formed against Afghan government.[84] In addition to the Faqir's support Afghan government also got sympathies of the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh, Giyan Mullah in Afghanistan and Mullah Fazal Din in South Waziristan. She also employed other Mullahs to propagate in her favour.[85] When Mzarak and his companions revolted against the Afghan government, the later issued a notice at Urgun to all those Mullahs in Waziristan who benefited Afghan pay to claim their pay personally or other Mullahs would be selected for allowances. The main purpose of this restriction

was to realize them of their responsibilities.[86] It was because of the persuasion of these Mullahs that prominent anti-Yahya Khel Maliks including the brothers and companions of Mzarak surrendered to the Afghan government gradually.[87]

Arm Factory in Gurvekht

Faqir of Ippi was a great `Chess player.' His tortuous relations with Afghanistan had directly affected the political situation of the tribal areas and Afghanistan. The Faqir was mainly concerned with the British. Although we would see so many ups and down in the relations of the Faqir and Afghanistan, but no deadlock came in their relations. When the Faqir established his own factory in Gurvekht, a number of Afghans were employed in this factory. The Faqir's followers used to purchase supply of Brass and Copper in Kabul which was later transferred to the factory.[88]

The Faqir was directly in correspondence with the king Zahir Shah and other high officials of Afghanistan.[89] When British government decided to leave India, the Faqir was reported to have sent Ghulam Shah brother of Gulbat Shah and Ghaizal, Tori Khel to Kabul to consult the Afghan government as to whether he should support Congress or the Muslim League.[90]

Pashtunistan

The Afghan government anticipated the establishment of responsible government in India after the round table conference of 1930.[91] They expected that the British hold on India would be gradually relaxed and the British might not be averse to return of the tribal areas and the N.W.F.P. to Afghanistan, probably with a view to weaken India.

The Afghan government requested the British government between 1931 and 1934 that the territories inhabited by the trans-border Afghans should not be considered a part of India.[92] Their theory was that this territory originally formed part of Afghanistan and the territory was descended from the same stock, so they should be permitted to re-unite and form one Afghan State. In view of the then anti-British feeling prevailing in India, the Afghans probably expected the British government not only to cede these territories to them but also pay them a large subsidy in return for certain concessions to the British.

When the Government of India Act of 1935 was passed by the British Parliament, the Afghan government was apparently convinced that the transfer of power was far off. Therefore, they apparently did nothing until Cripps' visit to India in 1942, when they again anticipated early transfer of power in India. They pressed their old demands again, but the only reply given by the British government appears to have been that they were at liberty to take up the matter when constitutional changes took place in India.[93]

After the announcement of the scheme for the partition of India by the British government on June 3, 1947, it was reported that daily conferences were held in Kabul and by June 9, 1947, Afghan government decided to demand of the British government that the people of N.W.F.P. should be given the option to form their own independent state or to accede to any other government. This virtually meant that instead of two, the following four options should be given to the people of the North West Frontier Province at the time of the referendum: [94]

1. Formation of an independent state;
2. Accession to Pakistan;
3. Accession to India;
4. Accession to Afghanistan

This representation by the Afghan government was followed by intensive propaganda in favour of Pashtunistan in the Afghan press and Radio and by prolonged correspondence with London. British government responded that she had throughout treated the North West Frontier Province as an integral part of India and that it was recognized as such by the Afghan government in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. Notwithstanding this reply from the British government the Afghan government continued their efforts through the Afghan Minister in London to persuade the British government to come round to their point of view.

Afghans government finally sent Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan to London in July, 1947. He had a series of discussions with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He did not meet with much

success. Later on the result of the referendum and the tone of the tribes and Abdul Ghaffar Khan convinced the Afghan government not to demand for the establishment of an independent state or for accession to Afghanistan. Their altered stand was that they did not want the annexation of any territory but merely claimed to take interest in the welfare of their living between the Durand Line and the River Indus.[95]

After the establishment of Pakistan, Afghan demand was nothing short of claim by a neighbouring foreign state to meddle in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Meanwhile Sardar Najibullah came to Karachi and carried negotiations with Pakistani authorities. After his return to Kabul, he broadcasted a speech on Feb 3, 1948, giving a one-sided and somewhat distorted account of all the confidential conversations he had in Karachi with Pakistan government.

Simultaneously an intensive propaganda was let loose by the Afghan government on their radio and in their press. They also sent emissaries in the tribal territories to carry on propaganda in favour of Pashtunistan. They distributed thousands of leaflets and posters in favour of Pashtunistan. Afghanistan's demand in respect of Pashtunistan can be summarized as under: [96]

a. N.W.F.P. should be named as `Afghania' or any other to denote the Afghan origin of the people;

b. that the Afghan government have the right to take interest in the welfare of the people of the N.F.F.P and the tribes on account of the ties of blood;

c. that the N.W.F.P. should have full autonomy;

d. that the medium of instruction in the primary schools of the province should be Pashto; and

e. that the freedom of the independent tribes living between the settled districts of N.W.F.P. and the Durand Line should be guaranteed by Pakistan and that they should not be subjected to military pressure or imperialistic domination. The relations between the tribes and the Pakistan government should be on the basis of an agreement.

Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan, the Minister of National Economy, who was one of the principal sponsors of the Pashtunistan movement, invited Abdul Ghaffar Khan to Kabul during the Jashan celebrations of 1946. His idea was to arrange for support of his movement from the N.W.F.P. Abdul Ghaffar Khan's idea was to use Afghan propaganda machinery and Afghan money to support his own movement of Pashtunistan and he had no intention of merging the N.W.F.P or the tribal areas in Afghanistan. According to Ernald Jansson, he was very much opposed to this concept of Pashtunistan and said.[97] "We don't want to be with those naked people."

For a long time, Faqir of Ippi had been aspiring to become the king of Waziristan. He therefore did not view with favour the establishment of Pakistan, as the establishment of this great Muslim state was bound to frustrate his ambitions. Afghan government saw in him an ally, who would be useful in creating trouble for Pakistan and continued to help him with money, food-grains etc. The Faqir's emissaries came to Kabul on several occasions and were given money in the name of Kharcha.

Afghanistan manifested her unfriendly attitude towards Pakistan from time to time as evidenced from the following facts: [98]

a. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations;
b. ever since the commencement of Jihad-e-Kashmir against India, Afghans government made determined efforts to stop the people of the tribal areas and Afghans and inflicted various punishments on them including the imposition of fines;
c. to prevent the people of Afghanistan from hearing Pakistan Radio, the Chief of the Intelligence Department secretly instructed hotels in Afghanistan about the middle of March, 1948, not to switch on their radios to news from Pakistan and India;
d. in May, 1948, the Afghan government made efforts to induce Hazrat Shore bazar to adopt an attitude of non-interference in Kashmir affairs but met with little success, as the latter told them that this was a matter of religious conviction with him and he could not give any advice except of participation in the Kashmir Jihad whenever he was consulted;
e. Afghan government encouraged propaganda to be carried on in Afghanistan and the tribal areas to the effect that Pakistan was not a Muslim country, that king George VI, king of England, was still the king of Pakistan and that Pakistan was not governed according to Shariat;
f. in order to win over the tribes for using them subsequently against Pakistan, Afghan government arranged supplies of

foodstuff not only to the tribesmen on their side of the border but also to tribal people on Pakistan side of Durand Line.

The government of Pakistan explained to the rulers of Afghanistan that N.W.F.P. and the tribal areas were actually a liability and not an asset. Pakistan government were paying a subsidy of over a Crore of rupees to the provincial government of N.W.F.P. every year and were spending about twelve Crores of rupees a year in the province and the tribal areas in giving subsidies to the tribes and employment to the people of these territories in the Frontier constabulary, the Scouts and the Army.

All this was beyond the means of the then Afghan government whose annual income was reported to be about six crores of rupees a year. Secondly the standard of life in N.W.F.P. was much higher than in Afghanistan while a soldier received nearly Rs.67 Kaldars in Pakistan, the Afghan government were paying to their soldiers only 45 Afghanis which in Pakistan currency was equivalent to about Rs.11/-. Thirdly the people in the N.W.F.P. and the tribal areas enjoyed complete freedom and were managing their own affairs and they would never like to exchange their position in Pakistan by coming under Afghanistan to subject themselves to autocratic rule.

Afghanistan's stand was that she did not want any annexation either of the tribal territory or N.W.F.P. but they only wanted to take interest in the welfare of the people who were descended from the same

common stock. Consistently with their claim, they were not prepared to concede a similar right to the people of N.W.F.P. to interest themselves in the welfare of the people of Afghanistan. Was it not likely, for instance, that they might tell the people of Afghanistan that there was no responsible government there; that there was a monarchy; that all the powers were concentrated in the hands of a few and that the people had no choice in the government.

The Afghan government maintained their special attention to intrigues among the tribesmen on Pakistan side to undermine their loyalty to Pakistan. Supplies of cloth and sugar received from India were widely distributed among their allowance-holders. Afghan agents were sent with propaganda material in Pashto to the tribal territory. Ippi's attempts at sabotage were eulogized as crusades in the cause of Pashtun freedom. Pashtunistan flags were supplied along with funds for being hoisted in the tribal territory on Pakistan side of the border. Jirgas were inspired to pass anti-Pakistan resolutions and proclaim Zahir Shah as their king. Fake Pashtunistan Assemblies were widely publicized to have been formed, and finally, support material as well as moral was extended to tribes.[99]

In August 1948 when Afghanistan was celebrating Jashan, it was presented to be to give full publicity of Pashtunistan campaign. About 400 Maliks were reported to have participated in the Jashan. Prominent among those present were the Firqa Mishar Ramzan Khan Mahsud. The Afghan press published an account of Jirga of these

Maliks held in Kabul on August 29, 1949, in which the following resolutions were alleged to have been passed: [100]

1. All the tribes undertake to maintain their national unity on all occasions and in the event of an emergency will take united action with the consultation of each other. No individual action will be taken by any single tribe.

2. All the tribes will organize a united stand against foreign aggression and will thus bring their freedom.
3. If any foreign power has any aggressive designs against any part of Pashtunistan, all the tribes will defend it with all their power and resources.

It is to be noted that the Afghan campaign against Pakistan started over the "aggressive" bombing of Pakistani planes on the followers of Faqir of Ippi when they were claimed proceeding on peace mission to Pakistan in the initial days of new born state. It was not clear how the Afghans came to know the nature of this mission? Since then the Afghan government had constantly eulogized the untiring crusades of Ippi in the cause of Pashtun freedom.

In spite of these sentiments and encouragement Ippi remained inactive and confined to his cave in Gurvekht throughout the year 1949 owing partly to his illness but mainly because of the pro-Pakistan sentiments of the tribesmen in general and the surrender of some of his most trusted lieutenants to Pakistan authorities. It was reported that about 50 Wazir and Mahsud children joined the Tribal Boarding School at Kabul. This school was opened especially for the tribes on Pakistan side in May 1949.[101]

All these attempts and propaganda did not bring about the results hoped for by the Afghan government. Their attempts to construct a road up to Gurvekht, the headquarters of Ippi, failed completely. The Wazirs did not allow them to use their territory for the installation of telephone lines as well. The Kabul Khel Wazir of Brimal also prohibited the construction of roads in the vicinity of Urgun and the Afghan government had to abandon the scheme. The Kabul press and Radio continued to publish exaggerated accounts of the skirmishes between the Pakistani forces and the men of Faqir of Ippi. Usually the Mujahid won the battle.[102]

In July 1950, the Afghan government was understood to have dispatched about 250 men to the Faqir to serve as his body-guards, and to commit raids in Waziristan on an allowance of Afghanis 100 each plus free rations. Faqir of Ippi was busy making recruitment from the Wazir and Mahsud tribes on the offer of Afghanis 150 for a soldier, 250 for a captain and 400 for a colonel. Four colonels were appointed from among the Mahsuds and 23 from amongst the Wazirs of Waziristan. The Mahsuds resented this and insisted on parity between the two tribes.

The Afghan government was further understood to have sent to the Faqir about 600 hand-grenades; three very light pistols, one duplicating machine, some propaganda material and a few lorry loads of food provisions. In August 1950, the Afghan government sent 300 Russian manufactured rifles and about 2½ Lakh Afghanis to Ippi. Two

Khalifas of the Faqir, Akhtar Jan and Saeedo, arrived in Kabul on June 26, 1950 and held secret conversations with the Prime Minister and the War Minister. They returned to Gurvekht on June 29, 1950 and were followed by Gulab Shah Zadran in August 1950. He expressed the opinion that a sum of 100 Afghanis had little appeal for the recruits; the ammunition supplied to them in small quantities was keeping their interest alive. He further disclosed that this money was being paid out of the donations of the Pashtunistan fund. He also passed on a letter to the Prime Minister in which the latter had conveyed the result of his recent interview with Tori Khel Wazirs with whom he had reached a secret understanding and succeeded in recruiting 600 members from them for the corps. Gulab Shah further disclosed that the Faqir was contemplating the constitution of the Majlis-i-Shura (General Assembly) and a Majlis-i-Aivan (Upper House) with membership of 250 each. Each member was to receive Afghanis 500 per month. More than 2000 Ahmadzai Wazirs were reported to have joined the Pashtunistan Corps by August 1950. A senior military officer had been detailed by the Afghan government to help in the training of the corps.[103]

Aurangzeb Khan, the son of Firqa Mishar Ramzan Khan Mahsud came to Kabul for a day in September 1950, met the Prime Minister Afghanistan and returned the next day with instructions and a sum of Afghanis 20,000. He was authorized to recruit a special Mahsud Militia for which necessary funds had been promised by the Prime Minister, as the Mahsuds were unwilling to accept the Faqir's leadership. They

were also reported to be considering establishment of a separate Mahsud Sanga to be affiliated later on with the Waziristan Sanga. It was also learnt that the Afghan government had offered 30 lorries to the pro-Pashtunistan Mahsuds and Wazirs at controlled rate and payment in easy installments.[104]

However, all did not go well as had been planned. Some leading pro-Pashtunistan Wazirs and Mahsuds protested to Faqir of Ippi that they should be paid the lorries promised to them by him or failing that he should give up the Riasat and revert to his old Caves and the life of a Faqir. They emphasized the distinction between Faqir and a Rais and pointed out that he should accept only one of the two jobs. They expressed due deference to him as a Faqir from whom it was not proper to demand any money but as a Rais he was bound to pay people. The Faqir promised payment before Id-uz-Zuha. Some of the Wazirs who had been given cloth from the Government Depot at Urgun also refused to pay its price on the ground that they had not received the salaries promised to them by the Faqir. Akbar Jan brother of Firqa Mishar Nasrullah Khan was in charge of this depot which was being utilized as a base for propaganda against Pakistan.

The Civil and Military Governor of the Southern Province summoned a Jirga of the Ahmadzai Wazirs in the last week of August 1950 and held long discussions about their future part in the Pashtunistan campaign. 500 Wazirs and Mahsuds led by Firqa Mishar Shergai, Angoor, Dilboz, Khalifa Ghulam Qadir, Miro, Bajan, Khalifa

Muhammad Sadiq and Mulki colonel Maital attended the Jirga. The Jirga stayed in Urgun for more than a week and returned with money, grain and cloth.[105] They were not given any rifles and ammunition and were told that the responsibility for such items lay with the Faqir. Besides all this help the Faqir failed to raise large scale unrest.

The Faqir's general failure to engineer wide scale disturbances in Waziristan before winter brought him under severe criticism of some high ranking Afghan government officials. They could not see why their government should have placed so much faith in a man who had neither men nor money at his back to make the scheme a success, and held the view that the Waziristan campaign had consequently almost fizzled out.[106]

It was reported that the Afghan government had paid Faqir of Ippi Afghanis 12 Lakhs for the purpose of pro-Pashtunistan activities. He was promised further to supplement the same by the grant of 300 Kharwars of wheat, 1000 meters of cloth and 800 Seers of sugars per year through Ghulam Rasul Khan Jadidi, the Civil and Military Governor, Southern province. About 200 boxes of ammunition were also supplied to Jadidi for onward transmission to the Faqir but the latter's request for 7000 rifles and some mountain batteries was not acceded to by the Afghan government. It was also said that the Government of India had sent Rs.2 Lakhs to their Embassy in Kabul for distribution amongst the Wazir tribes in order to stop them from joining the Jihad in Kashmir.[107]

A number of Jirgas consisting of prominent Wazir and Mahsud leaders visited the Governor of the Southern Province during the year to demand financial and other help from the Afghan government. Firqa mishar Behram Khan Mahsud was reported to be making regular payments to those Mahsuds who were under his charge and this had a favourable reaction amongst the tribesmen who began to feel that the so-called Pashtunistan stunt could become a lucrative source for them.

He had received about 900 signet rings to be distributed amongst Ippi's colonels, which were to be used for the attestation of pay distribution. Colonel Zahuruddin Shaman Khel Mahsud was selected by the Afghan government to represent Waziristan in the so-called Pashtun Jirga-i-Hind in January 1951. Din Faqir also acted as an agent of the Afghan government in Waziristan and tried to enlist some battalions for the so-called Pashtunistan Lashkar and visited the Faqir's headquarters at Gurvekht and came to Afghanistan in this connection.[108]

The payments in cash were not regular from Afghanistan. It was reported that the Faqir had sent several letters to the Afghan government that if the promises made with him were not fulfilled, it would become difficult for him to run the Pashtunistan movement successfully.[109] A number of his agents who had been staying for long at Gurvekht to get arrears for their pay, returned ticked off with 6 yards of cloth each and chits stating that they would be paid in April 1951.[110]

Again in May 1951, with the exception of leading Mahsuds, all the employees of the Faqir's levy returned from Gurvekht almost disappointed. It was reported that the Faqir had told them that will they will be paid all their arrears when Shah Mahmud Khan, the Afghan Premier returns from America.[111]

The Faqir opened depots in different places in Waziristan. Prominent depots were at Sre-Khawre and Mande Kot etc. As there prevailed no organized system among the supporter of Pashtunistan, daily quarrels about the misappropriation in the funds and other items were common. Faqir of Ippi himself hauled up Shah Behram and Parmana Khan for misappropriating certain amounts which he had advanced them sometime back for Kharchas and pays. Captain Sher Jan Kabul Khel and Walizar Garrerai had also been accused in the same manner.[112]

Afghan government was stressing on the Faqir to raise a Lashkar against Pakistan. She drew the attention of the Faqir to the facts that the Rais of Northern and Southern zones of Pashtunistan had succeeded in stirring the people and raising Lashkars who had started active hostilities against Pakistan. Afghan government complained that the Faqir, who, being the Rais of the central zone was still keeping silence for the last two years and nothing concrete was achieved by him during this period despite spending considerable money in Waziristan.

Meanwhile Afghan government gave rifles and ammunition to those 250 Mahsuds who were permanently domiciled in Afghanistan and were dispatched in ten lorries to Baluchistan side. They were to be used against Pakistan. It is noteworthy that some 500 Mahsud families had migrated to Afghanistan in British time and were living there permanently.[113]

Faqir of Ippi also started writing letters to his designated persons to enlist more and more persons for Pashtunistan cause. Firqa Mishar Behram Michi Khel received such a letter from him to enlist 1200 Mahsuds forthwith and not to worry about their pay which would be forthcoming soon. The former invited all his employees and asked them to persuade people to join his lashkar.[114]

The Kurnails who were already disappointed, did not show readiness and said that unless pay was distributed to the Mahsuds, no one was willing to come forward. F.M. Shah Behram took back the signet rings from the so-called Kurnails in Gurri Khel section lest they should join Pakistan forces and hand over the rings to the Pakistan authorities.[115]

To counter the Faqir Government of Pakistan invited other spiritual leaders of Waziristan and abroad to persuade the people of Waziristan not to indulge in Pashtunistan stunt. In addition the irregular, in-organized and un-just payments to specific quarters made the tribes to join hands with Pakistan. For example the Momit Khels claimed to _ share of all benefits received by the Utmanzai Wazirs,

when they failed to accomplish their aim, they requested the Political Agent North Waziristan to summon them to represent their grievances to Government of Pakistan.[116]

The tribesmen were annoyed with Afghanistan government which failed to pay their dues. They were now trying to find out a person who could threaten the existence of Yahya Khel dynasty. Sardar Amin Jan, brother of ex-king Amanullah Khan was residing in South Waziristan. He was in search of any opportunity to overthrow Zahir Shah.

The tribesmen were now trying to hold out Amin Jan's threat with a view to force Afghan government into clearance of the amount due from it.[117] Madda Khels and Kabul Khel paipali had the strategic location on the border. Paipali Kabul Khels stopped the passage of food grains and other supplies to the Faqir through their area from Urgun. They also detailed a few loaded camels.[118]

A meaningful description of Pashtunistan was not easy. Much was form without substance, and even the form had changed from time to time. The amount of cohesion within the whole could only be guessed at. Yet there were certain important factors associated with it.

According to Kabul, the governing body of Pashtunistan consisted of a president, under whom there were several department heads, and a national assembly. The assembly was divided into southern, central and northern sections. For years, the president was Faqir of Ippi. His

department heads lived with him in cliff side caves at Gurvekht, where stores of food and arms and a small Pashto printing press also existed, on which a monthly newspaper was produced. In 1954 Most notable among the department heads were Muhammad Zwahir Shah, who held the thankless position of chief of internal affairs, and Ramazani, Chief of publicity and sometimes president of the central section of the national assembly. The national assembly, sometimes referred to by the tribesmen as the Loe Jirga, included a member or two from practically each of the major hill tribes and a few individuals from the settled districts of Pakistan. The Faqir claimed control of an area of 5000 square miles centering on Gurvekht, but actually managed to assert his authority in considerably less than 500 square miles.

The southern section was located at Gurvekht; the central section in the Tirah; and the northern section in the Mohmand country above the Kabul River. Meetings were rare and little, business appeared to have been conducted. Indeed, the whole governmental organization of Pashtunistan appeared to exist in theory rather than in fact, and even the theory was often elusive.

To sum up, as a national entity, Pashtunistan had little basis in reality. It was impractical economically, politically and geographically. In so for as it was a nationalist movement at all, it was before its time as far as the vast bulk of the tribesmen was concerned. However, it was of real significance as a continuing source of irritation on sensitive border and as a dangerous weapon in border conflicts.

Pashtunistan was an expression of Kabul's attempt to cope with two vital and lasting concerns of Afghanistan: historical irredentist urgings and the need to control a powerful and irresponsible threat to national security. The movement was a focus and magnifier of Pakistani-Afghan tensions as much as a cause of them. The Frontier has demonstrated the ability to remain for prolonged periods in a nerve-wrecking state of suspended eruption. Indeed, such a situation is frequently to the taste and profit of **its i**nhabitants.

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112. South Waziristan Confidential Fortnightly Summary No.10 for the period from 9/5/51 to 23/5/51.
113. South Waziristan Confidential Fortnightly Summary No.11 for the period from 24/5/51 to 8/6/51.
114. South Waziristan Confidential Fortnightly Summary No.17 for the period from 25/8/51 to 8/9/51.
115. South Waziristan Confidential Fortnightly Summary No.15 for the period from 24/7/51 to 8/8/51.
116. File No.25-S/53, Express letter No.739/S/1/53 from Northwaz, Miranshah to Norwef, Nathiagali, 25/6/53, T.R.C., Peshawar.
117. File No.25-S/53, Minutes of the meeting held on August 19, 1953 in the Government House Peshawar under the chairmanship of Governor Khwaja Shahabuddin.
118. 118.File No.25-S/53, Memorandum No.46/P.S From Pol. Sec to the Governor N.W.F.P to the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Karachi, 6/1/54.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA AND THE FAQIR 7

North West Frontier was considered, throughout the British rule, as a dangerous spot in the administration. Roos Keppel's attitude to the propositions of the Montego-Chelmsford reforms as bearing on the Frontier was just that "it is unwise to light matches in a powder magazine."[1] In 1920, when all India entered on the dyarchic experiment in the direction of responsible government, the province stood unchanged. For Pashtuns, no franchise, elections, legislature, and ministry - not even elections to local bodies; for the Ripon reforms of the eighties had not been forced on the Frontier.

For the first twelve years after 1919, the province stood on a dead centre.[2] It was represented by two of its leading citizens, nominated, not elected to the Central Legislature at Delhi. One of these was Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum; the other was Akbar Khan of Hoti.[3] Both belonged to the same areas, having no interaction with Hazara, D.I. Khan, Bannu and the tribal belt.

British government was too slow to recognize all the signs of newly found pride in the Pashtuns. In the constitutional field, progress was halted by counsels of prudence, while political ambitions were subordinated to considerations of all India strategy and defence. Right up to the Simon Commission (1929), theory of the powder magazine was allowed to rule decisions. From 1920 to 1930 nothing was done to enlarge the political horizon in the Frontier, and thus resentment grew and flared.

British immobility in conceding a measure of responsible government to the Frontier released other forces. There arose a movement in the shape of Faqir of Ippi, which in complete absence of the ballot box, or any form of expression, was necessarily conceived as a pressure group and subsequently as an armed movement for agitation against the government.

The Indian Congress, led by Gandhi and Nehru, had succeeded, within India, in winning to its counsels some Muslims form ancient centers of Muslim culture such as Delhi and Luchknow. But they were few. On the Frontier the story was different. There were many currents in the red Shirt movement, but its impetus came originally from the British failure to grant to the Pashtuns the system of representative institutions, set-up elsewhere in the sub-continent in 1920.

Once more frustrated, the Pashtuns turned to the only effective political organization at that time, the Indian National Congress. The Congress, working for a united India, seized the occasion with both hands. The enormous preponderance of Muslims in the Frontier population discounted any fear of Indian domination, and Congress could give what the Pashtun needed, namely backing, organizational and financial, to fight the British for its rights. Thus, at first communal fears did not arise, and the alliance was made.

In 1932, the North West Frontier was raised from the status of Chief Commissionerate to a Governor's Province, with political rights and

institutions equal to those available in the rest of the sub-continent. Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum became its first Prime Minister.[4]

It is hard to see how the tradition could reconcile itself for long to Hindu leadership, by so many regarded as smooth faced, pharisaical and double dealing. The Pashtun never regarded himself as an Indian, he still spoke daily of going to, or coming from Hindustan, a country that began vaguely somewhere the other side of the Margalla Pass. How then could he have associated himself with a party under Indian, even Brahmin inspiration?

The answer was not in much doubt. There were the temporary advantages in an alliance with Congress. already mentioned. But not even the Frontier Congress leaders could conceive of future conditions in which it would ever be possible for a Hindu dominated government to tell the Pashtuns what to do or how to do it.

Faqir of Ippi treated an entirely different path for the liberation of his motherland. The approach adopted by the Congress or the Muslim League was disapproved by him because he thought it to be not only time-consuming but also alien to the tribesmen's mental framework. Moreover, the Faqir was a strongman and he did not share the democratic idealism of both the Congress and the Muslim League. He realized fully that he will never be able to rise to the highest rung of power if he joined with either of these two political parties.

Faqir of Ippi adopted the path which was in consonance with tribesmen's temperament and geographical realities of his area. It was

the way for which oratory and knowledge of modern international relations were not at all required. The Congress did not see eye to eye with the Faqir's armed struggle and the Congressites bended all their energy to belittle him and disparage his efforts.

The main reason for Congress's hostility stemmed from the fact that the Faqir's guerrillas had been zeroing in on Hindus whenever they got a chance. When the rift between the Faqir and the Congress came to a pass, the politically shrewd Congressites tried to paper over the hatred by extending olive branch to him. The Red Shirt Leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan tried for a clandestine tete-a-tete with the Faqir, but the latter cold-shouldered the proposal. Later, when the daughter of Dr. Khan Sahib, another Congressite married a Sikh, the Faqir had reportedly expressed his disapprobation over it and declared her as Murtad and "unholy".[5]

Faqir of Ippi was a firm believer in violence while Gandhi Jee and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan were apostles of non-violence. They were poles apart and, obviously, twin could not meet. When the Congress Ministry was inducted into office in the N.W.F.P., Dr. Khan Sahib tried his utmost to persuade the Faqir from calling off the guerrilla warfare but he found him to be a hard nut to crack. The Faqir's intransigence led to the stiffening of government attitude towards him and this, in turn, discredited the Congress government in the eyes of the tribesmen of North Waziristan.[6]

Faqir's March Towards Independence

Faqir of Ippi was a saintly man who could not easily be digressed from his own path. On the other hand, if support of his own particular ideas was forthcoming then he was likely to accept that support and accelerate his pace along the path which he had chosen. The march of events since early 1936 had led the Faqir from an insignificant Mullah of minor local importance into an important spiritual leader with a large and widespread followers.

During the year 1940 and onwards, he gained international reputation. This gain to power coincided with persistent reports of financial and propaganda support by the Axis powers. Now the Faqir seemed more affluent than at any time since gifts of money from the settled districts were seriously checked.

Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi visited Frontier in 1940 on the instructions of the League to study the repercussions of Gandhi's visit to that area in so far as they related to the trans-border tribes. On his return to Lahore he told a reporter of the Civil and Military Gazette that, "the Faqir of Ipi has organized a network of Jirgas within the tribal area in order to be able to enforce more effectively on an organized basis his scheme for the constitution of a Muslim state in North India.[7]

In considering the future of the Faqir, one very important factor which could not be overlooked was that Mullah Fazal Din, the powerful Mahsud leader, was particularly anxious not to see an influential rival

in Mahsud country. Fazal Din had frequently shown a disinclination to co-operate with the Faqir in his anti-government activities. Were they united against British, the map of Waziristan would have inevitably changed.[8] Here we would analyse the Faqir's connections with various national movements in connection with his independence plan.

Congress and The Faqir

Obviously there seemed no reason of co-operation between the Faqir and All India national Congress. The Faqir had based his entire struggle on the slogan of Islam while Congress was claimant of Secularism. But the Congress could not ignore any movement, purely anti British on the soil of India. Tribal areas were considered by the Congress as an integral part of India. Again, Congress claimed to be the representative organization of all Indians.

To counter Muslim League, she needed the Faqir on her side. Congress had already established herself in N.W.F. in shape of `Red Shirt'. When Pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru visited Bannu in 1938, he expressed sympathy with the Faqir, as has already discussed in chapter IV. From that very day Congress tried to influence the tribes through her policies.

A Congress deputation toured Kohat and Bannu Districts in August 1939. In Bannu, the deputations' propaganda while directed against the raiders and dacoits was also directed against the Government of

India's Policy in Waziristan. The speeches went so far as to allege that a number of raids had been connived at by local officers, and that all Congress supporters were fully in sympathy with the Faqir and his cause, but were unable to assist him as they were unarmed.[9]

The Cripps Mission's arrival in India aroused some interest in Waziristan. There were reports that the tribes had apprehension against any transfer of power to other than Muslim control.[10] On the other hand Congress Agents Satijan of Peshawar and Rakhmani Niamat Khel, Bhittani visited the leading hostiles in both Agencies and in Bhittani country. They visited Mustalbar to see Mullah Zwahir Shah. They later moved to Khozhai to the Tochi and into Hamzoni areas where they were apprehended by the government on September 17, 1942.

Another group from D.I. Khan arrived at Makin on September 11, 1942. They stayed at Gul Lala's house and made objectionable speeches. Later they moved to the Kaniguram area. They intended to visit Hayat Khan Nazar Khel at Baddar and Mullah Fazal Din at Marobi.[11] They did not appear to have made much heading in their negotiations with Wazir and Mahsud hostiles. They were told that no anti-government demonstrations could be organized until after Eid festival and subsequent developments must depend on the production of adequate funds from Congress sources.[12]

The fact that these visitors had hitherto met with a cold reception had apparently led the Faqir to reconsider his policy vis-a-vis the

Congress. It was reported that he had summoned the leading hostiles to a Jirga at Gurvekht to decide whether co-operation with the Congress was permissible under Shariat.[13] Meanwhile a new development took place when Mullah Zwahir Shah started a Pashto cyclostyle newspaper of single sheet headed to Akhbar-i-Ghazian. In the issue of May 24, 1946 the tribesmen were advised not to take up the Bagai transport contract and not to allow government to construct road via Tut Narai.[14]

Nehru's Visit to Waziristan

The visit of Cabinet Mission to India and later developments aroused a fair amount of interest in Waziristan, especially so far as these changes might have affected the tribal areas. Meetings were held during the second week of October, 1946 in Lower Daur country in which speeches were made, opposing the idea of placing the tribal areas under a Hindu Raj. Later a wire was sent to the Viceroy and other concerned offices stating these views and expressing a wish that Pandit Nehru should not come to Waziristan.

This interest on the part of the Daurs was probably due to their proximity to Bannu bazaar gossip, and to press and radio utterances though many Wazirs were also now commenting on the changes. Malik Ali Marjan of Hurmaz who took a prominent part in these meetings, was put in lock-up and later released at the request of a Daur deputation on security of two British made rifles and Rs.5000/- for a breach of the peace by means of beating of chigha drums, etc.

Meanwhile a representative Dre-Mahsud Jirga was summoned to Razmak for October 17, 1946 to meet Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru. A similar Ahmadzai Wazir Jirga was proposed on October 18, 1946. The Mahsud and Wazir Maliks had announced their intention to attend. The local supporters of Congress had sent tribesmen to the Faqir to persuade him to meet Nehru.[15]

He could not afford to meet Nehru due to the prevalent political circumstances. The local Muslim Leagues held a private meeting in the afternoon of October 11, 1946 at the residence of Gul Muhammad Pleader, with Malik Damsaz Khan in the chair. They discussed various steps and appointed the following persons to go to Waziristan and propagate against the visit of Nehru.[16]

1. K.B. Mian Mianwar Shah, Wazir Jani Khel,
2. K.B. Sher Jan Khan, Wazir Bakka Khel,
3. Atta Muhammad Khan, Wazir Hathi Khel,
4. K.B. Ghazi Marjan Khan, Wazir Sperka.

Apart from this arrangement, it was reported that the Pir of Manki Sharif had met the Pirs of all important Gaddis in the tribal and settled areas of Frontier and had explained to them that Congress and the British were against the Muslims and that Jinnah was going to launch a crusade. The Pir went on to say that Congress was responsible for the murder of innumerable Pashtuns who had gone to Bombay and Calcutta in search of employment. It was rumoured that the Pir had sent a number of Pashtuns to Delhi and Bombay to help Muslim residents. It was threatened that if Nehru went to the Frontier, he would not return safely.[17]

The visit of Pandit Nehru to Waziristan overshadowed other events. Before the visit of Nehru the leading Wazir and Daur Maliks were collected at Miranshah on October 14, 1946 to meet Dr. Khan Sahib whose tour, however, was later cancelled. The Jirga was, therefore, seen by the Political Agent. He explained that Nehru, who could shortly visit them, had become Vice President of the Council and Head of the External Affairs Department, in which capacity he controlled tribal affairs. They were informed that Nehru would be accompanied by Dr. Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan who wished to talk to them and explain their mission. They were asked to treat the visitors as their guests and with the respect due to them.

The news was received with signs of un-easiness and the Jirga seemed unanimously of the opinion that they did not wish to meet the visitors or discuss their future with them. There was much resentment expressed against any idea of being placed under a Congress government. The Jirga threatened to disperse. Thanks largely, however, to the efforts, tact and patience of the A.P.O., Khan Bahadar Muhammad Aslam Khan and the P.N.T., Miranshah, who persuaded them to continue.

On Nehru's arrival, however, they received their visitors without standing up to greet them and again showed little enthusiasm for the visit. Both Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, addressed the Jirga and received the same answers as given to the Political Agent previously. Eventually as tempers became strained, the

Jirga rose and walked out. The sudden impact of ideas, distasteful to them, overcame their manners to an unfortunate extent. Subsequently the visitors went to Razmak. Nehru going by air, and after staying the night there, returned to Miranshah by road.

With regard to the visit of Nehru and his party to the South Waziristan, Mullah Fazal Din circulated letters amongst the leading Dre-Mahsud Maliks, the day before the party was due, to arrive at Razmak, exerting them to offer a united front against the Interim government which, he claimed, was at present dominated by the Congress party. A Jirga was held by Fazal Din on October 16, 1946 at Marobi, attended by a large proportion of leading Dre-Mahsud Maliks at which he asked them not to attend the Jirga to be held at Razmak with Nehru. The Maliks replied, however, that they had been called in by the political authorities and would therefore have to attend the Jirga.

On October 17, 1946 the representative Dre-Mahsud Jirga was seen at Razmak Residency. The Mahsuds gave Nehru an address that they were unaware of the purpose of his visit, and also that they were unwilling to sacrifice their freedom to any government. The Jirga was then addressed by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Nehru. After listening to what they had to say for some minutes, the Jirga became disorderly and left the Residence grounds, protesting that government at the centre was dominated by the Hindus.

Nehru also saw ex-Malik Hayat Khan, Nazar Khel, on October 18, 1946 together with some Mahsud hostiles with whom the Resident

had held a Jirga on October 17, 1946 to discuss certain `control' matters, viz. cloth and cereals, and also to prepare the ground for Hayat's anticipated return to grace. These Mahsuds also told Nehru that Muslims would not submit to Hindu domination.

On October 18, 1946 Nehru and the party visited Wana. Here, although Nehru declined to see the Ahmadzai Jirga, the Wazirs had already announced their intention of not coming in Jirga to meet him. Shortly before the arrival of Nehru and the party, some Wazirs attacked certain Hindus on the landing ground at Wana who intended to garland Nehru on his arrival. A company of infantry had to be sent to the landing ground to control the situation as stone throwing was taking place and slogans were being shouted in favour of Pakistan.

Nehru with Dr. Khan Sahib, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and a party of press representatives arrived Tank by air from Wana on the morning of October 19, 1946. They were greeted by the Assistant Commissioner, Tank, with a red-shirt bodyguard. A large number of Congress supporters and spectators were also present.

The reception was under guard by the provincial police, etc. Shortly before the visitor's arrival a small Muslim League black flag party attempted to gain entry to the landing ground. A scuffle, including a lot of stone throwing, between the members of this party and Congress supporters, ensued. The black flag party retreated to a position on the road-side half way between the landing ground and Tank Cantonment and stoned Nehru's motor car as it passed them. They were dispersed

by the police and Dr. Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister N.W.F.P.

After receiving deputation at Tank the visitors left for Jandola by road accompanied by the Red-Shirt bodyguard and about 150 armed supporters. The Assistant Commissioner, Tank, had arranged a party of Bhittanis to receive the visitors in the Tehsil at Jandola, where, after talking to the local tribesmen present, they and their supporters were entertained to a meal by Ghazi Khan S/o the late Subedar Major Muqam Khan, the leading Tatta Bhittani Malik. Ghazi Khan was an unsuccessful Congress candidate for elections in the Tank rural constituency in February, 1946.

On their return journey from Jandola the party were entertained with tea by the Army Unit at Manzai. They left Tank by air for Peshawar on the same day.[18]

Olaf Caroe's Comments on Nehru's tour

Olaf Caroe, the then Governor of N.W.F.P. is considered to be the mastermind on behalf of all this opposition faced by Nehru and his party. Olaf Caroe has recorded his defence in a letter written to the then Viceroy Lord Wavell on October 23, 1946. When he knew about the visit of Nehru, he went to Delhi and opposed the proposed visit on following ground:

a. visit at this moment, when a coalition was on the tapis, was exceeding ill-timed;

b. if Nehru was determined to carry it out, he must take the

> approach on non-party lines, and on no account take with him the Frontier leaders of one party.

The reasons behind these points were the activities of Muslim League. She had increased her activities in tribal areas. Olaf Caroe opined that tribes must not allow either Congress or the League to make them the subject of a party approach, and that their policy laid in a refusal to deal until both parties came together in the Constituent Assembly.

The fact that Nehru's appointment as Head of External Affairs carried with it power over tribal affairs did not at once penetrate to the tribes, but it did not take long for the Muslim League to understand the implications; and there was no doubt that it was this realization which led them to decide to send their emissaries, and particularly the Pir of Manki, into tribal territory. Government was unable to arrest him.

As soon as it became known that Nehru was definitely coming to the Frontier to deal through Abdul Ghaffar Khan without consulting the Governor and over-riding subsequent direct warnings which Caroe had delivered in Delhi, the League decided to intensify their propaganda among the tribes.

It is noteworthy that neither the Pir of Manki nor any other important League propagandist went to Waziristan, which since 1930 had remained aloof with the Indian political parties of both complexions. The Pir's activities had been confined to the Northern tribes around the Peshawar District.

Before Nehru's arrival, apprehending that his reception, particularly if he were accompanied by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, would likely be hostile, the Governor arranged with the Resident in Waziristan for Dr. Khan Sahib to pay a special visit to Miranshah to prepare the ground for Nehru. Special air transport was arranged, but Dr. Khan Sahib showed no keenness and never went.

The leaders, Nehru saw at Miranshah and Razmak, according to Caroe, were not Jirgas, but the real leaders of the tribes who were of course selected by the tribes on tradition and heredity. Abdul Ghaffar Khan made the usual approach so popular in Congress circles, saying that all had been slaves together and were now going to be free. One can imagine the effect of that sort of talk on a gathering of glowering Pashtun tribesmen. The Maliks were further enraged by Nehru losing his temper. What they particularly disliked was the talk of a regime of love, coupled with arrogant loss of temper.

Moreover, it had been a great shock to the tribes to see a Hindu coming down to talk to them from a position of real authority, and they told him plainly that they regarded Hindus as Hamsayas, and would have no dealings. Certain factions for their own ends had made in approach to Congress. One of them was a faction of Bahlolzai Mahsuds led by a well-known Malik named Hayat, who had been hostile for the last ten years because government did not raise his allowance to the pitch which he thought he deserved; and there was a friendly gathering of Bhittanis, at Jandola, collected by Naib Tehsildar.

Nehru called the tribesmen, to their faces, pitiful pensioners, and at the same time Congress funds were spent to win over the old hostiles. There had been a good deal of talk in Congress circles of stopping the tribal allowances, and one would wonder whether the pattern might not be to stop the allowances from government and to replace them with secret party funds to obtain the support or bribery of sections hitherto hostile to the government. Caroe has recorded his comments about Nehru as: [19]

> *this politician of world-wide fame repute is entirely without any element of statesmanship, and that matters such as timing, adjustment, a quite approach and a decision after weighing a great issue are beyond his ken ... I must reiterate the warning that the retention of Nehru, or any other Hindu, in charge of Tribal Affairs will prolong disaster and probably lead to tribal rising. Given the manner in which the Interim Government had to be formed, I see that it was not possible to do anything else at the outset, but to continue this arrangement must lead India into great danger.*

Congress continued her efforts to infiltrate in Waziristan. On January 16, 1947 three Congress workers entered South Waziristan Agency without reference to the Political Agent. In order to avoid any possible interference on the way, however, they left the lorry in which they were travelling before reaching Jandola and proceeded past Jandola by a circuitous route, picking up their lorry again on the far side.

The party spent their first two nights in Michi Khel limits, proceeding therefore to Kaniguram. They intended to visit Parmana Khan, Musa Khan and Mullah Fazal Din. Their visit was apparently confined to

making contacts with individuals.[20] In North Waziristan, the following Daurs returned from a visit to Delhi on April 20, 1947.[21]

1. Malik Haji Mirjani, Daur Darpa Khel.
2. Mir Sade Jan, Lower Daur.
3. Gul Anar Jan S/o Malik Alimarjan, Lower Daur.
4. Gul Ahmad Khan S/o Malik Haji Khan Shah of Tappi.

They had visited Maulvi Mir Asghar of Hassu Khel and intended to meet other Pro-Congress Lower Daur Mullahs. It was reported that they had brought a large sum of money to distribute in the Tochi in order to win supporters for Congress. Parties of red Shirts also had proceeded on good mission to North and South Waziristan, Mohmand tribal territory, Kurram Agency, Swat and Bajaur, in order to acquaint the inhabitants of tribal territory with the Congress Creed. The party which preceded North Waziristan was stated to have contacted Faqir of Ippi. The mission to South Waziristan only penetrated a short way into the Agency and was turned back due to the possible attack by tribesmen hostile to them.[22]

After the announcement of June 3, 1947 Plan, the activities of the Congress and Red Shirts shaped into new direction. Now they were propagating for independent Tribal Area. Some elements were propagating in favour of the then Dr. Khan Sahib ministry. Colonel Zahur-ud-Din Mahsud, who later became a prominent supporter of Pashtunistan, released a belated letter to the British authorities to leave Waziristan immediately, condemning the partition of India and

stressed his faith in the present Provincial Ministry.[23]

Daily Marakkas continued in South Waziristan by the small Congress element, in which mullahs were taking an active part. The usual demands and resolution had been formulated, including the demand for the release of Mahsud prisoners. A copy (in English) of the resolution was sent to the Political Agent. The leading signatories were seen by the Political Agent at Razmak on June 4, 1947.[24]

On the other hand riots took place in D.I. Khan. Following on the rioting and looting at D.I. Khan the Mahsuds arranged a similar riot to take place at Tank. Although the town was largely looted by its residents and men of various outlying villages and Trans border tribes, adequate defence arrangements made it safe from another attack. Spoiled by the Tank conflagration, the tribesmen concentrated their energies at Bannu, and started off from all villages in the northern part of the Agency in order to loot Bannu. The Political Agent drove over more than 400 Mahsuds and locked them up in prison, which made the other tribesmen do no further mischief.[25]

Wild stories were circulating everywhere about the distribution of secret fund amongst the tribes. One of these rumours was to the effect that a sum of Rs.50, 000/- had been sent through Ali Bakhsh, M.L.A., of Hangu, for distribution between the Sunni Tribal people, asking them to pounce upon the Shia area in the Tribal territory and also to commit decoities over the Shias in the British territory, with a view to bring about disunity amongst Shias and Sunnis.[26]

In North Waziristan, Malik Mirjani and Alimarjan, Daurs, the alleged recipients of Congress secret funds, called meeting of the Lower Daur Mullahs at Hassu Khel on April 21, 1947 to use their influence to stop tribesmen from joining the Muslim League. The party also held marakka with the Hassu Khel and the Tori Khel of Keithu Valley at the mosque of Shahmirai village in Spinwam on April 24, 1947. Some 400 tribesmen, including Maulvi Zwahir Shah, Bora Khel participated. A resolution was unanimously passed that Wazirs wouldn't join either the Congress or the Muslim League. The Mullah toured Shewa, Mir Ali and Dosalli and held meeting there. The Kabul Khels refused to hear anything in favour of the Congress.[27]

Muslim League and The Faqir

It was the role of Pir of Manki, Faqir of Shewa, Mullah Karbogha, Pir of Wana and other prominent religious scholars which aroused sympathy for the Muslim League in the tribal areas. Obviously it was the effect of these personalities that Jani Khel voted solidly for the Muslim League in the elections of 1946.[28] The idea of Pakistan had been pressed and the tribes were anxious about the transfer of power.

Haji Najmuddin alias Mullah Karbogha along with six Peshawari Mullahs visited Tank, Makin, Marobi, Karama, Kaniguram and Latakka. They met with Mullah Fazal Din and tried to persuade him in favour of Muslim League and Pakistan.[29] The Muslim League which until now had taken no serious interest in the affairs of Waziristan, became worried about the bombardment on Waziristan.

A large meeting was held at Takhtbai, Mardan district, on September 17, 1946, at which Bakht Jamal held the Hindus responsible for the communal riots at Calcutta and Bombay. Hakim Abdul Malik of Pati Claimed that Wazir tribes had refused to co-operate with the central government; resolutions were passed, condemning the bombing in Waziristan and Congress efforts to include Tribal Territory in British Territory.[30]

It is noteworthy that the bombing in Waziristan and the communal riots in Calcutta and Bombay had already made the Nationalist Muslims of the North West Frontier Province very shaky and the Congress was bound to lose its influence in the province and especially in Tribal Areas where the League became stronger than before.[31] Another huge meeting of the Muslim League, attended by about 2000-3000 persons, was held at mosque in village Jamrud, Tribal territory under the president ship of Haji Gul Akbar Afridi.

The Sajjada Nashin of Manki, Sayyid I'llauddin Shah of Kohat City, Maulvi Shaista Gul of Mata and three Afridi Maliks delivered speeches. Resolutions were passed in the meeting; one was related to Waziristan, stating that "All tribesmen of the Tribal territory consider Pandit Nehru as the killer of Muslims in Waziristan and in India."[32]

Meanwhile Muhammad Haibat Khan, son of the Nawab of Tank sent a telegram to his father at Lahore on October 22, 1946, that the Wazirs and Mahsuds of the Tribal Area wanted Mr. Jinnah to tour the

tribal area and that ten of them would be going to Delhi shortly to meet him.[33] In reply to this telegram the Nawab of Tank informed Muhammad Habit Khan that he had talked to the Nawab of Mamdot over the matter and that during the Muslim League Conference at Lahore, some 200 Wazirs and Mahsuds should make a deputation to meet Quaid-e-Azam and invite him to their country.[34]

The visit of Pandit Nehru to Waziristan enabled the Muslim League to gain ground in the Tribal Area. On November 5, 1946, a large Eid Jirga was held near Kotkai and attended by the Kai Khel, Gurri Khel, Garrerai, Shingi, Malikshahi and Abdullai of that area. The Jirga was also attended by Malik Hayat Khan Nazar Khel. Discussions were held to decide whether it was right to join the Muslim League or not. After protracted discussions a unanimous decision was reached to join the Muslim League.[35]

Pir Manki's Visit to Waziristan

Muslim League D.I.Khan arranged `Pakistan' conference and invited Pir Manki to attend it. After the conference, the Pir was invited by the residents of Tribal territory to visit Waziristan. The Pir along with his Khalifas started the tour of Waziristan on November 12, 1946. He stayed with Mullah Fazal Din at Latakka on November 12-13, 1946.

Mullah Fazal Din convened a Mahsud Jirga, to which Mullah Fazal Haq of Karbogha was also invited. Pir Manki moved to Makin, where the Jirga was supposed to be held on November 15, 1946, to decide

whereas the Mahsuds should join the Muslim League or not. A separate meeting of the Mahsuds and Bhittanis was held on November 15, 1946 which was attended by Muhammad Yousaf Gilani, Pir Baghdadi or Pir Wana.

On November 15, 1946 Mullah Fazal Din, Parmana Khan Shaman Khel and Naib Salar Musa Khan Abdullai with about 200 Mahsud tribesmen held a Jirga with the Pir and informed him that Waziristan wished to remain independent and did not desire interference from either Congress or Muslim League. On the following morning the Pir was at Sheranna where he held discussions with Malik Khandan Khan, Chief of the Madda Khel tribe and left for Faqir of Ippi's headquarters at Gurvekht on Nov 17, 1946.

It was reported that the Pir urged the Faqir to attend a Dre-Mahsud Ahmadzai Wazir Jirga scheduled to take place at Kaniguram with the near future and to advocate support for the Muslim League. The response of the Faqir in this regard was not known. Pir Manki returned from Gurvekht for Thal on November 19, 1946 visiting the Faqir of Shewa en route.

Pir Manki assured the Shabi Khel Maliks of full Co-operation on behalf of Muslim League. During his visit he performed one of his evening prayers in a mosque destroyed by the then bombardment. His visit had a good effect on tribesmen.[36]

In the same days the Viceroy of India Lord Wavell, accompanied by

the Governor, N.W.F.P. paid a visit to Waziristan. He interviewed Ahmadzai Jirga of approximately 200 in Wana Camp. The spokesman of the Jirga K.S. Hafta Khan, made his address in Pashto. The address contained criticism of the distribution of portfolios in the interim government to the members of Muslim League and requested the establishment of Pakistan.

The Viceroy advised the Jirga to wait for more concrete developments in India. On the other hand Hayat Khan Nazar Khel with some of his party met the Pir of Wana Sayyid Muhammad Yousaf Shah Gilani in the Municipal Garden at Tank on November 15, 1946 where they conferred with certain elders and Hayat promised to support Muslim League.[37]

Din Faqir, a staunch supporter of the Faqir held a meeting at Sheikh Ziarat near Kotkai after Friday prayers, which was attended by some Bhittanis, Malikshahi, Shingi, Abdullai and Haibat Khel Mahsuds. Besides Din Faqir, Mullah Sher Ali, Mir A'zam and Qazi Najeebullah (Mahsuds) also attended the meeting. He stressed the necessity for unity amongst the Mahsuds leaders for the preservation of their tribal freedom.

He issued letters to Mullah Fazal Din, Naib Salar Musa Khan, Parmana Khan etc. asking them for the convention of another Dre-Mahsud Jirga in which to urge the Mahsuds to give active support to the Mussalmans in India in the struggle against the Hindus and to save them from further atrocities.[38] These were the days when Faqir

of Ippi sent Ghulam Shah son of Gulat Shah and Ghaizal, Tori Khel, to Kabul to consult the Afghan government as to whether he should support Congress or the Muslim League.[39]

Pirs and Gaddi nasheen constantly visited Waziristan to make foundation for Muslim League. A meeting of Daurs and Utmanzai Wazirs was held at Miranshah. It was also attended by 4-5 representatives of Mahsuds, and two from Hangu, Kohat District. Maula Khan (Faqir of Shewa) and Mullah Karbogha explained the Pakistan and Akhand Hindustan, and exhorted the listeners to support the League.

At this, some of the audience told that Faqir of Ippi did not say so, and rather wanted them to be neutral and not to side with any political party, either the Congress or the League. Abdul Rahim Khan of Bannu then stood up and supported the League stressing that Faqir of Ippi would not live forever; even the Prophet (P.B.U.H) had to meet his death; they shall follow the Faqir of Shewa and the Mullah of Karbogha who were also their spiritual leaders.[40]

Gulab Khan was the most active supporter of Muslim League among the Mahsuds. On April 20, 1946 he wrote to Quaid-e-Azam: [41]

> *I on behalf of all the Mahsuds of South Waziristan Agency beg to assure you of our armed help for the achievement of Pakistan, whenever so ordered by the Muslim League High Command. We have full faith in the (Sic) critical time. Wish you long life and health.*

> *I am also ready to send Mahsud armed escort as your body guard if so ordered. Pakistan - Zindabad.*

Quaid replied:

> *I am in receipt of your letter of the 20th April, and thank you very much for your sympathies and your confidence in my leadership. With regard to my staff, I have my own arrangements while thanking you for your kind offer, there is no need just to trouble you.*

Besides Gulab Khan the large Muslim League element among the Mahsuds was in favour of Co-operation with Pakistan Government. There was already talking of Mahsud representatives visiting Quaid-e-Azam for preliminary parleys.

Faqir Ippi's Independent Path

When India was confronted with the independence movement, the Faqir failed to realize the situation and to streamline his movement along with the popular partition plan. His first reaction was to advise his adherents not to involve themselves in the Indian Politics. Maulvi Fazal Din and Umar Din, Idak Daurs and several other mullahs proposed to hold a Shariat conference at Spalga in connection with the then Congress and Muslim League activities in Waziristan.

They received letters from the Faqir advising them to refrain from discussing politics with the members of the Congress delegation at present touring in Waziristan. Faqir of Ippi was also said to have

written to Malik Khan Shah of Tappi and Alimarjan, Hurmaz (Lower Daur) and to several other Congress protagonists, including ex-Jamadar of Khassadars, Sadde Jan, warning them that mainly owing to their co-operation with the Congress the Congress delegation was encouraged to visit North Waziristan and that if they continued to intrigue with either political party, strong action would be taken against them. He advised all the tribesmen to keep aloof from Indian party politics.

In addition the Faqir was said to have sent warnings to the members of the Congress delegation in Tochi area to quit the Waziristan.[42] To meet the new challenges, in March 1947, Lord Wavell was succeeded as Viceroy by Lord Mountbatten. He decided to go to N.W.F.P. to see for himself what the situation was like. This visit took place on April 28 and 29, 1947.

In this visit he met with a Jirga representing the tribes of North and South Waziristan. The Jirga demanded establishment of Pakistan and the resignation of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry and threatened to use force, if their demands were not conceded. Mountbatten assured them that he had taken note of what they had said.[43] Meanwhile Referendum was held in N.W.F.P. according to the Partition Plan June 3, 1947.[44]

Faqir of Ippi had been attracting even more local attention than usual. It was expected that he might come into the open after the Eid festival. For some months the Faqir had been collecting the thumb impression

of tribesmen for an un-specified purpose, and lately there had been many reports that he contemplated declaring himself Amir of Waziristan.[45] There had been even reports of a sort of rehearsal ceremony.

The Faqir had always been indebted of Congress, who had given him liberal financial support. He did his best to dissuade his followers in the Bannu District from voting in the referendum. British government in India was convinced that the Faqir would naturally seek to enhance his political power when British control was withdrawn, and, provided his old allies continue to be generous, he would probably be quite ready to make things difficult for Pakistan by creating as much disturbance as possible. The Faqir and his lieutenants had lately been very active politically.[46]

Kabul Radio and press reviewed their propaganda in those days. This revived interest coincided with a visit to Kabul of one Puri, the Peshawar correspondent of the Hindustan Times and the Deputy Speaker of the Province's Legislative Assembly. He was commonly supposed to be the main link with Gandhi. In articles to the Hindustan Times from Kabul he had made most of Afghan interest in Pashtunistan.

It was supposed that his visit to Kabul at that particular time was not accidental. It is interesting to note that the then Governor N.W.F.P. Lockhart proposed to the Viceroy to re-name the Province as "Pathanistan." He wrote," I have been wondering whether it would be

a good thing to suggest that this province be renamed PATHANISTAN on the analogy of Baluchistan, but on the whole I think the balance of argument is against such a change."[47] Had this proposal been approved, the political scene of the province would be quite different.

Large number of tribesmen from the Agency and also from settled areas including Bannuchis and Marwat continued to visit Gurvekht. They were understood to have been advised by the Faqir neither to support the Congress nor the Muslim League. Some contingents were intercepted at Isha corner and Mir Ali and returned to Bannu. It appeared that the Faqir was endeavouring to increase his following and strengthen his position for the future proposed independence of Waziristan.

In general it seemed that the tribesmen of North Waziristan Agency were looking to the Faqir to make a declaration before showing their own reaction to the statement of June 3, 1947. There were, however, signs of anxiety over the future regarding the general benefits received from the then government and their continuance after its termination.[48]

The Congress element had remained silent during these days and was presumably awaiting a lead from Faqir of Ippi. Some individuals had expressed the view that the Mahsuds should join whatever government or country makes them the best offer, i.e., Pakistan or Afghanistan.

The Faqir who was not planning to come open and explain his designs, suffered consecutively of the death of some of his very staunch supporters like Sardar Muhammad Khel, Tilladar Bannuchi, Azal Mir Tori Khel, Arsala Khan Madda Khel and the Faqir's elder brother Sher Zamin. All these persons died in June 1947, leaving the Faqir desperately alone.

A large number of the Faqir's followers proceeded to Gurvekht ostensibly to offer condolence on the death of his brother. On June 25, 1947 eighteen lorries carrying Bannuchis, Marwat and others visited Gurvekht. They were for certain reasons permitted to proceed but prohibition against such entries into Agency limits were re-imposed with effect from June 28, 1947. On that date six passenger lorries were turned back from Khajuri. In addition over 20 lorries were detained at various Scouts posts with the object of minimizing the possibility of further traffic. Visitors continued to go to Gurvekht on foot owing to imposition of restrictions on the traffic.[49]

The increasingly desperate Hindus and Sikhs now began to woo their former tormentor. In July 1947 a complete hartal was observed in Bannu city as a mark of respect for the Faqir on account of his elder brother Sherzaman's death. About three hundred Hindus and Sikhs held a meeting in the city, at which they decided to send their condolences to him.[50]

Allama Al Mashriqui's Offer

The Faqir continued to persuade his followers not to indulge in Indian politics. This advice was more favourable to Pashtunistan theory than to any other. These were the days when the Faqir was contacted by Khaksars. Allama Mashriqi sent a deputation under the leadership of Hakeem Dost Muhammad (Adamzai-Bannu), Salar-i-A'la N.W.F.P along with Abdur Rahman Khan, Falak Sher Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Niazi and Maulvi Muhammad Amir Khan to seek co-operation of the Faqir of his revolutionary programme of independence. Allama al-Mashriqi had also handed over a proclamation in Persian to the deputation to be delivered at Mustalbar in an assembly of the Maliks.

The Faqir arranged his meeting with the deputation at Gurvekht. He accepted the offer in principle but wanted to clarify some of his reservations. In this regard he sent his confident Malik Muezzullah Khan to Allama al-Mashriqi. The deputation again met with the Faqir after the return of Malik Muezzullah Khan from al-Mashriqi. The Faqir put forwarded his incapability in collaborating with al-Mashriqi. The main reason of regret was his poor health, in-organized movement and lack of confident companions.[51]

Faqir Ippi's Open Rebellion

As soon as the creation of Pakistan became inalienable, the Faqir showed his resentment openly. Past ten years Jihad against the British had earned him the most attractive and prominent personality

in the subcontinent of India. Now he was favourite to Congress, Muslim League, Ahrar, Khaksars, Jamia't-ul-Ulama, Red-shirts and Afghanistan. To clarify his position, he released a letter to the public as: [52]

> *U'lema-e-Hind have borne severe atrocities, Allah may give them reward for this sacrifice ... the undersigned waged Jihad against British government for the last twelve years and is determined to continue it. The undersigned does not know the objective and manifesto of political parties nor is satisfied of this system. That is why I am not in collaboration with any political party nor have any animosity with them except the British. Yes if there is any party which is willing to collaborate with me in the light of the commandments of Qur'an, she can do so.*

Faqir of Ippi now turned propagating against Pakistan and advising the visitors not to vote in its favour. This was contrary to his previous advice of non-adherence to either political party in India and savoured of the newly raised cry of Pashtunistan. He was said to have sent letters to the Mahsuds proposing a visit to their country before or after the month of Ramzan. Some mullahs visited Makin and Kaniguram to try and persuade the Mahsuds to follow the Faqir's policy.[53] Mullah Fazal Din and leading Mahsud Maliks informed him in writing that he should on no account visit the Agency. His Mahsud visitors had been confined to half a dozen in number.[54]

Waziristan continued to abuzz with rumours about the Faqir's probable future activities. It was the month of Ramzan and the Faqir usually secluded himself in this month from the worldly affairs. But August 1947 saw the Faqir continued seeing his followers and visitors. He intended to obtain fatwa from the U'lema to legalize his position and by this means to coerce the tribes to co-operate. He visited the house of Malik Nazemir and the Faqir of Shewa. Mehr Dil Khattak and Zmarai, Tochi Scouts deserters were deputed to Tirah to secure the support of the Afridis.

His followers were advising the Mahsuds to prepare themselves for a Jirga to be held under him after the Eid. Mullah Fazal Din continued a protracted tour of the Agency, collecting Shukrana, advancing his own position and vilifying the Faqir. Meanwhile a deputation of leading Wana Wazirs left for Peshawar during the week to discuss with the Pir of Manki their future in Pakistan.

Malik Shah Pasand paid a visit to the Pir of Wana and obtained his agreement to a joint Wazir-Mahsud marakka being held before August 15, 1947 in order to obtain the agreement of both tribes that Pakistan should be wholeheartedly supported. Both the Mahsuds and Wazirs had reacted very favourable to the news that Maliki and Khassadari will in all probability be continued on the scale under Pakistan.[55]

Throughout the spring of 1947 efforts were made, primarily, it seems, on the initiative of pro-Muslim League elements among the Waziristan tribes, to arrange an all Frontier tribal marakka to decide a common

policy for all the tribes.[56] No such marakka materialized. The nearest to it was a meeting on May 12, 1947 of Afridi, Mohmand, Wazir, Turi, Bangash, Orakzai and Mahsud representatives at Murghan in the Kurram Agency. The following decisions were taken: [57]

1. all tribes of the tribal areas should unite into one block and negotiate with the new government of India as one bloc;
2. if any tribe disregarded this agreement, it would be subject to reprisals by the others;
3. the tribes would use all their power, even force if necessary, to bring about similar unity among the Pashtuns of the settled districts;
4. they would take no part in Indian politics on the other side of the Indus, but nevertheless they declared themselves to be in favour of Pakistan.

The validity of these decisions was, however, questionable. No united front was ever achieved.

Pashtunistan Movement

In May 1947 when it was becoming clear which way the wind was blowing, the Faqir increased his activities. A number of marakka were held. The problem was that his Jihad programme - freedom from the British and independence of Waziristan - had become irrelevant. The latter had to be deferred till after independence and so far as freedom form the British was concerned, it was no longer at issue.

The question now was: Hindu rule or Muslim rule? When finally the AINC accepted partition, the Frontier Congress and her allies were placed in a hopeless position. The communal ideology of the Muslim League had been vindicated while the secular ideology of the Congress had not stood the rest of reality. Nor had the alliance with the AINC been strong enough to save the Khudai Khidmatgars in their hour of need. After these failures Ghaffar Khan and the Faqir ought, logically, to have joined the Muslim League or at least to have supported Pakistan.

The enmity between the Frontier Congress and the Muslim League had little to do with Pakistan. The reasons for the Frontier Congress' opposition to Pakistan were historical rather than ideological. Pakistan had been advocated by their enemies on the Frontier, while their allies in the AINC had opposed, so the Khudai Khidmatgars also opposed it. Originally Ghaffar Khan's alliance with the AINC had been mainly a marriage of convenience, though admittedly the mutual feelings had grown very warm over the years. The case of Faqir of Ippi was quite different. His movement was essentially an Islamic one in Waziristan, not Indian.

When the Faqir realized that his stand was becoming untenable and that Muslim League would be victorious, there were basically two things about Pakistan that worried him. The first was that in Pakistan he and his adherents would not get proper position. No matter how strong the Faqir was in his own area, Waziristan was too small that he

would not be able to withstand the pressure from the other areas. Secondly, the Faqir was desperately anxious to see the British out of his country. He was afraid that Pakistan would not be genuinely independent but would remain under British domination.

The course the Faqir chose to follow in this difficult situation was to restate his commitment to Islam under the cover of Pashtun nationalism and put increased emphasis on Pashtun values. Some of his prominent Khalifas like Latif Tori Khel and Maulvi Zwahir Shah Mohmit Khel had already established contacts with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Afghan government in this regard. Although the concept of Pashtunistan at that critical time was controversial, here a correspondence of Olaf Caroe with Sir J. Colville is worth mentioning: [58]

> *The interesting local development in the political field is that my Ministry and Abdul Ghaffar Khan have started propaganda on a theme which I advised them to take up some months ago, that of a Pathan national province under a coalition if possible, and making its own alliances as may suit it. When I put it to them then they professed what amounted to fury at the mere suggestion. There is a good deal in the theme itself, and the appeal is a far more constructive one than that of Islam in danger. The switch-over has probably come too late, but to my mind it is strength, and not a weakness, that Pathanistan cannot subsist financially or otherwise on its own legs. The weakness is that the Pathans have hitherto been too divided among themselves to set up a stable state, and where they have ruled as conquerors of alien populations. They themselves had always*

> *been in a state of anarchy right through history until we came and put them in order. (Afghanistan is not really a Pathan state at all).*

It is on the record that in those days Khudai Khidmatgars took a new turn by introducing Zalme Pakhtun, founded by Khan Abdul Ghani, eldest son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The foundation probably took place towards the end of December 1946. It was not until May 1947, in the unsettled conditions then obtaining, that it began coming into prominence.[59] Was this organization an outcome of Caroe's maneouring or not is debatable.

> *Though the tribal areas and their people were in a very real sense "the farthest part of India", they were inevitably deeply affected by the events which were taking place all over the sub-continent. Independence Day confirmed legally the freedom which the tribes had always enjoyed in practice. Departure of the British made little difference to the way of life in the border hills. The chaos which developed in the plains, however, had its historic appeal. A mixed band of Pashtuns attacked a troop train near Kohat, killed twenty two and wounded ninety four of the Bombay Grenadiers who were being evacuated from the Kohat cantonment. These incidents were isolated, however, and on September 6, 1947, a Time's correspondent on the spot was able to report:60 Nor have the Pathan tribesmen as yet given much trouble, mainly because it is the time of year when they descend into the valleys with their herds. The Pathan shooting season does not open until later in the year.*

When the shooting season did get underway, all Pashtun energies were concentrated on the Kashmir Jihad, and the tribal areas quietly

and almost imperceptibly became a part of Pakistan. Pakistan government, sorely pressed from all sides, decided almost at once to abandon all army installations in the tribal belt. Busy in Kashmir, the tribesmen hardly noticed this gesture of confidence in their loyalty. On December 25, 1947, Governor General Quaid-e-A'zam's birthday, it was announced that withdrawal of regular military units had been completed.

Jirgas of all the most important tribes already made agreements with Sir George Cunningham to accept Pakistan as their new suzerain on the same terms as had existed with the British. In mid-January, 1948 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan paid a visit to Miranshah and Tank and addressed Wazirs and Mahsud Jirgas.[61] An all tribal Jirga was held at Government House in Peshawar on April 17, 1948.

In the presence of Quaid-e-Azam, 200 Maliks pledged their allegiance to Pakistan, restated their determination to win Kashmir for their new country, and requested that they be placed under the direct administration of the central government. The request was met on July 6, 1948 when Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah created the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and personally took over responsibility for the tribal area.

As this was happening in Karachi, posters appeared in Bannu in the name of the Faqir, denouncing Jihad on Kashmir as an attempt to overthrow a `national government.'[62] Other posters came to notice in Peshawar city, which were believed to have been issued by Faqir of

Ippi criticizing the personality of Quaid-e-A'zam for not introducing Shariat in Pakistan. Meanwhile a meeting of Jama't Islami was held in the month of May 1948, attended by 300 persons, including Dr. Said Badshah Kazmi, a Khaksar Hakeem Abdur-Rauf, a Congressite, Said Anwar Shah, an Ahrari and others including Ahrar, Khaksars and Red Shirts.

Sayyid Abul A'la Maudoodi delivered the address in the course of which he blamed the members of the Constituent Assembly for the lack of knowledge of Islam and demanded that a state with an Islamic Constitution should be created immediately.[63]

The introduction of Shariat Law was the constant theme of many speakers everywhere who blamed Pakistan for its immediate failure to introduce the full Shariat Law with all its implications. There were rumours that contact had been established between certain sections of the Muslim League in Bannu with Faqir of Ippi on the same matter of the introduction of Shariat Law.

There were many adverse comments on the appointment of Sir Zafrullah Khan as Foreign Minister on the ground that he was a Qadyani. There had also been abuse of the Pakistan and provincial government for retaining British officers from a small minority.[64]

These were the days when Pir Manki, the prominent leader of freedom movement was demanding for the imposition of Shariat Laws, Shahzada Fazal Din Mahsud had joined Muslim League and a proposal was made to organize an All-Pakistan Shariat group.[65]

Arrest of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan

Meanwhile Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan along with certain other Red-Shirt leaders was arrested on June 15, 1948 at Kohat while ostensibly on his way to Bannu. For sometimes, since his return from the Constituent Assembly at Karachi, he had been very active in re-organizing his Red-Shirt party and making a number of disloyal speeches, even though he insisted that he was a supporter of Pakistan. There was now little doubt that he had every intention of causing as much embarrassment as possible to government had he been given time to complete his organization. His intentions had become public on June 21, 1947, when he convened a party meeting at Bannu and the following resolution, called the Bannu Resolution, was passed: [66]

> *A joint meeting of the Frontier Jirga (Frontier Provincial Congress Committee), members of the Assembly, commanders of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Zalme Pukhtun was held on the 21st of June, 1947 at Bannu with Khan Amir Muhammad Khan in the chair. The joint session unanimously decided that here in this country (N.W.F.P.), an independent Government of all the Pukhtuns shall be established, the constitution which will be based on Islamic principles of democracy, equality and social justice. This session appeals to all Pukhtuns to unite together on one platform to achieve this noble aim and not to bow before the power of anybody except that of the Pukhtun.*

The government of Pakistan believed that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was acting in collusion with Faqir of Ippi and that his visit to Bannu

coincided with the sabotage activities of the Faqir. It was propagated that Ghaffar Khan intended to disappear from the province and join the Faqir in carrying on subversive activities from the Faqir's headquarters. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment under section 40 F.C.R.[67] Red Shirt workers arranged protest meetings against the arrest of Ghaffar Khan refuting the allegations that he was in collaboration with the Faqir. Pir Manki and Pir Zakori, both agitated against the arrest of Ghaffar Khan and staged processions in this regard but in vain.[68]

Faqir's Alleged Letters to Nehru

The Dawn of June 29, 1948 published sensational news about the arrest of one Awal Hussain along with some letters of Faqir of Ippi addressed to Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister of India. It was reported that the Faqir's emissary had been in previous contact with the Pandit. Awal Hussain, the man arrested, was indeed well known as a regular messenger in the employment of the Faqir. Local opinion in the North West Frontier Province, though surprised that he should have been arrested at Hyderabad, Sind, was satisfied of the authenticity of the letters.

It was alleged that the choice of this particular moment for publication of such news was made with one eye on the impending arrival of the Security Council's Kashmir Commission and on the other to neutralize any possible sympathy caused by the arrest of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and to isolate the Faqir.[69]

According to Awal Hussain, the Faqir's 35 years old emissary to Pandit Nehru, he was deputed on a secret mission to New Delhi, where he met first a high Indian Government official who took him to Nehru. He delivered the Faqir's letter to the Indian Prime Minister and had secret talks with him.

The Faqir wanted India's monetary and military aid for fulfilling his ambition of annexing the Pakistan territory up to the Indus River and later India's good offices to secure international recognition of his claims. Pandit Nehru was reported to have expressed his sympathy with the Faqir's aims and promised assistance at an opportune time. He was also stated to have inquired if the Faqir was maintaining close contacts with the Red Shirts led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Faqir's idea appeared to have been that his men and the Indian Army should open simultaneous attacks on Pakistan from both sides.[70]

It is not easy to assess the precise significance of this "sensational revelation." The material presented clearly carried no weight as evidence against India or Mr. Nehru, nor was any explanation advanced of Awal Hussain's presence in Hyderabad which was not the normal route between N.W.F.P and Delhi. Increased activity on the part of the Faqir and his followers had been reported in Waziristan, together suggestions that he was receiving support from the Indian embassy in Kabul, and it must be supposed that the Pakistan government considered the situation sufficiently serious for it to be worthwhile making the maximum propaganda use of the arrest of Awal Hussain or even conceivably fabricating the whole incident in

order to rally tribal opinion in her support. She may also have wished to drive a final nail into the coffin of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the principal ground for whose arrest was that he was conspiring with Faqir of Ippi (see Appendix E).

Armed Resistance against Pakistan

In the earlier part of the year 1948 there was four pronged offensive against Pakistan, from Afghan government, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's party, Faqir of Ippi, and the Government of India as instigators and supplier of money through the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Faqir of Ippi planned the starting of hostilities on June 15, 1948. Majority of the tribes were aware of the struggle Pakistan was carrying on against the Hindu Government of India and did not join the Faqir. He did not meet with success and disbanded his army on the pretext of Ramzan.

His Lashkar destroyed Datta Khel post and was reported to have driven the Khassadars out of Boya post which was entrusted to Khassadars when it was evacuated by the Scouts.[71] He tried his best to persuade the Tori Khel to help him in securing possession of Razmak, but failed. Later a Lashkar approximately 800 strong, of followers of the Faqir assembled in Tochi Valley near Thal, attacked the fortress of Thal and fired on R.P.A.F. aircraft sent for investigation. Aircraft retaliated with cannon causing about 50 casualties. Further casualties caused by 25 Pounds fire with machine gun and mortar from Thal Fort, the Lashkar ultimately dispersed.[72]

It was the general impression that the Faqir whose life before partition was devoted to raiding the `infidel' British, had now found himself without means of livelihood. After the creation of Pakistan, he argued that "she as a dominion was still under non-Muslim rule and, therefore, should be attacked by all `faithful' tribesmen" had little success among his old followers particularly as Pakistan withdrew her army from the frontier areas and left their policing to local Scouts. Government of Pakistan had gained considerable success in securing the surrender of individual hostiles.[73]

The Government of Pakistan gave a `free pardon' to the Faqir in October 1947, allowing him to live freely in any part of the Dominion, but the Faqir continued to defy the existence of Pakistan. It was reported that a school set up by the Pakistan authorities at Idak in the Daur area was closed down under the orders of the Faqir. One of the teachers was arrested and brought to Gurvekht and the other killed during the conflict that initiated at the time of their arrest.[74]

The Faqir convened a big Jirga composed of the representatives of Wazirs, Mahsuds and Daurs, their U'lema and tribal leaders on January 19, 1950. After a series of discussions the first session of the Pashtunistan Assembly was held and the red flag of Pashtunistan hoisted. The Faqir was unanimously elected head of the State and the following bodies were formed:

- General Assembly
- A Special Committee
- Military Affairs Committee
- Foreign Affairs Committee

- Internal Affairs Committee
- Judiciary.

Apart from the Regional Assembly a "Provisional Government of Pashtunistan" with Ippi as head of the Cabinet was also formed.[75] After this Jirga, a series of meetings of Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mahsuds and Daurs were held in support of Pashtunistan. Red flags of Pashtunistan were hoisted in tribal areas. Government of Pakistan dropped threatening leaflets from air in Waziristan to bring down the Pashtunistan flags; otherwise she would order bombardment over Waziristan. Pakistan planes took Aerial action in Shin and Wana on August 19, 1950 against all those persons who maintained the flags.[76]

The Faqir collected a large number of Wazirs and Mahsuds around him promising handsome pay out of the allowance promised by the Afghan government. He registered a number of tribesmen from that area as volunteers of the so-called Pashtunistan Lashkar with promises to pay them which were not fulfilled. The tribesmen of the area visited the Faqir's headquarter in Gurvekht in large number in the hope of getting money, arms and ammunition but actually they were not given what was widely published by the Afghan Publicity Agencies.

The failure of the Faqir to make good his promise to the tribesmen resulted in the loss of his prestige. In addition Shahzada Fazal Din, an important anti-Pashtunistan leader, challenged the Faqir to discuss the so-called Pashtunistan issue with him in the light of the religious dictates of Islam. The Shahzada was reported to have expressly told

the Faqir in his challenge that the losing party would join the winner's side. The Faqir did not, however, accept the challenge nor did he send any reply to it.[77]

A team of Mullahs of settled areas consisting of Maulana Khan Mir Hilali, Midrarullah Midrar, Muhammad Shoaib and Abdullah Shah Mezari toured Waziristan from December 5, 1950 and delivered lectures at Kotkai, Shahur Shaman Khel and Wana. The visit was successful and had a wholesale effect on the people and Mullahs of Waziristan. Mullah Najibullah Laswandai was of great assistance to the party.[78]

Pashtunistan Conference in India

India, the main supporter and instigator of the Pashtunistan issue arranged a so-called "Azad Pashtunistan Conference" at Calcutta and invited staunch supporters of the issue from Afghanistan and tribal areas. Zahur-ud-din, Shaman Khel had been invited to Afghanistan and later on dispatched by the Afghan government to Delhi as one of the delegates to the conference.

The announcement of Zahur-ud-din's arrival at Delhi by All India Radio was hailed by his brother Aurangzeb at Sultana by firing happy shots in the air. On the other hand certain quarters seriously criticized the visit and claimed it as a clear proof that Azad Pashtunistan stunt was un-Islamic and was backed by Hindus and Sikhs.[79] Mahsud bitterly resented Zahur-ud-din’s visit and blamed him as an agent of

the Hindus.

A mammoth meeting of all the Dre-Mahsud Mullahs and elders was held at Tank on January 16, 1951, who condemned the maneuverings of India and Kabul, challenged the position and authority of Zahur-ud-din etc. delegates to the so-called Pashtunistan Jirga held in Delhi. They openly condemned them laying of wreaths on Gandhi's Samadhi.

The Pashtunistan stunt was described as an un-Islamic move with intent to divert the attention of Pashtuns from Kashmir. They unanimously passed resolutions urging upon the Pakistan government to allow them to restart Jihad in Kashmir and establish a democratic government in Kabul instead of Yahya Khel clique. Zahuruddin reached back to Gurvekht in March 1951.[80]

Visit of Mufti-E-A'zam of Palestine

To counter the activities of the Faqir and his followers, Government of Pakistan invited Hazrat Alhaj Sayyid Amin-ul-Hussaini, Grand Mufti of Palestine to visit Pakistan. He arrived at Wana by air from Peshawar on March 22, 1951. He was accorded rousing evasion and was greeted among gun-fires, and volleys of shots from sten guns and rifles, by leading Mahsud and Ahmadzai Wazir Maliks and U'lema, Scouts and Political Officers at the landing ground.

After a while the Grand Mufti was given a welcome address, in a joint mammoth Jirga of Mahsud and Ahmadzai Wazirs, by Shahzada Fazal

Din on behalf of all the tribes of the Agency. Mahsuds then presented to their guest one sten-gun and a sword captured by them in Kashmir Jihad as a souvenir.

While replying to the welcome address and thanking for the presents offered to him, the Mufti-e-Azam said that provided Mussalmans adhere to three tenets of Islam - IMAN, ITTEHAD and JIHAD - no accession of their suppression by enemies of Islam like Kashmir, Morocco and Palestine was possible.

He further remarked that they will find their Arab brethren fighting along with them in Kashmir and that the arms presented by them will be issued in Jihad in Palestine and Morocco. He further expressed that he was doing his best to remove unpleasantness between Pakistan and Afghanistan and that any individual or state maneuvering for disrupting the solidarity of Mussalmans was enemy of Islam.[81]

The government of Pakistan continued her struggle to counter the Faqir's anti-Pakistan motives through religious scholars. A team of Mullahs headed by Qazi Abdul Hanan, Jani Khel Wazir of Bannu and Maulvi Najeebullah of Laswandai (once staunch supporters of the Faqir in Jihad against the British government), including several other prominent Mullahs toured Makin, Badar, Khaisora and Wana plain on July 16, 1951.

They held about a dozen meetings in Wana plain, Spin, Tanai and Shaki and expressed in very strong words that Afghanistan's

propaganda or any anti-Pakistan move was un-Islamic and that anybody who is killed in defending Pakistan's subject or territory, is a Shaheed. They further expressed that it was obligatory on every Muslim to join in Kashmir Jihad. They also condemned the action of the Indian government about the concentration of their troops on Pakistan border and resolved that the Government of Pakistan may allow them to go and defend their country.

In addition the Pir of Wana accompanied with Pir Ghulam Dastagir of Sultan Bahu addressed a huge meeting in the Shaman Khel area on July 21, 1951 and condemned the action of the Indian government for bringing their forces on Pakistan border. They resolved that 50,000 Wazirs and Mahsuds will sacrifice their all to defend their country.[82]

Kashmir Jihad and The Faqir

The Pashtun invasion, especially the invasion of tribesmen of Kashmir in 1947-48 is significant. Their movement into the state was inspired primarily by the stories which reached them. The Dogras of the state army and the Hindu extremist organization, Jang Sang had committed atrocities against the Muslim inhabitants of Kashmir. This made their invasion of Kashmir a very real Jihad in their eyes.

Lashkars from tribal areas continued to flow through D.I.Khan and Bannu. Seeing the tribesmen marching to the help of their victimized brothers in Kashmir the Afghan Powindah from Afghanistan and those temporarily sojourning in the D.I. Khan District were also fired with

enthusiasm for joining the holy war against the Dogra oppressors. Hundreds of them, fully armed passed through D.I. Khan District every day on their way to Kashmir. The Pir of Wana, Shahzada Fazal Din and other prominent spiritual leaders placed themselves at the head of them.[83]

The Faqir whose alleged opposition of Pakistan and favour of India had demoralized his prestige was confined to bed, because of fresh attack of Asthma. He was reported to be indignant over the Wazirs and Mahsud's response to recruitment in Lashkars and the infidelity of his employees.

Meanwhile the Political Agent South Waziristan, saw a fully representative Dre-Mahsud Jirga at Jandola on August 21, 1951, in connection with further recruitment of Lashkars and was assured of the whole-hearted co-operation of the Maliks. One thousand Mahsuds and one hundred and fifty Ahmadzai Wazirs were enlisted in the tribal Lashkars during this period.[84] 2955 Mahsuds had been enrolled for the tribal Lashkar till the end of August 1951.

Pakistan's Resort to Mediation through Ulema

Pakistan government repeatedly tried to settle the issue of the Faqir through some of her trusted U'lema. She tried to arrange discussion between them and the Faqir. It was suggested to arrange periodical visits of U'lema to the Faqir, with a view to convert him to Pakistan side, and to convince him that Pashtunistan was Hindu-Afghan stunt.

It was reported that Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the time of N.W.F.P. referendum sent a deputation of U'lema to the Faqir, who told him that Pakistan was the creation of the British, and was not an Islamic State.

In 1950, the Political Agent North Waziristan sent the Faqir a letter. It was suggested to him that he should meet them at a suitable (other than Gurvekht) place for discussion. This letter was signed by 21 U'lema and 60 Maliks. In his reply in Persian addressed to the U'lema in particular and Maliks in general, he stated that U'lema from Gurvekht had assembled at the shrine of Malak Azhdar on Rabi-ul-Sani 18, 1368 A.H. for friendly discussion and understanding with the government but the latter instead bombed and killed them. Beside all that he was again willing to meet them provided they were armed with a letter of authority from the Governor General, Prime Minister, Governor N.W.F.P. and Punjab. In addition he demanded impartial and disinterested judges sitting to give a verdict on the matter.

In another letter, the U'lema favouring Pakistan told him that the government was not only willing to enforce Shariat but was actually striving towards it and that they were prepared in every way to remove his doubts in this respect. They asked for an assurance that after they had proved to and satisfied him about the question of Shariat, he would have no more demands. To this, the Faqir did not reply.[85]

Later in August 1953, once again the Faqir expressed his willingness to start negotiations with Pakistan government through Assistant Political Officer, North Waziristan. No outcome was seen of these

negotiations.[86] Again in 1958, the late Mr. Iskandar Mirza who was then the President of Pakistan had almost reached rapprochement and the Faqir was about to hit it off with Pakistan Government on what is said to be his "political differences" with it when Ayub Khan's martial law abruptly put an end to these efforts and, then nobody picked up the thread till the Faqir breathed his last on April 16, 1960.[87]

Last Days of The Faqir

It was reported in October 1958 that the Faqir who was the pivot of the so called Pashtunistan movement had turned absolutely indifferent, if not openly hostile, to Afghanistan, the reason being that the Afghans realized the futility of their monetary aid to him and stopped paying the tribes through him. He had discarded the so called Pashtunistan flag and had hoisted instead his own flag which was called "Faqir Flag".

Maulvi Amir Saeed alias Jangi Mullah and Maulvi Akbar Zaman Bannuchi, the close associates of the Faqir distributed in the Hamzoni Daur area the copies of a newspaper, The Azad Pukhtun published at Gurvekht. The paper inter alia published the details of the Faqir's tour to Waziristan. A large number of weapons and cash were collected for the Faqir's exchequer in Waziristan during this tour. Although the Faqir was reported silent about Pakistan, he never turned pro-Pakistan. After his tour he returned to Gurvekht.[88]

Today, the name of Faqir of Ippi is hardly remembered outside Waziristan and among the Europeans only by a handful surviving

administrators and soldiers who served on the Frontier. The Faqir had of course a number of distinguished precursors in the region like the Hadda Mullah, a Mohmand leader in 1890s, or the Powindah Mullah. Even the foremost authority on the region, Sir Olaf Caroe, whose official correspondence in those days, of course, full of the Faqir's name, does not mention him in his post war historical study on the Pashtuns.

When the Faqir died on April 16, 1960, the Times of April 20, 1960 described him as[89]

> *"a doughty and honourable opponent ... a man of principle and saintliness ... a redoubtable organizer of tribal warfare..."*

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Conclusion

Mirzali Khan alias Faqir of Ippi's life has always been shrouded in mystery. He was considered to be a saint until March 1936, when the so-called `Islam Bibi' case came the turning point in the Faqir's career. The case aroused considerable local excitement. The British retaliated by sending troops in the Khaisora Valley. They tried to suppress the agitation by applying traditional ways of suppression. He succeeded in inducing a semblance of tribal unity, thus well preparing the ground for his bold challenge which was soon to follow. He continued to ride on the wake of the `Islam Bibi' case and gradually added, measure by measure, a long catalogue of local Muslim grievances under the slogan `Islam in Danger'. Thus, after eleven years of relative peace in Waziristan, a major rebellion began to flare up.

For all intents and purposes, British and Indian troops in Waziristan were to remain on active service continuously for the next twelve months. The Faqir had successfully avoided all traps and remained constantly on the move over the rugged but familiar terrain, in which a modern army with its cumbersome equipment and long supply lines proved all too slow and inefficient. The elusive Faqir earned himself the nickname `The Scarlet Pimpernel of Waziristan'.

India's Northern Command despite substantial numbers of troops at their disposal, must have felt frustrated by their inability to design any

coherent pattern of operation against the Faqir. The 1937 campaign was soon bogged down and fragmented into numerous separate operations none of which could dislodge the Faqir.

He was the most anachronistic one. He utterly disregarded the logic of international situation and unwittingly started a campaign when he had the least chance of attracting the international support against the British. As a guerilla leader he was uncompromising, unyielding, obstinate and unscrupulous in the choice of combat methods against his opponents. These included traditional methods of tribal warfare such as ambush, kidnapping and sniping. His hatred of the British bore no relation to raison d'état, though he was usually supported with money and military hardware by the Afghan authorities, especially so after the partition, when he became the symbol of independent Pashtunistan.

At one point nearly 40,000 British and Indian troops were reported to be in the field trying to capture him, while he remained elusive as ever, always succeeding in evading the tight net put around him. And yet, his force of armed tribesmen probably never exceeded one thousand men, armed with rifles and a few machine-guns, and occasionally one or two pieces of antiquated cannon, he was always short of ammunition, had no radio communications, and relied for all his intelligence on the traditional network of informants and messengers.

Following the established practices of the Mughal and Afghan governments, the British first satisfied themselves by paying allowances in cash to the tribal Maliks, which for instance for the year 1940 amounted to nearly one million Rupees for the tribal territory. Theoretically, these were paid for services of Khassadari and contracts etc. As a result of their dealings with the authorities on both sides of the Indo-Afghan border, the Wazirs and other Pashtun tribes had, rightly or wrongly, come to the conclusion that the shortest cut to lucrative allowances was not through loyal service, but by occasional demonstration of their nuisance value. In particular the Wazirs, in the barren and inaccessible country on the Durand Line, were in an admirable position to play its game.

Throughout 1937 the tribal raids into the administered territory continued, seemingly undeterred by military action. The Faqir continued to command his Lashkar from remote areas like Arsal Kot, Pasal Kot and Gul Zamir Kot etc. Here he was visited by many tribesmen, mostly those who were neither receiving British allowances nor profiting from the Khassadari system and had therefore little to lose. The Faqir also sent letters to all quarters, including the Mohmands, Afridis, and the Kurram Wazirs, as well as to tribes in Afghanistan proper, urging all to join in Jihad against the British. In September 1937, he wrote a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, then the president of the Indian National Congress, addressing him as `the leader of the liberty loving people and the distinguished Head of the Indian Nation.

However, despite all the Faqir's extraordinary appeal to Muslim tribesmen, they failed in their main purpose due to the inability of the tribes to combine their considerable fighting power in any common cause under a unified command, even though the Faqir's Lashkars achieved quite a few stunning successes by blocking British line of communication. In retaliation, the British set out to take Arsal Kot but, of course, found the nest empty. The Faqir had fled further south in an attempt to seek refuge among the Bhittanis. This, however, the British prevented by extensive air bombing and by sending in troops. But the ubiquitous Faqir yet again managed to elude them. After failing to bribe the Faqir by offering him land outside Waziristan to help him to settle peacefully elsewhere, the British attempted to get the Afghan government to assist in the capture of the Faqir. But these attempts failed as well. Meanwhile, the Faqir moved westward. He was to hide for the rest of his life among the Madda Khel Wazirs. They continued to shelter him despite British reprisals. He occupied inaccessible caves in the mountain cliff at Gurvekht, barely a mile from the Afghan territory into which he could easily slip should the British ever, attempt to dislodge him from his eagle's nest.

There was another unusual incident which occurred in 1938 on the Frontier, known as the Shami Pir affair, and in which the Axis powers were believed to be implicated. Towards the end of January 1938 he entered N.W.F.P. and in March went further to South Waziristan. He gained large followers and was deeply revered as saintly person, the Shami Pir as his counterpart the Faqir of Ippi in the northern half of Waziristan.

Almost immediately upon his arrival on the Frontier, the Afghan government became deeply suspicious of his activities. On June 13, 1938 the Pir summoned wishes a Jirga of some 3000 tribesmen. He openly denounced the ruling Afghan king Zahir Shah as a usurper and acclaimed Amanullah as the lawful king of Afghanistan. This announcement unleashed a wave of fanatical enthusiasm which ran through South Waziristan with such electrifying effect that the tribesmen, predominately Mahsuds, flocked in to join the Pir who on June 23, 1938 set out on his march to Kabul. For four days the downfall of the Kabul government seemed very possible.

The Pir's appeal, however, did not reach wider Amanist circles inside Afghanistan and his supporters failed to establish contact with the Ghilzai insurrection right across the Durand Line. It was the straight - forward air bombing by the RAF on the Pir's Lashkars before they could reach the Afghan border and a handsome bribe of £ 25000 offered to the Shami Pir that the Government of India were able to secure the Pir's surrender and removal, and the breakup of Lashkars already on their way to Kabul.

During the World War II, the Faqir, though quick to explore unscrupulously any opportunity which could guarantee him Axis supplies of money and arms, proved extremely furtive whenever, Axis agents tried to establish a direct communication with him via their diplomatic mission in Kabul. He did not want to be harnessed into any anti-British scheme which would not be of his own doing.

Indian intelligence, suspecting that links between the Axis and the Faqir had existed for some time, first received concrete evidence in June 1941, after the arrest of the interpreter to the Italian Legation in Kabul while he was visiting his relatives in Baluchistan. According to his statement, several Italians had visited the Faqir between 1939 and 1941 with supplies of money and weapons, including machine-guns and a wireless transmitter and receiving set. He also supplied the British with the names of Afghan officials and army officers collaborating with the Italians and with the Faqir, which were then used by the British and Indian governments to bring more pressure to bear upon the Kabul authorities.

The Germans too wanted to establish their own links with the Faqir. They sent their two specially trained agents, accompanied by a dozen tribesmen carrying ammunition and money. They near reached their target, failing into a trap set up by the Afghan authorities in the Logar Valley just south of Kabul. In the ensuing exchange of fire with an Afghan patrol waiting in ambush for them, one agent was killed and the other wounded, the tribesmen arrested and everything confiscated.

In spite of the fact that the Logar incident amply demonstrated that German intelligence was incapable of mounting even a small scale operation in Afghanistan, Axis activities with the Faqir through intermediaries went on for some time. The funds already brought to Kabul during 1941 enabled the German Legation in Kabul not only to send regular payments to the Faqir but also to finance their schemes

in India until the end of the war whereas their poor Italian partners could afford nothing of this sort. However, despite receiving Axis money, the Faqir still failed to launch a large scale operation against the British which he had been promising for some time.

In the following spring, symptoms of growing tribal unrest became clearly discernible in Waziristan as the Faqir persisted in his attempts to fine Wazirs engaged by the British in defence works and threatened local contractors with religious sanctions. In May 1942, the Faqir besieged the fortified outpost at Datta Khel. The British failed to reach Datta Khel until August 1942.

Meanwhile, in August 1942, a major internal upheaval flared up in India. The Congress-inspired rebellion was not only the most important rising to occur within the entire British Empire, but within the entire United Nations coalition during the war. During these days British pressure on the Afghan government had been almost ceased because of their pre-occupation in quelling the rebellion in India. It gave ex-king Amanullah one more chance. Fortunately for the British, the Axis had no clear concept of how to accommodate under one roof its support for Amanullah's restoration with that for the Frontier tribes and Faqir of Ippi.

After the outbreak of the Congress rebellion, Amanullah made it known to the Italians that he was now ready to broadcast and use his name in the Axis press to encourage his supporters in Afghanistan, as well as fellow Muslims in India, to rise in revolt against the British. He

was afraid that the British, after eliminating the Congress as negotiating partners, might go ahead with the disastrous scheme of Pakistan. But the Italians declined his offer as they were now convinced that the moment was not propitious enough to antagonize the existing Afghan government in favour of Amanullah.

To sum up, the Axis plans to use Faqir of Ippi were a sheer waste of time and money. The most propitious time to start against the British on the Frontier would have been in the autumn of 1940. But the Germans in Kabul proved themselves incompetent. During 1944 the Frontier remained unusually quiet, the peace being occasionally disrupted by the customary raiding and by the British retaliation in the form of air bombing. Although German intrigues with the Faqir continued, they were entirely harmless.

The end of the war did not stop the Faqir from resuming his activities against the British who were, in any case, ready to quit India soon. Thus the year 1946 again saw the British in action in Waziristan and the Faqir making yet another attempt to unite the Mahsuds and Wazirs. After partition the Faqir turned into the most vehement tribal opponent to Pakistan.

The Faqir's role between 1947 and 1960 is highly controversial, open to debate, with arguments running against it as well as its favour. Only few can equal with the Faqir's clean, illustrious political career in freedom struggle in the pre-dominance era of Indo-Pak sub-continent. It is really tragic to note such a redoubtable figure falling foul of

various administrations in Pakistan and then dying rather unsung, unceremoniously in the morass of uncertainty at place which he had selected for fear of British animosity against him, but could not leave it even after the dawn of independence and expulsion of the British, which he had so ardently desired.

Taken him as a case study we can analyze the Faqir phenomenon on the following lines:

I. The Faqir was simply a Muslim Mujahid whose purpose of life was to oppose any movement which was not Islamic, and in that direction he did not mind to get assistance and whatever organization or government it came from.

II. During the struggle for Pakistan in the Frontier Province, especially in 1945-47, the fore-front of the Frontier Muslim League was occupied by certain personalities whose background and reputation was definitely pro-British. Hence for all sensible purposes it seemed to many Frontier anti-British freedom fighters that the propagation of the idea of Pakistan, even genuine per see, was in the hands of persons whose character and performance was all but Islamic.

III. The above `assumption' after the creation of Pakistan tuned into a more forceful conviction when the Shariat aspirants like Pir Zakori, Pir Manki and others in N.W.F.P. observed that Pakistan did not bring about the Role of Islam in which propaganda the Khan and Arbabs had turned many Pashtun nationalist Muslims of the province as `Hindus' and Kafirs.

IV. Since these U'lema could not appreciate the limitations and

difficulties of the nascent State of Pakistan in turning the British administrative and judicial machinery into an ideal Islamic model, it was but natural that they began looking at the struggle and the sacrifices for Pakistan, even when they abstained aloof, as a mere `game' and "drama" which the Nawab and the Arabs had played upon the Frontier simpleton. In that simplistic background of their observation and understanding the bringing back of Sir George Cunningham to the Frontier Governorship by the Quaid-e-A'zam was resented in all possible modes of propaganda wherein Pakistan was identified with every sort of wrong ideas. It is, therefore, no wonder that even some of the most ardent U'lema in the Frontier Muslim League were disillusioned. For them the post-partition hectic and mean manoeuvres of certain top-notch League leaders were too much.

V. This attitude of ignoring the most internal fault in the League leadership led to another chronic demeanour on the part of the Governmental agencies. As they were never in a position to eradicate the internal mischievous factor, they laid the whole blame at the door of the neighbour governments whose involvement and active support to the disruptionist elements cannot be over-looked.

VI. For the Government of Pakistan, the Faqir phenomenon was no more than a `Law and Order' problem, and instead of taking it in its proper perspectives, was left to the power and play of a political Agent with whom there are always two traditional cards; bribe and boot, which always fail in the face of an ideological hostility. Instead of dealing with the Faqir in an honourable way,

the government used its local Maliks to nullify him. The Faqir knew these Maliks very well in their true positions. Hence seeking a short statured solution for a lasting and serious situation was another political blunder committed by the government in regard to Faqir of Ippi.

VII. The Faqir was a man of flesh and blood, with his strong and weak points. He was faced with choices not only of political but also of moral significance. For him, the question was not only how he and his movement could thrive politically but also how his ideals could best be furthered. When his political surroundings changed, he had to decide how far he could adapt himself politically without compromising his essential creed. This was, in the final analysis, the factor which determined his political behaviour.

On the other hand if we analyze Islamic Movements around the world, we would find that the leadership loses their sense of direction when the destiny is near to meet. The same was the case of the Faqir. His inner cabinet wanted the Faqir to put his entire weight behind Afghanistan's plan to carry out subversions inside Pakistan. The Faqir would tell them that it looked immoral and treacherous to kill Muslims in Pakistan as these were the people on whose support, monetary as well as material; his Langar had thrived in the past. Very soon, his erstwhile friends like Maulvi Abdul Hanan, Laswandai Mullah, Mehr Dil Khattak and Gul Nawaz etc, defected him one by one for they could not reconcile with his stand against Pakistan.

It beats one's mind as to why did Faqir of Ippi plump for Pashtunistan? He had a clear choice, a better alternative before him. What precluded him from coming down from his hide-out at Gurvekht and under-taking consolidation of newly-born country and demanding introduction of Arabic, language of the Holy Quran and the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in Pakistan.

North Waziristan's society like the other social set-ups of this country is not free from Customs/rites which run counter to Islam, through and through. He never raised his tiny finger even to ask his huge following amongst the tribesmen not to practice un-Islamic customs, though strangely enough he harped on the tune of introduction of Islamic Shariat in Pakistan as his one pre-condition for coming down from Gurvekht. Did he not shipwreck pan-Islamism by raising the bogey of Pashtunistan? Faqir of Ippi remained to the end a prisoner of his narrow prejudices, unable to look beyond Gurvekht.

His work after partition is most disheartening to note for he did not deem it necessary to bring his society in consonance with true Islamic pattern and instead played second fiddle to the elements which valued parochialism more than religion.

APPENDIX - A

Translation of a petition dated 6th April, 1895 presented by the Daurs and the Darwesh Khel Maliks to H.A. Anderson Esquire, CS. Political Officer, Tochi Valley.

"We the Daurs of the Upper and Lower Daur and Darwesh Khel Wazirs of the Tochi Valley and the Kazha beg to that as the British Government has come into our country, we, in consequence of our domestic feuds and the Mahsud raids, pray that the Government should place us under its beneficent shadow, and we petition that as has been done in the other hilly countries newly brought under the subjection of the British Government, we should also be granted, according to our Pashtu, customs, services, gratuities, allowances, Malikships, Mu'afis to Sayads, Fakirs, and Pirs, and the Government should respect our rights over Hindus and the revenue realized in villages, mosques and shrines. We ask that our status and rules admittedly reverenced and obeyed should not be interfered with. And for cases should be decided according to the Muhammadan Law and Jirga, but the cases which the parties do not agree to settle according to the awards of Jirga and such cases as cannot be decided according to the Muhammadan law or by Jirga, these should be decided by the British Government according to the rules it deems proper. We are a poor people and should be exempted from court-fees, and the Government should not realize any revenue from us, but if the Government desires to realize revenue from us, it should once be assessed and be changed and increased from time to time. The

jungles should remain in our possession, and no revenue should be realized on account of them. And the iron mines in our country should also remain in our possession, but if the Government desires to occupy the mines, it should appoint suitable allowances for our maintenance, as we are very poor. And the jail for the prisoners of our country should be established in the Tochi Valley; if not, then within the Derajat Limits, and when the Tochi route will be opened, the Powindah caravans will use the route and cause injury to our trees and grass; therefore when the route is opened badraga rights and grazing fees should be realized from the Powindah and granted to us."

Source *:(S. Mazhar Ali Shah, (The Summing up, (Peshawar; T.R.C., 1981), pp.41-42.)*

APPENDIX - B

Translation of a petition dated 31st October, 1895, presented by the Daurs Jirga to the Political Officer, Tochi Valley, at Miranshah.

"We the Maliks of Upper and Lower Daur have assembled here and are willing to pay one-tenth share of produce of our land as revenue to the British Government. As regards the revenue to be paid to the Government, we beg to state that we are ignorant of the exact area of land in Daur, as we have never paid revenue to any ancient King, nor do we recollect that it has ever been paid. However, we willingly offer to pay annual revenue of Rs.6, 000/- to the Government. In addition to this, we willingly agree to contribute Rs.2, 000/- for general advantage in Daur, which should be distributed through the Government among the following classes:

1. Syads (Sayyids).
2. Maulvis who from ancient times decide our cases and are maintained by us.
3. Fakirs, the shrines of whose ancestors are reverenced by us.
4. Hindu Brahmans who permanently reside in Daur and have hitherto enjoyed mu'afi.
5. Certain other respectable Maliks who have not been granted Maliki allowances, but who will assist us in the collection of the revenue.

We request that this rate of revenue may be continued for three years after which when our lands are measured, the Government may kindly address a new revenue at one tenth of the gross produce in Daur. The revenue may be recovered in kind, and no increase may be made in this rate in future.

As the Dangar Khels and c., Syads (Sayyids) and Maulvis who decide our cases and deliver sentences according to Muhammadan Law

have always enjoyed Mu'afi, may be exempted forever from paying revenue to the Government.

Signatures and seals of 89 persons."

***Source**: File No.31/33 F.R.P; subject: Agreement with the Daurs, p.7. T.R.C., Peshawar.*

APPENDIX - C

The Durand Line Agreement
Signed in Kabul by Amir Abdur Rahman
On
12 November, 1893

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:-

1. The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.

2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal trace as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows:-

> *From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost knowingly as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill known as the Main Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half-a-mile of the road.*

6. The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His

Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by, the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

The line has demarcated on the ground, and boundary pillars were erected. These have now disappeared. The first omission, on the Chitral border, was rectified during World War II.

The second relates to the sector from Nawa Sar (on the dividing range between Kunar and Bajaur) and the Sikaram Peak (at the western end of the Sufed Koh overhanging the Paiwar Kotal). This sector pass through (and divides) Mohmand Country, and includes the Khyber, and Afridi boundaries toward Afghanistan. A small piece of this at the western exit of the Khyber Pass was demarcated in 1919 after the Third Afghan War. The rest of the sector has never been demarcated on the ground. This is not of great importance along the great range of the Sufed Koh, 10,000 to 16,000 feet high and the admitted and obvious boundary between the Afridis and Afghanistan. But it has led to difficulties north of the Kabul River in Mohmand Country, which it bisects.

In an endeavour to resolve these difficulties the Government of India offered the Amir an alternative boundary through Mohmand Country further to the east, known as 'Presumptive line.' This would have left to the Bohai Dag Valley to Afghanistan. The offer was not taken up.)

***Source**: C.H. Philips, H.L.Singh and Dr. B.N. Panday, The Evolution of India and Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.491-94. See also Caroe, The Pathan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.363-64.*

APPENDIX - D

Proclamation to the tribes of Waziristan.

Since I assumed charge as Governor of the North-West Frontier Province a week ago, I have learnt with great astonishment that some people on the Frontier are saying that Islam is in danger from the Government. Those who know the true intention of the Government, who know the friendly feelings of the British officers towards the Frontier tribes and all other Muslims, and the perfect freedom which everyone enjoys in matters of religion, know that such a thing is impossible.

Some of this talk has started as a result of a recent case at Bannu. About a year ago a Hindu girl named Ram Kaur, aged 15 years, was taken away from her mother's home in Bannu by a Muhammadan youth. At the mother's request the police were called in and the youth and the girl were arrested. The case came before the courts and was tried under the laws of British India, laws which are acknowledged without question by crores of Muslims. By the order of the Judicial Commissioner, who is the highest judicial authority in the Police, the girl was handed back to her Hindu mother.

Can this be called interference in religion? If a Muhammadan girl had in similar circumstances been abducted by a Hindu, she would in exactly the same way would have been handed back to her Muhammadan mother. British law in India is applied equally to high and low, irrespective of religion. If you think quietly over this matter you will, I am certain, see that this case gave no justification whatever for the cry 'Islam in danger.'

I wish now to explain the origin of the recent events in the Khaisora valley of Waziristan. While the case I have just mentioned as under the consideration of the authorities in Bannu, the Faqir of Ipi collected a large Lashkar on the borders of Bannu District, under the mistaken idea that Islam was in danger. His intention was by this means to threaten the Government, but the Government clearly cannot allow the administration of justice to be influenced by a display of force of

this kind, nor allow the peace of settled districts to be disturbed. They therefore took measures to make the Lashkar return homes. This was done by putting a blockade on the Daurs and by pulling down the house of a few of the ring leaders. After a few days the Lashkar returned peacefully to their homes. Subsequently, however, the)Faqir of Ippi again attempted to excite the tribesmen, misleading them once more by the mistaken plea that Islam was in danger. He encouraged some of the tribesmen to show hostility towards the Government; and, when in October 1936 the Government troops visited the Khaisora valley with peaceful intentions and with no purpose of offensive action but in pursuance of a specific agreement with the Tori Khel, opinion this valley to troops, they were attacked by a Lashkar consisting mainly of bad characters form various tribal sections under the instigation of the Faqir. Government were, therefore, forced against their will to demand reparation from the tribesmen.

Since then anti-Government activities have continued; murders and kidnapping have taken place, telephone wires have been cut. As a result of this the Government have had to impose punishment on the tribes concerned.

What is the recent cause of all this trouble? Apparently it is the misguided notion that the Government do not wish well to Islam. I do not know whether the Faqir really believes that in spreading such false idea he is speaking the truth. I can hardly believe that this is so, for no intelligent person could have such an idea. The good of the tribe is also the good of Islam, and anyone who spreads false ideas of this kind is doing nothing save to bring trouble upon the tribes, and endanger the friendship and generous treatment which the tribes have enjoyed at the hands of the Government.

I have never desired and never will desire anything but the good of the tribes of the North West Frontier Province; I also know that it is only useless folly on the part of the tribes to oppose Government, and it causes me regret when force has to be used. But peace and order must be maintained; the lives of the Government servants must be protected; all members of the public must be safe from molestation. It is the Government's first duty to ensure this, and I intend to see that whatever action is necessary to attain this shall be carried out. I

appeal to all who read this message and who have the real welfare of the tribes at heart to assist me in restoring Waziristan to its former state of peace and progress.

Sd/- G.Cunningham
Governor
North-West Frontier Province.

Peshawar
The 9th March, 1937.

***Source**: File No. 260 S.T.B.I. T.R.C. Peshawar.*

APPENDIX - E

Letter No.1 (May 6, 1948):

Respected Sir, Pandit Jawaherlal, King of India.

I beg to state that Awal Hussain returned to me very happy from you, I am very grateful for your personal talk with him.

Since long Pakistan (that is, the British) is harassing Kashmir. May God give you and me power so that we could liberate the people of Kashmir from this calamity. It is hoped that Pakistan has now become weak and, by the grace of God, cannot do anything.

The third thing is that as soon as your help reaches me, I will compel all people of Tribal areas at once to fight, because since long Pakistan (that is, the British) has starved and made naked the people of the Frontier. When they get something in their country, they will be ready to help me on small salaries. You should press your attack from Hindustan.

Now Awal Hussain returns to you, because the king of Afghanistan has placed a strict guard on all Ambassadors. It is difficult for me to approach your ambassador. Therefore, it would be better that he (Awal Hussain) should fly to your Ambassador in Kabul with your authority. Then whatever is done, will be done satisfactorily. Awal Hussain will explain to you personally the remaining facts. Greeting.

Letter No.2 (May 6, 1948)

(This letter was to be handed over to an official whom Awal Hussain contacted during his previous visit to Delhi.)

"To respected General Sahib. I beg to state that Awal Hussain spoke very high of you. I am very pleased with you and hope that in future you will explain the situation of my country to Pandit Jawaherlal, so that no harm is caused to our work. With regards. This is an opportune time. We should not be inactive.

(Source: IOR L/P&S/12/3241.)

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